Unbundling and infrastructure competition for broadband adoption: Implications for NGA regulation

The common idea of open access policy is that it refers to the sharing of particular elements, such as wholesale access networks, backhaul, under-sea cable and internet exchange points in fixed and mobile networks. In broadband networks, the use of open access policy usually refers to the infrastructure parts, which are considered a bottleneck. Many regulators have generally focused open access policy on fixed broadband networks, especially digital subscriber line (DSL) technology, in the last decade. Local loop unbundling (LLU) regulation is one of the main strategies for the regulator to open access to an incumbent’s bottleneck network in order to soften its monopoly power and encourage competition in the DSL broadband market. The OECD countries have different strategies regarding unbundling local loop and infrastructure competition, as the characteristics and infrastructure networks of countries vary. There are currently more choices of next generation network (NGN) technologies to develop. While local loop unbundling may not be applied fully to NGN development (the cost is not sunk, more technologies are available to implement, incentive of investment by operator), it can indicate benefits and drawbacks of open access policy in the past decade that can be adapted to NGN.The empirical results of this study show that during 2002–2008, LLU regulation was one of the strategies used to increase broadband adoption in countries that had difficulty encouraging infrastructure competition. Unbundling regulation can therefore be implemented carefully and differently in each country that has inefficiency that is harmful to consumers in its market from a monopoly incumbent. Infrastructure competition, on the other hand, is introduced as another strategy to increase broadband adoption. The empirical results of this study indicate that infrastructure competition can be used as a strategy when there are already enough infrastructures in the area or country. These results support the idea of using open access and infrastructure competition policy depending on the existing competition of broadband infrastructure in each country.     

“Open access:” the ideal and the real

“Open access” would allow ISPs to use a cable operator's broadband connection under regulated terms and conditions. Advocates stress the desirability of an “end-to-end” architecture for the Internet and the danger that cable operators will use their control over the last mile to limit consumer choice and stifle innovation. Opponents contend that wholesale price controls and other regulatory burdens under what they term “forced access” would in fact slow down the deployment of broadband, stifle innovation and harm consumers. The fears of “open access” advocates seem largely speculative at this point. Evidence from related policies also favors the opponents. “Closed” cable systems are beating their “open” DSL competitors in the market place; analogous regulation of cable TV did not serve consumers well; and forced “unbundling” of local service has been controversial and largely ineffective. In addition, relevant technology stocks declined in price with political and legal victories for “open access” and increased when it suffered setbacks.     

Access regulation,entry and investments in telecommunications

This paper presents a model of competition between an incumbent and an entrant firm in telecommunications. The entrant has the option to enter the market with or without having preliminary invested in its own infrastructure; in case of facility based entry, the entrant has also the option to invest in the provision of enhanced services. In the case of resale based entry the entrant needs access to the incumbent network. Unlike the rival, the incumbent has always the option to upgrade the existing network to provide advanced services. We study the impact of access regulation on the type of entry and on firms’ investments. We find that without regulation the incumbent sets the access charge to prevent resale based entry and this generates a social inefficient level of facility based entry. Access regulation may discourage welfare enhancing investments, thus also inducing a socially inefficient outcome. We extend the model to account for negotiated interconnection in the case of facilities based entry.     

The interplay of regulation and other drivers of NGN deployment: A real-world perspective

This paper contributes to the current, lively debate on which factors induce or hinder the deployment of next generation networks (NGNs), where regulatory design plays the key role. As a country with one of the highest levels of fibre deployment, intense infrastructural competition in urban areas and regulated access to both copper and fibre networks, Slovenia is an interesting case to explore using the recent theoretical and empirical findings. First, the impacts of regulation and other factors on investment decisions are explored. Second, the impact of NGN investments on investors' performance is analysed and explained, and we focus on both the investors' business strategies and the demand for NGN services. Third, the regulatory policy in both regimes, namely, before and after the mandated access to fibre was implemented, is discussed and changes are proposed.     

Ex ante regulation and co-investment in the transition to next generation access

Investments in next generation access networks (NGANs) ask for a new set of regulatory remedies. This paper contributes to this debate by focusing on three issues: the migration from the legacy copper network to the NGA infrastructure, and how wholesale pricing regulation might affect this process; the introduction of differentiated wholesale remedies according to geographical differences in NGAN deployment; the impact of co-investment decisions on market outcomes and their interplay with access regulation. Using the recent economic literature, arguments and possible guidelines are proposed, which might be useful to regulators and policy makers.     

