Cooperative and non-cooperative R&D and trade costs

We examine the effect of trade liberalization on the level and mode of R&D in an international duopoly setting. Firms have the choice to invest in R&D either independently or cooperatively. A reduction in trade cost increases R&D irrespective of the mode of R&D. However, an increase in spillovers has ambiguous effects on R&D. More precisely, we find that an increase in spillover leads to higher R&D activity under cooperation but lower R&D activity under non-cooperation. Concerning cooperation versus non-cooperation, we find that firms prefer cooperation only if trade costs are low. Consumers are better off under cooperation if spillovers are high. We find that there can be a mismatch between private and social incentives. If spillovers are low and trade costs are low then cooperation might be privately profitable but socially undesirable. On the other hand, if there are large spillovers and high trade costs then cooperation may be socially desirable but not privately profitable.     

Distribution Channel Management in an Internet Age: Equilibrium and Social Welfare

This paper considers the conditions under which a monopoly manufacturer selling through independent retailers in a spatial market will add an Internet distribution channel (an e-channel), and analyzes the effect this would have on consumer surplus and social welfare. We find that an e-channel will be added only if consumer??s travel costs are high and the e-retailer??s delivery costs are low. Such double-channel operation will decrease consumer surplus if in the pre-entry case the market is fully covered by brick-and-mortar retailers. If instead the market is partially covered and delivery costs are sufficiently high, it will not decrease any consumer??s surplus. When delivery costs are low, social welfare will be improved by profitable double-channel operation even if consumer surplus is harmed by it. Finally, double-channel operation could be Pareto superior even if delivery costs are high.     

Endogenous market structures and the gains from foreign direct investment

This paper discusses the gains from liberalizing foreign direct investment (FDI) in a two-country setting with endogenous market structure. We investigate two different scenarios. In the first scenario, headquarters costs are large in the foreign country so that the industry is located in the domestic country only. In this case, multinational and national firms may coexist and market concentration may make FDI welfare improving for the foreign country and welfare reducing for the domestic country. In the second scenario, headquarters costs are symmetric and firms will be located in both countries. Here, profitable FDI activities lead to mutual welfare gains, irrespective of market structure effects.     

Testing competing destinations gravity models – evidence from BRIC International

This paper derives and compares two competing-destinations formulation of the gravity model applied to trade in intermediates. We build a probabilistic input demand function from entropy maximization in which firms may purchase some of their inputs from other firms paying the required transport costs and accounting for the spatial structure of trading partners in a geographical system. In the second model, firms trade inputs to reduce the overall cost of production and intermediate sales are encouraged by low distance costs and low competition from alternative input sources. Even if the gravity equations look similar, we show that their underlying structures are different, and that the type of gravity equation has significant implications for the estimation technique adopted.     

Company Taxation and Merger Incentives in International Oligopoly: on International Policy Coordination with Strategic Trade

We analyse how national taxation of firms is likely to affect merger incentives in international markets. In particular, we ask whether non-coordinated trade policies stimulate cross-border mergers that are overall inefficient, and if this then is an argument for international coordination of such policies? We address this issue in a setting where policy makers use two-part tariffs to tax exporting firms. The analysis reveals that while non-coordinated policies may induce cross-border mergers by allowing the firms in question to play national policy makers out against each other, this can nevertheless be overall welfare enhancing compared to market outcomes under coordinated policy making.     

Trade and the location of industries: Some new results

We study a two-country two-sector model with free entry and monopolistic competition where both industries use labour to produce differentiated goods. The two countries are identical except for size. Labour is freely mobile across industries but it cannot move internationally. Transport costs affect both industries. The location of industries and the pattern of trade are the results of the interaction of two effects: the home market effect and the wage differential effect. The main results are: (i) if the two countries are sufficiently close in size and demand elasticities differ across industries (transport costs being equal), a continuous fall in transport costs from a prohibitive level to zero is associated with a reversal in the pattern of trade at some intermediate level. For large transport costs, the large country is a net exporter of the more differentiated good. For lower transport costs, the large country becomes a net exporter of the less differentiated good; (ii) if the two countries are very different in size and demand elasticities differ across industries (transport costs being equal), the larger country is always a net exporter of the less differentiated good.     

The Factor Content of Heterogeneous Firm Trade

The present paper studies the factor content of heterogenous firm trade in the presence of market imperfections and transaction costs. The conceptual framework builds on a relative factor endowment model, which we extend to account for firm heterogeneity and transaction costs. Using a large panel of firm‐level data for the EU, we are able to examine not only the aggregate factor content of trade but also to identify differences in the factor of trade between heterogenous firms. Our empirical results suggest that because of transaction costs and market imperfections, the factor content of agricultural trade is heavily distorted in the CEE transition economies. To increase the gains of trade and the employed factor rewards, the policy should first address the transaction costs and market imperfections.     

