美国经常项目逆差原因综述

近年来,美国不断增长的经常项目逆差不仅仅成为影响其自身经济的一个重要不确定因素,也给全球经济增长带来潜在威胁,引起了全球经济学家和政策制定者们的广泛关注。他们进行了广泛的探索和研究,分析了其产生的原因、对经济的各种影响,并提出了一系列的对策和措施。然而对美国经常项目逆差的系统分析是一项庞大的工作,本文将集中于对已有美国经常项目逆差的各类研究在原因方面做一文献综述,指出美国经常项目持续逆差在长期中必然会进行调整。在美国进行这一调整的过程中,中国要认识到其对中国经济所带来的各种潜在风险,以积极应对。     

美国巨额经常账户赤字仍将维持几年

鉴于美国的特殊地位,其经常账户的走向对世界经济产生重要的影响。随着美国经常账户近年持续扩大,引起了经济学界的担忧与争论。而由于美国经济的增长前景良好,美元作为国际储备货币的地位难以动摇,美元大跌的风险也不大     

美国国际收支与次贷危机

按照马克思的分析,资本主义经济由于其内在机制,会周期性地发生经济危机。在以美元为主要国际货币的体系中,在经济扩张阶段,按照特里芬的分析,世界对美元的需求增加,为了保证有足够的结算货币,需要通过逆差输出美元,但长期的逆差,会使美元贬值。因此,美元收支平衡机制及其调节会在经济危机上有所体现。文章基于此。结合21世纪初的美国国际收支变化情况,分析了美国国际收支与次贷危机的关系。     

美国国际收支与次贷危机

按照马克思的分析,资本主义经济由于其内在机制,会周期性地发生经济危机。在以美元为主要国际货币的体系中,在经济扩张阶段,按照特里芬的分析,世界对美元的需求增加,为了保证有足够的结算货币,需要通过逆差输出美元,但长期的逆差,会使得美元贬值。因此,美元收支平衡机制及其调节会在经济危机上有所体现。文章基于此,结合21世纪初的美国国际收支变化情况,分析了美国国际收支与次贷危机的关系。     

美国经济所面临的挑战（英文）

美国经济在全球经济中占有非常重要的地位,因此美国经济的未来走势直接关系到全球经济的发展.本文分析美国在经济发展中所具有的优势地位以及在未来经济发展中所要面对的挑战与风险。美国未来经济面临着巨额的经常项目逆差、财政收支赤字、能源价格高涨以及房地产泡沫破灭的威胁,使美国必须采取措施进行调整。这将导致本世纪初美国未来经济发展速度减慢。     

特里芬悖论与美国国债

特里芬悖论揭示了美元作为国际结算货币和储备货币,币值不稳定的问题,归根结底是美国在全球经济中的地位下降导致的,美国经济实力与美元国际货币地位不相称。但由于特里芬悖论目前很难有效解决,美元国际货币地位下降对美国国债需求冲击有限。目前市场中还没有一种完美的货币可以充当国际货币,特别提款权由于本身的缺陷也很难成为国际货币基础,其被广泛接受还面临挑战。未来相当长一段时期,美元仍是全球主要国际结算和储备货币,其国际货币地位很难面临严峻挑战。     

人民币汇率的走势与影响因素分析

影响人民币升值的基础实际上是四个：美元相对贬值；国际短期资本的大量流入；出口的大幅增长与经常项目的大量逆差在投资与出口推动下的经济增长。根据国内外经济形势和人民币汇率调整趋势分析，人民币汇率未来走势特点是：渐进式升值。[编者按]     

全球经济失衡、美元霸权及其对人民币汇改的影响

2008年由美国次贷危机导致的全球经济危机对世界经济有很大的影响,使本来已经失衡的全球经济变得更加不平衡.虽然美元的国际地位在此时受到了挑战,但是其在全球的霸权地位仍然没有改变.人民币汇改是在经常账户和资本账户双顺差的情况下开始的,美元的地位对于人民币汇改有很大影响,因此在目前新的环境下讨论人民币汇改有着积极重要的意义.     

