The Shadow Economy in German Regions: An Empirical Assessment

Despite the increasing number of contributions to the literature, regional variations of the shadow economy have been hardly studied. This article analyses the determinants and derives the size of the shadow economy on the district level in Germany. I find that an inferior local labour market and the burden of taxation significantly contribute to the existence of the shadow economy, while a better enforcement of tax rules and regulations has the potential to deter such activities. Districts in the affluent south of Germany experience on average smaller shadow economies.     

US shadow economies: a state-level study

Recent studies of shadow economies focus primarily on cross-country comparisons. Few have examined regional or state-level variations in underground economic activity. This paper presents estimates of the shadow economy for 50 US states over the period 1997–2008. Results suggest that tax and social welfare burdens, labor market regulations, and intensity of regulation enforcement are important determinants of the underground economy. Among the states, Delaware, on average, maintains the smallest shadow economy at 7.28 % of GDP; Oregon, on average, has the second smallest shadow economy at 7.41 % of GDP; followed by Colorado, averaging 7.52 % of GDP, rounding out the three smallest shadow economies in the US West Virginia and Mississippi, on average, have the largest shadow economies in the US as a percent of GDP (9.32 and 9.54 %, respectively).     

Measuring the size of the shadow economy in 30 provinces of China over 1995–2016: The MIMIC approach

Applying the multiple indicators and multiple causes (MIMIC) approach, the present paper measured the size of the shadow economies in China's provinces over 1995–2016. The results show that the average size of the shadow economy in 30 provinces of China increased from 13.55% in 1995 to 14.39% in 2009, and then decreased to 12.30% in 2016. There are obvious variations in the size of the shadow economies in different districts of China. The average size of the shadow economy is lowest in provinces in the eastern district and highest in the western district. In addition, the causes and consequences of the shadow economies in China's provinces have also been analysed using the MIMIC approach, and the results show that tax burden, complexity of the tax system, intensity of regulation, unemployment, employment in the agricultural sector and economic openness have significant positive effects on China's shadow economy, while the ratio of direct taxes to indirect taxes, fiscal autonomy and income levels have significant negative effects on China's shadow economy. Using the growth rate of energy consumption as the benchmark indicator, the MIMIC analysis shows that the shadow economy has significant positive effects on the development of the official economy and income inequality while having a significant negative effect on the labour participation rate.     

Economic Globalisation and Youth Unemployment – Evidence from African countries

The present study seeks to examine the impact of economic globalisation on youth unemployment for 50 African countries between the period 1994 and 2013. In addition to the economic globalisation measurements, the present study controlled the variables that represent the fluctuations in economic activates; demographic changes, a country’s economic size; the quality of governmental institutions; and labour market regulation. The results of the Arellano-Bond (A-B) GMM technique showed that greater openness to global markets would reflect in a lower youth unemployment rate. Furthermore, the results revealed that rigidity in labour market regulations seemed to reduce the youth unemployment rate. In addition, urbanisation seemed to raise the youth unemployment rate. The findings supported contemporary calls to participate in international trade to facilitate the job creation process.     

What ever happened to Germany? Is the decline of the former european key currency country caused by structural sclerosis or by macroeconomic mismanagement?

This paper challenges the institutional sclerosis view of the German crisis according to which rigid labour markets and generous welfare state institutions have driven Germany into its position as ‘Europe's sick man’. In general, the view is not convincing, because the underlying hypotheses about the effects of labour market regulation and welfare state institutions on employment and growth cannot unambiguously be derived from modern labour market theory and are at least partially at odds with accepted empirical findings. In particular, the explanation is unconvincing, because in international comparison Germany's labour market and welfare state institutions are simply not as sclerotic as often supposed. In most of the aggregate indicators for structural rigidities Germany is not worse than the average OECD or EU country. Moreover, there is a macroeconomic explanation focusing on the combined effects of restrictive and pro‐cyclical monetary, fiscal and wage policies in Germany that is broadly consistent with modern macroeconomic theory and is supported by empirical data.     

Market Rigidities and Labour Market Flexibility: An International Comparison

The effects of product and labour market rigidities on labour market dynamics are analysed using a panel of two-digit ISIC level data for seven OECD countries. As expected, employment protection was found to slacken labour market flows. Centralized wage bargaining also reduced the degree of job turnover, although a priori the effect of centralized wage bargaining on labour market flexibility is not clear. Industry subsidies have a positive impact on job reallocation by increasing job creation. The labour market dynamics are also compared in detail for two economies regarded as extremes in terms of regulations, the U.S. and Norway.     

Do fiscal decentralization and income inequality affect the size of the shadow economy? A panel data analysis for OECD countries

In this article, we study fiscal decentralization and inequality as driving forces of the shadow economy in advanced economies. Our empirical analysis suggests that a reduction in income inequality will contain the shadow economy, whereas expenditure and tax decentralization do not significantly impact it. As decentralization is generally believed to increase government efficiency, this result is indicative of already highly efficient public administrations. Our results further indicate that redistributive policies positively affect the size of the shadow economy, whereas the tax burden does not have any discernible effect on the shadow economy in our sample.     

