FINANCIAL CONSTRAINTS, GLOBAL ENGAGEMENT, AND FIRM SURVIVAL IN THE UNITED KINGDOM: EVIDENCE FROM MICRO DATA

Financial constraints have been found to play an important role on various aspects of firm behavior. Yet, their effects on firm survival have been largely neglected. We use a panel of 61,496 UK firms over the period 1997–2002 to study the effects of financial variables on firms' failure probabilities, differentiating firms into globally engaged and purely domestic. Estimating a wide range of specifications, we find that lower collateral and higher leverage result in higher failure probabilities for purely domestic than for globally engaged firms. This can be seen as evidence that global engagement shields firms from financial constraints.     

Housing Collateral and the Monetary Transmission Mechanism

In this paper, we quantify the effects of the recent increase in the housing loan‐to‐value ratio (LTV) on the monetary transmission mechanism. We set up a two‐sector dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with collateral constraints and production of goods and housing. Using Bayesian methods, we quantify the component of the monetary transmission mechanism that is generated by housing collateral. We find that this component is substantial and strongly increasing in the LTV. We conclude that in order to properly understand the monetary transmission mechanism, we need to take into account the effects of housing‐related collateral constraints and their changing nature.     

Collateral premia and risk sharing under limited commitment

A competitive general equilibrium model with complete collateralized contracts under limited commitment is proposed and analyzed. With limited aggregate collateral, risk sharing is imperfect. There exists a minimal spanning set of finite collateralized contracts that generates the feasible space and that contains more than the complete set of collateralized Arrow securities. Examples show that exogenously restricting feasible contracts has a significant impact on agents’ welfare. I prove that constrained optimal allocations can be decentralized as a general equilibrium with collateral constraints, and vice versa. Because a capital good serves as collateral, it has an additional value, called collateral premium. The collateral premium is zero if and only if risk sharing is perfect. This is a testable implication of the model.     

Collateral constraints and rental markets

We study a benchmark model with collateral constraints and heterogeneous discounting. Contrarily to a rich literature on borrowing limits, we allow for rental markets. By incorporating this missing market, we show that impatient agents choose to rent rather than to own the collateral in the neighborhood of the deterministic steady state. Consequently, impatient agents are not indebted and borrowing constraints play no role in local dynamics.     

Consumption,housing collateral and the Canadian business cycle

How important are collateral constraints for reproducing salient features of the data? To address this question, we estimate two nested versions of a New Keynesian model: one with collateralized household debt and the frictionless version of the same model. Both versions of the model are fit to Canadian data using Bayesian methods. We argue that the presence of collateral constraints improves the performance of the model in terms of overall goodness of fit. Housing collateral helps to generate a positive correlation between consumption and house prices. Moreover, housing collateral induced spillovers boosted consumption growth during the housing market boom‐bust cycles of the late 1980s and early 2000s.     

Optimal growth when consumption takes time

This article analyzes a one‐sector growth model where the consumption takes time. When the consumption takes time, the consumption set is compact and we meet satiety. However, we prove that dynamic constraints are binding. This result is crucial to prove that, under well‐known assumptions in macroeconomic dynamic programming, the optimal path is monotonic and always converges to a unique nontrivial steady state as in the case where consumption is timeless.     

Collateral constraints and the amplification mechanism

Kiyotaki and Moore (J. Polit. Economy 105 (1997) 211) have offered a theory for how common shocks to credit-constrained firms are amplified through changes in collateral values and transmitted as fluctuations in output. I clarify and extend their model by showing that their collateral amplification mechanism is not robust to the introduction of markets that allow these firms to hedge against common shocks. A theory of incomplete hedging is proposed in which the supply of hedging available in the economy is constrained by the aggregate value of collateral. I illustrate how the constraint reinstates amplification effects and discuss empirical implications of this new mechanism.     

Scarce collateral and bank reserves

If collateral for bank loans is scarce and, if as a result, access to secured loans is restricted, the allocation of resources is inefficient. In anticipation of future borrowing constraints, individuals over-invest in collateralized types of capital, and consume and invest inefficiently low levels while they are borrowing constrained. The dual counterpart of this misallocation of resources is inefficiently low interest rates. In this situation, bank reserves play a positive welfare role by adding liquidity to the economy and by increasing not only bank lending rates, but also, paradoxically, bank deposit rates. As a result, in economies with scarce collateral the optimal reserves–requirement ratio is positive.     

