Cognitive dissonance and resistance to change: the influence of commitment confirmation and feedback on judgment usefulness of accounting systems

This study investigates the effects of commitment, confirmation and feedback on people's judgment about the usefulness of costing systems and, in turn, people's resistance to change. Building on the theory of cognitive dissonance, this study predicts that commitment to a particular course of action will cause people to become insensitive to the potential benefits of the rejected alternative. A laboratory experiment was conducted to examine why people are motivated to resist change and what mechanisms they use to rationalize their judgment. Results from the experiment indicated that people's judgments about the usefulness of costing systems were influenced by their commitment to their favored system. People assessed only a subset of their knowledge to support their desired conclusion. Consequently, committed people refused to change their chosen system even when facing negative feedback. In addition, the results confirmed that people normatively know that their judgment should be objective yet they unconsciously make prejudiced judgments biased toward their committed course of action.     

The effect of cognitive style and sponsorship bias on the treatment of opportunity costs in resource allocation decisions

The incorporation of opportunity cost is stressed in normative approaches to resource allocation decisions. Empirical evidence has revealed a variety of behaviours. A consequence of inappropriate treatment of opportunity costs is an incorrect assessment of the economic consequences of resource allocation decisions. Improved understanding of why some managers treat opportunity costs inappropriately permits identifying situations where the incorrect economic evaluations will lead to sub-optimal resource allocation and therefore provides a basis for remedial action. This study identifies two conditional factors which potentially influence the way managers respond to opportunity cost information.These factors are managers' cognitive style and whether or not managers sponsor a project (project sponsorship), and it is argued that they influence managers' decisions on opportunity costs in situations in which opportunity cost implications are implicit. In particular, the paper proposes, first, that in the absence of project sponsorship, managers with an “intuitive” style of “taking in data” will tend to incorporate opportunity costs in their economic decisions whereas those wiht a “sensation” style will not. Second, it is suggested that because sponsorship encourages managers to ignore negative economic signals (sponsorship bias) any effects of cognitive style will be moderated in conditions where sponsorship is evident.A laboratory experiment with managers as subjects was used to examine these propositions. The results indicated that intuitive managers tended to incorporate opportunity costs in their decisions whereas sensation individuals appeared to focus more on the directness of the relationship between expenditure and a project to determine the relevance of the cost. Opportunity cost implications tended not to be identified by the sensation group. Evidence was found that sponsorship moderated the influence of cognitive style on decisions to include opportunity costs.     

Alliances and corporate governance

We study the link between a firm's quality of governance and its alliance activity. We consider alliances as a commitment technology that helps a company’ Chief Executive Officer overcome agency problems that relate to the inability to ex ante motivate division managers. We show that well-governed firms are more likely to avail themselves of this technology to anticipate ex post commitment problems and resolve them. The role of governance is particularly important when the commitment problems are more acute, such as for significantly risky/long-horizon projects (“longshots”) or firms more prone to inefficient internal redistribution of resources (conglomerates), as well as in the absence of alternative disciplining devices (e.g., low product market competition). Governance also mitigates agency issues between alliance partners; dominant alliance partners agree to a more equal split of power with junior partners that are better governed. An “experiment” that induces cross-sectional variation in the cost of the alliance commitment technology provides evidence of a causal link between governance and alliances.     

Strategic transfer pricing,absorption costing,and observability

This paper analyses the use of transfer pricing as a strategic device in divisionalized firms facing duopolistic price competition. When transfer prices are observable, both firms’ headquarters will charge a transfer price above the marginal cost of the intermediate product to induce their marketing managers to behave as softer competitors in the final product market. When transfer prices are not observable, strategic transfer pricing is not an equilibrium and the optimal transfer price equals the marginal cost of the intermediate product. As a strategic alternative, however, the firms can signal the use of transfer prices above marginal cost to their competitors by a publicly observable commitment to an absorption costing system. The paper identifies conditions under which the choice of absorption costing is a dominant strategy equilibrium.     

