商业银行表外业务信用风险管理研究

对商业银行表内业务信用风险的管理,目前国际上有许多成熟的成果。但最近,商业银行表外业务占据了越来越重要的地位,其风险管理也引起了关注。本文论述了表外业务具有高杠杆性等特点,当今国外表外业务迅猛发展势头及我国的表外业务现状,说明加强对表外业务信用风险管理的必要性。文章引介了两种度量表外业务信用风险度量的方法:BIS模型和信用风险度量术,最后对这两种方法进行了实例分析。     

Indirect Convertibility,Equity‐Based Banking and Financial Stability

Banking reform proposals put forward in the wake of the recent financial crisis maintain that equity‐based banking would be stable and would prevent bank runs. This article argues that complementing this form of banking with an indirect convertibility monetary standard and thereby dispensing with base money would enhance financial stability further. Banks would not hold a distinctive asset (base money) that would be called upon by customers at short notice, thereby removing the possibility of bank runs. No discrepancy in value between the two sides of a bank's balance sheet would arise as its assets (securitised loans) would be marked to market. Unlike other recent contributions, the intermediation model outlined here is not ‘limited purpose’ in nature as banks would not be restricted in the form of lending activity they can pursue. Common sources of banking and financial instability – liquidity risk, solvency risk, moral hazard – would be absent.     

Financial stability indicators and public debt developments

This paper investigates the inter-linkages between financial stability and fiscal policy. It analyzes the effect of selected financial stability indicators on the probability of future debt deterioration, controlling for several macroeconomic variables. We find significant evidence that a fragile banking system can put at risk public finances. Weak bank profitability, low asset quality and a weak capital base increase the fragility of the banking system, thus, raising the probability of future fiscal troubles.     

Bank valuation in new EU member countries

This paper studies the role of institutional reforms in affecting bank valuation in new European Union (EU) member countries. It takes advantage of the dynamic nature of institutional reforms in transition economies and explores the causal effects of those reforms on banks’ Tobin's Q over the period of 1997–2008. Using a difference-in-difference approach, the paper shows that Tobin's Q increases substantially after these countries reform their legal institutions and liberalize banking. However, it decreases after stock market reforms. After further examination of the interactive relationships between different reforms and bank valuation, it is observed that when the banking reform is well implemented, legal reform can have a stronger impact on banks’ Tobin's Q. On the other hand, banking reform and security market reform has a substitutive relationship. The analysis also suggests that foreign ownership, market power, and asset diversification significantly affect Tobin's Q. These results are robust even after simultaneously controlling for equity risk.     

Bank herding and systemic risk

Bank herding behavior is often hypothesized to increase systemic risk, but the actual effect is unclear ex-ante from the theory and unknown ex-post from the data. We expand the literature on this topic in several dimensions – posing alternative hypotheses regarding the effects of herding in asset, liability, and off-balance sheet portfolios; developing a novel set of bank-specific, time-varying measures of herding in these portfolios; and empirically testing the relations between bank herding for all three portfolios and bank systemic risk contributions. We find nuanced empirical results that differ by portfolio, bank size class, and periods before versus after TARP.     

Accounting enlightenment in the age of reason

We scrutinize the role financial reporting for fair values, asset securitizations, derivatives and loan loss provisioning played in the Financial Crisis. Because banks were at the center of the Financial Crisis, we focus our discussion and analysis on the effects of financial reporting by banks. We conclude fair value accounting played little or no role in the Financial Crisis. However, transparency of information associated with asset securitizations and derivatives likely was insufficient for investors to assess properly the values and riskiness of bank assets and liabilities. Although the FASB and IASB have taken laudable steps to improve disclosures relating to asset securitizations, in our view, the approach for accounting for securitizations in the IASB's Exposure Draft that would require banks to recognize whatever assets and liabilities they have after the securitization is executed better reflects the underlying economics of the securitization transaction. Regarding derivatives, we recommend disclosure of more disaggregated information, disclosure of the sensitivity of derivatives' fair values to changes in market risk variables, and implementing a risk-equivalence approach to enable investors to understand better the leverage inherent in derivatives. We also conclude that because the objectives of bank regulation and financial reporting differ, changes in financial reporting needed to improve transparency of information provided to the capital markets likely will not be identical to changes in bank regulations needed to strengthen the stability of the banking sector. We discuss how loan loss provisioning may have contributed to the Financial Crisis through its effects on procyclicality and on the effectiveness of market discipline. Accounting standard setters and bank regulators should find some common ground. However, it is the responsibility of bank regulators, not accounting standard setters, to ensure the stability of the financial system.     

