Early warning indicators and macro-prudential policies: a credit network agent based model

Credit network configurations play a crucial role in determining the vulnerability of the economic system. Following the network-based financial accelerator approach, we constructed an agent based model reproducing an artificial credit network that evolves endogenously according to the leverage choices of heterogeneous firms and banks. Thus, our work aims at defining both early warning indicators for crises and policy precautionary measures based on the endogenous credit network dynamics. The model is calibrated on a sample of firms and banks quoted in the Japanese stock-exchange markets from 1980 to 2012. Both empirical and simulated data suggest that credit and connectivity variations could be used as early warning measures for crises. Moreover, targeting banks that are central in the credit network in terms of size and connectivity, the capital-related macro-prudential policies may reduce systemic vulnerability without affecting aggregate output.     

Credit allocation and the financial crisis: evidence from Spanish companies

The worldwide financial crisis of 2007–2008 raised serious concerns about the soundness of banks’ activities and about the extent to which banking regulation should supervise banks’ investment decisions. We contribute to this topic by examining the Spanish case, which has been emblematic of the bubble and burst dynamics in the credit market. In particular, we study the allocation of bank credit among Spanish companies from 1999 to 2014, showing that larger companies accumulated greater amounts of bank loans per unit of total assets, thus leading to a notable concentration. We also find that, during the Spanish boom period, bank loans shifted from the manufacturing to the construction industry, and in particular to the largest companies of the latter sector. This happened in spite of the high leverage of large construction firms, which was increasing also due to their growing debt. We argue that the higher operating benefits, reflecting the increase of the housing price during the boom period, overvalued construction firms as potential borrowers. The bankruptcy of several large construction companies during the Spanish crisis supports the need for monitoring and regulation, to avoid an excessive concentration of bank credit to a few large companies, especially if they belong to a specific sector.

     

The Macroeconomic Effects of Shocks to Large Banks’ Capital

We propose a simple approach to quantifying the macroeconomic effects of shocks to large banks’ leverage. We first estimate a standard dynamic model of leverage targeting at the bank level and use it to derive an aggregate measure of the economic capital buffer of large US bank holding corporations. We then evaluate the response of key macro variables to a shock to this aggregate bank capital buffer using standard monetary VAR models. We find that shocks to the capital of large US banks explain a substantial share of the variance of credit to firms and real activity.     

Financial fragility,sovereign default risk and the limits to commercial bank bail-outs

We show that with intertwined weak banks and weak sovereigns, bank recapitalizations become much less effective. We construct a DSGE model with leverage constrained banks lending to firms and holding domestic government bonds. Bond prices reflect endogenously generated sovereign risk. This introduces a negative amplification cycle: after a credit crisis output losses increase more because higher interest rates trigger lower bond prices and subsequent losses at banks. This further tightens bank leverage constraints, and causes interest rates to rise further. Also bank recapitalizations are then much less effective. Recaps involve swaps of newly issued sovereign bonds for bank equity, the new debt increases sovereign debt discounts, leading to capital losses for the banks on their holdings of sovereign debt that (partially) offset the impact of the recapitalization. The favorable macroeconomic effects of bank recaps on the recovery after a financial crisis are correspondingly lower.     

Lending attitude as a financial accelerator in a credit network economy

In existing literature, commercial banks are often considered mere financial intermediaries that facilitate the flow of credit in an imperfect credit market. However, as demonstrated in the history of financial instability, the behavior of financial institutions plays an important role. This paper examines how lenders’ attitudes affect macroeconomic performance. In our analysis, the economy is composed of multiple borrowers (firms) and one lender (bank). Each borrower is directly connected to the lender through its credit contract. At the same time, each borrower is indirectly connected to all the other borrowers within the credit network. Using this model, we execute computer simulations to examine the economic consequences of lending attitudes. The results of the simulations demonstrate that the bank’s lending attitude functions as a financial accelerator; that is, it significantly affects the dynamics of the economic system through the credit network. Consequently, the same level of exogenous shock generates completely different outcomes depending on the different lending attitudes. The results also show that there exists an optimal lending attitude that leads to high economic growth and a stable growth path.     

Wealth transfer effects between stockholders and bondholders

Prior research has addressed the question of whether certain events cause a transfer of wealth between stockholders and bondholders but does not control for the events’ impacts on firms’ credit risk. This may explain why many studies fail to identify wealth transfers. By employing announcements of reductions in credit quality, we find that two types of events cause wealth transfers from bondholders to stockholders. These are unexpected increases in firm leverage, and the firms’ contemporaneous involvement in M&A. Both cases reveal positive excess stock returns and CDS premiums, which exhibit a significantly positive correlation.     

