Competitive Nonlinear Pricing and Contract Variety

We analyze markets with both horizontally and vertically differentiated products under both monopoly and duopoly. In the base model with two consumer types, we identify conditions under which entry prompts an incumbent to expand or contract its low end of the product line. Our analysis offers a novel explanation for the widespread use of ‘fighting brands’ and ‘product line pruning.’ We also extend our analysis to asymmetric firms and three types of consumers and show that depending on the specific environment, entry may lead the incumbent to expand or contract the middle range of its product line (middle contracts). Our results are mainly driven by interactions between horizontal differentiation (competition) and vertical screening of consumers.     

消费契约的双重特性与大企业危机

消费契约具有长期契约特征，不但企业对消费者的购买激励具备投资特征，消费者也会在购买过程中形成专用性资产。通过转移成本壁垒，企业和消费者被封闭在一种双边的长期契约关系当中，这种关系造成了消费契约的相对稳定性。但同时由于契约的不完全性，一旦消费者预期专用性资产变为沉没成本，潜在消费者将转投其他企业，造成企业的迅速倒闭。如果大企业不能采取有效措施，小的失误可能会演变成大的危机；由于大企业存在着危机的外部性．因此需要相应的公共政策。     

A decision model for adopting an extended warranty under different maintenance policies

Numerous products are sold with a warranty period and the possibility of buying an extended warranty for a given additional cost. The buyer has then to decide to take the extended warranty or not when purchasing the product. We develop in this paper a mathematical model to study the opportunity provided by the extended warranty for the buyer as well as for the manufacturer. The total average cost incurred by each side during the product’s life cycle is expressed in order to determine the maximum extra cost the consumer should pay and the minimum price at which the manufacturer should sell the extended warranty. This is done under different options in terms of maintenance strategies adopted during the product’s lifecycle.     

User Toolkits for Innovation: Consumers Support Each Other

User toolkits for innovation were recently proposed as a means to eliminate (costly) exchange of need-related information between users and manufactures in the product development process. The method transfers certain development tasks to users and thereby empowers them to create their own desired product features. This article examines the implications of different levels of opportunities for consumer involvement (OCI) in product development to learn what happens when firms pass design tasks on to consumers. It explores this issue by studying the relation between the employment of user toolkits and the need for firms to support their consumers. An analysis of 78 computer games products and the amount of support given by firms to the consumers of these products suggests that a share of the costs firms save on information acquisition by letting consumers "do it themselves" may eventually reemerge as costs in consumer support. In other words, an increase in opportunities for consumer involvement seems to increase the need for supporting consumers. A promising solution to the problem of support costs is identified, namely, the establishment of consumer–consumer support interaction. A case study of an outlier in terms of firm support to consumers—Westwood Studios—shows that consumers who use toolkits may be willing to support each other. Such interactive problem solving in a firm-established user community is advantageous to the firm, because the process reduces the amount of resources that the firm itself needs to dedicate to the support of consumers using toolkits. Generally, consumer-to-consumer interaction can facilitate problem-solving in the consumer domain, can aid the diffusion of toolkit related knowledge, and potentially can enhance the outcomes produced by the toolkit approach.     

Curbing obfuscation: Empower consumers or regulate firms?

This paper develops a market model where consumers refrain from buying products that they are unable to understand and a firm can influence the probability of a consumer understanding its offer. In equilibrium, firms artificially increase product complexity, and firms that offer more transparent products choose on average higher prices. We study two sets of public policies. We show that consumer side policies may have the unintended consequence of encouraging obfuscation while firm side policies are always effective in curbing obfuscation. Interestingly, a consumer side policy can even harm consumers when it protects consumers so much that it greatly increases the marginal effectiveness of obfuscation. Policies on both sides can either increase or decrease social welfare depending on the marginal effectiveness and the marginal cost of obfuscation. Our main insights hold in both asymmetric and symmetric obfuscation equilibria.     

Competitive targeted online advertising

This paper examines how an online publisher utilizes its information about consumer preference to target advertising. In our model, two firms first bid for a prominent ad position in a publisher-organized position auction, and then compete on price in the subsequent product marketplace. We consider two dimensions of consumer heterogeneity. First, consumers are heterogeneous in product preference. Based on their tastes, some consumers prefer one product over the other, whereas other consumers may rank the products in an opposite order. Second, consumers differ in search preference, i.e., “nonshoppers” only consider the advertised product, while “shoppers” always search both firms’ products before buying. We show that targeted advertising based on product preference will mitigate price competition in product markets as well as competition in position auctions, the latter to the detriment of the publisher. In contrast, targeted advertising based on search preference always benefits the publisher, as the winning firm can charge monopoly prices to nonshoppers. We show that the publisher’s optimal choice is to utilize only the information about consumer search preference. We also explore the welfare implications of targeted advertising based on different types of consumer preference.     