Tax enforcement,tax compliance and tax morale in transition economies: A theoretical model

The focus of this paper is the analysis of the relationship between tax enforcement, tax compliance and tax morale within countries characterised by rapid introduction of market institutions and slow evolution of political regimes, such as transition economies. The paper investigates a coordination game in which the government is ex-ante committed to tax enforcement and can observe the proportion of tax-compliant agents in the economy. In turn, two groups of agents (third-party reporting and self-reported income) are keen to evade taxes unlawfully but have limited information on how many others evade taxes; their tax morale is therefore an endogenous function of agents' perception on tax compliance. The model predicts that the lower the quality of political institutions and the weaker tax morale, the less tax compliance can be achieved. The third-party reporting group will also be bearing higher tax burden than the self-reported income group. The model entails that having political institutions of good quality is not a sufficient condition to conduce to tax enforcement or tax compliance. Due to the endogenous role of tax morale, the government could be pushed ex-post towards poor or no tax enforcement. If good political institutions are not accompanied by good information about the enforcement of tax collection, there is scope for co-existence of poor tax enforcement, low tax compliance and weak tax morale. As such, this model well describes the tax evasion behaviour observed since the outset of transition from planned to market economy.     

SYNCHRONISING DEREGULATION IN PRODUCT AND LABOUR MARKETS

Deregulation typically comes with redistribution of rents and thus with opposition from the losing interest groups. We show that, by exploiting complementarities, synchronising deregulation across markets makes this opposition lower. Indeed, a particular deregulation may reduce rents for one interest group, but may result in gains for another interest group. Synchronising reforms can therefore offer a way out of the ‘sclerosis’ of especially European markets. For this effect, we build a microeconomic model based on two assumptions: Cournot competition à la Vives in the product markets and firms hiring workers in accordance with an efficiency wage in the labour markets. As being particularly relevant for European economies, we focus on product market regulation that determines the degree of market integration and labour market regulation that determines the degree of employment protection.     

Do the catholic and protestant countries differ by their tax morale?

Does the tax morale differ between various countries? The paper introduces a model of tax evasion. The equilibrium shadow production is determined by consumers’ and entrepreneurs’ tax morale, affected by the inherited culture or religion. The model suggests that in the conditions of the prisoners’ dilemma, shadow economies tend to be large once a moral code is violated. The implications of the model are tested in the OECD data on groups of countries with different religious denominations in two regimes, 1979–1992 and 1992–2003. We find evidence on a link between tax morale and shadow market activities, but none to support the view that tax morale differs between the catholic south and protestant north in Europe.     

Dynamic Optimal Taxation with Private Information

We study dynamic optimal taxation in a class of economies with private information. Optimal allocations in these environments are complicated and history-dependent. Yet, we show that they can be implemented as competitive equilibria in market economies supplemented with simple tax systems. The market structure in these economies is similar to that in Bewley (1986) ; agents supply labour and trade risk-free claims to future consumption, subject to a budget constraint and a debt limit. Optimal taxes are conditioned only on two observable characteristics—an agent's accumulated stock of claims, or wealth, and her current labour income. We show that optimal taxes are generally non-linear and non-separable in these variables and relate the structure of marginal wealth and income taxation to the properties of agent preferences.     

Shadow pricing of labour and capital in an economy with unemployed labour

This paper derives the shadow prices of labour and capital to be used in the public sector in a situation of unemployment. The setting considered is that of a three-good, two-period general equilibrium model. Then shadow prices are compared to their corresponding market prices and shown to closely depend on own and cross-elasticities of supply and demand for labour and investment. In the first part, a rigid wage rate is the sole source of distortion; then, a tax on capital income is introduced so that our formula for the social rate of discount can be contrasted with that of Harberger, Sandmo and Drèze.     

The Impact of the Shadow Economy on Indirect Tax Revenues

This paper examines empirically the impact of the shadow economy on indirect tax revenues in an unbalanced panel of 125 countries for the period 1990–2011. The same analysis is conducted excluding at first and then including international trade tax revenues in (total) indirect tax revenues, as a way to disentangle any impact of trade liberalization. In both cases, the results suggest that the size of the shadow economy increases the ratio of indirect tax revenues to GDP, as long as informality does not exceed a cutoff value. When the size of the shadow economy exceeds that level, any further increase affects indirect taxation negatively. The findings are robust to a number of sensitivity tests and when addressing the problem of potential endogeneity. The empirical evidence is in line with the predictions provided by the theoretical framework of the paper.     

