Proxy variable estimation of productivity and efficiency

We model productivity and inefficiency jointly, instead of modeling and estimating either only productivity or only inefficiency with many variable and quasi-fixed inputs. In the first model, we use a multi-step procedure. We use the proxy variable method based on the first-order condition (FOC) of expected profit maximization with respect to the single variable input to take care of the endogeneity problem arising from both productivity and inefficiency. To separate mean inefficiency from mean productivity we assume them nonparametric functions of different sets of exogenous variables. In the second model, we consider a novel system consisting of the production function and the FOCs of expected profit maximization for the multiple variable inputs. Distributional assumptions are made on all the random errors associated with the production function, the FOCs, productivity, and inefficiency functions in the second model. We use the Colombian food manufacturing data as an application of our model.     

Elasticities of derived demand under different objectives of the firm

Conclusions We have reconciled and generalized earlier comparisons of input demand elasticities under different objective functions of the firm. In general little can be said of the relative magnitudes of the elasticities under different objectives, since different goals usually imply different levels of production and input demand. With some simplifying assumptions about the technology we can conclude that a profit-constrained, utility-maximizing firm tends to have higher input demand elasticities than a profit-maximizing firm facing the same cost and demand functions. This tendency is reinforced by a high profit requirement, decreasing returns to scale and slowly falling demand elasticity for the output. The results may help to explain differences in the stability of employment between industries,. Scherer [1980, pp. 365–67] reports that some studies have found an inverse relation between market concentration and stability of employment, which is contrary to the expected result. One may argue that in concentrated industries the firms are likely to have organizational slack or to face an inelastic product demand curve. Hence demand for factors of production should be less elastic than in more competitive industries. We have shown, however, that deviations from profit maximization may lead to higher input demand elasticities. Since non-profit-maximizing goals are likely to be more common in concentrated industries, the observed instability of employment may be partly due to the high elasticity of derived demand. Although the type of alternative goals studied in this paper may not be realistic in practice, the analysis shows nevertheless that goals of the firm may be one factor in explaining differences in the stability of employment.     

经济发展与国有商业银行利润效率

体制改革中国有商业银行盈利能力备受瞩目,以往认为盈利能力差的国有商业银行在世界金融危机期间成为世界最赚钱的银行。本文从不完全竞争厂商利润最大化角度设定随机前沿法利润效率分析模型,以财务盈利能力指标ROAA作为第三方检验标准,分析了1996至2010年我国商业银行利润效率与经济发展指标之间的联系。结果表明:国有商业银行利润效率历经高速增长2003年开始高于其他股份制商业银行;国有商业银行利润效率与GDP增长率和固定资产投资增长率强相关,与消费增长率弱相关;而股份制商业银行利润效率与宏观经济指标相关度弱。由此推断,后危机时代经济增长速度减缓将对国有商业银行利润效率形成较强冲击,而对股份制商业银行影响小,同时消费领域可能成为未来国有商业银行新的利润增长点。     

Privatization, Incentive Delegation and Foreign Direct Investment

Despite the empirical relevance, the privatization literature paid little attention to the effects of the owner-manager relationship and the implications of foreign direct investment (FDI). We focus on these aspects, and show the relationship between privatization and greenfield FDI when the owners design strategic managerial incentive contracts. We show that there is complementarity between privatization and greenfield FDI. Whether incentive delegation (compared to no incentive delegation) increases the degree of privatization in the presence of FDI is ambiguous; it depends on whether the degree of privatization that attracts FDI is higher or lower than the degree of privatization that maximizes domestic welfare under FDI.     

Optimal R&D Policy and Managerial Delegation Under Vertically Differentiated Duopoly

The paper investigates the optimal research and development (R&D) policy in a vertically differentiated market with managerial delegation. We consider not only discriminatory R&D policy but uniform R&D policy as well. It shows that R&D policy can vary depending on the regulator's objective: social welfare, consumer surplus or producer surplus; however, the outcomes are invariant to the nature of market competition. Undoubtedly, the relative‐performance contract plays a crucial role for elaborating policy effects. The government prefers discriminatory R&D policy to uniform policy under a consumer‐oriented objective. On the contrary, under a producer‐oriented objective, the government would prefer to choose uniform R&D policy rather than discriminatory policy.     

Profit taxation and capital accumulation in a dynamic oligopoly model

We illustrate a differential oligopoly game using the capital accumulation dynamics à la Ramsey. We evaluate the effects of profit taxation, proving that there exists a tax rate yielding the same steady state social welfare as under social planning. Contrary to the static approach, our dynamic analysis shows that, in general, profit taxation affects firms’ decisions concerning capital accumulation and sales. In particular, it has pro-competitive effects provided that the extent of delegation is large enough (and conversely).     