Capacity constrained firms in (labor) markets with adverse selection

Summary. We discuss a competitive (labor) market where firms face capacity constraints and individuals differ according to their productivity. Firms offer two-dimensional contracts like wage and task level. Then workers choose firms and contracts. Workers might be rationed if the number of applicants exceeds the capacity of the firm. We show that under reasonable assumptions on the distribution of capacity an equilibrium in pure strategies (by the firms) exists. This result stands in contrast to the case of unlimited capacity. The utility level is uniquely determined in equilibrium. No rationing occurs in equilibrium, but it does off the equilibrium path. Received: December 29, 1999; revised version: November 30, 2000     

Collateral and growth cycles with heterogeneous agents

We investigate the effects of collateral and monetary policy on economic growth within a Ramsey equilibrium model where agents have different discount factors. Introducing liquidity constraints in segmented markets where (poor) impatient agents without collateral have limited access to credit, we study their implications in terms of welfare and business cycles (based on deterministic cycles through bifurcations and self-fulfilling prophecies). We find that an accommodative monetary policy may be growth-enhancing and welfare-improving (through the inequality reduction) while making unpleasant fluctuations more likely. Conversely, a regulation reinforcing the role of collateral and tempering the financial market imperfections may stimulate the economic growth while pursuing the goal of stabilization.     

Optimal long-run inflation with occasionally binding financial constraints

This paper studies the optimal long-run inflation rate in a simple New Keynesian model with occasionally binding collateral constraints that intermediate-good firms face on hiring labor. The paper finds that the optimal long-run annual inflation rate is around 1.5% if the economy is hit by a total factor productivity (TFP) shock and nearly 2.5% if the economy is subject to a markup shock. The shadow value of the collateral constraint is akin to an endogenous cost-push shock. Differently from usual cost-push shocks, however, this shock is asymmetric as it takes non-negative values only. Since the mean of this asymmetric endogenous cost-push shock is positive, inflation is also positive on average. In addition, a binding collateral constraint resembles a time-varying tax on labor, which the monetary authority can smooth by setting a positive inflation rate. More generally, the basic result is related to standard Ramsey theory in that optimal policy smoothes distortions over time.     

Liquidity and Twin Crises

This paper proposes a simple analytical framework for understanding 'twin crises'– i.e. crises where a currency crisis and banking crisis occur simultaneously and reinforce each other. The distinguishing feature of such crises is the spill‐over effects across financial institutions through collateral constraints, declines in market values of assets, currency mismatches on the balance sheet and the endogenous amplification of financial distress through asset sales. We explore the role of liquidity and the role of monetary policy in such crises. In particular, a central question is whether raising interest rates in the face of a twin crisis is the appropriate policy response. Raising interest rates has two countervailing effects. Holding the domestic currency becomes more attractive (other things being equal), but the value of the domestic banking system falls due to the fall in asset prices. When assets are marked to market, there is a potential for endogenously generated financial distress that leads to a collapse of asset prices, as well as the exchange rate. It is thus possible that raising interest rates can have the perverse effect of exacerbating both the currency crisis and the banking crisis.     

Monetary policy in a financial crisis

What are the economic effects of an interest rate cut when an economy is in the midst of a financial crisis? Under what conditions will a cut stimulate output and employment, and raise welfare? Under what conditions will a cut have the opposite effects? We answer these questions in a general class of open economy models, where a financial crisis is modelled as a time when collateral constraints are suddenly binding. We find that when there are frictions in adjusting the level of output in the traded good sector and in adjusting the rate at which that output can be used in other parts of the economy, then a cut in the interest rate is most likely to result in a welfare-reducing fall in output and employment. When these frictions are absent, a cut in the interest rate improves asset positions and promotes a welfare-increasing economic expansion.     

Stability of supply function equilibria implications for daily versus hourly bids in a poolco market

We consider a supply function model of a poolco electricity market where demand varies significantly over a time horizon such as a day and also has a small responsiveness to price. Although there are equilibria yielding prices at peak that are close to Cournot prices, it is known that the wider the range of demand uncertainty the narrower the range of such supply function equilibria. Here we show that such equilibria are also typically unstable and consequently would be difficult to sustain in practice. This strengthens the results of Green and Newbery by ruling out many equilibria that have high prices. We demonstrate this result both theoretically under somewhat restrictive assumptions and also numerically using both a three-firm example system and a five-firm example system having generation capacity constraints. Hence, this reinforces the conclusion that the market outcome is significantly influenced by a requirement that offers into the poolco be consistent over the time horizon. This result contrasts with markets where bids can be changed on an hourly basis, where Cournot prices are possible outcomes. The stability analysis has important policy implications for the design of day-ahead electricity markets. The stability perspective also provides a narrowing of the equilibrium selection that strengthens empirical analysis.      

