Organic salmon farming: risk perceptions, decision heuristics and the absence of environmental accounting

This paper reports on interviews with salmon farmers exploring their decision as to whether to adopt organic production methods. Organic salmon farming has the potential to considerably reduce the social, environmental and economic risks associated with salmon farming. Salmon farming is an industry subjected to intense scrutiny and is highly controversial. The combination of these two factors was expected to reveal the use of environmental accounting in evaluating this potentially difficult, expensive strategic decision, responding to the barrage of public criticism, driven by changing environmental regulations and a potential value shift by key actors.However, interviews revealed that going organic was regarded as a normal agricultural decision, largely based on price forecasts. The shift to organic was relatively easy, unproblematic and not too expensive. The environmental pressure groups campaigns had very little impact on this decision and it was not subjected to systematic accounting evaluation. The interviews described a sector exhibiting many of the characteristics of Beck's Risk Society thesis (1992, 1995, 1996).Decision makers’ risk perception is identified as important for considering what factors are thought to be legitimate/illegitimate and powerful/weak in the decision making process. Unless risks are considered ‘real’ by the decision makers then the associated costs/benefits of doing or not doing something are not going to figure in the decision heuristics, regardless of the nature of their calculation. Environmental accounting could play a part, not necessarily at the individual farm level, but as part of a reflexive process in reconstructing the underlying knowledge of the social, environmental and economic risks of salmon farming as a whole.     

A new social contract for technology? – On the policy dynamics of uncertainty

This paper proposes a typology of two fundamentally opposing conceptualizations of managing technology under uncertainty: ‘technology governability’ and ‘technology selection’. A wide variety of different versions of these idealized conceptualizations can be shown to underlie the controversies about scientific‐technological development. The example of genetic engineering indicates that such points of view are reconstructed over time in different forms and diverse settings, not only by the scientific community or during regulatory decision making, but by a rather wide‐reaching spectrum of social actors. Thus, the current efforts to open up science and technology decision making to a wider range of participants is interpreted here as an effort of generating a new social contract for technology management, by way of bridging the differences between the two opposing conceptualizations.     

The role of controversy in engineering design

To ensure the acceptance of technical systems and products in society, the crucial role of social controversy in technology development has to be more openly recognized. Many of the current acceptance problems of technical systems developed because the social controversy generated by the system under design was not sufficiently taken into account. Actively managed and organized controversy, on the other hand, could become an integral part of the engineering design process and the basis for a new underlying philosophy of design. Technical design in companies and technological organizations could be opened up to the active involvement of social actors usually excluded from it (like the actual users of the technology as well as potentially affected social groups), to allow for the incorporation of more diverse points of view into the design of new technical systems; in this way, socially and ecologically, as well as technically and economically more acceptable solutions could be generated.     

Managing toxic chemicals in Australia: a regional analysis of the risk society

The paper takes examples from two decades of toxic risk management in Australia in order to examine the challenges that the conditions of the ‘risk society’ pose for the chemicals industry in this country. These issues for corporate governance are set against a shift in political discourse in the direction of the limiting of the state, co‐governance between state and industry, and new community involvements and responsibilities. The paper describes new social movements and alliances influencing corporate structures and processes for decision making in Australia. The case examples lead to conclusions concerning the fundamental innovations in the organizational design of regulatory bodies and corporations that are required if progress is to be made towards sustainability and the re‐establishment of public trust. The findings of this paper are symptomatic of the more general challenges that the ‘risk society’ poses for the mainstream political programmes and their frameworks for regulation, for corporate architecture and for the relationships between governments, corporations and the community.     