Did covenants distort risk signals from bank subordinated debt yields before the financial crisis?

Restrictive covenants on bank debt require a bank to take or refrain from specific actions that affect the riskiness of that debt. Although covenants all but disappeared in the 1990s, they re-emerged after 2004 with an increase in bank risk leading up to the financial crisis. Subordinated debt yields potentially enable better risk monitoring by supervisors, but covenants can shift risk from bondholders to stockholders without reducing overall bank risk. This can distort the risk signal used by market participants to discipline excessive risk taking. Because covenants are endogenous and increase during periods of bank stress, the yield signal is dampened the most precisely when regulators most need accurate risk monitoring.     

Information asymmetry,capital adequacy,and market reaction to loan loss provision announcements in the banking industry

This study finds significantly negative abnormal returns accompanying press announcements of loan loss provisioning in the banking industry. The negative reactions are shown to arise from both an informational asymmetry regarding asset value and the costs associated with capital adequacy regulation. It is further shown that the market reaction depends upon the type of asset being provisioned. Announcements regarding the provisioning of foreign debt are accompanied by positive market reactions, while announcements of the provisioning of real estate loans and other types of debt are accompanied by negative market reactions.     

Value-Driving Activities in Euro-Zone Banks

We develop and test accounting-based valuation models for commercial banks. We extend Begley et al.'s framework (2006) and propose a valuation model where goodwill is generated by virtually all commercial and investment banking activities. Key features of our model are: the development of a relation between future cash flows from fee income and the bank value that depends on lending, borrowing and off-balance sheet business; and the inclusion of proprietary investment and trading as value-driving activities. Empirical tests on a sample of Euro-zone banks from 1998 to 2006 provide the following evidence. Unrealised expected cash flows from fee income are the most important source of unrecorded goodwill. This is consistent with the increasing importance of revenue from the sale of financial services to banks' income. The contribution of fee income to goodwill is higher for banks with large deposits and new loans. Equity securities are a source of unrecorded goodwill, but the introduction of fair value accounting, with the adoption of the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), reduces their valuation role. Yet equity securities remain positively associated with unrecorded goodwill after IFRS adoption, suggesting that the fair value standards do not fully capture market expectations about future cash flows of investment assets.     

Federal Home Loan Bank advances and bank risk

The Federal Home Loan Bank system (FHLB) has evolved into a major source of liquidity for the banking system with the demonstrated ability to borrow over a trillion dollars in world financial markets based on an implied U. S. Treasury guarantee. The FHLB loans the borrowed funds to commercial banks at reduced rates that are not adjusted for the risk of an individual bank. Moral hazard could cause member banks using FHLB loans to increase financial leverage and exposure to high risk assets. Conversely, the FHLB offers banks additional liquidity and specialized debt instruments that help them manage interest rate risk. We use dynamic panel generalized method of moments estimation to test the relation between FHLB advances and bank risk. We find that if banks have relatively normal default probabilities, advances are not associated with increased bank risk but, instead, advances are related to decreased interest rate risk. However, when bank default probabilities are high, our evidence suggests advances and higher bank risk are related.     

