退耕还林结构的演化博弈分析

通过建立演化博弈模型,证明了退耕还林工程还林结构演化稳定的结果。在满足一定的条件下,退耕还林市场将演化为稳定的结构状态,其中一定比例的农户还经济林,而其余的农户还生态林。调整补贴政策对退耕还林结构进行引导、加大林业科技投入,可以提高退耕还林工程的绩效。     

Visualization service investment strategies for a self-operated fresh agricultural product e-tailer

Motivated by the fact that numerous fresh agricultural product e-tailers utilize the visualization technology to improve service quality, this paper examines visualization service investment strategies for a fresh agricultural product e-tailer. A supply chain comprised of one manufacturer and one self-operated e-tailer is constructed. We first investigate two service investment strategies in the game theory model: the manufacturer investment and the e-tailer investment. Our analysis reveals that there are two investment cases in the supply chain: one member intends to the service investment (a “win-win” situation) and neither is willing to offer the service (a “lose-lose” dilemma). Then we extend the theory model. The impacts of consumer preference heterogeneity, demand uncertainty and consumer preference for the product quality difference on the investment strategies are explored by the method of multi-agent modelling. We find that: (i) when consumer preference heterogeneity is small, the e-tailer should invest in the service; (ii) if consumer preference or demand uncertainty is moderate, it is difficult to reach an agreement between two players. Further, the government subsidy factor is considered. The issue of how the government subsidy affects service investment strategies is discussed. In fact, it is not necessary to provide a subsidy all the time. Only when the free-riding behavior happens, the government should grant a moderate amount of subsidy to coordinate the supply chain members. An excessive subsidy hurts two sides’ benefits instead.     

Education, trade and investment liberalizations

Empirical evidence suggests a two-way causality between skilled labor and inward direct investment. I construct a general equilibrium model that allows for endogenous firm and plant-location decisions and the endogenous accumulation of skilled labor. I examine the effect of an education subsidy when trade is liberalized and investment is restricted and vice versa. For an initially skilled-labor-scarce country, I show that an education subsidy under investment liberalization can jump the economy to a high-level equilibrium, and that it may be possible to remove the subsidy completely and remain at the superior equilibrium.     

Rivalry in uncertain export markets: commitment versus flexibility

This paper examines optimal trade policy in a two-period oligopoly model, with a home and a foreign firm choosing capital and output. Demand uncertainty, resolved in period two, gives rise to a trade-off between strategic commitment and flexibility in the firms’ investment decisions. Firms’ investment timing is endogenous and can be manipulated by the home government, which sets a subsidy before firms decide when to invest. We show that when the government wishes to manipulate investment timing, it will choose its policy to deter investment commitment by the home or the foreign firm.     

The impact of public R&D subsidy on small firm productivity: evidence from Korean SMEs

This paper explores the effects of R&D promotion policy on SME performance. We use a large panel data set on public R&D subsidies to Korean manufacturing firms. We control for counterfactual outcomes employing the DID (difference in differences) estimation procedure as well as for the endogeneity of the R&D investment and the R&D subsidy using the 2-stage Tobit/Logit DPD (dynamic panel data) procedure. We find significant evidence for positive effects of the public R&D subsidy on both the R&D expenditure and the value added productivity of Korean manufacturing SMEs. The policy thus appears to have been successful in fostering technological advancement and in promoting economic growth.     

Trade patterns,unemployment and growth

This paper analyses the implications of a minimum wage in an open economy two-sector model where the effect of growth on trade and unemployment is explicitly determined. The first-best policy is a wage subsidy to all employment while the second-best policy is a production tax cum subsidy. In the absence of policy intervention it is shown that growth in the short run results in decreasing unemployment for the home country if it is specialized in consumption goods or incompletely specialized provided that the minimum wage is binding. If the economy is specialized in investment goods, then unemployment may increase initially but as growth continues the minimum wage no longer remains binding and full employment is restored. In the long run by examining the dynamic interaction between trade and growth it is possible for the economy to be incompletely specialized with unemployment. If the economy specializes in consumption goods, it is possible for the economy to attain full employment.     

Dynamic Agency and Investment Theory under Model Uncertainty

We extend dynamic agency and investment theory by incorporating model uncertainty. As concerns regarding model uncertainty induce a trade‐off between incentives and ambiguity sharing, the principal tends to delay the cash payout to the agent. We find model uncertainty lowers the firm value, the average q and marginal q, where q is defined as the ratio between a physical asset's market value and its replacement value. Furthermore, model uncertainty leads to insufficient investment, which provides an alternative explanation for under‐investment. Finally, the optimal pay‐performance sensitivity of the agent's continuation value to the firm's output is state dependent and exceeds the lower bound when it is close to the payout boundary.     

