Credit Contagion from Counterparty Risk

Standard credit risk models cannot explain the observed clustering of default, sometimes described as "credit contagion." This paper provides the first empirical analysis of credit contagion via direct counterparty effects. We find that bankruptcy announcements cause negative abnormal equity returns and increases in CDS spreads for creditors. In addition, creditors with large exposures are more likely to suffer from financial distress later. This suggests that counterparty risk is a potential additional channel of credit contagion. Indeed, the fear of counterparty defaults among financial institutions explains the sudden worsening of the credit crisis after the Lehman bankruptcy in September 2008.     

Are credit default swaps still a sideshow? How information flow between equity and CDS markets has changed since the financial crisis

We examine the information flow between equity and credit default swap (CDS) markets using firm-level returns data before and after the global financial crisis. Before the crisis, the information flow was unidirectional, with equity returns leading CDS returns. While equity returns continue to lead CDS returns after the crisis, we find that the speed of adjustment of the CDS market to equity markets has increased during this period. We also find evidence of a bidirectional flow of information between these markets, with equity returns responding to credit protection returns in the postcrisis period. The quicker response of CDS spreads to equity returns during the postcrisis period primarily occurs among entities with lower credit ratings. In contrast, the response of equity returns to lagged CDS returns during the postcrisis period is observed among firms across different credit rating categories; however, the magnitude of the response is higher among those with lower credit ratings.     

Credit risk transfer activities and systemic risk: How banks became less risky individually but posed greater risks to the financial system at the same time

A main cause of the crisis of 2007-2009 is the various ways through which banks have transferred credit risk in the financial system. We study the systematic risk of banks before the crisis, using two samples of banks respectively trading Credit Default Swaps (CDS) and issuing Collateralized Loan Obligations (CLOs). After their first usage of either risk transfer method, the share price beta of these banks increases significantly. This suggests the market anticipated the risks arising from these methods, long before the crisis. We additionally separate this beta effect into a volatility and a market correlation component. Quite strikingly, this decomposition shows that the increase in the beta is solely due to an increase in banks’ correlations. Thus, while banks may have shed their individual credit risk, they actually posed greater systemic risk. This creates a challenge for financial regulation, which has typically focused on individual institutions.     

Credit and liquidity components of corporate CDS spreads

This paper investigates the role of credit and liquidity factors in explaining corporate CDS price changes during normal and crisis periods. We find that liquidity risk is more important than firm-specific credit risk regardless of market conditions. Moreover, in the period prior to the recent “Great Recession” credit risk plays no role in explaining CDS price changes. The dominance of liquidity effects casts serious doubts on the relevance of CDS price changes as an indicator of default risk dynamics. Our results show how multiple liquidity factors including firm specific and aggregate liquidity proxies as well as an asymmetric information measure are critical determinants of CDS price variations. In particular, the impact of informed traders on the CDS price increases when markets are characterised by higher uncertainty, which supports concerns of insider trading during the crisis.     

The impact of central clearing on counterparty risk,liquidity, and trading: Evidence from the credit default swap market

This paper examines the impact of central clearing on the credit default swap (CDS) market using a sample of voluntarily cleared single-name contracts. Consistent with central clearing reducing counterparty risk, CDS spreads increase around the commencement of central clearing and are lower than settlement spreads published by the central clearinghouse. Furthermore, the relation between CDS spreads and dealer credit risk weakens after central clearing begins, suggesting a lowering of systemic risk. These findings are robust to controls for frictions in both CDS and bond markets. Finally, matched sample analysis reveals that the increased post-trade transparency following central clearing is associated with an improvement in liquidity and trading activity.     

Counterparty credit risk and the credit default swap market

Counterparty credit risk has become one of the highest-profile risks facing participants in the financial markets. Despite this, relatively little is known about how counterparty credit risk is actually priced. We examine this issue using an extensive proprietary data set of contemporaneous CDS transaction prices and quotes by 14 different CDS dealers selling credit protection on the same underlying firm. This unique cross-sectional data set allows us to identify directly how dealers' credit risk affects the prices of these controversial credit derivatives. We find that counterparty credit risk is priced in the CDS market. The magnitude of the effect, however, is vanishingly small and is consistent with a market structure in which participants require collateralization of swap liabilities by counterparties.     

