ANIMAL HEALTH SERVICES: FINDING THE BALANCE BETWEEN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE DELIVERY

Growing fiscal deficits and greater awareness of the huge economiccost of often-inefficient government activities have renewedinterest in transferring the delivery of important servicesfrom the public to the private sector in developing countries.This article, drawn from a longer study, offers a frameworkfor determining the appropriate roles of the public and privatesectors in delivering animal health services, such as veterinarysurveillance, disease vector control, vaccination, clinicaltreatment of sick animals, inspection of livestock products,and veterinary research and extension. The profitability and therefore the supply of private veterinaryservices is governed by several factors arising from economiesof scale, such as the size of the livestock enterprises in thelocality, the nature of potential or actual diseases, and thetypes of animals raised in the production systems. Thus, inareas where private veterinary work is unprofitable or whereother types of market failure occur, economic or social concernsmay make some type of public intervention necessary. The transferof animal health services from the public to the private sectormust be done selectively, and government support may be neededto ensure the success of such transfers.      

THE RELATIVE EFFICIENCY OF PRIVATE AND PUBLIC SCHOOLS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

Aside from revenue mobilization, one of the arguments for allowingthe private sector to assume a larger role in the provisionof education is that it would increase efficiency, as administratorsbecome more responsive to the needs of students and their parents.But what is the evidence? Based on case studies that compareprivate and public secondary education in Colombia, the DominicanRepublic, the Philippines, Tanzania, and Thailand, private schoolstudents generally outperform public school students on standardizedmath and language tests. This finding holds even after holdingconstant for the fact that, on average, private school studentsin these countries come from more advantaged backgrounds thantheir public. school counterparts. In addition, preliminaryevidence shows that the unit costs of private schools are lowerthan those of public schools. Although these results cannot,in themselves, be used as arguments for massive privatization,they indicate that governments should reconsider policies thatrestrain private sector participation in education. Furtherresearch is needed to determine whether some teaching and administrativepractices in private schools are applicable to public schools.      

Democracy, Public Expenditures, and the Poor: Understanding Political Incentives for Providing Public Services

The incentives of politicians to provide broad public goodsand reduce poverty vary across countries. Even in democracies,politicians often have incentives to divert resources to politicalrents and private transfers that benefit a few citizens at theexpense of many. These distortions can be traced to imperfectionsin political markets that are greater in some countries thanin others. This article reviews the theory and evidence on theimpact on political incentives of incomplete information forvoters, the lack of credibility of political promises, and socialpolarization. The analysis has implications for policy and forreforms to improve public goods provision and reduce poverty.      

HOUSEHOLD RESPONSES TO PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICES: COST AND QUALITY TRADEOFFS

The effectiveness of government investments in health care dependson the public's response to price and quality as well as onwhether these expenditures actually improve health outcomes.Consumers, even those in low-income households, are willingto pay fees for better health care if the fees translate intoimproved access and reliability. But when prices rise withouta concomitant improvement in services, malnutrition and childmortality rates increase. The availability of basic health carehas a relatively greater impact on households with low incomesor low education, or both, than does the provision of more specializedservices. This article describes the types of services for whichhouseholds indicate they are willing to pay increased fees.It also indicates the potential gains from improving these services,as well as the consequences of moving faster on cost recoverythan on providing improved or better-targeted services.      

Reassessing Conditional Cash Transfer Programs

During the past decade, the use of conditional cash transferprograms to increase investment in human capital has generatedconsiderable excitement in both research and policy forums.This article surveys the existing literature, which suggeststhat most conditional cash transfer programs are used for essentiallyone of two purposes: restoring efficiency when externalitiesexist or improving equity by targeting resources to poor households.The programs often meet their stated objectives, but in someinstances there is tension between the efficiency and equityobjectives. The overall impact of a program depends on the gainsand losses associated with each objective.      

The Impact of Oportunidades on Consumption,Savings and Transfers*

In this paper, we estimate the effect of the Mexican conditional cash transfer programme, Oportunidades, on transfers, savings and consumption for treated households. We find positive effects on consumption of non‐durable and durable goods, an increase in savings coupled with a drop in the number and values of loans, and a reduction of in‐kind transfers received by households in treatment areas. These results are consistent with the existing evidence that conditional cash transfer programmes have beneficial effects in both the short and medium term, but that they partly crowd out private transfers.     