浅谈我国金融风险成因分析及会计防范措施

银行经营活动的运作过程,与会计工作十分密切,几乎每一笔业务都需要银行会计的核算与操作,防范金融风险的前提是防范银行会计风险。我国金融风险的成因有:商业银行的资产结构不合理,资产的盈利性及流动性差;金融机构采取粗放式经营方式,盲目扩张;金融机构内部管理松弛,运作不规范,约束机制不健全;银行自身风险意识差;中央银行的监管侧重于计划型和行政性、不适应市场经济。     

我国商业银行表外业务发展面临的风险问题探究

随着我国资本市场的逐渐成熟,我国商业银行表外业务也蓬勃发展,呈现一片良好势头,但是,由于表外业务无法体现在银行的财务报表中,缺乏足够的信息透明度,因此表外业务成为了部分银行一定程度上规避监管的一种手段,这使得银行的管理层和监管机构都承担着较大的风险。文中主要通过分析当前一些表外业务在快速迅猛地发展过程中暴露出的问题,又结合与当前的会计准则进行研究,得出银行以及相关信息使用者和投资者应该注意的主要风险问题,并提出相应的一些风险应对措施,希望能给我国商业银行发展表外业务提供理论建议。     

Sovereignty, Separation and Risk Premiums

This study investigates the risk premia of Canadian debt issuers in the U.S. capital markets under conditions of sovereignty stress. In particular, the impact of separatist activity is considered. The incidence of separation news around the sale of debt issues is associated with a specific increase in the proceeds yield or cost to the issuer, but not the market yield. Debt issues by Quebec parties within the separation news event window had an added cost. The added cost is estimated at more than 0.56% to the issuer or about $1.30 million per average $230.77 million issue. These costs are additional fees that are paid to the investment banking syndicate, but these do not increase the yield to the investors. Brown, Durbin and Evans (BDE) recursive residuals tests support the hypothesis of structural changes over time in the pricing process. Debt issues from other countries facing political risk may be priced in a similar manner.     

Deposit insurance and banking system risk: Some empirical evidence

This paper examines the effect of federal deposit insurance on the riskiness of the commercial banking system. It is generally acknowledged that a system affixed rate deposit insurance creates incentives for banks to increase their risk-taking activities. Yet very little empirical evidence exists confirming or refuting this supposition. The coefficient of variation of bank profits and the standard deviation of profits are used as measures of bank risk. How these measures of bank risk are affected by deposit insurance coverage, and other variables thought to affect bank risk, is examined. Deposit insurance is found to have a statistically significant positive effect on bank risk. This result provides empirical support for the FDIC Improvement Act requirement of risk related deposit insurance premiums starting January 1994.     

Systemic financial risk indicators and securitised assets: an agent-based framework

The paper presents an agent-based model of a credit economy which includes a securitisation process and a bailout mechanism for bank bankruptcies. Within this framework, banks are able to sell mortgages to a financial vehicle corporation, which finances its activity by creating mortgage-backed securities and selling them to a mutual fund. In turn, the mutual fund collects liquidity by selling shares to households and remunerates them with a monthly interest. The impact of this mechanism is analysed by means of computational experiments for different levels of banks’ securitisation propensity. Furthermore, we study a set of systemic risk indicators which have the aim of assessing the imbalances in the financial system. Two of them are the mortgage-to-GDP ratio and the capital adequacy ratio, which are constructed to detect only the on-balance sheet changes in banks’ credit exposure. We consider two additional indicators, similar to the previous ones with the only difference that they are also able to account for the off-balance sheet items. Moreover, we adopt an indicator, the so-called “virtuous–unvirtuous cycle” indicator, which, besides off-balance assets, targets also the GDP. The results show that higher securitisation propensity weakens the financial stability of banks with relevant effects on different sectors of the economy. Most importantly, the analysis of systemic risk reveals the important issue of designing suitable systemic risk indicators for predicting incoming financial crises, finding that an essential feature of these indicators should be to integrate banks’ off-balance sheet assets.

