Optimal property taxation in the presence of interregional capital mobility

A single region's optimal property tax policy is examined in a model with interregional capital mobility. In this model, property taxation is used to finance local public expenditures. Different tax rates may be imposed on property used to produce goods which are traded between regions and property used to produce nontraded goods (e.g., residential property). The key determinants of the difference between the optimal tax rates are identified, and it is argued that there exists a bias towards relatively low tax rates on property used to produce traded goods. The role of labor mobility is also investigated.     

The Spatial Effects of Wage or Property Tax Differentials, and Local Government Choice between Tax Instruments

This paper considers the spatial effects (on wages, employment, and business capital as functions of location) of a localized differential in source-based wage tax rates or business property tax rates between (for example) a central city and the surrounding suburbs. A simple model is used in which business production uses only labor and capital inputs. Consumers have fixed residential locations but may commute to work. Wage and property tax differentials have effects that are similar in some ways but different in other ways. If given a choice, a local government would choose to set its business property tax rate equal to zero and use only a wage tax.     

Tax Competition and Revelation of Preferences for Public Expenditure

This paper considers a federal country composed of local jurisdictions that differ in their inhabitants' tastes for public goods, and which finance local public expenditure through a source-based tax on capital income. The taste for public goods is the private information of local governments. The central government seeks an optimal policy, in which grants to local governments are conditioned on local tax rates. The uninformed central government seeks both to allocate capital efficiently among jurisdictions, and to induce jurisdictions to provide an efficient mix of private and public consumption. It is shown that there persist at this constrained optimum both some misallocation of capital and some violation of the Samuelson rule for optimal public good provision in every jurisdiction.     

Tax competition,uniform assessment,and the benefit principle

In previous discussions it has been argued that tax competition between local governments results in a tax burden on business that is less than the cost of public services for business and in suboptimal levels of public expenditures for residents. However, this conclusion has never been substantiated by a full theoretical treatment. Here a theoretical model of tax competition is developed between metropolitan areas, with labor perfectly immobile and two local public goods, one for residents and one for business. For “plausible” parameter values, numerical solutions of the optimality conditions are computed by means of a nonlinear programming algorithm.     

Formula Apportionment: Factor Allocation and Tax Avoidance

This paper addresses the question of how firms react to tax incentives in a formula apportionment (FA) tax regime. Under FA, the profits of all consolidated entities of a business group are summed and then allocated according to a formula based on FA factors. We hypothesize that firms may change the allocation of real production factors and/or manipulate the FA factor through tax avoidance strategies. Analyzing FA tax effects of the German local business tax with payroll expense as the exclusive FA factor, we find empirical evidence consistent with both hypotheses. Regarding the allocation of production factors, we observe significant tax effects on labor input at the intensive margin but not on labor input at the extensive margin. In addition, we find evidence of an indirect FA spillover effect on capital investment. Our findings on tax avoidance proxies are consistent with tax-induced manipulations of payroll expense as an FA factor to save tax payments.     

Tax Regimes and Capital Gains Realizations

This paper contrasts the individual capital gains realization behavior between progressive and proportional tax regimes. Using a longitudinal panel of over 288,000 individuals in Sweden, I exploit the 1991 tax reform in Sweden that changed progressive capital gains tax rates ranging from 12% to 80% to a proportional tax rate of 30%. Using the proportional tax system to control for non-tax reasons to realize capital gains, I show that individuals are highly responsive to capital gains tax incentives created by temporary income changes under a progressive capital gains tax. More specifically, I find that individuals with temporary negative (positive) income changes sell (hold) shares that they would hold (sell) in the absence of temporary tax incentives. Further, I show that high-income individuals are more tax sensitive than low-income individuals. This result indicates that low-income individuals facing temporary negative income changes could trade predominantly for non-tax reasons.     

Pigou, Tiebout, property taxation, and the underprovision of local public goods

Pigou's proposition that the use of distorting taxes rather than neutral head taxes reduces public service levels is examined in this paper. A simple model with a national system of competing local governments is utilized to demonstrate that the use of a distorting property tax on mobile capital decreases the level of residential public services. The case where public services are an intermediate producer good is also considered.     

