The Great Depression versus the Great Recession in the U.S.: How fiscal,monetary, and financial polices compare

This study reviews the financial distress that triggered and amplified the financial crises of the Great Depression and Great Recession and compares macroeconomic and financial policy responses. Shadow banking funded the build-up of the financial excesses that preceded both. The quicker and forceful response of monetary and fiscal policy during the Great Recession and stronger action to restore market functionality mitigated the downturn and aided recovery. Nevertheless, actions to address the mortgage debt overhang were slower. Post-Depression reforms focused on preventing deposit runs and post-Great Recession reforms on preventing runs on bank debt and shadow banks while boosting capital buffers.     

Financial stability indicators and public debt developments

This paper investigates the inter-linkages between financial stability and fiscal policy. It analyzes the effect of selected financial stability indicators on the probability of future debt deterioration, controlling for several macroeconomic variables. We find significant evidence that a fragile banking system can put at risk public finances. Weak bank profitability, low asset quality and a weak capital base increase the fragility of the banking system, thus, raising the probability of future fiscal troubles.     

In search for yield? Survey-based evidence on bank risk taking

Monetary policy can have an impact on economic and financial stability through the risk taking of banks. Falling interest rates might induce investment into risky activities. This paper provides evidence on the link between monetary policy and bank risk taking. We use a factor-augmented vector autoregressive model (FAVAR) for the US for the period 1997–2008. Besides standard macroeconomic indicators, we include factors summarizing information provided in the Federal Reserve’s Survey of Terms of Business Lending (STBL). These data provide information on banks׳ new loans as well as interest rates for different loan risk categories and different banking groups. We identify a risk-taking channel of monetary policy by distinguishing responses to monetary policy shocks across different types of banks and different loan risk categories. Following an expansionary monetary policy shock, small domestic banks increase their exposure to risk. Large domestic banks do not change their risk exposure. Foreign banks take on more risk only in the mid-2000s, when interest rates were ‘too low for too long’.     

Coordination and non-coordination risks of monetary and macroprudential authorities: A robust welfare analysis

This study compares a central bank’s leaning against the wind approach with a mix of monetary and macroprudential policies under parameter uncertainty in an estimated DSGE model with two financial frictions. We show that uncertainty of the economic environment is an essential constituent in properly designing macroprudential policy. Although coordination between monetary and macroprudential policies minimizes the policymakers’ Bayesian risk, coordination and non-coordination risks threaten the goals of both authorities. The former describes the situation where the authorities partly resign from implementing the monetary policy objectives to stabilize macroprudential risk. The latter is when conducting a non-coordinated macroprudential policy induces higher total Bayesian risk than when only the central bank minimizes the expected total welfare loss. The robust Bayesian macroeconomic rules show that when financial shocks shrink the banks’ or entrepreneurial net worth, a contractionary macroprudential policy should be combined with an expansionary monetary policy. However, if capital adequacy ratio or risk shocks strike the economy, such a conflict in macroeconomics policy instruments disappears, thus synchronizing both policies.     

A survey on time-varying parameter Taylor rule: A model modified with interest rate pass-through

Today, the prime aim of central banking is to achieve price stability and, to a lesser extent, output stability. To this end, central banks use various monetary policy rules. This paper intends to provide a broad survey of the literature on Taylor-type monetary policy rules with a time-varying parameter (TVP) specification. To include the TVP feature, some modification is made in the monetary transmission mechanism of Taylor-type monetary policy models to account for the changing risk preference of individuals. In line with this approach, we introduce an interest rate pass-through specification of the monetary transmission process in a general equilibrium model to account for the varying perceptions of risk by individuals. We include an application for Turkey and estimate the time-variable parameters of the model by employing a structural extended Kalman filter (EKF). The results indicate that the EKF performs better than the standard Kalman filter in estimating the reaction function of the central bank.     