Strategic investments under competition for access provision

We examine competition for access provision when symmetric vertically integrated firms invest in infrastructure upgrades. Spillovers through access have two effects (a wholesale-profit effect and a retail-production effect) on infrastructure investment made by vertically integrated firms. When the vertically integrated firms freely set access charges, due to the dominance of the wholesale-profit effect, quality differentials endogenously occur between these firms (asymmetric equilibria). When access charges are regulated, symmetric equilibria occur with multiple equilibrium investments due to the retail-production effect. Because competition for access provision induces a strong incentive for infrastructure investment, it also achieves a higher social welfare than does access regulation.     

Competitive targeted online advertising

This paper examines how an online publisher utilizes its information about consumer preference to target advertising. In our model, two firms first bid for a prominent ad position in a publisher-organized position auction, and then compete on price in the subsequent product marketplace. We consider two dimensions of consumer heterogeneity. First, consumers are heterogeneous in product preference. Based on their tastes, some consumers prefer one product over the other, whereas other consumers may rank the products in an opposite order. Second, consumers differ in search preference, i.e., “nonshoppers” only consider the advertised product, while “shoppers” always search both firms’ products before buying. We show that targeted advertising based on product preference will mitigate price competition in product markets as well as competition in position auctions, the latter to the detriment of the publisher. In contrast, targeted advertising based on search preference always benefits the publisher, as the winning firm can charge monopoly prices to nonshoppers. We show that the publisher’s optimal choice is to utilize only the information about consumer search preference. We also explore the welfare implications of targeted advertising based on different types of consumer preference.     

International network competition under national regulation

We extend the workhorse model of network competition to international calls. This model enables us to show that national regulatory authorities (NRAs) maximizing domestic welfare have incentives to increase termination rates above the social optimum to extract rent from international call termination. Excessive termination rates distort prices but transfer surplus from foreign to domestic consumers via intensified network competition. The model can explain the regulation of termination rates through rate floors. International network ownership and deregulation are alternatives to combat the incentives of NRAs to distort termination rates. We identify conditions under which each of these policies increases aggregate welfare.     

Free speech and the challenge of efficiency

Radical transformation has come to speech platforms in the Information Society 2.0, typified by the migration from newspapers to social media. The change has been spurred by disruptive efficiencies in digital platforms. First, information distribution has been altered by near-costless electronic reproduction. Second, traditional bundles -- packaging editorial content of publications or broadcast networks with general-interest advertising messages -- have been eclipsed by competitively superior news aggregation hubs. Third, specialized content, including advertising, has become more easily targeted and better supplied via “long tails.” Fourth, the democratization of “publishing” has transformed “editing” into “platform mediation.” The resulting changes in market organization have made vastly higher volumes of news and public affairs information – from exponentially more sources – easily available to mass market consumers. In so doing, they have rendered the “Walter Cronkite” consensus obsolete, creating social controversy and considerable backlash. Demands to regulate, or re-regulate, are frequently voiced across the political spectrum. Such policies as “public interest” licensing, public utility regulation, and the Fairness Doctrine are here evaluated.     

Access regulation and investment in next generation networks — A ranking of regulatory regimes

This paper analyses how different types of access regulation to next generation networks affect investments and consumer welfare. The model consists of an investment stage with uncertain returns and subsequent quantity competition. The access price is a function of investment costs and the regulatory regime. A regime with fully distributed costs or a regulatory holiday induces highest investments, followed by risk-sharing and long run incremental costs regulation. Simulations indicate that risk-sharing creates most consumer welfare, followed by regimes with fully distributed costs, regulatory holiday and long run incremental costs, respectively. Risk-sharing benefits consumers as it combines relatively high ex-ante investment incentives with strong ex-post competitive intensity.     

„Collaborative Governance“ – ein neues Konzept für die Regulierung der europäischen Strom- und Gasmärkte?

Current British and American publications about the liberalization of electricity and gas markets demand a paradigm shift in the regulation of energy networks. These publications can be subsumed under the scientific debate about “collaborative governance” in the USA. They call for an integration of network users and consumers into the regulatory process. Their philosophy resembles the philosophy of the negotiated third party access in Germany from 1998 till 2005. Their regulatory strategy might be more effective than the actual European “command and control” strategy in establishing competitive energy markets. This article examines and evaluates these publications and their regulatory strategy.     