The human side of disaster

Public engagement through deliberative processes is promoted in both academic and policy circles as a potential means to build public trust in risk decisions and decision‐makers. Governments in particular seem to optimistically take a positive relationship between public engagement and trust almost for granted. This paper provides a new and critical analysis of this hoped‐for relationship, questioning whether such a direct and positive link between engagement and trust is a false hope. The paper draws upon personal experience of deliberative processes to discuss key components of an engagement process that have the potential to impact positively on trust. Specifically, who is engaged and which interests are represented; an open and collaborative framing of the discussion, and a direct and clear relationship between engagement and the risk decision. But the paper argues that given the complexities of optimising these process elements and in the light of the known underlying dimensions of trust, expectations are misplaced and that enduring trust is unlikely to spring from engagement itself. This is not to negate the other benefits of engagement, rather it is to focus on those key elements that will need to be in place, both process and beyond, if trust is to be enhanced.     

The meta‐governance of risk and new technologies: GM crops and mobile telephones

The stylistic shift from government to governance in the regulation of risks associated with new technologies is often portrayed as an attempt to reach a deeper consensus over public controversies and to avoid future risk management failures. Stakeholder involvement in decision‐making through more inclusive and learning styles is seen as increasingly necessary in order to correct the steering deficit of the state, to rebuild trust in state institutions, and to obviate problems caused by uncertainty and different value perspectives in risk assessments. In this paper we scrutinise this model of risk and governance in the light of recent developments in the UK, focusing in particular on the regulation of genetically modified crops and mobile telecommunications technology. We conclude that the shift to governance is best understood in terms of the accommodative response of the state to a number of new challenges: primarily posed by the changing role of the private sector; by pressures on government to engender public trust in the face of shifting social values; and by the related difficulty in taking decisions with confidence and legitimacy. There is a perceived need within government for a more deliberative approach to regulation and standard‐setting, achieved by a creative combination of managed scientific order and the establishment of deliberative cooperative institutions. However the creation of deliberative mechanisms and institutions is not an easy passage, especially if it is accelerated by uncontrollable political events. Indeed, we caution against romantic interpretations of governance as indicating a uniform popular trend towards the democratisation of state decision‐making, despite the very real opportunities for reform that it affords. Rather, we suggest that a more plausible account is provided by seeing governance as a form of adaptive management necessitated by a series of interlocking economic and social changes, and responses to successive risk management crises.     

How to invest in social capital.

Business runs better when people within a company have close ties and trust one another. But the relationships that make organizations work effectively are under assault for several reasons. Building such "social capital" is difficult in volatile times. Disruptive technologies spawn new markets daily, and organizations respond with constantly changing structures. The problem is worsened by the virtuality of many of today's workplaces, with employees working off-site or on their own. What's more, few managers know how to invest in such social capital. The authors describe how managers can help their organizations thrive by making effective investments in social capital. For instance, companies that value social capital demonstrate a commitment to retention as a way of limiting workplace volatility. The authors cite SAS's extensive efforts to signal to employees that it sees them as human beings, not just workers. Managers can build trust by showing trust themselves, as well as by rewarding trust and sending clear signals to employees. They can foster cooperation by giving employees a common sense of purpose through good strategic communication and inspirational leadership. Johnson & Johnson's well-known credo, which says the company's first responsibility is to the people who use its products, has helped the company in time of adversity, as in 1982 when cyanide in Tylenol capsules killed seven people. Other methods of fostering cooperation include rewarding the behavior with cash and establishing rules that get people into the habit of cooperating. Social capital, once a given in organizations, is now rare and endangered. By investing in it, companies will be better positioned to seize the opportunities in today's volatile, virtual business environment.     

Learning to organise risk management in organisations: what future for enterprise risk management?

This paper identifies recurring issues in the regulation of new technologies through an historical review of the risk management of automobiles in the 1800s. Parallels are drawn between the regulation of early automobiles and that of the regulation of Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UASs) today. It is found that many of the regulatory challenges facing UASs are analogous to those which faced the automobile industry more than a century and half ago and that the need for informed and objective decision making in policy development is reinforced. A systems engineering approach, based on general systems theory and decision‐based design principles, is then proposed as a means for improving the objectivity, transparency and rationality in the risk management decision making process. An example risk management decision making scenario is given within the context of a small UAS operating over a populated area. The results obtained from this case study illustrate how even simple analysis can support the decision making process and highlights some of the potential challenges in the regulatory approach currently applied to UASs.     