策略性管理授权下混寡模型中的税收选择——基于公营厂商视角

在公营厂商经营效率低于私营厂商的假设条件下,公营厂商作为一般经济体,与私营厂商并无区别。文章则放松这一假设,并将公营厂商视为兼顾自身利润和消费者剩余的经济体。加入考量公营厂商对其经理人选择管理授权后,通过设计具有一般性反需求函数的三阶段非合作赛局,求解子博弈完美均衡从而得到最优税率并且最大化社会福利。研究发现,如果公营厂商对其经理人的策略性管理授权接近于政府的目标函数,而且公营厂商所有者没有全部占有消费者剩余,那么,相对于混和寡占模型中的私营厂商和传统古诺竞争而言,政府对公营厂商课税的最适税率较低反而有利于增加社会福利。     

技术资本营运活动分析

营运活动是企业利润的来源,而如何以最小的成本实现技术资本的高效运转,创造最大的收益是技术资本营运管理的目标。而要实现这个目标,首先需要把握技术资本的属性。在此基础上,让每一项技术资本都参与到企业的经营运转。参与企业营运活动的技术资本分为管理型技术资本、生产型技术资本和产品型技术资本,营运特点各异。其中,产品型技术资本的营运最为关键,直接决定了新产品的价值含量。     

Free entry equilibria with positive profits: A unified approach to quantity and price competition games

Free entry equilibria are usually characterized by the zero profit condition. We plead instead for a strict application of the Nash equilibrium concept to a symmetric simultaneous game played by actual and potential entrants, producing under decreasing average cost. Equilibrium is then typically indeterminate, with a number of active firms varying between an upper bound imposed by profitability and a lower bound required by sustainability. We use a canonical model with strategies represented by prices, although covering standard regimes of quantity and price competition, to show that in equilibrium the critical (profit maximizing) price must lie between the break-even and the limit prices.     

The Effect of Information Systems on Honesty in Managerial Reporting: A Behavioral Perspective*

This study examines the behavioral impact of an information system, and how that impact varies with the information system's precision, in an internal reporting environment. We propose that a manager's reporting decisions are affected by his or her trade‐off of the benefits of appearing honest against the benefits of misrepresentation. The information system affects the manager's trade‐off by improving the owner's ability to make an inference regarding the manager's level of honesty. Thus, to the extent that the manager perceives benefits to appearing honest, the presence of an information system can increase managerial honesty. As the information system becomes more precise, however, the manager must forgo greater benefits of misrepresentation in order to achieve the same appearance of honesty. For managers under a precise system, this will shift the trade‐off decision toward the benefits of misrepresentation and away from the benefits of appearing honest. Notably, in our experiment, the only benefit of appearing honest is an intrinsically motivated desire for social approval. We find that, although the existence of an information system increases managerial honesty, honesty is lower under a precise than under a coarse information system. We also compare profit earned by the owners in our experiment, which relies on a behavioral role of an information system, with the maximum profit theoretically possible given a contractual use of the information system. This comparison suggests that, unless the available information system is sufficiently precise, the owner will obtain greater profits by not contracting on its output, even if that output is fully contractible.     

Private Predecision Information,Performance Measure Congruity,and the Value of Delegation*

We use a linear contracting framework to study how the relation between performance measures used in an agent's incentive contract and the agent's private predecision information affects the value of delegating decision rights to the agent. The analysis relies on the idea that available performance measures are often imperfect representations of the economic consequences of managerial actions and decisions, and this, along with gaming possibilities provided to the agent by access to private predecision information, may overwhelm any benefits associated with delegation. Our analytical framework allows us to derive intuitive conditions under which delegation does and does not have value, and to provide new insights into the linkage between imperfections in performance measurement and agency costs.     

PRODUCTIVE EFFICIENCY IN THE IVORIAN MANUFACTURING SECTOR: AN EXPLORATORY STUDY USING A DATA ENVELOPMENT ANALYSIS APPROACH

The African industrial structure is characterized by firm‐size heterogeneity with the coexistence of small, if not micro, enterprises in the informal sector and large formal organizations operating with modern technology. In this paper, using the Data Envelopment Analysis production frontier methodology, we investigate the technical efficiency of Ivorian manufacturing firms in four sectors of economic activity: textiles and garments, metal products, food processing, and wood and furniture. Efficiency scores are adjusted to take into account the impact of the external operating environment. These scores are then broken down into three elements: the purely managerial effect, the impact of the scale of production, and a technological effect capturing the potential gain that could result from the adoption of modern technology by small informal organizations. Not only formal activities prove to be more efficient in scaling their production but also, they greatly benefit from their modem technology.     

Organization and economic behavior: An interpretation of recent findings

Conclusion Institutionalist theorists have long suggested that market power creates managerial discretion to diverge from competitive norms — for good or for bad [Spechler, 1978]. Where differences appear among them on how to conceptualize the objective, Baumol [1967] and Eichner [1976] have argued for growth maximization (subject to a minimum profit constraint), while Galbraith [1973] and the Carnegie “school” [see Cyert, March, 1963] have preferred an indeterminate combination of security, growth, prestige, and so forth.     