Subsidies for FDI: Implications from a model with heterogeneous firms

This paper analyzes the welfare effects of subsidies to attract multinational corporations when firms are heterogeneous in their productivity levels. I show that the use of a small subsidy raises welfare in the FDI host country, with the consumption gains from attracting more multinationals exceeding the direct cost of funding the subsidy program through a tax on labor income. This welfare gain stems from a selection effect, whereby the subsidy induces only the most productive exporters to switch to servicing the host's market via FDI. I further show that for the same total subsidy bill, a subsidy to variable costs delivers a larger welfare gain than a subsidy to the fixed cost of conducting FDI, since a variable cost subsidy also raises the inefficiently low output levels stemming from each firm's markup pricing power.     

Licensing versus direct investment: implications for economic growth

We develop a symmetric two country model of foreign direct investment (FDI) that captures the internalization decision and its implications for both the rate and magnitude of innovations. When mode choice (licensing versus FDI) is fixed, a subsidy to multinational production increases the rate but decreases the size of innovations. When mode can switch, the rate and size of innovations both increase, provided the subsidy is not too large. Although innovation size decreases for industries where firms already were choosing FDI, innovation size increases for industries where firms switch from licensing to FDI because multinationals choose larger innovations than licensors.     

A Signalling Model of Firms' Foreign Direct Investment Relocation Decision

We analyse whether the foreign government can influence the multinational firm's relocation decision, through signalling the amount of subsidy it can grant. The foreign country is one of two possible types which differ on their investment conditions. Comparing the results obtained with an adverse selection model (the government knows the country type but the firm does not) with the results of a signalling model, we conclude that relocation is more likely, and the necessary subsidy is smaller, in the signalling model than with adverse selection. This can explain the proliferation of Investment Support Agencies worldwide.     

浅析黑龙江省农业循环经济发展现状及方向

当前,黑龙江省农业循环经济发展存在的主要问题是,农民文化水平偏低、基层领导干部利用循环经济的思想意识缺乏,财政补贴、资金支持不到位,废弃物规模化利用水平不够,绿色有机农产品的市场需求不足。提高区域农业循环经济发展水平,应加强宣传教育力度,完善财政补贴制度、稳定资金投入,建立无害化设施农业生态模式,加快循环农业技术支撑体系建设,通过生态农业与有机农业等生产模式的推广,提高农村能源的利用效率。     

BETTER THAN DYNAMIC MEAN‐VARIANCE: TIME INCONSISTENCY AND FREE CASH FLOW STREAM

As the dynamic mean‐variance portfolio selection formulation does not satisfy the principle of optimality of dynamic programming, phenomena of time inconsistency occur, i.e., investors may have incentives to deviate from the precommitted optimal mean‐variance portfolio policy during the investment process under certain circumstances. By introducing the concept of time inconsistency in efficiency and defining the induced trade‐off, we further demonstrate in this paper that investors behave irrationally under the precommitted optimal mean‐variance portfolio policy when their wealth is above certain threshold during the investment process. By relaxing the self‐financing restriction to allow withdrawal of money out of the market, we develop a revised mean‐variance policy which dominates the precommitted optimal mean‐variance portfolio policy in the sense that, while the two achieve the same mean‐variance pair of the terminal wealth, the revised policy enables the investor to receive a free cash flow stream (FCFS) during the investment process. The analytical expressions of the probability of receiving FCFS and the expected value of FCFS are derived.     

政府研发补贴、融资约束与企业创新绩效——基于所有权性质视角

政府研发补贴是克服研发市场失灵，促进企业研发活动的重要手段之一。然而，目前鲜有关于考察政府研发补贴、融资约束以及所有权性质对企业创新绩效的复杂关系研究。基于2001-2018年间我国上市制造业企业数据分析，结果表明：首先，政府研发补贴和融资约束对企业创新绩效的影响取决于企业所有制性质，国有企业的创新绩效受其影响最为显著。其次，企业在接受政府研发补贴后，其融资约束的程度都会被减缓；与国有企业相比，政府研发补贴对民营企业融资约束的缓解更强。最后，对任何所有权性质的企业而言，政府研发补贴都会挤出企业的研发投资。     

Greenfield FDI,cross-border M&As,and government size

This study examines the effects of greenfield foreign direct investment (FDI) and cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&As) on government size in host countries of FDI. Using panel data for up to 130 countries for the period from 2003 to 2011, the study specifically tests the compensation hypothesis, suggesting that by increasing economic insecurity, economic openness leads to larger government size. It is found that greenfield FDI increases labour market volatility and thereby economic insecurity while M&As are not significantly associated with labour market volatility. The main results of this study are that greenfield FDI has a robust positive effect on government size, while M&As have no statistically significant effect on government size in the total sample of developed and developing countries, as well as in the sub-samples of developed and developing countries.     