Corporate redemption and the seven deadly sins

Competitive purgatory is the sorry state of too many formerly proud U.S. corporations. They are languishing from the devastating effects of seven familiar sins: inconsistent product quality; slow response to the marketplace; lack of innovative, competitive products; uncompetitive cost structure; inadequate employee involvement; unresponsive customer service; and inefficient resource allocation. To make matters worse, the maladies are mostly management-induced, and the remedies most managers are employing-shifting strategy, reallocating resources, focusing on operations--are proving ineffective. The cures don't address the cause of the disease: negative, risk-averse, bureaucratic work environments that flourished in decades of easy growth but today are undermining competitive performance. What's needed is a total reinvention of the soft side of the organization to produce a work environment that stresses speed, Spartanism, innovation, and marketplace focus. First, top managers must decide what their company stands for and convince their employees of this uniqueness. Second, they must set standards that drive their business to worldclass levels and be tough about enforcing and raising them. Third, they must push constantly to ensure that enough innovations take place to change the company's future significantly. Three other factors are crucial: the right talent, an effective reward system, and CEOs who can drive the desired changes personally. Creating a dynamic work environment is not easy: it takes perseverance, flexibility, and commitment. But these efforts will pay off: how people tackle problems, work together, and think about their jobs are the activities that make a company great.     

The influence of change agents' behavioral intention on the usage of the activity based costing/management system and firm performance: The perspective of unified theory of acceptance and use of technology

This study adopts the viewpoint of the Unified Theory of Acceptance and Use of Technology (UTAUT) model to examine the change agents' behavioral intentions in the implementation of an activity based costing/management (ABC/M) system. ABC/M is an important management system that emphasizes the allocation of overhead costs on the basis of cost drivers, in order to provide relevant information for improved decision-making. A change agent is a person chosen to cause organizational change. Senior managers and often chief executives usually play the role that implements change. The behavioral intentions have been identified as a proactive attitude and action for promoting the ABC/M system in this study. Since there is little evidence of ABC/M adoption outside the United States and European countries, this research used Taiwanese companies as the sample. Questionnaires were used to investigate the factors influencing change agents' behavioral intentions to promote ABC/M systems and the type of facilitating conditions that affected the extent of usage of ABC/M systems. The questionnaires were carried out through the perspective of user acceptance of information technology (IT). Furthermore, the aim of this paper is also to explore whether use of the ABC/M system will produce an improved effect on performance. The empirical results from 100 valid responses collected indicate that performance expectancy and social influence directly affect change agents' behavioral intentions. Both change agents' behavioral intentions and facilitation conditions are important constructs that affect the extent of usage of ABC/M systems. The extent of ABC/M usage is also significantly associated with relative financial and non-financial performance. The results demonstrate that the adaptive UTAUT model is applicable for measuring change agents' behavioral intentions in current implementations of ABC/M systems. The study also reveals the positive effect of change agents on the performance of ABC/M systems.     

Arguments in Favour of Tax Neutral Cost Allocation

When considering corporate taxes in a cost allocation context a trade‐off is generated for shareholders. On the one hand, accelerated depreciation increases the value of a project due to the depreciation tax shield. On the other hand, accelerated depreciation most likely does not induce robust goal congruency between managers and shareholders when utilizing residual income as an incentive system and, as a consequence, over‐ or underinvestment could result. In this context, the literature suggests the application of particular allocation rules. When extending the relative marginal benefits cost allocation rule (Reichelstein, 1997; Rogerson, 1997) to include corporate taxes we find it to be tax neutral and to maintain its properties of generating robust incentives. As a consequence the over‐/underinvestment problem is solved, but the depreciation tax shield is often not maximized. However, we illustrate that in competitive markets shareholders ought to prefer a tax neutral allocation scheme over an accelerated depreciation schedule. Thus, we show that shareholders as well as regulators have—for different reasons—a preference for tax neutral cost allocation.     