Can collusion promote sustainable consumption and production?

Several competition authorities consider the exemption of horizontal agreements among firms from antitrust liability if the agreements sufficiently promote public interest objectives such as sustainable consumption and production. We show that when consumers value sustainable products and firms choose investments in sustainability before choosing output or prices, coordination of output choices or prices boosts investments in sustainability and may even enhance consumer surplus when products are sufficiently close substitutes and the marginal cost of investment in sustainability is relatively low. By contrast, coordination of investments in sustainability leads to lower investments and harms consumers.     

Market share and warranty costs for renewable warranty programs

A majority of consumer products is associated with some type of warranty. The nature and extent of the warranty affect the sales, market share, costs and profits of many businesses. A warranty can be defined as an assurance from a seller to a buyer that the product sold is guaranteed to perform satisfactorily up to certain length of time, which is the warranty period. In case of product failure within the warranty period, it is assumed that the seller will conform to a rebate policy. In this paper the rebate policy is selected to be linear pro-rata or lump sum. The paper investigates warranty programs that offer customers the option to renew warranty, after an initial period, for a certain premium. The effect of such programs on market share and warranty costs is explored.     

Consumer responses to front-of-package labeling in the presence of information spillovers

Voluntary nutrition labeling, a means of nutrition quality disclosure, was introduced in the U.S. over the last decade by leading food manufacturers, primarily in the form of front-of-package (FOP) labeling. This article examines how consumer responses to FOP labeling via product participation and information spillovers shift consumer demand across competing products. Applying a random coefficient logit demand model to sales data from the U.S. ready-to-eat cereal market (RTEC) empirically confirms a positive participation effect of FOP and a strong negative spillover effect on non-participating products. Further results indicate that the participation and spillover effects are stronger for healthy RTECs than they are for unhealthy ones. Moreover, ignoring such effects leads to underestimation of consumer valuation of FOP labeling for participating products, higher own-price elasticities of demand and lower price-cost margins. The findings also suggest that an incentive in a firm’s voluntary participation in self-regulated labeling programs is to avoid negative treatment externalities and that less health-conscious consumers are not influenced by spillover effects. Overall, this article highlights the importance of including spillover effects in the evaluation of FOP programs and that FOP can play a positive role in improving the healthfulness of consumer choices.     

Product Line Rivalry and Market Segmentation—with an Application to Automobile Optional Engine Pricing

This paper addresses the questions whether and when the pricing practices on base products may differ from those of premium products, sold with options or add-ons. Various alternative models are considered: a monopoly model, a model of brand rivalry with full consumer information and a model of rivalry in which consumers are only well informed about base product prices. Only the brand rivalry model with limited consumer information predicts that premium products have larger percentage markups than base products, provided that brand rivalry is sufficiently intense. Empirical evidence on base and premium product pricing in the automobile market is consistent with the limited information model and inconsistent with the other two models.     

The impact of firm introductory strategies on consumers' perceptions of future product introductions and purchase decisions

In this research, we develop and test a model of the consumer's decision to immediately purchase a technologically advanced product or to delay such a purchase until a future generation of the product is released. We propose that for technologically advancing products, consumers consider both performance lag (how far behind am I now) and expected performance gain (how far ahead will I be if I wait to buy a future expected release) in their purchase decisions. Furthermore, we hypothesize that a firm's past product introductory strategy can significantly influence consumer perceptions of performance lag, performance gain, and the rate at which a product is advancing technologically. We also propose that these perceptions of lag, gain and rate of technological change influence purchase action and ultimately determine whether or not a consumer will delay or immediately purchase a firm's current technological offering. We investigate the above relationships by introducing a model of consumer purchase behavior that incorporates the effects of a firm's frequency and pattern of next generation product introduction, and test the impact of different introductory strategies on performance lag, gain, rate of change perceptions, and purchase action. In our first study we test our model in a monopolistic setting and show that, holding all else fixed, infrequent product upgrades and/or increasing intergenerational release times result in consumers perceiving larger performance lags and gains. We also show that, holding all else fixed, consumers with larger performance lags and/or gains are less likely to delay their purchases of the currently best available product. In our second study we test our model in a competitive setting and show that, holding all else fixed, a firm's past pattern of new product introduction can influence consumers' perceptions of the firm's product's rate of technological change. We also find that consumers are more likely to purchase products which they perceive to have higher rates of technological change. The key insight from this research is that firms have a strategic tool at their disposal that has been overlooked—the pattern of introduction of next generation products. Our findings suggest that a change in the frequency and/or pattern of introduction, in and of themselves, can influence consumers' perceptions of future product introductions, and ultimately influence their purchase actions. Specifically, we demonstrate that by better understanding consumers' purchase timing decisions, firms may be able to induce purchase on the basis of introductory frequency and pattern alone. Additionally, we demonstrate that by strategically managing consumer expectations of future product introductions, firms may be able to decrease the purchase likelihoods of competing products. Implications of our research and its application to the pattern and timing of preannouncements for new products are also explored.     