Next Generation Access (NGA) supply side interventions—An international comparison

Over the last years, technical and economic developments towards the deployment of Next Generation (Access) Networks have triggered discussions under which circumstances investments into physical infrastructure are economically viable. In many countries the discussion has arisen regarding conditions under which private investment will/will not be undertaken and whether or not in such cases public policy measures should support deployment. This could come in different ways—from incentivizing private investments to deploying new “state-owned” networks. Public policy can have an impact for example by intervening into a competitive market. The paper tries to provide answers as to “why” such interventions and supply side policies are undertaken (thereby referring to the central role that broadband infrastructures have for the economy) and “how” such interventions take place, for example an analysis of the public policy interventions to drive Next Generation Access Network deployment. The article thereby derives policy patterns that have occurred in different regions of the world.     

Eigentumsentflechtung,deep-ISO,der dritte Weg — wohin führt die Reise der Europäischen Energiemärkte?

This paper discusses vertical unbundling of networks from the commercial businesses in the European energy markets. The current status quo in the political field in Brussels is to implement a choice between three options: ownership unbundling, the “deep-ISO”, the “third way”. The “third way” is the strengthening of the current unbundling regulations, but will change hardly anything in the industry structure. The “deep-ISO” requires the separation of system operations into an independent entity, whereas transmission ownership does not change hands and thus possibly remains in one hand with the power plants. If the ISO decides and orders network investment, we speak of a “deep-ISO”. The more controversial proposal is ownership unbundling. A social-cost-benefit-analysis of the German transmission system operators (Brunekreeft, 2008) suggests that the likely overall effect for social welfare is slightly positive, but effects are small.     

Telecommunications infrastructure facilitating sustainable development of rural and remote communities in Northern Australia

Telecommunications access in the rural and remote areas of Australia has come under considerable scrutiny in recent years. In the past decade, various Federal Government reports and inquiries have citied inadequate infrastructure, lack of service provision, the high cost of access and “thin” markets as key impediments. Whilst these difficulties are not restricted to rural and remote Australia, they tend to impact disproportionately on regional communities, notably in education and health service provision. Particularly at risk are the indigenous communities in rural and remote regions of Australia.In this paper telecommunications infrastructure is perceived as the lynch-pin for achieving sustainable economic and social development. It is suggested that without appropriate development of information infrastructure, the disparities already experienced by rural and remote communities will be further exacerbated as the reliance of goods and services over computer-mediated networks increases.The paper offers a new paradigm that will assist in maintaining a competitive telecommunications environment and facilitate the sustainable social and economic development of rural and remote communities.     

Roaming and investments in the mobile internet market

This model discusses mobile network operators' (MNOs) incentives to invest in their network facilities such as new 4G networks under various regimes of data roaming charge regulation. Given an induced externality of investments (spillovers) due to the roaming agreements it will be shown that MNOs, competing on investments, widely set higher investments for below cost regulation of roaming charges. Otherwise, if MNOs are free to collaborate on investments, they set higher investment levels for above cost roaming charges. Both below and above cost charges may be preferred from a welfare perspective. Furthermore, the paper discusses effects of the roaming charge regulation on roaming quality and MNOs' coverage.     

Leadership with 5G in Europe: Two contrasting images of the future,with policy and regulatory implications

European policy makers have shown a keen interest in the success of 5G because ubiquitous and high capacity electronic communication infrastructure is recognized as a cornerstone of economic development and productivity growth. The second generation, GSM, is considered the leading example, reaching its peak of deployment in 2015 with 3.83 billion subscribers served by over 700 operators in 219 countries and territories.With 5G rapidly shaping up in the R&D and standardization environments, and a call for leadership with 5G in Europe by policy makers, it is timely to investigate what lessons can be learned from the success of 2G that can be applied to 5G. More broadly, this calls for research into the commonalities and differences between successive generations of mobile technology, their introduction and the market adoption that followed. This also calls for an investigation into the possibility of multiple futures of 5G and how that impacts the opportunity for leadership. As one future may be more desirable than the other, depending on the perspective of the actor involved, a policy debate will be required to determine the most desirable future. As well as a discussion of the policy and regulatory actions required to enable a particular future.Hence, the two-part research question being addressed in this paper is: What explains the success of 2G-GSM and how can it be applied to create success with 5G in the European Union?To respond to the research question this paper first identifies the leadership lessons to be drawn from the success of 2G-GSM in relation to its successors 3G and 4G. Secondly, the contribution describes two stylized images of possible futures of 5G, called “Evolution” and “Revolution”, as input to the policy debate on the options for leadership with 5G. These images reflect two extremes in terms of possible futures of 5G. “Evolution” follows the pattern of previous generations and current trends. “Revolution” represents a clear break with these trends and a path towards leadership with 5G, as it exploits the opportunities of standardized APIs for service creation, being enabled by network virtualization as an architectural foundation of 5G. These open and uniformly applied APIs allow the market entry of a multitude of virtual mobile network operators (VMNOs) serving particular industry verticals or economic sectors with tailored feature sets and qualities of services. They allow a market momentum to be built that constitutes leadership with 5G in Europe.     