The four faces of mass customization

Virtually all executives today recognize the need to provide outstanding service to customers. Focusing on the customer, however, is both an imperative and a potential curse. In their desire to become customer driven, many companies have resorted to inventing new programs and procedures to meet every customer's request. But as customers and their needs grow increasingly diverse, such an approach has become a surefire way to add unnecessary cost and complexity to operations. Companies around the world have embraced mass customization in an attempt to avoid those pitfalls. Readily available information technology and flexible work processes permit them to customize goods or services for individual customers in high volumes at low cost. But many managers have discovered that mass customization itself can produce unnecessary cost and complexity. They are realizing that they did not examine thoroughly enough what kind of customization their customers would value before they plunged ahead. That is understandable. Until now, no framework has existed to help managers determine the type of customization they should pursue. James Gilmore and Joseph Pine provide managers with just such a framework. They have identified four distinct approaches to customization. When designing or redesigning a product, process, or business unit, managers should examine each approach for possible insights into how to serve their customers best. In some cases, a single approach will dominate the design. More often, however, managers will need a mix of some or all of the four approaches to serve their own particular set of customers.     

Beware the busy manager

Managers will tell you that the resource they lack most is time. If you watch them, you'll see them rushing from meeting to meeting, checking their e-mail constantly, fighting fires--an astonishing amount of fast-moving activity that allows almost no time for reflection. Managers think they are attending to important matters, but they're really just spinning their wheels. For the past ten years, the authors have studied the behavior of busy managers, and their findings should frighten you: Fully 90% of managers squander their time in all sorts of ineffective activities. A mere 10% of managers spend their time in a committed, purposeful, and reflective manner. Effective action relies on a combination of two traits: focus--the ability to zero in on a goal and see the task through to completion--and energy--the vigor that comes from intense personal commitment. Focus without energy devolves into listless execution or leads to burnout. Energy without focus dissipates into aimless busyness or wasteful failures. Plotting these two traits into a matrix provides a useful framework for understanding productivity levels of different managers. Managers who suffer from low levels of both energy and focus are the procrastinators: They dutifully perform routine tasks but fail to take initiatve. Disengaged managers have high focus but low energy: They have reservations about the jobs they are asked to do, so they approach them half-heartedly. Distracted managers have high energy but low focus: They confuse frenetic activity with constructive action. Purposeful managers are both highly energetic and highly focused: These are the managers who accomplish the most. This article will help you identify which managers in your organization are making a real difference--and which just look busy.     

Using reciprocal allocation of service department costs for decision making

This article has provided a look into the use of the reciprocal method as an alternative to more conventional methods of hospital service department cost allocation methods. The reciprocal method can be used with readily available software and with data that are largely already known. This method will provide not only appropriate allocation values for financial reporting but data that can be used for hospital decision making. In the highly competitive and sometimes hostile environment in which hospitals now fight to survive, any additional relevant data--especially that generated at almost no additional cost--should be provided to managers to help in the decision-making process.     

Stock Market Efficiency and Economic Efficiency: Is There a Connection?

In a capitalist economy, prices serve to equilibrate supply and demand for goods and services, continually changing to reallocate resources to their most efficient uses. However, secondary stock market prices, often viewed as the most “informationally efficient” prices in the economy, have no direct role in the allocation of equity capital since managers have discretion in determining the level of investment. What is the link between stock price informational efficiency and economic efficiency? We present a model of the stock market in which: (i) managers have discretion in making investments and must be given the right incentives; and (ii) stock market traders may have important information that managers do not have about the value of prospective investment opportunities. In equilibrium, information in stock prices will guide investment decisions because managers will be compensated based on informative stock prices in the future. The stock market indirectly guides investment by transferring two kinds of information: information about investment opportunities and information about managers' past decisions. However, because this role is only indirect, the link between price efficiency and economic efficiency is tenuous. We show that stock price efficiency is not sufficient for economic efficiency by showing that the model may have another equilibrium in which prices are strong-form efficient, but investment decisions are suboptimal. We also suggest that stock market efficiency is not necessary for investment efficiency by considering a banking system that can serve as an alternative institution for the efficient allocation of investment resources.     