From vision into action

Utopian thinking, problematic as it can be, is used for imagining alternative visions of the future as a design process. Visioning adds foresight to an active-learning process in which participants share critical reflection, decision and change, as Anticipatory Action Learning. Guidelines, including ethics, are suggested. Once its limitations are recognised, it can be a used for integrating learning in a social system.     

The effects of decision aid structural restrictiveness on cognitive load,perceived usefulness,and reuse intentions

As accounting environments become increasingly automated through information technology support systems, the underlying systems are increasingly restrictive in an effort to direct user behavior and decision making. However, consistent with the theory of technology dominance, restrictive systems have been found to dominate users' decision processes and to have a detrimental effect when decisions require knowledge from outside the system's capability. This study expands upon this research through an examination of users' preferences for more (less) restrictive systems based on their own level of domain knowledge. Incorporating theory on task technology fit, we theorize that users with less knowledge will prefer to be dominated by the system, while users with greater levels of knowledge will prefer a system that provides the user with a level of control over the decision process rather than submitting entirely to the decision aid's control. These theorizations are empirically tested through an experimental design that varies the level of systems restrictiveness across groups of novice and experienced participants. The results confirm that novice (experienced) participants find a highly restrictive system substantially (minimally) reduces cognitive load, increases (decreases) usefulness of the decision aid, and strengthens (weakens) the intention to reuse the system in the future. The results add an important piece to understanding the effect of restrictive systems in that the users that are most susceptible to dominance by decision aids are the users most willing to adopt a restrictive system that reduces the effort they must put forth and in turn reduces the knowledge they accrue from using the system.     

Trust and Control in Network Relations: A Study of a Public Sector Setting

This study contributes to the literature by addressing the role of trust and control in public sector settings in which several organizations cooperate; its aim is to advance the understanding of trust and control in relations in which several parties are involved. The empirical study presented is a longitudinal case study of the relationships between organizational units within a municipality and a shared service center (SSC) that provides IT and administrative services. The main finding is that, compared to actors in previous studies of dyadic relationships in the private sector, actors in network relations seem to consider trust a risky option. It is less tempting to rely on a certain party when that party in turn is entangled with other parties. This situation causes a more intensive use of formal control. Another result is that increased trust between two parties might lead to more emphasis on formal control by a third party.     

Accountability and the debt crisis

The international debt crisis is viewed here as only a symptom—its underlying causes have resulted from a crisis in management among the major actors in the development process, namely commercial banks, recipient countries and development assistance agencies. The cumulative effect has been a lack of accountability that puts the development objectives themselves into jeopardy. This article proposes that all actors should write off their debt for failed projects, that the development assistance system be redesigned, and that a strategy be developed to help countries design and manage development programmes appropriate to their unique circumstances.     

CVS/Caremark: The Costs and Strategy of a Tobacco‐Free Pharmacy

This instructional case presents CVS/Caremark's decision to discontinue tobacco sales at its U.S. pharmacies effective October 1, 2014. The case provides data on the strategic issues underlying the decision and examples of the nonfinancial factors that affect product‐line decisions. The case illustrates the use of the broad array of costs in management decision making, including hidden costs, contingent costs, reputational costs, and social costs. It also provides data to explore the decision from the perspective of customer profitability analysis and the differential costs of serving tobacco customers compared with general retail customers.     

Stepwise Approach to the Long‐Term Management of Radioactive Waste1

Stepwise decision making has long been utilised as a tool for handling the technical complexity of radioactive waste management (RWM). Recently, it is being recognised as a useful means to address social complexities. This paper reviews—through a number of examples—the current developments regarding the stepwise approach to managing long‐lived wastes from a societal point of view with the aim of pinpointing where it stands, highlighting its social dimensions, and identifying guiding principles and issues in implementation. It is observed that there is convergence between the approach taken by the practitioners of RWM and the indications received from social research, and that general guiding principles can be distilled from the analysis of RWM case histories. The paper concludes that a stepwise approach to decision‐making indeed constitutes an effective tool, and that competing requirements of social sustainability and efficiency, openness and analytical rigour will need to be balanced. A long‐term process of decision‐making incorporating the views of national and local stakeholders will very likely be a difficult process to implement. The concrete arrangements for sketching out and agreeing on decision phases, for selecting and involving stakeholders in a participatory process, and for adapting institutions to meet long‐term requirements, will require careful reflection and tuning in each national context.     