PREFERENTIAL CREDIT AND INSURANCE AS MEANS TO PROMOTE EXPORTS

Rationales for preferential export credit and export creditinsurance are reviewed and several countries' programs are examinedto determine if these preferential programs are appropriateexport promotion instruments for developing countries. Marketfailure is the most compelling rationale for their introductionbut these arguments have not been well articulated and thereis no systematic analysis of the costs of alternative governmentresponses. Industrial countries' programs have histories ofsubsidy while developing countries' preferential programs havenot been significant factors in stimulating exports.      

ALTERNATIVE FORMS OF EXTERNAL FINANCE: A SURVEY

For many developing countries, alternative forms of externalfinance—all forms of finance that are not guaranteed byor mediated through the public sector—have become increasinglyimportant as traditional financing to the public sector hasebbed. Yet a survey of the literature reveals few recent analyticalinsights about alternative financing, which includes foreigndirect investment, project lending, portfolio investment, closed-endequity funds, private nonguaranteed debt, licensing, joint ventures,quasi-equity contracts, and other forms of private, nonrecourselending to private borrowers. The literature offers little solidguidance for distinguishing between alternative and traditionalfinancing with respect to country risk, for establishing themost appropriate and efficient incentive structures and restrictionsin the host country, or for identifying the optimal financingmodes for international firms investing in developing countries.This gap in the analytical literature has important implicationsfor policy formulation. It is not always clear whether a countryis developing incentives and establishing safeguards (for ensuringadherence to project performance requirements) that are mosteffective in attracting alternative forms of finance.      

Formal Water Markets: Why, When, and How to Introduce Tradable Water Rights

In most countries the state owns the water resources and thehydraulic infrastructure, and public officials decide who getsthe water, how it is to be used, and how much will be chargedfor it. But costly inefficiencies in the supply and use of watersupport a shift from government provision to a market-basedapproach that is more effective and less wasteful. Markets can allow rapid changes in allocation in response tochanging demands for water and can stimulate investment andemployment as investors are assured of access to secure suppliesof water. Because of water's unique characteristics, such marketsdo not work everywhere; nor do they resolve all water-relatedissues. By designing appropriate water laws and regulationsand by strengthening private and public institutions to administerthem, formal water markets can effectively address rising demandsfor groundwater and for water found in rivers, lakes, and canals.Lessons from Chile's experience demonstrate that formal watermarkets can improve the economic efficiency of water use andstimulate investment.      

Targeting Revisited

Public spending programs aimed at alleviating poverty can eitherbe broadly targeted at categories ofspending or narrowly targetedat types of people. Each approach has benefits and costs tothe poor. It is often claimed that narrow targeting of the poorwill allow governments to reduce pQverty more effectively andat lower cost. But narrow targeting often has hidden costs,and once these costs are considered, the most finely targetedpolicy may not have any more effect on poverty than a broadlytargeted one. Both approaches also have hidden benefits, althoughless is known about their impact. Targeting can help, but itis not a cure-all. Reducing poverty calls for broadly targetedsocial sector spending combined with narrower targeting of cashand in-kind transfers to spec groups. It is also important forgovernments to experiment with schemes that offer better incentives,to carefully monitor the costs and outcomes, and to be flexibleand pragmatic in their policy responses.      

EDUCATION VOUCHERS IN PRINCIPLE AND PRACTICE: A SURVEY

An education voucher system exists when governments make paymentsto families that enable their children to enter public or privateschools of their choice. The tax-funded payments can be madedirectly to parents or indirectly to the selected schools; theirpurpose is to increase parental choice, to promote school competition,and to allow low-income families access to private schools.Some opponents predict that vouchers will destroy the publicsystem, aggravate poverty, and foster segregation. Others fearthat voucher-receiving independent schools will be regulatedout of recognition. The main purpose of this article is to examine the recent emergenceof voucher systems as an interesting phenomenon in its own right.The evidence summarized relates to voucher systems operatingin twenty countries, provinces, and states. The typical "funds-follow-the-child"voucher system, in which governments subsidize "schools of choice"in strict proportion to enrollment, appears to be the favoriteform. This type of voucher has been adopted by developing countries—notablyBangladesh, Belize, Chile, Colombia, Guatemala, and Lesotho—aswell as by industrial countries such as Poland, Sweden, theUnited Kingdom, and the United States. Much of the recordedexperience with such programs is pertinent to the longstandingtheoretical debates on the desirability of voucher systems.      