Nigerian SMEs: Commitment and loyalty to their banks

Commitment has a crucial role to play in underpinning long-term business relationships, and as such, is well established in the related academic literature. Limited research does, however, exist pertaining to the specific relationships between SMEs and their banks. This paper presents and assesses commitment relationship framework that seeks to evaluate such relationships. Various validated scale-sets from the existing studies are combined here to assess commitment, advocacy and repurchase intention. Data were collected from 199 SMEs via interviews with owners or senior (financial) managers. Their assessment involved exploratory factor analysis to determine underlying data structure, with internal reliability assessment of the identified factors. Commitment is established around two components; affective and calculative, whilst advocacy and repurchase intention converge into a single behavioural intentions factor. The two-dimensional presentation of commitment and behavioural intentions are also distinct. Originality lies in the validation of commitment and behavioural intention constructs within this specific business arena and geographical location, as well as showcasing research that involves engagement with smaller organisations rather than their larger counterparts in the consideration of bank performance.     

Career Concerns and Resource Allocation in Conglomerates

We investigate resource allocation decisions in conglomerateswhen managers are motivated by career concerns. When divisionalcash flows are differentially informative about managerial ability,we show that it is in the managers' interest to overallocateunobservable intangible resources to the more informative divisions.Anticipating this bias, it is optimal for the firm's ownersto also overallocate observable capital to the more informativedivisions. The model provides rationale for corporate socialismand corporate hedging. It also highlights a cost of segmentreporting and tracking stocks, namely, that they allow managersto distort their perceived ability at the expense of investors.     

Optimal hedge fund portfolios under liquidation risk

We use an expected utility framework to integrate the liquidation risk of hedge funds into portfolio allocation problems. The introduction of realistic investment constraints complicates the determination of the optimal solution, which is solved using a genetic algorithm that mimics the mechanism of natural evolution. We analyse the impact of the liquidation risk, of the investment constraints and of the agent's degree of risk aversion on the optimal allocation and on the optimal certainty equivalent of hedge fund portfolios. We observe, in particular, that the portfolio weights and their performance are significantly affected by liquidation risk. Finally, tight portfolio constraints can only provide limited protection against liquidation risk. This approach is of special interest to fund of hedge fund managers who wish to include the hedge fund liquidation risk in their portfolio optimization scheme.     

Markets versus governments

We provide a simple framework for comparing market allocations with government-regulated allocations. Governments can collect information about individuals’ types and enforce transfers across individuals. Markets (without significant government intervention) have to rely on transactions that are ex post beneficial for individuals. Consequently, governments achieve better risk sharing and consumption smoothing than markets. However, politicians in charge of collective decisions can use the centralized information and the enforcement power of government for their own benefits. This leads to political economy distortions and rents for politicians, making government-operated allocation mechanisms potentially worse than markets. We provide conditions under which it is ex ante beneficial for the society to tolerate the political economy distortions in exchange for the improvement in risk sharing. For example, more effective controls on politicians or higher discount factors of politicians make governments more attractive relative to markets. Moreover, when markets cannot engage in self-enforcing risk-sharing arrangements and income effects are limited, greater risk aversion and greater uncertainty make governments more attractive relative to markets. Nevertheless, we also show theoretically and numerically that the effect of risk aversion on the desirability of markets may be non-monotonic. In particular, when markets can support self-enforcing risk-sharing arrangements, a high degree of risk aversion improves the extent of risk sharing in markets and makes governments less necessary. The same pattern may also arise because of “income effects” on labor supply. Consequently, the welfare gains of governments relative to markets may have an inverse U-shape as a function of the degree of risk aversion of individuals.     

The costs of organization structure: Dispelling the myths of independent divisions and organization-wide decision making

For theoretical and methodological convenience, accountants often assume that the divisions of an organization are largely independent of one another and that divisional managers therefore can make decisions consistent with global optimality. Along with these assumptions, accountants have taken the structure of an organization as fixed and not changeable. This paper suggests a framework and method for assessing the costs resulting from non-independent divisions, as a component of organization productivity. Also offered is a methodology for changing the structure of organizations so that these hidden “conversion costs” first will be exposed and then can be managed for productivity improvements. Structural change thus becomes an alternative to designing elaborate information/control systems as a way of managing interdependency problems. Furthermore, as organizations are redesigned to make divisions more independent, accountants can concentrateon more intermediate matters, such as procedures for optimally determining joint-cost allocation and transfer prices, with minimal interference from the divisional structure of the organization.     