Forecasting development outcomes under alternative surplus labour assumptions

Economic forecasts are useful to policymakers both as aids to planning, and as baselines against which counterfactual scenarios can be compared. However, policy makers should be aware that assumptions relating to model structure can influence forecast results. We explore the sensitivity of forecasts to one aspect of model structure important in modelling developing economies: surplus agricultural labour. We outline a framework for modelling surplus agricultural labour that relies on average product remuneration. We embed this within a model of a developing economy (the Philippines) characterized by surplus agricultural labour. We compare the results of two forecasts that differ in their treatment of the agricultural labour market. In the first, the surplus labour theory is activated, establishing average product remuneration in agriculture. In the second, the surplus labour theory is not activated, creating a failure to recognize average product remuneration in agriculture. By comparing the two simulations, we show that failure to model the presence of average product remuneration, when it would be appropriate to do so, has an impact that would be material to economic planners, leading them to: under-estimate agricultural employment; over-estimate GDP growth; and, over-estimate important policy variables (like tax revenue) that are related to GDP growth.     

Creditor protection and the dynamics of the distribution in oligarchic societies

This paper analyzes the impact of weak contracting institutions on economic development and the wealth distribution in a Ramsey-type growth model. We show that, at low levels of accumulation, weak contracting institutions strongly favor the economic elite: By preventing market entry, such institutions provide the “oligarchs” with cheap access to credit—which is highly beneficial as long as capital is scarce. At the same time, a broad cross-section of society faces only low returns so that capital accumulation is slowed down and the capital stock gets concentrated in the hands of the elite. At higher levels of development, however, weak contracting institutions are harmful to all segments of society and institutional reform becomes unanimously supported. So the model helps to explain the pervasiveness of weak contracting institutions in less-advanced economies.     

WHAT DETERMINES THE “LEGAL” QUALITY Of BANK REGULATION AND SUPERVISION?

This article has two contributions. First, using the methodology of Neyapti and Dincer, it provides measures of legal quality of bank regulation and supervision (RS) for a new set of developed and less‐developed countries. Second, it investigates the determinants of RS in view of the hypothesis that the existing institutional environment matters for the quality of formal institutions such as banking laws. The empirical evidence in this article demonstrates that past financial crises and prevailing levels of both financial market development and foreign direct investment inflows affect RS beyond and above the effects of other potential factors, such as macroeconomic performance and good governance. Evidence from transition economies also supports these findings. (JEL E44, G2, K29, O1)     

Monetary Expressions of Labour Time and Market Prices: Theory and Evidence from China,Japan and Korea

This article presents estimates of labour values and prices of production following two approaches: the first is based on the classical and Marxian theory of value and distribution; the second on the so-called ‘new solution’ to the ‘transformation problem’ and its variant, the Temporary Single-System Interpretation (TSSI). The major advantage of the latter approach is its simplicity, along with the relatively low data requirements. Our empirical findings from the economies of China, Japan and South Korea suggest that both approaches give estimates of labour values and prices of production which are extremely close to each other as well as to actual market prices. On further examination, however, we conclude that our empirical findings are absolutely consistent with the theoretical requirements of the classical approach and contradict those of the TSSI.     

Optimal Taxation with a Trade-off Between Income and Children

This paper explores the implications of endogenous fertility for optimal redistributive taxation in the presence of a trade-off between labour income and children. The labour supply is a decreasing function of the desired quantity and quality of children. Since children enter into the parent's budget constraint in a nonlinear form, their shadow prices are directly distorted by the income tax rate. It is shown that the substitution effects of the income tax rate on the quantity and quality of children cannot be signed uniquely although the effect on labour supply is negative. The aggregate substitution effect of the income tax rate on the quantity of children plays an important role in the determination of the signs of the income tax and child subsidy rates at a Rawlsian or Benthamite social welfare optimum.
JEL Classification Numbers: H21, J13, J22     

The impact of fiscal policies on agricultural household decisions

This paper provides a comparative static analysis of farm household's production, consumption, and labor market decisions under alternative tax policies. We explore the implications of non-separable household decisions caused by widespread non-participation in labor, land, financial and/or food markets, as is typical of low income economies. The analytical results indicate that when labor market imperfections occur, most tax-induced responses are ambiguous, mainly due to shadow price effects. This is particularly the case for the labor market and production responses to most tax tools under study, while a decreasing demand for consumption goods appears to be the result in several cases. Furthermore, tax-induced allocation effects may differ between the non-separable and the separable model versions, indicating the potential impact of labor market constraints on farm household responses to tax policies. In particular, standard taxes as well as a land tax may imply production adjustments in the case of non-separability.     

Environmental Tax in a Green Market

We examine the impact of an emission tax in a green market characterized by consumers’ environmental awareness and competition between firms for both environmental quality and product prices. The unique aspect of this model comes from the assumption that the cost for an increase in quality is fixed. We show that the emission tax improves welfare, thanks to a decline in pollution and despite an accentuation of product differentiation. The higher the marginal environmental damage is, the higher the optimal tax will be. The optimal tax, however, becomes lower than the marginal damage when the market is not too large. Finally, when marginal environmental damage is not too low, the optimal tax leads to a green product monopoly.