Rules of Origin and Strategic Choice of Compliance

This paper examines how an input supplier’s monopoly power affects exporters’ choice between compliance and noncompliance with rules of origin (ROO) in a free trade area (FTA). When the regional input supplier has monopoly power, the number of compliers largely affects the input price. This is because to meet ROO, exporters must use a certain ratio of the input originated within the area. In such a case, each exporter has an incentive to choose noncompliance with ROO if the rival exporter complies. Because this incentive yields strategic substitution between symmetric exporters, the coexistence of the complier and the non-complier appears in equilibrium. Our model consists of three final-good producers (one in an importing country and two in an exporting country) and one input supplier, which is in the importing country and has monopoly power. We show that within the range of parameter values for which some exporters comply with ROO, the content rate affects the output of the final-good producer in the importing country and the country’s welfare in a U-shaped fashion. The content rate levels that allow the coexistence of the complier and the non-complier minimize welfare.     

Free trade areas,the limit of Rules of Origin,and optimal tariff reductions under international oligopoly: A welfare analysis

In this article we analyze the economic effects associated with preferential Rules of Origin (RoO) in a free trade area (FTA). By presenting a stylized three-country model of trade under oligopoly, we show that there exists a maximum limit of RoO below which forming an FTA is welfare-improving. In examining external tariff reductions under FTA, we take into account the constrained conditions that optimal tariffs set by member countries effectively induce the intrabloc exporters to comply with RoO. This approach rules out trade regime switches and helps identify the economic determinants of establishing an effective and welfare-improving FTA with RoO. We further examine whether an FTA with RoO increases total trade or whether the extra trade arises at the expense of nonmembers. Our simple model has implications for economic factors that foster or impede regional economic integration under imperfect completion.     

The effects of cross-regional free trade agreements under a vertical industry structure

This paper examines the effects of a cross-regional free trade agreement (FTA) on tariffs, welfare, and the incentives for multilateral free trade in a three-country model with a vertical industry structure. We show that the FTA induces member countries to reduce their tariffs on nonmember countries. On the other hand, a nonmember country lowers its tariff on final-good imports, but raises its tariff on intermediate-good imports. Also, the FTA makes member and nonmember countries better off. After the FTA is enacted, member and nonmember countries have an incentive to support multilateral free trade, so an FTA acts as a building block for multilateral trade liberalization.     

Does firm size matter in exporting and using FTA schemes?

In this paper, we empirically compare the role of firm size when exporting with that when using free trade agreement (FTA) schemes. We employ a unique survey providing detailed information on FTA use by Japanese affiliates in ASEAN, India, and Oceania. Our findings from the analysis on Japanese affiliates in ASEAN are as follows. First, firm size matters in both decisions on exporting and on using FTA schemes. In particular, firm size is more quantitatively important in decisions on FTA use than on exporting. Second, firms with experience in utilizing FTAs for exporting have an approximately 40% higher probability of using an FTA for exporting to a new country. Third, larger-sized firms use a larger number of FTA schemes.     

Dispensing with NAFTA Rules of Origin? Some Policy Options

The objective of this paper is to use a computable general equilibrium (CGE) methodology to estimate the economic gains, for both Canada and Mexico, of: (1) adopting a North American customs union (CU) that would also liberalise rules of origin (ROO); and (2) reviving the WTO scenario of multilateral free trade, thereby eliminating preferential commerce and thus the need for preferential ROO across free trade agreements (FTAs). Such a CGE methodology is useful as the approach permits computation of an efficiency (or ex post) cost of ROO that might, in some contexts, be more relevant than the existing ex ante indices of ROO restrictiveness, which are unable to account for the fact that the use of preferential access in an FTA (and the concomitant ROO compliance) is an option, not an obligation. The paper shows that the erosion of NAFTA tariff preferences at the end of the 1990s and early 2000s, which resulted from a different phasing of the NAFTA and Uruguay Round measures, has reduced the efficiency cost of NAFTA ROO, making these rules economically less relevant, especially for Canada, and therefore limiting somewhat the gains from liberalising them through a CU. Given this, the WTO scenario of multilateral free trade remains the approach that would deliver the largest economic gains in terms of GDP and welfare, while making preferential commerce and ROO obsolete.     