美元国际供应量的界定、估算及其影响因素

美元国际供应量的规模和波动程度对汇率、资本流动和世界经济增长有相当重要的影响.本文分析了美元的国际供给和流通机制,在界定并估算美元国际供应量的基础上,通过单位根检验和误差修正模型对美元国际供应量的影响因素进行了实证研究,研究结果表明,美国实际GDP的增长和美元升值都会引起经常项目下美元国际供给的增加.本文的政策含义在于,主要储备货币国家应实行自律的财政政策和货币政策,以降低储备货币供给的过度波动给汇率和世界经济带来的冲击.     

2004年中国国际收支保持“双顺差”

国家外汇管理局4月22日公布了2004年国际收支平衡表。统计显示,去年中国国际收支经常项目、资本项目呈现“双顺差”,国际储备保持快速增长。2004年,中国国际收支经常项目顺差686.59亿美元,同比增长50%。按国际收支统计口径计算,货物出口5,933.93亿美元,货物进口5,344.10亿美元,顺差589.82亿美元;服务项目收入624.34亿美元,支出721.33亿美元,逆差96.99亿美元;收益项目收入205.44亿美元,支出240.67亿美元,逆差35.23亿美元;经常转移收入243.26亿美元,支出14.28亿美元,顺差228.98亿美元。2004年,资本和金融项目顺差1,106.60亿美元,同比增长110%…     

The US current account,sustainability, and the international monetary system

In this paper, we examine the sources of the US current account imbalances and discuss the role of the international monetary system in enabling the US in carrying such external deficits. There is evidence that the stochastic properties of the US current account are not compatible with the intertemporal national budget constraint. We argue that this is likely to be related to the dominant role of the U.S. dollar as an international reserve asset, which allows the US to meet international demand for safe assets and allows borrowing at very low interest rates. Results from a structural VAR model indicate that temporary shocks dominate the current account in the short run, whereas domestic permanent supply shocks and preference shocks contribute significantly to US current account movements in the long run. To the extent that temporary shocks stem from aggregate demand, stabilizing aggregate demand is important in achieving long-term sustainability in the current account. Finally, the paper discusses the role of the international financial system and the international role of the U.S. dollar in contributing to US external imbalances.     

Demography and the U.S. current account deficit

We examine whether aging in the trading partners of the U.S. has affected their demand for foreign (i.e., U.S.) assets enough to materially affect the U.S. current account balance. There is reason to think that demography may be at work in international capital flows because the standard life-cycle model of consumption behavior predicts that a household's age will influence its saving behavior. Moreover, simple national accounting identities link a country's current account balance to its savings–investment imbalance. Thus, differences in national age-profiles should affect the current account. To test this theory's plausibility and significance, I simulate a multi-region overlapping generations model that is calibrated to match the demographic differences among the major industrialized countries over the past 50 years. In the model, it is found that these differences can explain some of the observed long-term capital movements in the G-7. In particular, the model does a good job of predicting the size and timing of U.S. current account deficits.     

THE UK'S PERSISTENT TRADE DEFICIT

The UK current account deficit reached a peak in excess of £20bn in 1989, equivalent to 4 per cent of GDP. In the next two years, as recession took its toll of domestic spending, it shrank quickly - on the latest data the deficit was only £4.4bn last year, 3/4 per cent of nominal GDP. Over the same period the trade gap narrowed front £25bn to £10bn, in each case taking the deficit back to the levels of 1987, before the late 1980s' boom really got under way. Since 1989, therefore, both 011 trade and the current account, there has been a significant reduction in the external deficit. Yet it remains the case that, despite the length of the recession - non-oil GDP has fallen for six successive quarters - the current account is still in deficit. Moreover, despite there being no concrete data to point to the beginnings of recovery, the shortfall is widening. The low point was the second quarter of last year, with a rare current surplus recorded in June, since when the trade deficit has steadily widened again as the consequence primarily of a 5.5per cent increase in the volume of imports over the last 12 months. Why is it that, in contrast with the experience in the 1980-81 downturn, this recession has not produced a trade or even a current account surplus? Does this mean that the recovery, when it does come, will inevitably widen the deficit with the possible consequence that ‘balance of payments problems’ will undermine the pound inside the ERM? We conclude that, while it is disappointing that UK producers have not managed to claw back more of the domestic market - in contrast with the experience of exporters in world markets - our forecast of a current account deficit of 0–2 per cent of GDP should be relatively easily financed and will riot therefore cause serious problem for economic policy. This conclusion would riot necessarily hold if the recovery occurs more rapidly than we expect arid sucks in a greater volume of imports. It may be the case that the UK will continue to run a current deficit with Japan in particular as the counterpart to ongoing Japanese direct investment in this country.     