Potential FDI causing large distortions in domestic production

When a foreign firm enters a domestic market, either via exports or through foreign direct investment (FDI), one factor determining the most favourable entrance mode is the profitability of the market, which may not be directly observed by the foreign firm. If the domestic trade protection policy is within a certain range that causes the foreign entrant's decision to swing between the two entry modes, the final choice will depend on the foreign firm's belief about the profitability. In such a situation, a domestic incumbent firm wishing to prevent FDI will heavily distort its production downward to convince the foreign competitor that the market is not profitable. When making trade policy, such strategic behaviour on the part of the domestic firm should be taken into account.     

民商法视野中的合作社

从民商法视角看,作为市场经济的参与者,合作社是人们自愿联合的组织,是平等的自然人、法人等主体之间的联合;合作社的内部制度设计以法人治理结构为基准,但与一般公司法人治理结构并不完全相同;合作社的经营活动具有两重性,合作社与社员之间的交易具有非营利性,而与其他非社员利益主体之间的交易则具有营利性,因此在对外交易活动中必然要受价值规律和市场竞争规律的约束。     

From merchant to merchant-ruler: A structure–conduct–performance perspective of the East India Company's history, 1600–1765

Many nineteenth-century historians claimed that the English East India Company's trade and commercial activities, right from inception, were never really a financially profitable enterprise. This argument is incorporated within an altered structure–conduct–performance (SCP) paradigm to rearticulate the Company's history between 1600 and 1765. Rather than characterising the Company as simply a chartered monopoly, the article instead argues that the market structure in which it operated was competitive or contestable but, at the same time, wrought with high sunk costs and free-riders. This framework allows us to understand why the Company desperately pursued market conduct strategies to gain monopoly and monopsony power in England and India respectively, which simultaneously contributed to its transformation from merchant to merchant-ruler. In this process the Company redefined not merely industry boundaries but also those between industry and state.     

REDISTRIBUTION AND FREE TRADE IN AGRICULTURE: ARE THEY COMPLEMENTARY?

The purpose of the paper is to look at the welfare effects of trade in agricultural goods in a less developed country where the agricultural market is controlled by a handful of large farmers. It is shown that the success of trade reform depends on the distribution of output between large and small farmers and the success of land reform leading to redistribution from the large to the small farmers depends on trade reform. In other words, if undertaken in isolation, each reform might lead to a fall in welfare, but if jointly undertaken, they will lead to an increase in welfare. Thus the two reforms are complementary.     

An empirical assessment of the welfare effects of reciprocal dumping

Can two-way trade in similar products lead to lower welfare than if such trade was banned? Theory answers yes. To empirically investigate this proposition we examine Swedish imports of bottled water. Assuming one-shot (Bertrand and Cournot) competition, we can use the estimates from a structural model of demand to uncover marginal costs. We simulate the effect on consumer and producer surplus of banning imports. We do not find convincing evidence that banning imports would increase overall welfare. Given our choice of market this suggests we should not be overly concerned with the welfare effects of two-way trade in consumer goods that are close to homogenous.     

Social costs of public service obligation routes—calculating subsidies of regional flights in Norway

In this note we describe an iterative procedure of how to estimate unit costs per leg of a public service obligation (PSO) route network if certain data is publicly available. The aim of this approach is to make judgments in benchmarking and in regulation if revenues, costs and profits (or losses) per flight and its distribution among these route networks are typical compared to carriers serving networks under a competitive regime. Particularly this note aims to set a reference for the question, if market or bargaining powers are abused and to which extent. This work is thus especially important for PSO cases where a particular network cannot be operated in a profitable manner; therefore, its routes are offered to monopoly providers in a bidding competition and (in most cases) the service needs to be publicly subsidized. We shall apply the procedure on origin-destination matrices from tender documents published by the Norwegian Ministry of Transport and Communications. The Ministry covers incurred losses produced by the bidding and winning carrier. As a first result we can observe that the PSO allocations show indications of an inefficient allocation process reflected in more than three-fold quoted costs on PSO routes above estimated market levels.     

Barriers to Exporting: What are They and Who do They Matter to?

The international trade literatures on gravity modelling and firm‐level export behaviour have established that nontariff barriers are important impediments to international trade flows. In this paper, we provide fresh evidence on the actual barriers to exports firms face and how they vary with firm‐level characteristics. Our results indicate that the higher the export experience of firms the lower are the trade costs they face. These barriers are not related to other firm‐level characteristics, such as productivity and size, found by the literature to be associated with export market entry. Overall, these results suggest the existence of a process of learning to export whereby firms learn how to cope with export barriers through direct experience in export markets.     

Trade Growth in a Heterogeneous Firm Model: Evidence from South Eastern Europe

In 2007 a free trade area (BFTA) will be created in the Balkans. In this paper we study BFTA‐induced trade growth in the SEE. Given that welfare impacts associated with trade growth depend on the growth channels, more goods and varieties exported or at higher price or more volume of exported goods and varieties, we study the structure of integration‐induced export growth in the Balkans. Given that no firm‐level trade data is available for the Balkans, we adopt the heterogeneous firm framework, which allows to decompose aggregate trade growth into intensive margin of trade and extensive margin of trade using only aggregate trade data. Our empirical findings predict that the BFTA would primarily increase the export volume through a growing number of shipments (the extensive margin of trade) suggesting that the actual welfare gains from the trade growth in the Balkans might in fact be larger than predicted in previous trade studies. We also found that reducing variable trade costs leads to higher export growth rates compared to reducing fixed trade costs by the same percentage.     