Some Potential Linkages for Input-Output Analysis with Flow-of-Funds

Three major, interrelated accounting statements, at the frontiers of quantitative economic analysis, are three interrelated systems, namely: (1) National income and product accounts (NIPA), (2) The input-output tableaux, (IO), and (3) flow-of- funds accounts (FF). The third-mentioned system is somewhat less available and used in only limited areas of macroeconomic analysis. This paper is mainly concerned with use of FF accounting systems. This system shows where financial resources originate, and where they go in support of real capital formation. In this respect, interest rates and other market-based financial rates are of key importance. While much macroeconomic analysis is based on the rates that fit the yield curve, showing the interest rate structure over various maturities of debt associated with a given degree of risk. In contrast, the FF accounts throw light on the whole spectrum of interest rates, across maturities and debt qualities. For example, in analysis of the real estate market and funding of capital formation there, it is important to have a full understanding of the course of mortgage rates of different maturities and qualities. In short, it is necessary to develop a full appreciation of supply and demand forces in the mortgage market, which often is not obviously related to movements of the operative rate for monetary policy, such as very short-term inter bank rates or call money rates. This paper attempts to provide material from the flow-of-funds accounts that would make it possible to analyze the movement of relevant mortgage rates or whatever other rates are needed to understand the financing of capital formation in real estate.     

The zero lower bound,the dual mandate,and unconventional dynamics

This paper examines monetary policy when it is constrained by the zero lower bound (ZLB) on the nominal interest rate. Our analysis uses a nonlinear New Keynesian model with technology and discount factor shocks. Specifically, we investigate why technology shocks may have unconventional effects at the ZLB, what factors affect the likelihood of hitting the ZLB, and the implications of alternative monetary policy rules. We initially focus on a New Keynesian model without capital (Model 1) and then study that model with capital (Model 2). The advantage of including capital is that it introduces another mechanism for intertemporal substitution that strengthens the expectational effects of the ZLB. Four main findings emerge: (1) In Model 1, the choice of output target in the Taylor rule may reverse the effects of technology shocks when the ZLB binds; (2) When the central bank targets steady-state output in Model 2, a positive technology shock at the ZLB leads to more pronounced unconventional dynamics than in Model 1; (3) The presence of capital changes the qualitative effects of demand shocks and alters the impact of a monetary policy rule that emphasizes output stability; and (4) In Model 1, the constrained linear solution is a decent approximation of the nonlinear solution, but meaningful differences exist between the solutions in Model 2.     

Macroeconomic and financial stability in a monetary union: The case of Lithuania

In this paper, we study the implications of macroprudential policies in a monetary union for macroeconomic and financial stability. For this purpose, we develop a two-country monetary union new Keynesian general equilibrium model with housing and collateral constraints, to be calibrated for Lithuania and the rest of the euro area. We consider two different scenarios for macroprudential policies: one in which the ECB extends its goals to also include financial stability and a second one in which a national macroprudential authority uses the loan-to-value ratio (LTV) as an instrument. The results show that both rules are effective in making the financial system more stable in both countries, and especially in Lithuania. This is because the financial sector in this country is more sensitive to shocks. We find that an extended Taylor rule is indeed effective in reducing the volatility of credit, but comes with a cost in terms of higher inflation volatility. The simple LTV rule, on the other hand, does not compromise the objective of monetary policy. This reinforces the “Tinbergen principle”, which argues that there should be two different instruments when there are two different policy goals.     

Lessons from a century of FED policy: Why monetary and credit policies need rules and boundaries

Wide operational and financial independence given to monetary and credit policies subjects the Federal Reserve to incentives detrimental for macroeconomic and financial stability. The absence of a monetary policy rule created go-stop incentives that produced inefficient volatility of both inflation and unemployment during the Great Inflation. Fed credit policy has undergone massive “mission creep” since the Fed was established. Being debt-financed fiscal policy, Fed credit policy beyond ordinary temporary lending to solvent depositories creates friction with the fiscal authorities and jeopardizes the Fed׳s independence. An ambiguous boundary of expansive Fed credit policy creates expectations of Fed accommodation in financial crisis—that blunts the incentive of private entities to take protective measures beforehand (to shrink counter-party risk and reliance on short-term finance, and build up equity capital) and blunts the incentive of the fiscal authorities to prepare procedures in advance to act systematically in times of credit turmoil. These points are illustrated with reference to the 2007–09 financial crisis. Part of the problem is that the independent Fed does not have the same incentive as the 19th century Bank of England to follow Bagehot׳s Rule. The paper concludes with a set of principles to preserve a workable, sustainable division of responsibilities between the independent central bank and the fiscal authorities.     