The Earnings Smoothing Potential of Systematic Depreciation

Ample evidence exists that managers attempt to use 'artificial' choices concerning alternative accounting procedures for classification, valuation and allocation of transactions to smooth reported periodic income or earnings series. However, the actual smoothing effect of such choices and their influence on the properties of earnings numbers is unknown. This study analyses the smoothing potential of depreciation when systematically applied. It exploits an idea regarding the effects of inclusion of expectations information in earnings calculations due to Willett (1988, 1991b), theoretically elaborated by Gibbins and Willett (1997) and applied analytically by Lane and Willett (1997). Using a statistical activity cost theory (SACT) framework, we quantify the smoothing (variance reduction) potential of straight-line and reducing-balance depreciation methods and compare the potential with an analytically derived depreciation method which optimizes variance reduction. We also evaluate the effects of conditioning factors such as accuracy of managers' expectations and relative asset acquisition and disposal values upon smoothing potential. We find that systematically depreciating assets can smooth undepreciated earnings numbers. Straight-line depreciation can exploit virtually all of this potential and reducing-balance depreciation a substantial proportion. However, realising this potential varies greatly depending on conditioning factors. The investigation is practical and policy oriented but complementary to theoretical extensions of the sort suggested by Butler et al. (1994). While the article focuses on depreciation, the SACT framework is completely general and may be extended to any choice of method for smoothing earnings series.     

An Italian forerunner of modern cost allocation concepts: Lorenzo De Minico and the logic of the 'flows of services'

This article provides an analysis of the thoughts of an Italian academic who lived in the first half of the twentieth century, Lorenzo De Minico, in particular it regards his approach to the allocation of common costs. De Minico's main concern was with the conventional, subjective allocation methods proposed by Italian practitioners and academics of his time. He valiantly searched for a methodological approach based on using causality as the basis for linking costs to cost objects. The most interesting finding of De Minico was the concept of 'flows of services' and his commitment to offering a convincing answer to the problem of general or common cost apportionment that went beyond 'traditional' criteria. De Minico's 'flows of services' referred to the outputs of resources consumed in indirect services. These indirect costs can be considered easily 'directly attributable' only if it is possible to measure the connected 'flows of services'. The article shows that the concept developed by De Minico in early twentieth century of Italy confirms the idea that some theoretical frameworks for a causal allocation of common costs were in existence many decades before information technology made such systems a practical proposition.     

Do firms use dividend changes to signal future profitability? A simultaneous equation analysis

This paper retests the signaling hypothesis of dividends by examining whether managers change dividends to signal their expectation of earnings prospects using a simultaneous-equation approach. This approach allows us to more clearly test the earnings prospects signaling hypothesis and facilitates the control of several alternative motives that managers may have for changing dividends. We also examine the information content of dividend changes with respect to future earnings changes in the same model system. Our results show that managers change dividends to signal equity-scaled rather than asset-scaled earnings prospects. In addition, we find evidence that managers also change dividends for signaling previous earnings changes and for catering to dividend clienteles. As for the information content of dividend changes, we find that dividend changes have significant and negative impact on ROA changes. The findings suggest that if investors consistently cannot recognize the signaling purpose and find that dividend increases (decreases) are not useful in predicting favorable (unfavorable) future earnings, managers may someday give up using dividend changes to signal the earnings prospects of their firms because they cannot obtain the expected market benefits anymore.     

An Analysis of Bank Loan Rate Indexation

This paper examines the economic rationale for the use of bank loan commitments and the effect on the allocation of bank credit of indexing the loan rate offered through the commitment to the prime. A simple model of the loan market is constructed and used to examine the effect changes in loan demand and the cost of bank funds have on the allocation of bank credit under indexation. It is shown that indexing implies changes in the relative cost of borrowing for certain groups of bank customers. For nonprime customers, an increase in the cost of bank funds results in a decline in the relative cost of borrowing under commitments. The pattern of commitment use is found to be consistent with the predictions of the model.