Agricultural Extension: Good Intentions and Hard Realities

What considerations lead policymakers to invest in agriculturalextension as a key public responsibility, and what factors andagency incentives explain differences in extension system performance?To help answer these questions, this article provides a frameworkoutlining farmers' demand for information, the public goodscharacter of extension services, and the organizational andpolitical attributes affecting the performance of extensionsystems. This conceptual framework is used to analyze severalextension modalities and their likely and actual effectiveness.The analysis highlights the efficiency gains that can come fromlocally decentralized delivery systems with incentive structuresbased on largely private provision, although in most poorercountries extension services will remain publicly funded.      

GOVERNMENT SPENDING IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: Trends, Causes, and Consequences

Throughout the twentieth century governments have been spendingever larger proportions of national income. Three issues arisein discussions about the growth of such spending as it pertainsto developing countries: How does it compare with expenditurein industrial nations? What explains the growth in spendingby developing country governments? And what are the effectson economic growth? Government expenditure as a share of GDPin low- and middle-income countries, on average, is lower thancomparable shares in industrial market economies and, with fewexceptions, is growing. Many factors, including ideology, demographics,a positive income elasticity for public goods, the rising costof public goods relative to private goods, and perhaps developmenttheory and practice, explain this growth. As for the relationshipbetween government expenditure and economic growth, the empiricalevidence does not reveal any strong correlation. The size ofgovernment may engender strong ideological debate, but the positionthat the aggregate level of government expenditure is a significantdeterminant of growth rates receives little support.      

The two faces of social capital in private flood mitigation: opposing effects on risk perception,self-efficacy and coping capacity

Impacts of flooding are expected to increase, most notably in residential areas. As a consequence, private households are increasingly encouraged to engage in private flood mitigation complementary to public measures. Despite the growing literature on private flood mitigation, little is known about how social capital influences households’ perception of and coping with flood risks. This study draws on survey data of 226 flood-prone households in two Austrian Alpine municipalities, both recently affected by riverine flooding. We show that social capital cuts both ways: on the positive side, social capital increases perceived self-efficacy and provides critical support during and most notably after flood events. On the negative side, social capital reduces flood risk perceptions of private households. While social ties are effective when responding to and recovering from floods, the expectation of social support downplays risk, making precautionary action by households less likely. The results also show that flood-affected households receive more social support than they provide to others. In the long-run, this can lead to a problematic reciprocity imbalance, challenging the long-term stability of the interpersonal exchanges underlying social capital. Among the various sources of social support, informal social networks (neighbours, friends and relatives) provide the most important workforce in the response and recovery phase of a flood event. It is therefore crucial for flood risk management to recognise and promote the protective quality of social capital alongside conventional structural and non-structural measures.     

The determinants of integrating policy-based and community-based adaptation into coastal hazard risk management: a resilience approach

Abstract

A growing number of studies focus on improving the understanding of how the households’ adaptations can be encouraged in the process of coastal hazards and risk management. Particularly, this process is undergoing a major paradigm shift as it moves from an approach dominated by policy-based adaptation to another one in which community-based resilience building is favored. Thus, this article aims to apply a resilience approach to improve the knowledge about how public measures influence private autonomous adaptation behavior, through a transdisciplinary investigation of household adaptation behavior and its determinants. The Resilience Framework of Household Autonomous Adaptation to Climate- and Weather-Related Hazard Risks (ROHACHR) is proposed and combined with a focus group meeting and multivariate analysis to compare pre-disaster, during a disaster, post-disaster adaptations, and resilience behavior of households. Using an empirical survey of the households in three coastal municipalities in Taiwan, we examine the relationships between public measures and private adaptations that provides three distinguishing types of household behavior: ‘core’, ‘trust in governmental aid’, and ‘awareness and structures’. Results show that providing hazard risk information may be one step toward encouraging private autonomous adaptations. Several factors that help foster resilience also appear to be influential in households’ adaptation decisions, such as specific and positive governmental aid, information trust, and social capital. Based on these results, it shows that the ROHACHR is useful to characterize households’ adaptation and resilience behavior and explain how they respond to public measures. Finally, the policy implications of our findings for improving resilience of coastal communities and encouraging public-private collaboration in the process of hazard risk management are discussed.     