Regulation of price increases

U.S. federal and state governments rarely regulate healthcare price levels, but do regulate price changes for pharmaceuticals, hospitals, and health insurance. Previous research showed that limiting price increases can raise launch prices and reduce both profit and social welfare, assuming consumers are myopic. We show that with forward-looking consumers, limiting price increases can have the opposite effect, that is, launch prices fall while profit and social welfare rise. Ironically, inflation regulation can cause inflation to rise, but only because firms are reducing launch prices to make the regulation bind and credibly commit to future prices.     

Buyer power through the differentiation of suppliers

This paper argues that rival retailers may choose to differentiate their supplying producers, even at the expense of downgrading the quality of the product offered to consumers, to improve their buyer power. We show that, through the differentiation of suppliers, a retailer may obtain a larger slice of a smaller pie, i.e, smaller bilateral joint profits. Thus, the “only” purpose of differentiation is to gain increasing buyer power. This result may hold (i) when retailers compete in the final market or (ii) when retailers are active in separate markets. The differentiation of suppliers, which results from a buyer power motive, may be harmful for consumer surplus and social welfare.     

Dark clouds over the Internet?

Currently, the Internet is characterized by excess capacity, which benefits consumers and producers of Internet-based services alike. High quality and declining prices of interconnection are the basis for many e-commerce, software and equipment businesses. However, tough competition in the Internet backbone market driving these developments could ruin network operators and threaten other markets, too. This paper will pursue the idea of the Internet backbone market's decline based on standard economic theory. The paper will present several scenarios and discuss potential market- and policy-based remedies. It is argued that due to a phenomenon called capacity paradox the industry's future development is overshadowed by “dark clouds”.     

Investigating the intertwining impact of wholesale access pricing and the commitment to net neutrality principle on European next-generation access networks private investment plans: An options-game application for capturing market players' competitive interactions

Whilst the deployment of next generation access networks (NGANs) is undoubtedly beneficial to the economy, new legal developments in the United States (US) regarding the issue of net neutrality (NN) pose a new challenge not only to policy makers but to telecommunication providers as well, that could justify a fresh approach when assessing NGANs investments. In particular, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) subverted extant NN rules in the US and if the European Union (EU) decides to follow a similar deregulatory path in the future it could change the way telecommunications providers on both sides of the Atlantic lay down their optical-fibre network infrastructure investment plans. For instance, if traffic prioritization is allowed then diversification of revenue sources can be achieved by charging customers for privileged data delivery to their premises. Currently, NGANs roll-out throughout EU is an ongoing process in a setting whereby access regulation in the form of network element unbundling is already imposed. As a result, these legal developments form a new context within which it makes sense to assess the role of NGANs wholesale access pricing in tandem with the degree of commitment to NN rules so as to i) determine their combinatorial impact on private telecommunications operators' financial figures and ii) capture their competitive interactions. Towards this end, an important aspect of particular value to market players (i.e. incumbents and competitive providers – CPs), and policy makers (i.e. National Regulatory Authorities – NRAs) that this article aims to examine is how to employ the option-game (OG) analysis, that reflects the intersection of game theory (GT) and real options (ROs), to model the competitive interactions between participants in a particular competition game set-up by means of deriving possible Nash-equilibrium (NE) outcomes within a regulatory setting part of which is the commitment or non-commitment to the NN principle. This, hybrid, evaluation tool is applied on top of a conventional discounted cash flow (DCF) techno-economic analysis assessment of an NGAN investment opportunity.