关于制度变迁观点的理论综述

制度经济学的开创者为几勃伦（Ｖｅｂｌｅｎ）和康芒斯（Ｃｏｍｍｏｎｓ）,他们为制度经济学奠定了理论基础,即从整体的、演进的角度,通过分析制度并将其作为一个变量以处理,从而来理解和把握人类行为和提高政策性建议。美国经济学家丹尼尔．Ｗ．布罗姆利《济利益与经济制度－公共政策的理论基础》一书中,将新制度经济学关于制度变迁的观点概括为三种：第一种是“产权学派”的概念;第二种是“诱致性制度变迁”的概念;第三种是     

“制度经济学”：一个多种语义的术语

虽然制度经济学在中国经济学界已近乎“主流”,但“制度经济学”这一术语的使用却有些混乱,不同的学者在使用“制度经济学”时的所指并不完全相同。 在欧美经济学界,“制度经济学”通常指的是由凡勃仑、康芒斯等人开创的、美国土生土长的经济学流派,《新帕尔格雷夫经济学大辞典》也是在前述意义上使用“制度经济学”的（该辞典中没有“新制度经济学”这一词条）。     

康芒斯的法经济学思想及其贡献

作为现代西方法经济学的伟大先驱,康芒斯非常重视法律制度在经济发展中的作用。他批评传统经济学把法律制度排除在研究之外的做法。在其著作中,康芒斯通过“交易”这一基本单位把法律、经济学和伦理学联结在一起。康芒斯的法经济学思想主要体现在他的集体行动理论、利益和谐理论和“法制决定论”之中。他对“财产”与“财产权利”的区分及对“交易”概念的一般化都深深影响到法经济学的奠基者——罗纳德·哈里·科斯。而康芒斯将法律制度看成是协调冲突的规则体系的观点,也对现代法经济学中的制度学派产生了深刻的影响。     

制度经济学的演进与马克思经济学的渊源

近年来,新制度经济学在中国经济理 论大舞台上成为了大红大紫的明星。名列新制度经济学大师之一的张五常教授更是凭借天时地利人和,巡回演讲走遍大江南北,刮起了一股不大不小的“张五常旋风”。新制度经济学能够如此迅速占领中国经济学舞台,除了其理论本身因素之外,我想还有下列两大起因:一是国际因素。美国经济学家科斯和诺思于20世纪90年代初先后获得诺贝尔经济学奖,新制度经济学成为了国际上最时髦的经济学。这对于普遍浮躁的国内学界来说,赶时髦而推波助澜也就不难理解;二是国内因素。中国正处在一个制度大变迁的时代,经济体制改革和对外开放说到底就是在制度上破旧立新,而在这破旧与立新、即新旧制度转换之间又不可避免存在一个所谓“制度缺位”时期,迫切需要制度理论为现实的制度转换服务。因此,生逢其     

康芒斯与制度经济学的基础

本文对康芒斯和凡勃伦作了比较，讨论了康芒斯为构建制度经济学的理论基础所作的努力，包括康芒斯理论与本能-习惯心理学、达尔文主义等的关系，以及康芒斯有关社会制度和法律结构的分析等。文章认为，康芒斯忽视了本能-习惯心理学，对达尔文主义的哲学等观点没有予以重视，而对没有包含在法律范畴之内的制度、自组织或者自发秩序则强调不够。     

康芒斯的产权思想评析

制度经济学派的早期代表人物之一约翰.洛克斯.康芒斯（John R.Commons）在其代表作《制度经济学》中阐述了＂交易＂的产权性质等诸多制度经济学的基本概念。康芒斯的产权思想为现代产权理论的发展奠定了基础,对后来的现代产权经济学产生了极为深远的影响。回顾其产权思想将更有利于理解现代产权理论的内涵和意义。     

演进经济学企业理论：一个理论的拓展

企业是市场经济中的一个必要组成部分,是推动经济增长的重要力量。演进经济学在研究经济体系发展变化时不可能对企业组织视而不见。尽管早期的演进经济学侧重于研究高层次的经济现象,但是,对行业的演进分析和整体经济的技术变革都需要把企业行为作为最基本的解释单位。另外,用演进经济学的逻辑分析企业在很多方面的确要优于新古典经济学以及新制度经济学。     

制度经济学方法论

本文对制度经济学的研究方法作一完整,全面的描述。根据制度经济学的观点,习惯和规则在制度分析中十分重要。文章指出制度经济学并非只是定性地分析问题,它同样在经济分析中使用定量化技术。文章还详细阐述凡勃伦,康芒斯旧制度经济学理论中的核心范畴－习惯和制度,并指出当前十分时髦的新制度经济学中存在某些问题,应以旧制度经济学者的思想对两者加以整合。最后说明在经济分析中习惯和规则无所不在,制度经济学在创建之时就有     

论马克思的制度分析

马克思的制度分析适用于长期的制度变迁分析,而新制度经济学的分析则适应于短期的制度变迁分析,并且马克思的长期制度变迁分析具有历史性、演进性和动态性;在马克思看来,建立在私有财产制度基础上的生产过程存在剥削和掠夺性的一面;马克思不仅重视制度公平性分析,而且注重对制度的性质进行分析,这也是马克思不同于制度经济学家的重要一点。     

