Optimal Tariff Policy on Imports from Multinationals*

Using partial equilibrium analysis, it is shown that for small countries there is an optimal tariff on imports from a monopolistic multinational. There is also (under specified circumstances) a tariff at which the multinational finds subsidiary production more profitable than exports: the switchover tariff. The interaction between the optimal and switchover tariffs is analyzed from the small country's welfare standpoint. The conclusion is that there is not one, but a variety of possible optimal policies for the country: trade at the optimal tariff, with or without prohibition of subsidiary production, or tariff-protected subsidiary production.     

Lobbying For Tariff Policies*

This paper fully specifies the political and economic markets in which trade policies are formulated and lobbying efforts are determined. In the political market, the winner of a two-candidate race chooses policies, and both candidates have incomplete information about the nonpolicy biases of voters. Voting is probabilistic and lobbying consists of informing candidates of the lobby members' nonpolicy voting biases. Economic markets are described by a Heckscher-Ohlin model. the determinants of lobbying expenditures are developed from these microfoundations instead of being introduced in an ad hoc manner.     

Tariff Compensation Without Omniscience*

The piecemeal application of second-best arguments to practical policy-making is highly dangerous. This paper attempts to demonstrate this by taking the recent Australian debate over ‘tariff compensation’ as an example. The attempt to ‘compensate’ for tariff-induced distortions in output prices by means of input subsidies is shown to lead to informational problems so serious that the pursuit of such a policy in practice seems unwise. This point is argued by means of extensive numerical examples. These suggest that the potential welfare gains from tariff compensation, optimally applied, are small relative to the potential costs of well-intentioned but erroneous interventions.     

内部货币与我国最优关税政策研究

本文将内部货币引入一个包含两国两商品的纯交换经济,在考虑贸易关税的情形下,将此拓展成一个Nash关税博弈模型。我们用2005年中国与世界其他国家(ROW)的产出和双边贸易数据对该贸易模型进行数值分析,考察一般经济均衡条件下内部货币的引入对我国与ROW最优关税政策的影响。研究表明:(1)内部货币对贸易双方关税博弈的Nash均衡有显著影响,即相对于无内部货币的情形,内部货币的存在将削弱我国在关税博弈中的关税报复力量。(2)中国在2005年的实际关税接近于不考虑ROW关税报复时的最优关税水平及Nash均衡关税,而ROW当时的实际关税却远低于其最优关税和Nash均衡关税水平,这说明我国在2005年所采取的关税政策合乎本国利益。     

Transport Cost and Tariff Protection of Australian Manufacturing*

This paper provides estimates of transport cost and tariff protection available to import-competing Australian manufacturing industries. It finds that transport costs provide an important component of total protection available to such industries; one which, for many, is more important than the Australian tariff. In view of the effects of protection on industrial structure and performance, it should be explicitly recognized that transport costs are an unavoidable element of the protective structure and are deserving of study in their own right.     

Equilibrium Tariff Schedules In Commercial Policy Games Under Uncertainty

Abstract A partial two country equilibrium model is built in which two different exogenous random shocks may occur. the governments simultaneously choose tariff functions relating their specific tariff to the level of an observable variable (volume of trade or international price). In the case of a “volume of trade shock” the Nash equilibria of this game are more protectionist the larger the possible trade swings and autarky is always an equilibrium outcome. In the case of a “terms of trade shock”, constant tariffs, at their Nash equilibrium in specific tariff levels are the only sensible equilibrium outcome.     

碳关税与战略性自主创新政策

从"碳关税"对我国对外贸易战略和对外贸易企业的影响入手,提出在低碳经济背景下我国国际贸易的发展,必须以战略性自主创新政策理论为指导,政府和企业必须采取一系列对策应对"碳关税"这一新的贸易壁垒。     

Partial Privatization,Foreign Competition,and Optimum Tariff*

Using a simple international mixed oligopoly model with one public and one or more foreign firms, this paper examines the effect of partial privatization or foreign competition on optimum tariffs and finds that foreign competition lowers the optimal tariff rate but partial privatization raises it. This result implies that trade liberalization is welfare improving if a country opens up its economy by allowing foreign competition. However, the liberalization policy is not desirable when the country only partially or completely privatizes its publicly‐owned enterprises.     