内部控制质量、资本结构与银行风险承担——货币政策与股权集中度的调节作用

本文选取2009—2018年中国24家上市银行年度数据,采用面板模型对内部控制质量对银行风险承担的影响及其作用机制进行实证分析。研究结果表明：（1）内控质量对银行风险承担具有抑制作用。内控质量提高有助于提升银行部门间贷款信息传递及风险协同控制效率,由此降低银行风险承担。相对于非国有、低联结度与高权力度银行,内控质量对国有、高联结度与低权力度银行风险承担的影响力度更大。（2）资本结构在内控质量与银行风险承担的关系中承担着中介作用,内控质量通过影响资本结构来影响银行风险承担,“内控质量—资本结构—银行风险承担”的传导渠道有效。（3）货币政策对内控质量与银行风险承担关系具有非对称性调节作用。高利率货币政策会减弱内控质量对银行风险承担的抑制作用,宽松货币政策会加剧内控质量对银行风险承担的抑制作用。（4）股权集中度提高会减弱内控质量对银行风险承担的抑制作用,这归于控制权过度引发的关联贷款风险集聚效应对冲了内控质量对银行风险承担的抑制效应。本文研究结论可为防控中国银行部门单体风险及金融系统性风险提供重要的理论指导与决策参考。     

Determinants of bank interest margins in Central and Eastern Europe: A comparison with the West

We investigate the determinants of bank interest margins in the Central and Eastern European countries (CEEC). We assess to what extent the relatively high bank margins in CEEC can be attributed to low efficiency or non-competitive market conditions, controlling for the macroeconomic environment and the influence of foreign and state-owned banks. We systematically compare CEEC banks with Western European banks. Our results indicate that banking in the CEEC is on a virtuous path, at least in the EU accession countries: Increased efficiency benefits customers, while capital adequacy supports systemic stability. In the non-accession countries, important policy actions are required.     

Monetary policy rules for convergence to the Euro

This paper investigates the applicability of open-economy convergence-consistent instrument rules for monetary policies in the economies undergoing monetary convergence to a common currency area. The proposed policy rule is forward-looking, consistent with a monetary framework based on inflation-targeting containing input variables that are relative to the corresponding variables in the common currency area. Robust forms of the policy rule are tested empirically for three inflation-targeting countries converging to the euro, i.e. the Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary. Empirical tests imply systemic differences in monetary policies among these euro-candidates. The Czech monetary policy seemingly follows the rule prescribed by our model. Both the Czech and the Polish central bank interest rate policies respond predominantly to changes in the inflation gap, while the Hungarian responds mainly to the exchange rate gap. In all three cases, changes in the eurozone short-term interest rates strongly drive adjustments in the central banks’ reference interest rates.     

The role of financial intermediaries in monetary policy transmission

The recent financial crisis has stimulated theoretical and empirical research on the propagation mechanisms underlying business cycles, in particular on the role of financial frictions. Many issues concerning the interactions between banking and monetary policy forced policy makers to redefine economic policies, and motivated macroeconomists to focus on the implications of financial intermediation constraints for asset price fluctuations, the behavior of non-financial firms, households, governments and in turn for real macroeconomic performance. This paper surveys research on the role of financial intermediaries and financial frictions in the transmission of monetary policy and discusses how to design both the new banking regulatory and supervisory structures and monetary policy in order to stabilize the economy. It also serves as an introduction to this special issue.     

Can money matter for interest rate policy?