Daily pricing of emerging market sovereign CDS before and during the global financial crisis

In this paper, we study the determinants of daily spreads for emerging market sovereign credit default swaps (CDSs) over the period April 2002–December 2011. Using GARCH models, we find, first, that daily CDS spreads for emerging market sovereigns are more related to global and regional risk premia than to country-specific risk factors. This result is particularly evident during the second subsample (August 2007–December 2011), where neither macroeconomic variables nor country ratings significantly explain CDS spread changes. Second, measures of US bond, equity, and CDX High Yield returns, as well as emerging market credit returns, are the most dominant drivers of CDS spread changes. Finally, our analysis suggests that CDS spreads are more strongly influenced by international spillover effects during periods of market stress than during normal times.     

The extent of informational efficiency in the credit default swap market: evidence from post-earnings announcement returns

Under semi-strong market efficiency future returns are unpredictable from previously released information. We test the degree of semi-strong form market efficiency in the credit default swap (CDS) market by examining the relationship between subsequent CDS returns and previously announced quarterly earnings surprises and quarterly accruals, both of which have been the source of stock market anomalies. We conduct our analysis over three time periods: (1) before the credit crisis that spanned from July 2007 to June 2009, (2) during the credit crisis, and (3) after the credit crisis. Both before and after the credit crisis, the CDS market was efficient, exhibiting no systematic relation between subsequent CDS returns and previously announced accounting information. During the credit crisis, however, we find that both quarterly earnings surprises and quarterly accruals are associated with systematic patterns in subsequent CDS returns that are consistent with underreaction to both measures. In the latter stages of the crisis, the pattern reverses, consistent with the CDS market overreacting to both measures although the overreaction is short-lived. Collectively, our results indicate that the CDS market is efficient during periods of relative economic stability but call into question its efficiency during less stable economic periods.     

Credit risk dynamics in response to changes in the federal funds target: The implication for firm short-term debt

The recent credit crisis has raised a number of interesting questions regarding the role of the Federal Reserve Bank and the effectiveness of its expected and unexpected interventions in financial markets, especially during the crisis, given its mandate. This paper reviews and evaluates the impact of expected and unexpected changes in the federal funds rate target on credit risk premia. The paper's main innovation is the use of an ACH-VAR (autoregressive conditional hazard VAR) model to generate the Fed's expected and unexpected monetary policy shocks which are then used to determine the effects of a Federal Reserve policy change on counterparty credit risk and more importantly short-term firm debt financing. The findings answer a longstanding question sought by researchers on the effect of policy makers' announcements on firm debt financing. The results clearly show that the Federal Reserve influences short-term debt financing through the credit channel for both expansionary and contractionary monetary policies. In particular, we find that the growth in counterparty risk appears less responsive to anticipated responses in the Fed funds rate that fail to materialize than to an unanticipated increase in the federal funds rate. Finally, we also document that the results appear to validate the Feds interventions in financial markets to stem counterparty risk and to make liquidity more readily available to firms.     

TARP announcement,bank health,and borrowers’ credit risk

Theory suggests that unhealthy banks exhibit more pronounced flight-to-quality behavior during financial crises and, hence, the infusion of capital through unhealthy banks is less effective in relieving the liquidity shocks of vulnerable borrowers. We test these predictions by investigating how the financial health of leading US banks influenced their borrowers’ credit risk surrounding the announcement of the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP). Changes in borrower credit risk, measured by credit default swap (CDS) spreads, should reflect the expected relief from liquidity shocks and other benefits of rescuing banks, such as maintaining the existing lending relationships. Consistent with the theory, prior to the TARP capital infusions, unhealthy banks’ borrowers with high leverage experienced a greater increase in their credit risk relative to similar healthy banks’ borrowers. Following the event, the CDS market anticipated less liquidity relief to these vulnerable unhealthy banks’ borrowers, but more liquidity relief to the vulnerable healthy banks’ borrowers.     