美国区域合作的财税规则及其经验启示

随着区域经济一体化的发展和公共事务的增长,美国作为区域合作先发国家,已经形成较为成熟的财税规则,包括多元化财政融资、区域合作财税优惠、合作组织财政职能、财税收益分配补偿、财税争议纠纷处理等规则。我国可吸取美国的有益经验,逐步扩大地方税权,加强财税规则顶层设计;加大国家财政支持,构建多元化融资模式;搭建区域合作组织平台,负责资金运营与维护;实施区域合作税收优惠,进一步优化合作环境;合理平衡区际财税利益,构筑多元纠纷裁决机制。     

Pennsylvania's Success with Local Property Tax Reform

A bstract Fifteen cities in Pennsylvania are pioneering an innovative approach to local tax reform that harnesses market incentives for urban renewal .
Opting for the so-called "two-rate" or "split-rate" property tax , these cities are lowering taxes on buildings, thereby encouraging improvements and renovations , while raising the tax on land values, thus discouraging land speculation . The resulting infill development as indicated by increased building permits means downtown jobs , efficient use of urban infrastructure, an improved housing stock, and less urban sprawl .
Cities in other states are poised to follow Pennsylvania's example.     

The Role of Symmetry between the Revenue and the Expenditure Side of the Government Budget in the Debate about the Potential Negative Effects of Tax Competition

The effects of capital tax competition are reconsidered in this paper incorporating the argument that the expenditure structure of public budget should reflect its revenue structure. The paper offers a small open economy model where capital and labour tax revenues are used exclusively on the provision of public inputs. It is shown that if the revenue side of the government budget exactly matches the expenditure side that is if industrial public goods are financed by both private production factors with the weights reflecting the contributions of public inputs to the private factor productivity then public inputs are provided optimally even in the presence of tax competition.     

Public housing units vs. housing vouchers: Accessibility,local public goods,and welfare

We develop a general equilibrium model of residential choice and study the effects of two housing aid policies, public housing units and housing vouchers. Land is differentiated by both residential accessibility and local public goods, and the provision levels of local public goods are determined by property tax revenues and neighborhood compositions. Households differ in their incomes and preferences for local public goods. Housing aid policies are financed by general income taxes. We discuss how the location of public housing units is a fundamental policy variable, in addition to the numbers and sizes of units, and argue that vouchers not only cause less distortion for social welfare compared to public housing, but may also improve overall welfare.     

Property Tax and Housing Returns

This paper evaluates the effects of property tax on housing. While land tax and capital gains tax are widely used for curbing hoarding of land and speculation, its effectiveness is inconclusive. The imposition of a capital gains tax will impair the liquidity of property transaction, lower the rate of return on property investment, and reduce revenue from land sales which represents an important tax resource for the communities. This paper shows that a capital gains tax is capitalized into housing prices. Individuals tend to postpone the purchase of houses because of transaction taxes. Using an impulse response function, we show that a transaction tax has a dynamic negative impact on housing returns. While this paper focuses on Hong kong, for the purpose of comparison Singapore and Taiwan are also discussed.     

Fiscal centralization versus decentralization: Growth and welfare effects of spillovers, Leviathan taxation, and capital mobility

This paper develops an endogenous growth model with spillovers of public goods, Leviathan taxation, and mobile capital to examine the relative merits of centralized and decentralized fiscal systems for economic growth and social welfare. We show that a decentralized system dominates a centralized system in terms of economic growth; however, the difference in social welfare between a decentralized and a centralized system is non-monotonic and displays a hump-shaped relationship with respect to capital mobility. Since higher capital mobility induces stronger tax competition, this finding implies that there is an optimal degree of tax competition; some tax competition is desirable, but fierce tax competition may be harmful. We also show that there is a critical level of spillovers of public goods above which centralization dominates decentralization in terms of social welfare, as in previous studies; however, if spillovers are below this critical level, capital mobility also matters in the welfare comparison between centralized and decentralized systems.     