Financial constraints and international trade patterns

Growing empirical literature shows that financial constraints reduce the chance of exporting, suggesting that financial constraints are an important determinant of international trade patterns. In this aspect, I develop a model of international trade based on new trade theory with financial constraints and non-homothetic preferences. With these two modified assumptions, the main findings are i) financial constraints act as trade barriers, ii) the largest amount of trade is between countries that have healthier financial systems in terms of access to loans and iii) financial constraints can cause one way or zero trade. As a result, this paper provides a single framework able to account for all possible patterns (two-way, one-way, and no trade) within the same industry. All these findings have important policy implications for countries suffering from relatively poor financial systems.     

Quasi-option value under strategic interactions

We consider a simple two-period model of irreversible investment under strategic interactions between two players. In this setup, we show that the quasi-option value may cause some conceptual difficulties. In case of asymmetric information, decentralized investment decisions fail to induce first-best allocations. Therefore a regulator may not be able to exercise the option to delay the decision to develop. We also show that information-induced inefficiency may arise in a game situation and that under certain assumptions inefficiency can be eliminated by sending asymmetric information to the players, even when the regulator faces informational constraints. Our model is potentially applicable to various global environmental problems.     

A note on optimal capital stock and financing constraints

There is a robust literature on the relationship between financing constraints and real investment. Little has been said on the relationship between financing constraints and capital stock in the long run. This note focuses on this last issue. To keep the model tractable, we assume that the firm employs a single input, and this input is used as collateral. We get three main results. Firstly, we show that the optimal capital stock chosen by a firm is affected by financing constraints even when they are slack at the current time. Secondly, we show that the net present value of the potentially constrained firm is always smaller than the one of the never constrained firm. Finally, we find that in the presence of latent financing constraints the firm does not limit itself to reducing its investment when the upper limit is reached. What it actually does is to lower its long run optimal capital stock, amplifying the effects of constraints in the long run.     

Testing exclusion restrictions and additive separability in sample selection models

Standard sample selection models with non-randomly censored outcomes assume (i) an exclusion restriction (i.e., a variable affecting selection, but not the outcome) and (ii) additive separability of the errors in the selection process. This paper proposes tests for the joint satisfaction of these assumptions by applying the approach of Huber and Mellace (Testing instrument validity for LATE identification based on inequality moment constraints, 2011) (for testing instrument validity under treatment endogeneity) to the sample selection framework. We show that the exclusion restriction and additive separability imply two testable inequality constraints that come from both point identifying and bounding the outcome distribution of the subpopulation that is always selected/observed. We apply the tests to two variables for which the exclusion restriction is frequently invoked in female wage regressions: non-wife/husband’s income and the number of (young) children. Considering eight empirical applications, our results suggest that the identifying assumptions are likely violated for the former variable, but cannot be refuted for the latter on statistical grounds.     

组合、套利和资本市场的均衡特征——对资本市场均衡“异化”现象的一种解释

无套利均衡是新古典主义理论在特定条件下所界定的市场均衡特征。考察卖空限制和借款约束行为对资本市场上的组合和套利行为的影响,并结合市场从非均衡向均衡的调整过程,定性考察不同行为假设之下资本市场均衡特征的变化,可以发现,资本市场均衡和套利机会之间的共存或排斥状态,直接受制于有关市场参与者的初始行为假设。在不同的行为假设之下,市场参与者的组合和套利行为具有不同的特征和不同的影响。     

银行结构与中小企业融资

本文建立了一个中小企业融资问题的分析框架。文章发现 ,中小企业的非匀质性 (heterogeneity)、贷款抵押和交易成本是影响中小企业从银行获得信贷的三个主要因素 ;缓和信息不对称程度、增加贷款抵押、降低交易成本 ,都将使中小企业得到的信贷增加。进一步 ,在一定的前提假设下 ,文章将中小金融机构引入模型 ,发现引入中小金融机构将使中小企业得到的信贷增加 ,增加社会的总体福利 ;并且在中小金融机构的信息优势、数量和中小企业的融资总额之间存在着正向关系。文章最后按照这一框架的思路 ,对中国的中小企业融资难题进行了分析 ,并提出了相应的政策建议。