制度经济学三大流派的比较与评析

20世纪二三十年代之后,西方经济学在经济理论上陷入持久的危机。制度经济学派就是在批判传统的主流经济学——新古典主义的基础上发展起来的。制度经济学按其类型一般分为以凡勃仑、康芒斯为代表的早期制度经济学,以加尔布雷斯、缪尔达尔为代表的后制度经济学和以科斯、诺斯为代表的新制度经济学。它们分别代表了三种制度观和三种研究思路与方法,各有其合理性和局限性。目前,国内经济学界往往热衷于新制度经济学的研究与介绍,而对于另外两大制度学派的研究却甚为冷清。只知晓其中一种而忽视其他,很难说就掌握了制度理论的精髓。只有了解制度学派的全貌,并对它们进行比较和鉴别,才能更为深入地了解制度经济学学说,才有可能形成较为客观的认识与判断。     

从均衡走向演化--经济学范式的演进

均衡与演化的思想很早就共生于经济思想史中。自亚当·斯密以来,经济学深受物理学的影响,一直被均衡思想和范式所支配,并由此建立了以均衡分析为核心的经济分析体系;进入20世纪80年代后,演化思想又促使人们在主流经济体系之外发展起来了经济演化理论。本文旨在对均衡和演化这两大截然不同的经济范式的演进进行剖析,从中我们不难看出:从均衡走向演化的范式变迁折射着两种经济思想交锋的历程和对以新古典经济学为代表的主流经济分析模式的超越。     

The Evolution of the Social Contract

Two transitions in the evolution of the social contract are considered, the first from the dominance hierarchies of the great apes (used as a proxy for our prehuman ancestors) to the egalitarian political structure of non-sedentary hunter-gatherer bands, and the second, to the reintroduction of hierarchical institutions of governance, primarily a result of living in fixed settlements after the inception of agriculture. The first transition was a product of biological and cultural evolution, which brought about big brains, language, higher consciousness, and a lower rate of time preference that enabled early man to sustain an egalitarian social contract and thereby escape the domination that confronted his prehuman ancestors. The second transition was a product of cultural evolution alone. The high costs of enforcing the hunter-gatherer social contract caused it to break down and be replaced by hierarchy when the domestication of plants and animals gave rise to a sedentary existence and increased populations. However, it is shown that the very biological and cultural adaptations that made hunter-gatherer egalitarianism possible were a necessary foundation for the spontaneous creation of complex culture and the evolution of institutions that would once again eventually make freedom possible and economic prosperity possible.     

Evolution of the Masters in Economics

In this article, the authors update their previous study of terminal master's degree in economics programs to determine whether changes in the characteristics and students or the desired outcomes of master's programs have occurred during the decade between the two studies. The authors find that there are now fewer programs and on average, there has been a reduction in rigor in terms of degree requirements. They also find some evidence for increased diversity of faculty in these programs. The average number of students in programs remained about the same over the decade, but the average number of faculty serving these students decreased. While some differences are found, overall the authors conclude that master's in economics programs have not dramatically changed over the past 10 years.     

知识网络演进视角下企业技术创新能力进化及政策建议

企业技术创新能力具有类生物进化的属性,基于该思想,以知识网络演进为背景,研究了知识网络对企业技术创新能力进化的作用,探讨了企业技术创新能力进化过程,进一步构建了企业创新能力进化的逻辑模型。研究发现,知识网络的循环演进通过知识获取、知识处理、知识共享和知识整合,促进企业技术创新能力不断进化。最后,分别从政策制定者角度和微观创新者角度,提出了促进企业技术创新能力进化的建议。     

演化与人的本性

本文从生物演化的角度,分析了经济学中偏好、信念和理性的形成和演化特点,揭示了人类经济行为的生物学基础。     

Early Evolution of the Assumption of Non-satiation

The paper explores the mostly tacit transmission of the assumption of non-satiation from the outset of classical political economy to the advent of marginal analysis in Great Britain. The evolution of the assumption is traced back to contributions to the philosophy of mind in the early British enlightenment, which provided scientific ground not only to the economic agent's insatiable nature but also to a delusional dynamic of association that challenges the causality between acquisitiveness and pleasure. The paper claims that, because there is evidence that such delusional aspect was known to the early political economists, the assumption of non-satiation might have become a mainstay in economics not only for its scientific status but also as a result of a strategic choice that can only be explained within the political, cultural, and social context in which it was made. Had this been the case, the exportability of the assumption through time and space must be further questioned. The consistent inclusion of non-satiation in economic theories, policies, and institutions may have had extraordinary consequences, and may have nurtured rational behaviors that in fact fulfill the assumption itself.     

Coordinated Punishment and the Evolution of Cooperation

In this paper, we analyze a team trust game with coordinated punishment of the allocator by investors and where there is also a final stage of peer punishment. We study the effect of punishment on the reward and the investment decisions, when the effectiveness and cost of coordinated punishment depend on the number of investors adhering to this activity. The interaction takes place in an overlapping‐generations model with heterogeneous preferences and incomplete information. The only long‐run outcomes of the dynamics are either a fully cooperative culture (FCC) with high levels of trust and cooperation and fair returns or a non‐cooperative culture with no cooperation at all. The basin of attraction of the FCC is larger; the higher the institutional capacity of coordinated punishment, the higher the level of peer pressure and the smaller the individual cost of coordinated punishment.