Connecting the Two Faces of CSR: Does Employee Volunteerism Improve Compliance?

In 2004, the United States Sentencing Commission amended the Federal Sentencing Guidelines to allow firms that create “effective compliance and ethics programs” to receive better treatment if prosecuted for fraud. Effective compliance and ethics, however, appear to be limited to activities focused on complying with the firms’ internal legal and ethical standards. We explored a potential connection between the firms’ external corporate social responsibility (CSR) behaviors and internal compliance: Is there an organizationally valid relationship between these two firm activities? That is, when organizations demonstrate CSR with behaviors external to the firm, such as employee volunteerism, are their employees more likely to demonstrate uncompromised legal and ethical compliance behavior internally? We collected data from 164 working professionals enrolled in a top-tier MBA program in the southeastern United States regarding their employer-sponsored volunteer activities and their intentions to comply in various organizational compliance vignettes. We found that employer-sponsored volunteerism is associated with uncompromised compliance choices in one of the three vignettes. This finding indicates preliminary support for further inquiry into the relationship within the firm between external CSR behaviors and policies regarding organizational compliance. Post hoc analyses suggest that employer-sponsored volunteerism is strongly associated with a positive organizational identity, but organizational identity is not associated with the significant compliance vignette. This evidence suggests that the underlying mechanism that connects external CSR behaviors and internal compliance intentions is complex and requires future study.     

Firm heterogeneity and location choice of Taiwanese multinationals

This paper examines the extent to which production location decisions of Taiwanese multinationals reflect underlying patterns of firm productivity. In our theoretical model, heterogeneous firms in a middle-income country decide on the optimal production locations for serving three geographically separate markets: domestic, foreign high-income and foreign low-income. The model shows that the equilibrium decision of a firm depends on the fixed investment costs of establishing foreign subsidiaries, production costs, transportation costs, market size and its own productivity level.Using firm-level data in 2000, Taiwanese electronics firms are divided into four different categories: non-FDI, investors in China only, investors in the U.S. only, investors in both China and the U.S. We use a multinomial logit model to link firms' location choices with their productivity, controlling for country, industry and other firm characteristics. Our empirical results are consistent with the predictions of the theoretical model. We show that more productive firms engage in outward FDI, with the most productive ones investing in both China and the U.S. We also provide evidence indicating that Taiwanese multinationals investing only in the U.S. are more productive than those investing exclusively in China due to smaller fixed investment costs in China relative to the U.S.     

Firm heterogeneity and location choice of Taiwanese multinationals

This paper examines the extent to which production location decisions of Taiwanese multinationals reflect underlying patterns of firm productivity. In our theoretical model, heterogeneous firms in a middle-income country decide on the optimal production locations for serving three geographically separate markets: domestic, foreign high-income and foreign low-income. The model shows that the equilibrium decision of a firm depends on the fixed investment costs of establishing foreign subsidiaries, production costs, transportation costs, market size and its own productivity level.

Using firm-level data in 2000, Taiwanese electronics firms are divided into four different categories: non-FDI, investors in China only, investors in the U.S. only, investors in both China and the U.S. We use a multinomial logit model to link firms' location choices with their productivity, controlling for country, industry and other firm characteristics. Our empirical results are consistent with the predictions of the theoretical model. We show that more productive firms engage in outward FDI, with the most productive ones investing in both China and the U.S. We also provide evidence indicating that Taiwanese multinationals investing only in the U.S. are more productive than those investing exclusively in China due to smaller fixed investment costs in China relative to the U.S.     

Firm heterogeneity and location choice of Taiwanese multinationals

This paper examines the extent to which production location decisions of Taiwanese multinationals reflect underlying patterns of firm productivity. In our theoretical model, heterogeneous firms in a middle-income country decide on the optimal production locations for serving three geographically separate markets: domestic, foreign high-income and foreign low-income. The model shows that the equilibrium decision of a firm depends on the fixed investment costs of establishing foreign subsidiaries, production costs, transportation costs, market size and its own productivity level.Using firm-level data in 2000, Taiwanese electronics firms are divided into four different categories: non-FDI, investors in China only, investors in the U.S. only, investors in both China and the U.S. We use a multinomial logit model to link firms' location choices with their productivity, controlling for country, industry and other firm characteristics. Our empirical results are consistent with the predictions of the theoretical model. We show that more productive firms engage in outward FDI, with the most productive ones investing in both China and the U.S. We also provide evidence indicating that Taiwanese multinationals investing only in the U.S. are more productive than those investing exclusively in China due to smaller fixed investment costs in China relative to the U.S.     