企业债务期限结构配置及其治理对策——湘火矩汽车股份案例

本文认为,债务期限结构错配是我国许多高速扩张企业出现流动性财务危机的主要原因之一,但在现有商业银行信贷期限结构错配和企业债券市场不发达的金融背景约束下,我国企业很难通过增加长期债务的方式来改变债务期限与资产期限错配的问题,唯有通过降低财务杠杆的方法来降低流动性风险。在现有金融市场条件下,企业现实的选择是债务期限结构错配和低财务杠杆,不能采用高财务杠杆方式来实现企业的高速增长,否则很容易陷入财务困境。     

The Dynamics of Capital Structure in Transition Economies

This paper uses a dynamic unrestricted capital structure model to examine the determinants of the private companies' target financial leverage and the speed of adjustment to it in two transition economies, the Czech Republic and Bulgaria. We explicitly model the adjustment of companies' leverage to a target leverage, and this target leverage is itself explained by a set of factors. The panel data methodology combines cross-section and time-series information. The results indicate that the Bulgarian corporate credit markets were less supply -constrained than those of the Czech Republic during the period under investigation. Bulgariancompanies adjusted much faster to the target leverage than Czech firms. The speed ofadjustment related positively to the distance between target and observed ratio for Bulgarian companies while the relationship was neutral for Czech companies. The conservative policies of Czech banks and the exposure control were likely responsible for the slower adjustment among the larger companies while the opposite were true for Bulgarian banks and companies.     

The dynamics of the leverage cycle

We present a simple agent-based model of a financial system composed of leveraged investors such as banks that invest in stocks and manage their risk using a Value-at-Risk constraint, based on historical observations of asset prices. The Value-at-Risk constraint implies that when perceived risk is low, leverage is high and vice versa; a phenomenon that has been dubbed pro-cyclical leverage. We show that this leads to endogenous irregular oscillations, in which gradual increases in stock prices and leverage are followed by drastic market collapses, i.e. a leverage cycle. This phenomenon is studied using simplified models that give a deeper understanding of the dynamics and the nature of the feedback loops and instabilities underlying the leverage cycle. We introduce a flexible leverage regulation policy in which it is possible to continuously tune from pro-cyclical to countercyclical leverage. When the policy is sufficiently countercyclical and bank risk is sufficiently low the endogenous oscillation disappears and prices go to a fixed point. While there is always a leverage ceiling above which the dynamics are unstable, countercyclical leverage policies can be used to raise the ceiling. We also study the impact on leverage cycles of direct, temporal control of the bank׳s riskiness via the bank׳s required Value-at-Risk quantile. Under such a rule the regulator relaxes the Value-at-Risk quantile following a negative stock price shock and tightens it following a positive shock. While such a policy rule can reduce the amplitude of leverage cycles, its effectiveness is highly dependent on the choice of parameters. Finally, we investigate fixed limits on leverage and show how they can control the leverage cycle.     

Firm–bank credit network,business cycle and macroprudential policy

We present an agent-based model to study firm–bank credit market interactions in different phases of the business cycle. The business cycle is exogenously set, and it can give rise to various scenarios. Compared to other models in this literature strand, we improve the mechanism according to which the dividends are distributed, including the possibility of stock repurchase by firms. In addition, we locate firms and banks over a space and firms may ask credit to many banks, resulting in a complex spatial network. The model reproduces a long list of stylized facts and their dynamic evolution as described by the cross-correlations among model variables. The model allows us to test the effectiveness of rules designed by the current financial regulation, such as the Basel III countercyclical capital buffer. We find that the effectiveness of this rule changes in different business cycle environments and this should be considered by policy makers.

     

Prices,debt and market structure in an agent-based model of the financial market

We develop an agent-based model in which heterogeneous and boundedly rational agents interact by trading a risky asset at an endogenously set price. Agents are endowed with balance sheets comprising the risky asset as well as cash on the asset side and equity capital as well as debt on the liabilities side. A number of findings emerge when simulating the model: we find that the empirically observable log-normal distribution of bank balance sheet size naturally emerges and that higher levels of leverage lead to a greater inequality among agents. Furthermore, greater leverage increases the frequency of bankruptcies and systemic events. Credit frictions, which we define as the stickiness of debt adjustments, are able to explain a key difference in the relation between leverage and assets observed for different bank types. Lowering credit frictions leads to an increasingly procyclical behavior of leverage, which is typical for investment banks. Nevertheless, the impact of credit frictions on the fragility of the model financial system is complex. Lower frictions do increase the stability of the system most of the time, while systemic events become more probable. In particular, we observe an increasing frequency of severe liquidity crises that can lead to the collapse of the entire model financial system.     

Costs of short-term credit for small and large firms

Changes in costs of credit for small and large firms respond differently to economic conditions and the markets are segmented. Costs for small firms are less responsive to changing economic conditions. Small firms borrow via credit card loans and from banks. Dynamic models prove the costs of funds are negative functions of quantities borrowed and positive functions of the Fed funds rate. During recessions, the decline in funds’ prices to large firms is greater than the reductions to small firms. Large firms benefit to a greater extent than small firms when prices of credit are changing.     