外国技术授权策略与本国关税政策之探讨

本文将以一个拥有技术优势，且将其产品输往本国寡占市场中的外国厂商为对象，探讨其对本国厂商的最适技术授权策略，以及该策略是否受关税保护贸易政策之影响。在本文的研究结论中，我们可以发现下列三点：（1）在自由贸易条件下，当外国企业可授权国内二家厂商时，其最适授权策略，会选择同时授权于国内二家技术劣势厂商。当外国厂商仅可授权国内一家技术劣势厂商时，若市场规模相对较小，国外技术优势厂商之最适单位权利金订定为存在内部解，且会受市场规模的影响，市场规模值愈大，权利金愈高。当市场规模相对较大时，则国外技术优势厂商之最适单位权利金恰等于其技术创新所能节省的成本幅度。（2）在关税政策条件下，国外技术优势厂商可同时授权国内二家厂商时，其授权策略不受关税政策影响。在可授权国内一家技术劣势厂商时，若市场规模相对较大，其授权策略不受关税政策影响。若市场规模相对较小，在自由贸易条件下外国厂商的授权权利金将高于采取关税政策条件下的水准。（3）在本国政府的最适关税政策下，不论是当外国厂商可授权本国二家厂商之Nash均衡或可授权本国一家厂商之Nash均衡，皆有助于本国福利水准的提升。     

Coordinating Tariff Reduction and Domestic Tax Reform under Imperfect Competition*

A major constraint on trade liberalization in many countries is the prospective loss of government revenue. Recent results, however, have established a simple and appealing strategy for overcoming this difficulty, whilst still realizing the efficiency gains from liberalization, in small, competitive economies: combining tariff cuts with point‐for‐point increases in destination‐based consumption taxes unambiguously increases both national welfare and total government revenue. This note explores the implications of imperfect competition for this strategy. Examples are easily found in which this strategy unambiguously reduces domestic welfare.     

Dynamic Effects of Tariff Liberalization: an Intertemporal Cge Approach*

The paper presents a multisectoral CGE model with overlapping generations in which intertemporal optimization by households and firms determines savings and investment under perfect foresight. We calibrate the model to Austrian data and simulate a unilateral tariff liberalization scenario. We find that unilateral tariff reductions are expansionary in the long-run but involve considerable diversity in sectoral adjustment. Foreign debt increases in the long-run, causing an improvement in the trade balance. In terms of welfare, some old generations gain at the expense of young and future generations. Budgetary policies are shown to be crucial for several effects.     

International Duopoly, Tariff Policy and the Superiority of Free Trade

This paper addresses the effectiveness of tariff policy in the long-run production framework in which decisions must be made about plant size and the level of output to be produced by foreign duopolists competing with each other in the importing country's market. We consider two types of tariff regime, discriminatory and uniform, and show that the importing country's welfare is unambiguously higher in the uniform tariff case. We consider free trade in the same production framework and show that, as the long-run capacity decision becomes increasingly relevant relative to the short-run quantity decision, free trade dominates tariffs in welfare rankings.
JEL Classification Number: F1.     

关税减让政策对我国进口的影响

中国加入WTO后,关税减让协议的逐步实行对我国进口贸易产生了极大影响.研究结果表明,关税与我国进口贸易额之间存在着高度的负相关关系,在影响我国进口效应的诸多因素中.关税起到了主要作用,但并非唯一因素.而关税减让在影响我国进口商品结构方面的作用不大.可见,在优化我国进口商品结构方面还需要其他政策措施的辅助与调整.     

我国关税政策对宏观经济影响分析

加入WTO后,我国开始实施自主降低关税的政策,新的关税政策对进出口贸易冲击直接影响着宏观经济的运行状况。本文通过计量分析方法分析了进出口贸易对宏观经济的影响,运用向量自回归的VAR模型来对进出口贸易总额、进口总额、出口总额、财政收入和外汇汇率进行VAR回归,得出多个变量的互相关联关系;通过冲击响应函数分析了进出口贸易和改革经济指标间的长期均衡关系。     

Australian Macroeconomic Policy Experience*

This paper looks at Australian macroeconomic experience from approximately 1912 to 1985. The whole period is divided into five episodes. The idea in preparing this paper was to try to answer three questions namely: how did Australian experience differ from that of other OECD countries, what policy lessons could be learnt, and finally, what light could be shed on the relevance of various macroeconomic theories notably rational expectations. In fact. the questions have by no means been adequately answered though the paper goes furthest in dealing with the first question. I hope it will encourage further discussion and research¹ Anticipating some of the conclusions, the historical review suggests that Australian experiences have been fairly similar to those of other OECD countries. notably European countries. But the timing has sometimes differed the Australian wages explosions have been (more or less) exceptional and recently Australia has been special in having on incomes policy, It also appears that the theory of rational expectations does not get much support from Australian was behaviour, that policy from 1916 to 1981 was not really monetarist, and that fiscal expansions since 1982 have been made possible by the availability of the international capital market.