Trade policy of a free trade agreement in the presence of foreign lobbying

This paper studies the effect of foreign lobbies on trade policy of a country which is a member of a Free Trade Agreement (FTA). It uses a monopolistically competitive political economy model in which the government determines external tariffs endogenously. The effect of foreign lobbying under the FTA is examined empirically using Canadian industry-level trade data that allow differentiating of lobby groups by the country of origin. The analysis suggests that the presence of foreign lobbying has a significant effect on the domestic trade policy. The heterogeneity of foreign lobbies is also important: the presence of an organized lobbying group in an FTA partner country tends to raise trade barriers while an organized lobbying group of exporters from outside of the FTA is associated with less protection.     

The Impact of Corruption on Firm Tax Compliance in Transition Economies: Whom Do You Trust?

Tax compliance is an important issue for governments and the public alike. To meet public needs and fund public mandates, firms around the world are expected to comply with tax laws. Factors that are related to organizational (firm) tax compliance have not been sufficiently examined in the literature. Owing to the increasing global influence of transition economies, factors associated with firm tax compliance in transition economies are particularly of interest. Based on a sample of over 5,000 firms from 22 former Soviet Bloc transition economies, we find that higher levels of corruption and higher levels of particularized trust (reliance on friends and family) are associated with lower levels of tax compliance. Interestingly, we also find that the negative relationship between corruption and tax compliance is weakened in situations of higher generalized trust (trust in strangers). Overall, our study’s results suggest that institutional factors play an important role and are related to firm tax compliance behavior in transition economies.     

Overlapping free trade agreements and international trade: A network approach

In our work, we have analysed the effect of the hub‐and‐spoke nature of free trade agreements (FTA s) on trade. Contrary to previous analyses, we have considered the effects of the country's position in the FTA network on the bilateral trade of the hub country. We have conducted an in‐depth analysis of the global network of FTA s, focusing particularly on its evolution in the last 15 years. We have utilised a panel data set covering the period 1960–2010 to investigate the effects of the hub‐and‐spoke on trade. Our results show that the countries that are more connected to FTA s export more than those that are less involved, although not all the partner countries you can connect with are the same. An increase in the number of spokes that have no link between them has, on average, a negative effect on the trade of the hub, which indicates that signing FTA s with every country is not the optimal strategy for increasing trade. However, if we consider the way new FTA s change the relative position of a country, we can see that if new FTA s make the country more central or less constrained in the network, these new agreements have a strongly positive and significant pro‐trade effect.     

比较优势与南—南自由贸易区的利益分配——中国—东盟自由贸易区对双方分工地位的影响

在自由贸易区(简称FTA)内,贸易利益如何在成员国间分配取决于各成员国的比较优势。在竞争型的南南FTA中,具有极端比较优势的国家利益将受损,具有中等比较优势国家将获益。CAFTA(中国—东盟自由贸易区)的建立,对中国来说将主要带来贸易转移,进一步导致优势产业在东盟的集聚,强化中国在高新技术领域与东盟的贸易逆差,从而使中国在国际生产链条的末端长期驻足,并导致利益损失。政府必须对此密切关注并采取相应的政策和战略。     

Optimal trade,industrial, and privatization policies in a mixed duopoly with strategic managerial incentives

Abstract

This paper examines optimal trade, industrial, and privatization policies in a home-market model of mixed international duopoly with strategic managerial incentives. Under linear demand and constant marginal costs, the optimal degree of privatization is shown to depend crucially on cost and demand parameters and on the availability of strategic trade and industrial policies. If both firms are equally efficient, optimal trade and industrial policies drive out the foreign firm and the privatization policy loses its effect on national welfare; however, if the home firm is less efficient, then full privatization combined with an import tariff and a production subsidy is optimal for the home country, while an export subsidy is optimal for the foreign country. If trade and industrial policies are unavailable and if both firms are equally efficient, full state-ownership, which drives out the foreign firm, becomes optimal; however, if the home firm is less efficient, only partial privatization is optimal, The state-ownership share is increased if either the market size grows, the home firm's efficiency increases, or the foreign firm's efficiency decreases. Further, the paper demonstrates the potential conflict between privatization and trade liberalization policies.     