New Models for Old-Age Security: Experiments, Evidence, and Unanswered Questions

The escalating costs of traditional social security systemsare forcing countries to reevaluate the formal programs thatprovide income maintenance support to the aging. This articlesuggests a reform strategy built around three systems, or "pillars,"to provide old-age security—a public pillar with mandatoa private, mandatory savings plan, and a voluntary savings system.Three variations of this model are being implemented in differentcountries: the Latin American model, in which individual workerschoose an investment manager for their retirement finds; theOECD model, in which employers, union trustees, or both choosethe investment manager for an entire company or occupation;and the Swedish notional account model, a reformed pay-as-you-gofirst pillar that may be supplemented by a second, funded pillar.Preliminary empirical evidence on the efficiency and growtheffects of pension reform, mostly from Chile, indicates thatthe impact on national saving and financial market developmentand, through these, economic growth, has been positive and possiblylarge. Problems concerning high administrative costs and regulationsthat distort investment decisions remain to be resolved, however.      

私人信息、公开信息与中国的金融市场参与

金融市场的发展能够为长期的经济增长提供动力,家庭对金融市场的有限参与是制约金融发展的重要因素之一。2015年中国绝大多数家庭未能参与金融市场。本文采用倾向得分匹配方法考察了私人信息和公开信息对家庭金融市场参与的影响以及两者的影响差异。基于2015年CGSS数据集的分析结果显示,家庭拥有金融市场私人信息或者能够充分获取公开信息都会显著提升其参与金融市场的概率。家庭获取公开信息的渠道越广泛,经由各种渠道获取的公开信息越多,参与金融市场的概率就越高。总体而言,充分获取公开信息比拥有私人信息对家庭金融市场参与的影响更大,这是源于个体对两种信息质量预期的不同。公开信息具有比私人信息更广泛的信息来源和更强的可验证性,这提升了家庭对公开信息质量的预期,为其提供了参与金融市场的更大激励。对中国而言,改善政策制定和执行的效率以及政策承诺的可信性有助于提升家庭对公开信息质量的预期,从而鼓励家庭参与金融市场。     

PRIVATE INVESTMENT AND MACROECONOMIC ADJUSTMENT:A Survey

This article reviews theories of investment behavior and examinesempirical studies of investment in developing countries. Theemphasis is on understanding the interactions among macroeconomicpolicies, structural adjustment, and private investment. Thearticle deals with the effect of exchange rate policy on investment,the relationship between public and private investment, theimportance of market imperfections and financial constraintson capital formation, and the effect of economic instabilityon irreversible investment decisions.      

Access to Financial Services: Measurement, Impact, and Policies

In many developing countries less than half the population hasaccess to formal financial services, and in most of Africa lessthan one in five households has access. Lack of access to financeis often the critical mechanism for generating persistent incomeinequality, as well as slower economic growth. Hence expandingaccess remains an important challenge across the world, leavingmuch for governments to do. However, not all government actionsare equally effective and some policies can even be counterproductive.This paper sets out principles for effective government policyon broadening access, drawing on the available evidence andillustrating with examples. The paper concludes with directionsfor future research. JEL Codes: D31, G20, G21, O12, O16     

Private Investment, Public Aid and Endogenous Divergence in the Evolution of Urban Neighborhoods

This paper offers a novel explanation for urban blight and endogenous divergence in the overall quality and wealth of neighborhoods and simultaneously derives the salient features of actual urban renewal and other aid programs from optimizing government behavior based on collective public preferences. These features appear when the objective of such public aid programs is to restore the ex ante distribution of wealth or property values within a blighted neighborhood, while equilibria exhibiting deficient levels of private investment and blight itself can arise when residents accurately anticipate the potential provision of public aid to an affected neighborhood and ex ante investment in private insurance diminishes neighborhood eligibility for such aid. Examples of antipodal equilibria in which urban renewal programs entirely crowd out local private investment or in which neighborhood residents invest in efficient levels of private mitigation illustrate these results, which stand in direct contrast to both traditional explanations of urban blight and to the new “social-interaction” models of neighborhood divergence.