THE DETERMINANTS OF CAPITAL INTENSITY IN FOREIGN-OWNED MANUFACTURING ACROSS U.S. REGIONS

This paper empirically tests hypothesized influences on the capital intensity of foreign direct investment (FDI) among the 48 contiguous United States. A theoretical profit maximizing model of the firm is developed linking capital intensity to traditional variables (the prices of labor and capital services); the model also takes account of the price of energy, agglomeration effects, educational levels, the importance of labor unions, and state and local public capital. The main focus is on the effects of public capital on the capital intensity of FDI. Public capital is disaggregated as follows: highway, sewer and water, and other (primarily buildings). The operational model defines FDI as the 1986 gross value of property, plant, and equipment of manufacturing affiliates of firms with headquarters in Canada, France, Germany, Japan, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. Findings are reported both for total manufacturing and for manufacturing disaggregated into five industry groups. Generally, the results emphasize that highway infrastructure and sewer and water public capital act as powerful incentives to attract capital-intensive FDI across the 48 contiguous United States.     

Some Comments on Tax Competition and Its Potential Effects on Tax Rates and Revenues

Corporate taxation is seen as the price of investing in a country, that is, the price either for the right to do business within the jurisdiction or for the supply of public goods. If consumption of that right or those public goods is mobile between jurisdictions and price competition ensues which will force prices together. Also, in the case of high tax regimes, a fall in the tax burden would be anticipated. In other words, countries will spontaneously harmonize their tax systems or face the loss of intemational investment and the disadvantages they bring.     

Taxes, Federal Grants, Local Public Spending, and Growth

In a dynamic model with both private and local public capital accumulation, this paper examines how federal and local income taxes, local consumption tax, and federal matching grants for local public consumption and local public investment affect the long-run equilibrium (equilibria) of private consumption, private capital accumulation, local public consumption, and local public capital stock.     

A theory of interregional tax competition

A general equilibrium model is constructed to study tax competition, where local governments compete for capital by holding down property tax rates and public expenditure levels. An exact definition of tax competition is provided, and both the existence and nonexistence of tax competition are shown to be theoretically possible. It is argued, however, that tax competition must occur under empirically reasonable conditions. Inefficiency in public production is also explicitly modeled. The amount of capital used to produce a given level of public service output is shown to be greater than that which is required to minimize costs evaluated at the prices facing private firms.     

我国个人所得税改革的误区及其突破

我国个人所得税改革存在一定的误区:税制改革的重点在于流转税、当前个税属于综合与分类相结合的税收模式、劳动所得作为个税的改革核心等。反思改革误区,我国个人所得税改革应实现三点突破:一是个税改革重点应由劳动所得转向资本所得,以股息和红利所得作为资本所得课税的改革核心,取消根据持有时间长短而差别计税的优惠政策;二是不断扩大个人所得综合征税的范围,逐步实现对资本所得的综合课税、以半二元模式作为我国综合与分类相结合的个税改革模式;三是缓步实现对个人所得税的"增税"调整,促进我国税制结构向"双主体"模式合理过渡。     

Challenges to the Ideal Property Tax

A bstract . In the 19th century state-appointed tax revision commissions began to influence the reform of the property tax. By 1893, some 28 commissions had been appointed. Their remarkably similar calls for reform set the parameters for much of the academic research in the 20th century when this tax instrument was transformed from a local tax to a federal-state-local exaction. As now administered, the property tax is no longer a unified tax. Separate assessment criteria make it a tax on mines, utilities, business property, household personalty and on housing. The latter is modified in different ways by homestead exemption (41 states), circuit breakers (50 sates) and use of classified schedules (17 states). Along with unprofessional and inaccurate assessments as well as politicized assessment practices, this has changed the tax to a general title for disparate fiscal activities in the 68,000 jurisdictions that use the property tax.     

Federalism,taxation, and economic growth

We present a model of endogenous growth where government provides a productive public good financed by income and capital taxes. In equilibrium, a decentralized government chooses tax policy to maximize economic growth, while a centralized government does not do so. Furthermore, these conclusions hold regardless of whether governments are beholden to a median voter or are rent-maximizing Leviathans. However, a decentralized government will under-provide public goods which benefit citizens directly, while a central government beholden to the median voter will optimally invest in such public goods.