     

BANK CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS, BUSINESS CYCLE FLUCTUATIONS AND THE BASEL ACCORDS: A SYNTHESIS

Abstract.  In order to survey the mechanisms through which the introduction of Basel II bank capital requirements is likely to accentuate the procyclical tendencies of banking, this paper brings together the theoretical literature on the bank capital channel of propagation of exogenous shocks and the literature on the regulatory framework of capital requirements under the Basel Accords. We conclude that the theoretical models that revisit the bank capital channel under the new accord generally support the Basel II procyclicality hypothesis and that the magnitude of the procyclical effects essentially depends on (i) the composition of banks' asset portfolios, (ii) the approach adopted by banks to compute their minimum capital requirements, (iii) the nature of the rating system used by banks, (iv) the view adopted concerning how credit risk evolves through time, (v) the capital buffers over the regulatory minimum held by the banking institutions, (vi) the improvements in credit risk management and (vii) the supervisor and market intervention under Basel II. The recent events and instability in financial markets all over the world have led the procyclicality issue to enter the agendas of several political international  fora  and some measures to mitigate procyclicality are being put forward. The bank capital channel literature should now play an important role in evaluating their effectiveness.     

Do stock markets discipline US Bank Holding Companies: Just monitoring,or also influencing?

This paper presents evidence that bank managers adjust key strategic variables following a risk and/or valuation signal from the stock market. Banks receive a risk signal when they exhibit substantially higher (semi-)volatility compared to the best performing bank(s) with similar characteristics, and a valuation signal when they are undervalued relative to the average bank with similar characteristics. We document, using a partial adjustment model, that bank managers adjust the long-term target value of key strategic variables and the speed of adjustment towards those targets following a risk and/or negative valuation signal. We interpret this as evidence of stock market influencing. We show that our results are unlikely to be driven by indirect influencing by regulators, subordinated debtholders, retail or wholesale depositors. Finally, we show that the likelihood that banks receive a risk and/or valuation signal increases with opaqueness, managerial discretion and specialization.     

Leverage and the price volatility of equity shares in equilibrium

The traditional valuation formulas for corporate debt, which are derived in a complete market setting and are based on the no-arbitrage principle, imply that equity prices become more volatile as leverage increases. If the asset structure is incomplete, the presence of corporate debt affects the linear subspace spanned by the payoffs of the existing assets, and the pricing of corporate debt and shares of levered firms becomes a simultaneous valuation problem. This paper characterizes the relationship between the price of corporate debt and the share price of a levered firm in an equilibrium framework where corporate debt is a non-redundant asset. While, in the absence of bankruptcy, higher leverage always implies riskier equity, it does not necessarily mean more volatile equity prices. In fact, the link between leverage and equity price volatility depends in a particular way on investors’ preferences towards risk.     

Towards a managerially specific (MS) framework for bank capital adequacy

The stock market crash of 1987 and continuing Third World debt problems are among the factors that have re-emphasized the importance of bank capital adequacy. The contemporary academic literature, however, seems to provide limited practical help for banks in this important decision area. This study develops a strategic framework for the appraisal of capital adequacy within the banking firm. It is suggested as a suitable practical way of overcoming the uncertainty problems for which bank capital adequacy is alleged to exist.     

Contagion risk in the Czech financial system: A network analysis and simulation approach

This paper examines the potential for contagion within the Czech banking system via the channel of interbank exposures of domestic banks, enriched by a liquidity channel and an asset price channel, over the period March 2007 to June 2012. A computational model is used to assess the resilience of the Czech banking system to interbank contagion, taking into account the size and structure of interbank exposures as well as balance sheet and regulatory characteristics of individual banks in the network. The simulation results suggest that the potential for contagion due to credit losses on interbank exposures was rather limited. Even after the introduction of a liquidity condition into the simulations, the average contagion was below 3.8% of the remaining banking sector assets, with the exception of the period from December 2007 to September 2008. Activation of the asset price channel further increases the losses due to interbank contagion, showing that the liquidity of government bonds would be essential for the stability of Czech banks in stress situations. Finally, the simulation results for both idiosyncratic and multiple bank failure shocks suggest that the potential for contagion in the Czech banking system has decreased since the onset of the global financial crisis.