The Agency Problems Embedded in Firm’s Equity Investment

We find that agency problems are embedded in firm’s excess and abnormal equity investments that are mainly dictated by controlling shareholder’s motives and ethical choices manifested in ownership and board structure. The excess equity investment is gauged with respect to industry average. The abnormal equity investment is specifically referred to the number of nominal investment companies that are fully controlled by the controlling owners while subject to little governance. Our empirical evidences of 345 Taiwanese non-financial listed firms show that firm’s excess and abnormal equity investments are negatively correlated with controlling shareholder’s cash flow rights while are positively correlated with the control–cash flow deviation, and board affiliation. The results are supportive of the positive incentive hypothesis and the negative entrenchment hypothesis put forth by La Porta et al. (2002, Journal of Finance 57, 1147–1171) and Claessen et al. (2002, Journal of Finance 57, 2741–2742). The negative relation between equity investment and firm’s value further supports the agency postulation that corporate excess and abnormal equity investments represent a leeway for controlling shareholder to exploit wealth of minority shareholders. This study potentially contributes to the literature of business ethics by portraying an empirically testable linkage from controlling owner’s ethical choices to his actions and therefore firm’s value. Yin-Hua Yeh, Ph.D., is Professor and Director of the Graduate Institute of Finance at Fu-Jen Catholic University (FJU) in Taiwan. He is also the Director of the Center for Corporate Governance and Business Ethics at FJU. His main research and teaching areas are corporate governance, corporate finance, and merger and acquisition. Tsun-Siou Lee, Ph.D., is Professor of Finance at National Taiwan University. His main research and teaching areas are corporate governance, futures and options, and financial innovation. Pei-Gi Shu, Ph.D., is Professor of Business Administration at Fu-Jen Catholic University in Taiwan. He is also the Vice Dean of Management College at FJU. His main research and teaching areas are mutual funds and behavioral finance.     

浅析新会计准则下的投资收益

在我国的新会计准则中,投资收益包括长期股权投资收益和金融资产投资收益.新会计准则中引入了公允价值的计量属性,使投资收益核算方法有所改变,但没有改变投资收益的数额.在长期股权投资中,投资收益采用成本法和权益法核算.金融资产的投资收益核算,在持有期间公允价值变动并没有计入投资收益,而是分别计入了公允价值变动科目和资本公积科目,只有在处王时才将公允价值变动损益转入投资收益.投资收益科目体现了新会计准则的核心理念.     

Strategic trade policy with endogenous choice of quality and asymmetric costs

This paper examines strategic trade and joint welfare maximizing incentives towards investment in the quality of exports by an LDC and a developed country. Firms first compete in qualities and then export to an imperfectly competitive, third country market. Under Bertrand competition, unilateral policy involves an investment subsidy by the low-quality LDC and an investment tax by the developed country, whereas jointly optimal policy calls for the reverse so as to reduce price competition by increasing product differentiation. Under Cournot competition, unilateral policy is also reversed from the Bertrand outcome, but jointly optimal policy involves a tax in both countries.     

上游补贴规则:国际反补贴法的重大发展——基于美国商务部实践的考察

上游补贴概念的提出,赋予了补贴更加宽泛的定义和判断标准,将反补贴的价值理念拓展至产品的生产要素领域,从而扩大了反补贴调查的适用范围。而美国商务部在实践中所演绎出的一整套补贴利益传递分析方法,则为抵消上游补贴对自由竞争造成的损害确立了可供操作的、相对严格的规则框架,是对国际反补贴法的重大发展。我国亟需深入研究和借鉴美国上游补贴的立法和实践。     

补贴策略在网络零售平台竞争中真的有效吗？——基于寡头竞争模型的理论与实证研究

文章基于双边市场理论与经典寡占模型，在推导出网络零售平台竞争静态结果的基础上，结合数值模拟方法推导出长期动态最优补贴率的选择，研究补贴策略在网络零售平台竞争中的应用。数理模型推导发现：(1)从短期看，为了在激烈的竞争中“活下去”，网络零售平台通过补贴获得更多用户和更高的市场份额，且消费者价格敏感度越大，补贴率的增加对用户数量增长的促进作用越大；(2)从动态和长期看，为实现可持续运营，最优补贴力度将随时间变化而呈倒U形变动趋势--即初始阶段逐步提高补贴力度，过了某个时段后将逐渐平缓降低补贴力度。文章选取中国三个主要网络零售平台上市财报数据进行经验分析，证实了数理模型推导出的主要结论。文章回答了网络零售平台是否应采取补贴策略、补贴力度的确定以及补贴力度如何随时间而变化等基本问题，对理解网络零售平台补贴策略的基本逻辑，对优化网络零售平台治理，均有重要的借鉴价值。     

The effect of the WIC program on consumption patterns in the cereal category

The Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC) is a federally-funded food assistance program for low income participants who are at nutritional risk. Beneficiaries receive vouchers for specific foods and brands, selected for their nutritional value. While the program is designed to improve nutrition, it may also induce changes in consumption behavior that persist beyond participation in the program. In this paper, we study how participation in WIC impacts the consumption patterns and preferences during and after the program. Our analysis focuses on the cereal category, in which the subsidized brands must meet certain nutritional guidelines. As expected, during the program households increase cereal consumption volume and shift their choices towards the WIC-approved brands. More interesting is that once households exit the program, the higher category consumption rate and elevated share of WIC brands persist. To understand the behavioral mechanism underlying these consumption patterns, we estimate a choice model and find an increased preference for WIC brands after controlling for state dependence. The evidence suggests that this targeted food subsidy program is effective in creating behavior change that persists even after the incentive is withdrawn.