Endogenous credit standards and aggregate fluctuations

Widespread empirical evidence shows that credit standards fluctuate over the business cycle. We build a macroeconomic model in which countercyclical lending standards emerge as an equilibrium outcome. In the model, banks compete on lending rates as well as collateral requirements. The presence of lending relationships between firms and banks gives rise to endogenous fluctuations in interest rate margins and collateral requirements. We demonstrate that endogenous credit standards amplify business cycles, driving up output volatility by around 25% when compared to a model without lending relationships. Finally, we show that in order to combat the effects of endogenous credit standards on macroeconomic volatility, a countercyclical loan-to-value ratio is an effective macroprudential policy tool.     

Firm entry, credit availability and monetary policy

This paper presents a dynamic general equilibrium model that incorporates firm entry under credit rationing. Goods-producing firms in this model are bank dependent in the sense that they have no choice but to borrow funds from banks to cover labor wages that must be paid in advance of production. The results show that a cut in the policy rate enhances firm entry by mitigating the severity of credit rationing. This policy transmission is different from the conventional balance sheet channel in that a change in the policy rate directly affects borrowers' credit availability. I also show that a sudden stop in the credit supply to new firms is most likely to occur shortly after a credit boom. This is because endogenous downward wage rigidity prohibits the credit risk of prospective firms from decreasing enough to re-equilibrate the loan market.     

Are small firms really credit constrained? Empirical evidence from Kosova

This article uses firm level data from an SME survey conducted by Riinvest Institute in 2006 in order to examine the determinants of obtaining bank finance conditional upon applying. The results of the survey show that not all the firms receive credit they apply for, suggesting a slight excess of demand over supply of credit. Unlike some other studies in transition economies this article corrects for sample selection bias. Econometric evidence indicates that commercial banks base their decision to loan firms primarily on the basis of collateral. Well performing firms are more likely to ask for credit because of better business prospects in the future, but profitability as a measure of firm performance does not seem to be sufficient signaling for banks in order to allocate credits. Banks seems to prefer more to secure themselves from likely opportunistic behavior of potentially “bad borrowers” with use of collateral. Findings are in line with theoretical and empirical arguments that systematic use of collateral can mitigate the adverse selection by banks in choosing whom to allocate the credit especially in country with turbulent political environment and weak property right system. However, unlike other studies findings suggest that the rhetoric of financial constraints to some extent has been exaggerated in a transition context.     

How Do Small Businesses Finance Their Growth Opportunities?—The Case of Recovery from the Lost Decade in Japan

Previous studies argue that bank loans are cheaper than trade credit, so less‐constrained firms largely depend on bank loans and use trade credit less, especially in financially developed economies. However, the Japanese evidence does not support this view. First, small businesses with higher credit demand increase trade credit more during the period of the recovery from a severe recession. Second, creditworthy firms also increase trade credit to finance their growth opportunities. Third, firms in unstable industries increase trade credit more. This suggests that suppliers are able to offer credit, unlike banks, as they have a relative advantage in day‐by‐day monitoring. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Business fluctuations and bankruptcy avalanches in an evolving network economy

We analyze the properties of a three-sector network economy characterized by credit relationships connecting downstream and upstream firms (inside credit) and credit relationships connecting firms and banks (outside credit). The network topology changes over time due to an endogenous process of partner selection (the preferred-partner choice rule). The output of simulations shows that a business cycle at the macroeconomic level can develop as a consequence of the complex interaction of the heterogeneous financial conditions of the agents involved. In this paper we focus on the emergence of bankruptcy crises: the bankruptcy of one agent can bring about the bankruptcy of one or more other agents in a snowball effect of more or less large size, depending on the network structure and the incidence of non-performing loans on balance sheets of agents involved.     

Leverage Dynamics and the Burden of Debt

In addition to leverage, the debt service burden of households and firms is an important link between financial and real developments at the aggregate level. Using US data from 1985 to 2017, we find that the debt service burden has sizeable negative effects on expenditure. Its interplay with leverage also explains several data puzzles, including the lack of above-trend output growth during credit booms and the severity of ensuing recessions, without appealing to large shocks or nonlinearities. Estimating the model with data up to 2005, it predicts credit and expenditure paths that closely match actual developments before and during the Great Recession.     

Systemic risk in banking networks: Advantages of “tiered” banking systems

This paper studies the risk and potential impact of system-wide defaults in a tiered banking network, where a small group of head institutions has many credit linkages with other banks, while the majority of banks have only a few links. A network is random and displays a given distribution of the number of banks׳ linkages, known as degree. We model tiering by a negative correlation between degrees of neighboring banks and by a scale-free degree distribution. The main findings of the paper highlight the advantages of tiering. Both the risk of systemic crisis and the potential scope of the crisis are lower in systems with negative correlation of bank degrees than in other types of systems. Similarly, in scale-free networks, the resilience of the system to shocks is increasing with the level of tiering.