Anti‐Competitive Interconnection: the effects of the elasticity of consumers' expectations and the shape of the network effects function

I find that interconnection might cause the market to be less competitive, and might lead to an increase in the price firms charge for their product. Absent interconnection, firms compete for a consumer for two reasons. The first reason is to obtain revenue from selling the product to a consumer (as in the case without network effects). The second reason is that by expanding the network by one more consumer, the product becomes more attractive to all other consumers. Interconnection eliminates the second reason—when firms interconnect, they are no longer concerned with consumers' following the crowd. I show that consumers and society might be worse off from interconnection. I focus on two factors that make the (post‐interconnection) price increase larger: consumer expectations that are highly sensitive to prices and consumers putting a high value on small increases in network size at the equilibrium market shares. Both of these factors make firms highly competitive, but only if the firms' products' networks are not interconnected.     

The effects of personal information on competition: Consumer privacy and partial price discrimination

This article studies the effects of consumer information on the intensity of competition. In a two dimensional duopoly model of horizontal product differentiation, firms use consumer information to price discriminate. I contrast a full privacy and a no privacy benchmark with intermediate regimes in which the firms can profile consumers only partially. I show that with partial privacy firms are always better-off with price discrimination: the relationship between information and profits is hump-shaped. In particular, competing firms prefer to target consumers with partial but asymmetric information about preferences. Instead, consumers prefer either no or full privacy in aggregate, but the effects of information on individual surplus are ambiguous: there are always winners and losers. Finally, I study the information acquisition incentives of the firms when there is an external data seller. When this upstream data broker holds partially informative data, an exclusive allocation arises. Instead, when data is fully informative, each competitor acquires consumer data but on a different dimension. These findings are relevant for the strategic decisions of firms active in digital markets and contribute to the policy debate surrounding privacy, exclusive access to data and competition.     

Using performance-based warranties to influence consumer purchase decisions

Abstract

Traditional warranty analysis focuses on the reliability of a product and offers warranty designs that compensate a consumer if the item fails. We introduce the concept of a performance-based warranty (PBW) that guarantees that a product will operate at or above some baseline level of performance, such as a minimum energy efficiency for an appliance. We illustrate how consumer behavior can change in the presence of a PBW and define the parameters for which a manufacturer may increase revenue. Finally, we present an algorithm to solve for the optimal PBW design given a consumer’s belief about the expected performance of the product.     

Consumer Innovativeness and the Use of New versus Extended Brand Names for New Products*

Despite the importance of branding to new product success, little research has been conducted on how individual adoption orientation might affect brand name preferences. This paper draws on the diffusion literature to investigate how consumer innovativeness affects consumer response to alternative branding strategies (i.e., new vs. extended brands, for new products). The results of an empirical study found that consumer innovativeness has a greater effect on new product evaluations for new brand names relative to extended brand names. Also, results indicate that highly innovative consumers evaluate new products with new brand names more favorably than brand extensions. Furthermore, consumer confidence in the new product was found to mediate the effects of consumer innovativeness and its interaction with brand name type on new product evaluation. Implications include not only giving greater managerial consideration to using new brands but also supporting the chosen branding strategy with appropriate promotional efforts for respective adopter groups.     