In this paper it is shown that money can matter for macroeconomic stability under interest rate policy when transactions frictions are non-negligible. We develop a sticky price model with a shopping time function, which induces the marginal utility of consumption to depend on the (predetermined) stock of money held at the beginning of the period. Equilibrium stability and uniqueness are then ensured by a passive interest rate policy, whereas activeness is associated with an explosive equilibrium. By reacting to changes in beginning-of-period real balances, the central bank can restore stability. Interest rates further depend on lagged real balances even if the central bank acts in an entirely forward-looking way, as under discretionary optimization. If the model is revised such that end-of-period money provides transaction services, money can in principle be neglected for a stabilizing interest rate policy. Discretionary monetary policy is, however, likely to be associated with equilibrium indeterminacy, which can be avoided if interest rates are set contingent on beginning-of-period real balances.     

货币区建设与货币政策的独立性：一个分析框架

美国次贷危机引发了全球性金融危机,这凸显了以美国为核心的“金融资本主义模式”和以美元为核心的国际货币金融体系的制度性缺陷,改革现行的以美元为核心的国际货币金融体系势在必行,建立货币区是较为现实的选择。但在现行货币政策框架下,货币区不可避免会出现“三元悖论”困境。本文提出的贷款准备金政策框架模型,能够解决货币区在保证其内在要求的资本自由流动和汇率稳定基本前提下,区内各个成员保持货币政策的独立性问题。     

国际短期资本流动对货币政策有效性的影响分析——基于VAR模型和脉冲响应函数的研究

采用VAR模型和冲脉效应函数实证分析国际短期资本流动对货币政策有效性的影响分析,结果显示：货币供给量、利率和国际短期资本流动之间具有长期稳定的均衡关系;利率变动和货币供给之间反向变动;国际短期资本流动对货币政策有效性的影响已经显现,然而国际短期资本流动带来的货币供应量的上升被国家货币政策的调控所冲销,而且冲销力度过大;由于我国对资本流动进行管制,因此隐蔽性资本流动对货币政策效果目标的影响不明显;进出我国的国际短期资本的套利动机虽然不显著,但是国际短期资本流动和利率的关联性已经很强。最后,以实证结果为依据,提出相应对策建议。     

基于市场利率波动测度的货币政策操作风险研究

在货币政策操作过程中,中央银行对宏观经济形势的认识偏差,货币政策工具及政策调控时机的选择不当,以及政策信息的披露不及时等,都有可能误导公众预期,增加市场不确定性,从而引致货币政策操作风险。文章通过利用中国货币市场上同业拆借和债券回购的利率数据进行实证,结果表明,中央银行政策操作透明度不高以及对宏观经济形势进行判断的前瞻性不足,是引致我国货币政策操作风险的重要原因。     

利率期限结构、商业银行投资组合与宏观经济波动——基于DSGE的分析框架

将包含同业业务的商业银行投资组合、利润和利率期限结构的局部均衡模型嵌入以家庭、资本投资者、商业银行、中间厂商和最终厂商为经济主体的DSGE模型中,分析商业银行风险错配、货币政策工具和经济增长对利率期限结构的影响。结果表明:经济增长冲击和商业银行的风险错配冲击对我国利率期限结构的影响最大,其次是数量型货币政策和价格型货币政策冲击。     

Estimating the Bank of Mexico’s reaction function in the last three decades: A Bayesian DSGE approach with rolling-windows

This paper uses a small open economy Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model to investigate how Mexico’s central bank has conducted its monetary policy in the period 1995–2019. The main objective of the paper is to document the systematic changes in the Bank of Mexico’s reaction function by analyzing possible shifts in the parameters of the policy rule. The central bank’s policy is modeled using a Taylor rule that relates the nominal interest rate to output, inflation, and the exchange rate. I employ Bayesian computational techniques and conduct rolling-window estimations to explicitly show the transition of the policy coefficients over the sample period. Furthermore, the paper examines the macroeconomic implications of these changes through rolling-window impulse–response functions. The results suggest that the Bank of Mexico’s response to inflation has been steady since 1995, while the response to output and the exchange rate has decreased and stabilized after 2002.