Global sourcing of complex production processes

We develop a theory of a firm in an incomplete contracts environment which decides on the complexity, the organization, and the global scale of its production process. Specifically, the firm decides i) how many intermediate inputs are simultaneously combined to a final product, ii) if the supplier of each input is an external contractor or an integrated affiliate, and iii) if that input is offshored to a foreign country. Our model leads to a rich set of predictions on the internal structure of multinational firms. In particular, it provides an explanation why many firms choose hybrid sourcing and have both outsourced and integrated suppliers.     

Validating the innovation prowess framework for firms in emerging economies facing tight regulatory regimes: the case of Indian pharmaceutical firms

ABSTRACT

The purpose is to investigate the generalizability of an innovation prowess framework, developed for firms in developed countries, for firms in emerging economies facing tight regulatory regimes. Using a qualitative approach we investigate key informants in six firms, supported by secondary documents and the business press, as well as in-depth organizational observation within one organization. Academic evidence suggests there are four factors – one external (industry structure) and three internal (economic structure of the firm, organizational structure of the firm, and historical development of the firm) – that drive the innovation prowess of firms. While firms in developed economies take such factors as the norm, firms in developing countries face evolving norms and internal challenges to comply with tighter regulatory regimes; however, the research suggests that impact of these four factors appear to be similar to those faced by firms in developed countries. Our research contributes by seeking to broaden our understanding of innovation prowess in emerging country contexts. Innovation in these markets is generally less well understood, especially as they adapt to the tighter regulatory regimes required to compete in global markets (e.g. WTO).     

R&D policies, trade and process innovation

We set up a simple trade model with two countries hosting one firm each. The firms invest in cost-reducing R&D, and each government may grant R&D subsidies to the domestic firm. We show that it is optimal for a government to provide higher R&D subsidies the lower the level of trade costs, even if the firms are independent monopolies. If firms produce imperfect substitutes, policy competition may become so fierce that only one of the firms survives. International policy harmonization eliminates policy competition and ensures a symmetric outcome. However, it is shown that harmonization is not necessarily welfare maximizing. The optimal coordinated policies may imply an asymmetric outcome with R&D subsidies to only one of the firms.     

Free trade networks

The paper examines the formation of free trade agreements (FTAs) as a network formation game. We consider an n-country model in which (possibly asymmetric) countries trade differentiated industrial commodities. We show that if all countries are symmetric, the complete FTA network is pairwise stable and it is the unique stable network if industrial commodities are not highly substitutable. We also compare FTAs and customs unions (CUs) as to which of these two regimes facilitates global trade liberalization, noticing that unlike CUs, each signatory of an FTA can have another FTA without consent of other member countries.     

Environmental Policy,North-South Trade and FDI

We analyze trade between two countries, called the North and the South. There is one firm in each country and production costs are lower in the South. To serve foreign markets firms may export or engage in FDI. Both countries set tariffs on imported goods. We find that the implementation of an environmental policy by the South may affect the location decision of the Southern firm. When only the North sets an environmental tax, firms engage in FDI if the difference in costs between the two countries is low, otherwise the South exports and the Northern firm engages in FDI. If the South also sets an environmental tax, this does not restrict FDI by Northern firm, encourages FDI by the domestic firm, reduces its environmental damage and increases joint welfare. Finally, in equilibrium the South decides to implement an environmental policy and both firms engage in FDI.     

Flower Export Barriers: A Comparative Study in Colombia,Mexico and Ecuador

Export of goods and services is one of the most common ways of internationalization performed by companies. This activity associates various obstacles, internal factors that depend of the firm’s performance, and external environment factors in which firm is involved. Based on the perspective of flower firms located in Colombia, Mexico and Ecuador, this article prioritizes the barriers they face for positioning themselves in the global market. Governmental factors are the obstacle perceived greater interference in external forces, while in the internal forces are the operational factors, although there are considerable differences in the assigned weights in each country.