Testing for statistical arbitrage in credit derivatives markets

This paper studies statistical arbitrage opportunities in credit derivatives markets using strategies combining Credit Default Swaps (CDSs) and Asset Swap Packages (ASPs) by means of an improved statistical arbitrage test. Using four different databases (GFI, Reuters, CMA, and J.P. Morgan) from 2005 to 2009, we find persistent mispricings between the CDS and ASP spreads of individual firms, which should be priced similarly, before and during the 2007–2009 financial crisis. These mispricings are more frequent in low credit quality bonds and appear to offer arbitrage opportunities. We also aggregate the firms' CDS and ASP in a portfolio and still find persistent deviations, mainly in the lower rated bonds. In aggregate terms the deviations from the parity relation can be explained from systematic factors such as financing costs, counterparty risk, and global risk. However, after considering realistic estimations of funding and trading costs, all these mispricings are unlikely to provide profitable arbitrage opportunities.     

Pitfalls and perils of financial innovation: The use of CDS by corporate bond funds

We use the financial crisis of 2007–2009 as a laboratory to examine the costs and benefits of teams versus single managers in asset management. We find that when a fund uses complex trading strategies involving the use of CDS team-managed funds outperform solo-managed funds. This may be due to the greater diversity of expertise, experience and skill of teams relative to single managers. During the financial crisis, however, the performance premium of teams becomes negative, which may be because of the slower decision times of teams, which are especially costly during times of rapidly changing market conditions.     

CDS as insurance: Leaky lifeboats in stormy seas

What market features of financial risk transfer exacerbate counterparty risk? To analyze this, we formulate a model which elucidates important differences between financial risk transfer and traditional insurance, using the example of Credit Default Swaps (CDS). We allow for (heterogeneous) insurer insolvency, which captures the possibility that relatively risky counterparties may exist in the market. Further, we find that stable insurers become less stable as the price of the contract decreases. The analysis includes insured parties that have heterogeneous motivations for purchasing CDS. For example, some may own the underlying asset and purchase CDS for risk management, while others buy these contracts purely for trading purposes. We show that traders will choose to contract with less stable insurers, resulting in higher counterparty risk in this market relative to that of traditional insurance; however, a regulatory policy that removes traders can, perversely, cause stable counterparties to become less stable. We conclude with two extensions of the model that consider a Central Counterparty (CCP) arrangement and the consequences of asymmetric information over insurer type.     

Bank credit default swaps and deposit insurance around the world

We investigate the impact of deposit insurance schemes on banks' credit risk – a predictor of failure and a key element in the current financial crisis. Unlike most studies, which use balance sheet measurements of risk, we adopt a forward-looking and market-based measure of bank credit risk: the credit default swap (CDS) spread. We find that banks in countries with explicit deposit insurance systems have higher CDS spreads, supporting the “moral hazard” view. The results suggest that deposit insurance design features that lessen the adverse impact are risk-adjusted premium, coinsurance systems, government-established systems, “risk-minimizing” systems, and systems with dual-funding sources. Full coverage appears to stabilize bank risk only during the financial crisis period. More stringent bank regulation, such as capital adequacy regulation and independent supervision, could reduce the undesirable impact of deposit insurance. Deposit insurance seems to help stabilize volatile markets, as evidenced during the financial crisis and in countries with greater market volatility. In addition, we find that the adverse impact of deposit insurance on bank credit risk is more pronounced for banks with low asset quality and low liquidity.     

Dynamics and determinants of credit risk discovery: Evidence from CDS and stock markets

This paper investigates the dynamics and drivers of credit risk discovery between stock and CDS markets in the US. Our research is distinguished from the existing literature in three aspects: 1) we employ an improved method to measure the information share; 2) we discover new drivers of credit risk discovery; and 3) we assess the impact of central clearing counterparty (CCP) on the CDS market. By using the generalized information share (GIS) by Lien and Shrestha (2014), we address the issue that the CDS and stock prices do not have one-to-one cointegration relation. The empirical results support the use of GIS instead of more conventional measures. We also find that eliminating transitory price components increases the information share of the CDS market in the earlier period of the sample. The economic condition and funding cost turn out to affect the information share of the CDS market negatively. Another interesting finding is that the CDS of investment grade firms possess higher information shares compared to speculative grade firms. Finally, CCP seems to reduce the information share of CDS, which suggests that the CDS market is driven largely by insider trading.     