Political Connections,Government Intervention and Acquirer Performance in Cross‐border Mergers and Acquisitions: an Empirical Analysis Based on Chinese Acquirers

The extant literature suggests that the political connections enjoyed by Chinese acquiring firms have both positive and negative effects on their performance in cross‐border mergers and acquisitions (CBMA). We employed firm‐level data on Chinese acquirers from 2001 to 2012, demonstrating that the effect of political connections on mergers and acquisitions performance is determined by external government intervention. Holding the level of political connections constant, the greater the degree of government intervention is, the worse the acquirer's performance in cross‐border mergers and acquisitions will be. We also demonstrated that political connections affect acquirer performance in cross‐border mergers and acquisitions through the channel of preferential access to bank financing, and the acquiring firms' high cash holdings, which are encouraged by the ease of bank financing, have a negative effect on acquirer CBMA performance. Using the Blinder‐Oaxaca decomposition, we investigated changes in the Chinese acquirers' performance following changes in the external policy environment in 2008 and the effect of political connections and other factors on this change.     

Long‐term information,short‐lived securities

The authors explore strategic trade in short‐lived securities by agents who have private information that is potentially long‐term, but do not know how long their information will remain private. Trading short‐lived securities is profitable only if enough of the private information becomes public prior to contract expiration; otherwise the security will worthlessly expire. How this results in trading behavior fundamentally different from that observed in standard models of informed trading in equity is highlighted. Specifically, it is shown that informed speculators are more reluctant to trade shorter‐term securities too far in advance of when their information will necessarily be made public, and that existing positions in a shorter‐term security make future purchases more attractive. Because informed speculators prefer longer‐term securities, this can make trading shorter‐term contracts more attractive for liquidity traders. The conditions are characterized under which liquidity traders choose to incur extra costs to roll over short‐term positions rather than trade in distant contracts, providing an explanation for why most longer‐term derivative security markets have little liquidity and large bid‐ask spreads. © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Jrl Fut Mark 26:465–502, 2006     

Barbarians at the Gates: State Control of Global Mergers and Acquisitions

Cross‐border mergers and acquisitions are a major and often politicised component of foreign direct investment. Using data on individual transactions between 1970 and 2006, we examine the restrictions countries place on mergers and acquisitions, whether they use these controls to discriminate against foreigners seeking to acquire domestic firms, and what factors may predict the propensity to block foreign entry by this method of direct investment. Drawing partly on the existing literature, we test hypotheses that state intervention can be explained by characteristics of the countries whose firms are targeted by acquirers, including per capita income, democracy, trade exposure, market size, government share of national income and industrial structure. Although democracy, trade exposure and high government expenditure are associated with more stringent merger control laws, none of these attributes cause states to discriminate against cross‐border mergers. Countries with high per capita incomes, large markets and strict merger control laws, do use those regulations to discourage foreign acquirers. A second set of tests, based on observations of individual deals, rather than national aggregates, reveal that governments are particularly averse to foreigners acquiring firms that are bankrupt or in the defence sector. Overall, governments do treat cross‐border mergers and acquisitions differently, and use their merger control laws to discriminate against foreign investors, particularly with respect to certain types of transactions.     

Increasing returns, multinationals and geography of preferential trade agreements

This paper uses a model of horizontal multinational enterprises to explore the relationship between transportation costs and trade policy cooperation. Tariffs have the effect of attracting foreign direct investment to the benefit of consumers in the host country. As transport costs fall, the incentive to impose tariffs falls and the benefits to cooperation rise. Thus, in a repeated game in which cooperation is limited by a self-enforcement constraint, a reduction in transport costs facilitates free trade. This logic is applied to a three-country model to examine preferential trade agreements. It is found that if any country is too distant from the others, then global free trade is not attainable. Rather, if two of the countries are within a critical distance of each other and distant from the third country, then the unique outcome is an exclusive free trade agreement between the two adjacent countries. Thus, the model predicts a strong regional bias in preferential trade agreements.     

我国外贸出口将逐步陷入长期困境

2011年下半年以来,我国外贸出口增长率急剧下降,2012年2月还出现了多年未见的贸易逆差。通过对宏观经济的全面研究,由于我国物流成本居高不下,人力、资源、土地、环境等成本不断增长,主要出口目的地欧美市场萎靡不振、新兴市场开发缓慢,替代竞争者成长迅速,税收体系不合理,生产效率低下,人民币持续升值,这些都必将导致我国外贸出口越来越陷入困境。要解决这些问题,我国经济必须在制度层面进行彻底改革,进行产业升级,开发出一系列能够带动我国乃至世界经济走出困境的新兴产业,占领世界经济发展的制高点。