Should You Really Produce What Consumers Like Online? Empirical Evidence for Reciprocal Voting in Open Innovation Contests

In open innovation, firms increasingly rely on online consumer votes to evaluate ideas for new products and services. Votes can represent cost‐effective external information about idea quality that can inform and facilitate a firm's task of evaluating and screening of ideas at the early stages of the innovation process. Challenging this perception, we proposed that consumer votes provided in open innovation contests can be socially biased by reciprocal voting. On the basis of theories related to cooperation and social influence, we argued that both gregarious consumers (those who solicit social ties) and consumers who initiate direct reciprocity (those who vote for others) signal a willingness to cooperate that stimulates reciprocal voting from peers. We empirically investigated consumer voting behavior using a unique dataset with information obtained from actual open innovation contests in which consumers could submit their own ideas and see and vote for the ideas of others. We found that both gregariousness and the initiation of direct reciprocity positively influence votes received. Such cooperation pays off for consumers because firms indeed use votes to inform internal idea evaluations. We also found, however, that the votes an idea receives during an innovation contest cannot significantly explain its later revealed quality. Reciprocity may be an effective form of cooperation among consumers, but it has potentially negative implications for firms' evaluations. Our results also indicated that beyond reciprocity, consumers and firms value different types of ideas, which further differentiates their evaluations. Thus, firms should not only be aware of social biases in votes but also account for the diverging idea preferences of customers.     

The impact of mandatory trans fat labeling on product mix and consumer choice: A longitudinal analysis of the U.S. Market for margarine and spreads

The impact of changes in food labeling policy on food consumption depends on how market participants—both firms and consumers—react to the changes across all products in the market. We investigate how both responded to the U.S. Food and Drug Administration’s 2006 rule mandating that the quantity of trans fat in food products be separately labeled on the mandatory Nutrition Facts Panel across an entire differentiated product category. Using a longitudinal data set tracking both product offerings and consumer purchases in the market for margarine and spreads for over a decade, we analyze how product mix and consumer purchase behaviors were influenced by the new regulatory requirement. We find that the number of products bearing voluntary “trans fat free” labels increased after the labeling regulation was implemented. However, a large number of the newly introduced products exited the market within five years. As a result, the FDA’s 2006 rule had a stronger short-run than long-run effect on product offerings. Even after the introduction of additional “trans fat free” labeled products, such products remained only a small percentage of margarine and spreads product offerings, increasing from a pre-regulation level of 2.3% of the market to a peak of 6.5% in 2007 before dropping to 3.1% by 2011. In addition to firm response, we examine demand-side reactions to the 2006 rule and find that consumers significantly increased their expenditures on “trans fat free” labeled products soon after the labeling changes were implemented, increasing from about 1.2% of the market in 2001 to a peak of 5.9% in 2007, before returning to 1.8% in 2011. We further explore variations in responses across different demographic characteristics. Although long-run effects are small, the market for “trans fat free” labeled margarine and spreads settled into a new equilibrium with a somewhat higher level of products in the market than prior to the 2006 rule taking effect and a somewhat higher share of expenditures in the category. Overall, our category-wide analysis of both firm and consumer behavior indicates that the effects of the labeling policy change were smaller in the longer run in this market than would be indicated by an analysis of only new product introductions in response to the policy change.     

Referrals in search markets

This paper compares the equilibrium outcomes in search markets with and without referrals. Although it seems clear that consumers would benefit from referrals, it is not at all clear whether firms would unilaterally provide information about competing offers since such information could encourage consumers to purchase the product elsewhere. In a model of a horizontally differentiated product market with sequential consumer search, we show that valuable referrals can arise in the equilibrium: a firm will give referrals to consumers whose ideal product is sufficiently far away from the firm's offering. We allow firms to price-discriminate among consumers, and consumers to misrepresent their tastes. We found that the equilibrium profits tend to be higher in markets with referrals than in markets without. Consumers tend to be better off in the presence of referrals when search costs are not too low, and under a certain parameter range, referrals lead to a Pareto improvement.     

How does income inequality affect market outcomes in vertically differentiated markets?

The distribution of consumer incomes is a key factor in determining the structure of a vertically differentiated industry when consumer's willingness to pay depends on her income. This paper computes the Shaked and Sutton (1982) model for a lognormal distribution of consumer incomes to investigate the effect of inequality on firms' entry, product quality, and pricing decisions. The main findings are that greater inequality in consumer incomes leads to the entry of more firms and results in more intense quality competition among the entrants. More intense quality competition raises the average quality of products in the market as firms compete for the shrinking share of higher-income consumers. With zero costs of quality improvements and an upper bound on the top quality or when costs of quality are fixed and rise sufficiently fast, greater heterogeneity of consumer incomes also reduces firms' incentives to differentiate their products. Competition between more similar products tends to reduce their prices. However, when income inequality is very high, the top quality producer chooses to serve only the rich segment of the market and charges a higher price. The conclusion is that income inequality has important implications for the degree of product differentiation, price level, industry concentration, and consumer welfare.