Credit derivatives and stock return synchronicity

The role of credit default swaps (CDS) in the 2008 financial crisis has been widely debated among regulators, investors, and researchers. While CDS were blamed for destabilizing the financial system, they remain effective tools for hedging credit risk, especially for major banks, and produce positive informational externalities to market participants. This paper examines whether the introduction of CDS enhances the amount of firm-specific information impounded in stock prices. We use stock return synchronicity to measure the amount of firm-specific information reflected in stock prices, with more firm-specific information being associated with a lower level of synchronicity. We find that a firm’s stock return synchronicity decreases after the commencement of CDS trading. This finding is robust to different model specifications, synchronicity measures, and endogeneity controlling methodologies. Furthermore, the decrease in stock return synchronicity is more pronounced for CDS firms with higher credit risk. Overall, our evidence supports the positive role of CDS in improving informativeness of stock prices.     

Trading behavior in S&P 500 index futures

This article examines the determinants of trading decisions and the performance of trader types, in the context of the E-Mini S&;P 500 futures and S&;P 500 futures markets. Speculators and small traders tend to follow positive feedback strategies while hedgers dynamically adjust positions in response to market returns. Such strategies apparently reverse during the 2008–09 financial crisis. Investor sentiment and market volatility play an important role in determining the net trading position of traders across the sample period. While all trader types are better at foreseeing market upturns, an out-of-sample test suggests that speculators and small traders have some predictive ability for short-term market returns.     

Pricing Sovereign Credit Risk of Poland: Evidence from the CDS Market

We analyze the market assessment of sovereign credit risk using a reduced-form model to price the credit default swap (CDS) spreads, thus enabling us to derive values for the probability of default (PD) and loss given default (LGD) from the quotes of sovereign CDS contracts. We compare different specifications of the models allowing for both fixed and time-varying LGD, and we use these values to analyze the sovereign credit risk of Polish debt throughout the period of a global financial crisis. Our results suggest the presence of a low LGD and a relatively high PD during a recent financial crisis.     

Credit spread interdependencies of European states and banks during the financial crisis

We investigate the interdependence of the default risk of several Eurozone countries (France, Germany, Italy, Ireland, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Spain) and their domestic banks during the period between June 2007 and May 2010, using daily credit default swaps (CDS). Bank bailout programs changed the composition of both banks’ and sovereign balance sheets and, moreover, affected the linkage between the default risk of governments and their local banks. Our main findings suggest that in the period before bank bailouts the contagion disperses from bank credit spreads into the sovereign CDS market. After bailouts, a financial sector shock affects sovereign CDS spreads more strongly in the short run. However, the impact becomes insignificant in the long term. Furthermore, government CDS spreads become an important determinant of banks’ CDS series. The interdependence of government and bank credit risk is heterogeneous across countries, but homogeneous within the same country.     

Bank use of sovereign CDS in the Eurozone crisis: Hedging and risk incentives

Using a comprehensive dataset from German banks, we document the usage of sovereign credit default swaps (CDS) during the European sovereign debt crisis of 2008–2013. Banks used the sovereign CDS market to extend, rather than hedge, their long exposures to sovereign risk during this period. Lower loan exposure to sovereign risk is associated with greater protection selling in CDS, the effect being weaker when sovereign risk is high. Bank and country risk variables are mostly not associated with protection selling. The findings are driven by the actions of a few non-dealer banks which sold CDS protection aggressively at the onset of the crisis, but started covering their positions at its height while simultaneously shifting their assets towards sovereign bonds and loans. Our findings underscore the importance of accounting for derivatives exposure in building a complete picture and understanding fully the economic drivers of the bank-sovereign nexus of risk.