环境规制、技术距离与异质性企业研发选择

文章从技术异质性角度,指出环境规制产生的利润削弱效应和摆脱规制效应下,异质性企业有不同的研发选择。环境规制一方面会削弱企业研发的边际收益,不利于企业研发;另一方面也会刺激企业增加研发以摆脱环境规制成本。这两种效应在不同技术企业中的差异会导致异质性企业截然不同的研发选择。为此,文章首先构建一个理论模型,推导出环境规制产生的利润削弱效应和摆脱规制效应下,不同技术企业的研发选择。发现对于高生产率企业,环境规制产生的摆脱规制效应超过利润削弱效应,环境规制力度增加会刺激企业增加研发;而对于低生产率企业,环境规制产生的利润削弱效应起主导作用,环境规制力度增加反而阻碍企业研发。进一步利用环境规制的政策实验和工业企业微观数据,对以上观点进行实证检验。发现环境规制对企业研发的影响取决于其所处的技术水平,这不仅体现在集约边际企业的研发投入上,也体现在广延边际企业是否研发的选择上。集约边际上,环境规制增加了高生产率企业的研发投入,但这种作用随着企业与技术前沿的距离增加而递减,最终逆转为减少低生产率企业研发投入。广延边际上,环境规制使低生产率企业相对高生产率企业进入研发的概率更低,而退出研发的概率却更高。     

中小企业贷款利率偏高的理论解释与经验证据

现有贷款定价理论一般认为商业银行应该对中小企业贷款实行高定价以实现当期收益最大化,却对中小企业后续业务价值缺乏考虑。本文认为后续业务价值可以用期权收益表示,进而利用期权定价方法构建了同时考虑当期收益和期权收益的贷款定价模型,并以广东省某股份制商业银行2011年中小企业贷款数据为基础进行了实证应用与比较。分析结果表明,当前市场条件下商业银行没有综合考虑中小企业贷款后期权风险与价值的合理匹配,商业银行对中小企业短期贷款利率水平偏高,而长期贷款又过度集中于传统行业并有定价偏低迹象。总体而言,商业银行高估了中小企业短期贷款风险制定了较高贷款利率,这可能超过了中小企业融资负担承受能力,并进一步阻碍中小企业发展壮大与商业银行后续业务拓展。     

垄断市场情况下企业中间产品的内部转移定价分析

随着企业集团的不断发展,企业内部的交易也越来越多,内部转移价格也成了影响企业责任中心业绩评价的一个重要因素。如何正确的确定企业内部产品的转移价格,对企业的经营和营利有着至关重要的影响,本文主要论述了中间产品在市场上处于垄断情况下的企业内部转移价格的制定的影响因素以及在各种因素的影响下如何选择适合的内部转移价格,从而使公司实现利润的最大化。     

中小企业贷款利率偏高的理论解释与经验证据

现有贷款定价理论一般认为商业银行应该对中小企业贷款实行高定价以实现当期收益最大化,却对中小企业后续业务价值缺乏考虑。本文认为后续业务价值可以用期权收益表示,进而利用期权定价方法构建了同时考虑当期收益和期权收益的贷款定价模型,并以广东省某股份制商业银行2011年中小企业贷款数据为基础进行了实证应用与比较。分析结果表明,当前市场条件下商业银行没有综合考虑中小企业贷款后期权风险与价值的合理匹配,商业银行对中小企业短期贷款利率水平偏高,而长期贷款又过度集中于传统行业并有定价偏低迹象。总体而言,商业银行高估了中小企业短期贷款风险制定了较高贷款利率,这可能超过了中小企业融资负担承受能力,并进一步阻碍中小企业发展壮大与商业银行后续业务拓展。     

Endogenous production of R&D and stable economic development

Summary Changes in production technology are usually a result of R&D efforts. In this paper a model is presented in which technological change emanates from production factors used for R&D. The model consists of two production sectors, one concerned with the production of consumption and investment goods, the other with that of new technologies. By means of this model we analyse the impact of R&D on the level of immediate income and the efficient allocation of production factors over both sectors. Furthermore, the existence of a steady state in this model is examined. It turns out that such a state is only possible under restrictive conditions.     

创业型企业的商业模式研究——基于创业板上市公司的案例研究

文章以深圳证交所创业板首批28家上市公司为研究对象,从价值主张、价值获取及盈利模式三个方面对创业型企业的商业模式进行了研究。研究结果表明,成功的创业型商业模式颠覆了传统商业模式,因而能够获得高成长;其特征是,提供解决方案而不是产品,富有弹性的价值生产方式和价格体系,崭新的细分市场＂深水利润池＂盈利模式。     

城镇化进程中民营旅游景区的盈利模式构建

新型城镇化建设是未来区域经济增长的新引擎,民营资本投资旅游景区成为资本市场的新热点。优化选择盈利模式获取盈利最大化和可持续性是民营旅游景区最关注的话题。目前,伴随旅游市场需求发生深刻的变化,受到城镇化的冲击,民营旅游景区仍面临着政策变动、资产流失和生态失衡等风险,需要通过找准利润点、选择利润源、发现利润杠杆和设计利润屏障等方式对盈利要素进行定位,构建出适合民营旅游景区发展的盈利模式,即综合延伸价值链模式、"醉翁之意不在酒"模式、"新三高"模式和电子商务模式等。