Hostile–vs.–white‐knight bidders

We examine the hypothesis that white knights enter control contests to spend free cash flow instead of paying it out to shareholders. Tobin's q is used to measure management's inclination to invest in negative NPV investments. We find that historically, white knights have over‐invested and their acquisition of the target is one more negative NPV investment. Alternatively, hostile bidders’ past investment decisions have increased shareholder wealth. Furthermore, white knights’ returns upon the announcement of their bid have a significant negative relationship with free cash flow, implying that their bid reveals information about white knights management's investment decisions. Copyright © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Spatial interactions among U.S. cities: 1900–1990

We test implications of economic geography by exploring spatial interactions among U.S. cities. We use a data set consisting of 1900–1990 metro area populations, and spatial measures including distance from the nearest larger city in a higher-tier, adjacency, and location within U.S. regions. We also date cities from their time of settlement. We find that among cities which enter the system, larger cities are more likely to locate near other cities. Moreover, older cities are more likely to have neighbors. Distance from the nearest higher-tier city is not always a significant determinant of size and growth. We find no evidence of persistent non-linear effects on urban growth of either size or distance, although distance is important for city size for some years.