The Changing Structure of the UK Economy: Implications for the Current Account

In common with other developed countries, the UK has seen the relative importance of the service sector grow, accounting for an ever greater share of employment and output — a trend that has accelerated over recent decades. At the same time, globalisation means that international trade is of increasing importance as a share of UK expenditure. With the traded goods sector dwindling in importance, what are the implications for the current account? This paper examines the changing structure of the UK economy and prospects for the current account. Although the current account is expected to remain in deficit for the foreseeable future, the size of the deficit is likely to remain manageable as growing surpluses from trade in services and investment income offset a widening goods deficit.     

Sudden equity price declines and the flight-to-safety phenomenon: additional evidence using daily data

Using daily data we show sudden, extreme declines in the U.S. stock market for crash dates to lead to a capital preserving (as opposed to strategic or tactical) reallocation to government debt securities. In most cases we find flight-induced reallocation reverses direction within one day of a crash. However, for the 1987 world crash we find increased and persistent return volatility in both equity and bond returns lasting up to five days following this dramatic decline in world equity prices. Like previous research in this area, we find equity crashes alter long-run stock/bond return correlations and lead to increased stock and bond return volatility. Finally, we describe the somewhat unique stock and bond correlation adjustments triggered by the 9/11 attack and the impact this event had on the behavior of U.S. equity investors?? flight-to-safety reaction.     

货币区建设与货币政策的独立性：一个分析框架

美国次贷危机引发了全球性金融危机,这凸显了以美国为核心的“金融资本主义模式”和以美元为核心的国际货币金融体系的制度性缺陷,改革现行的以美元为核心的国际货币金融体系势在必行,建立货币区是较为现实的选择。但在现行货币政策框架下,货币区不可避免会出现“三元悖论”困境。本文提出的贷款准备金政策框架模型,能够解决货币区在保证其内在要求的资本自由流动和汇率稳定基本前提下,区内各个成员保持货币政策的独立性问题。     

THE INTERNATIONAL CURRENT ACCOUNT IMBALANCES: A SCEPTICAL VIEW

The international current account imbalances, whereby the USA has a vast deficit and several countries, notably Japan, China, Germany and the oil exporters, have corresponding surpluses, are usually seen as problems. The argument here is that current account imbalances simply indicate intertemporal trade – the exchange of goods and services for financial claims. There are as likely to be gains from trade of that kind as from ordinary trade.     

Fiscal deficits and current account deficits

Recent fiscal stimulus packages depend for their effectiveness on the assumption of non-Ricardian savings behavior. We show that, under the same assumption, higher fiscal deficits can have problematic implications if they turn out to be permanent. First, if they occur in large countries they significantly raise the world real interest rate. Second, they cause a short run current account deterioration equal to around 50% of the fiscal deficit deterioration. Third, the longer run current account deterioration equals almost 75% for a large economy such as the United States, and almost 100% for a small open economy.     

International transmission of stock price movements: Evidence from the U.S. and five Asian-Pacific markets

Using a vector autoregressive analysis, this paper examines the structure of international transmissions in daily returns for six national stock markets— the U.S., Japan, Hong Kong, Singapore, Taiwan, and Thailand. Our results generally indicate that (1) the degree of interdependence among national stock markets has increased substantially after the 1987 stock market crash, (2) the U.S. market plays a dominant role of influencing the Pacific-Basin markets, (3) Japan and Singapore together have a significant persistent impact on the other Asian markets, and (4) the markets in Taiwan and Thailand are not efficient in processing international news.