How information and communication technology affects decision‐making on innovation diffusion: An agent‐based modelling approach

We introduce a computational agent‐based model of innovation diffusion that allows us to analyse the influence of information and communication technology (ICT) development on decision‐making. Model dynamics are based on local emulation between pairs of individuals that generate an evolving social network on which an innovation is virally spread (by word of mouth). Results suggest that ICT development affects the data usefulness for decision‐making by changing the topology of the social network (the means whereby the innovation is propagated). Paradoxically, a higher level of ICT development (providing a larger volume of data) narrows the differences between better and worse launch strategies, thus reducing data‐driven decision‐making usefulness, which then shows diminishing returns on the ICT level.     

Stop making plans; start making decisions

Many executives have grown skeptical of strategic planning. Is it any wonder? Despite all the time and energy that go into it, strategic planning most often acts as a barrier to good decision making and does little to influence strategy. Strategic planning fails because of two factors: It typically occurs annually, and it focuses on individual business units. As such, the process is completely at odds with the way executives actually make important strategy decisions, which are neither constrained by the calendar nor defined by unit boundaries. Thus, according to a survey of 156 large companies, senior executives often make strategic decisions outside the planning process, in an ad hoc fashion and without rigorous analysis or productive debate. But companies can fix the process if they attack its root problems. A few forward-looking firms have thrown out their calendar-driven, business-unit-focused planning procedures and replaced them with continuous, issues-focused decision making. In doing so, they rely on several basic principles: They separate, but integrate, decision making and plan making. They focus on a few key themes. And they structure strategy reviews to produce real decisions. When companies change the timing and focus of strategic planning, they also change the nature of senior management's discussions about strategy--from "review and approve" to "debate and decide," in which top executives actively think through every major decision and its implications for the company's performance and value. The authors have found that these companies make more than twice as many important strategic decisions per year as companies that follow the traditional planning model.     

Nonviolent futures

Nonviolent action — including methods such as rallies, strikes, boycotts and sit-ins — has become increasingly important in the past century as a method for waging conflict and promoting social change. Nonviolent action has been adopted by many social movements, yet its potential impact has only begun to be realised. Some areas for future expansion of the role of nonviolent action include replacing military defence, technological design, challenging capitalism, bureaucratic politics, information struggles and interpersonal behaviour.     

The angel investment decision: insights from Australian business angels

While much has been written about the investment criteria of business angels, few studies explore why these particular criteria are important to them. The Australian context has a diverse range of actors along with complex jurisdictional arrangements, making for an interesting background for investigation of the angel finance phenomenon. We examine 12 business angels in the rapidly changing Australian context and use nine corroborating participants to validate responses and identify four key drivers – personal experience, trust, the need to contribute and realistic expectations – that influence business angels during the initial investment process.     

The effects of system design alternatives on the acquisition of tax knowledge from a computerized tax decision aid

Accounting firms are intensifying their reliance on experiential learning, and experience increasingly involves the use of computerized decision aids [Messier, W. (1995) Research in and development of audit decision aids. In R. H. Ashton & A. H. Ashton, Judgment and decision making in accounting and auditing (pp. 207–230). New York: Cambridge University Press]. Accountants are expected to learn from automated decision aid use, because the aids are not always available when dealing with the aid's topical matter, and the knowledge inherent in the aid is needed for competency on broader issues. To facilitate knowledge acquisition and explain the logic of the underlying processes, computerized decision aids provide the rationale for their calculations in the form of online explanations. We study how the location of explanations in a computerized decision aid affects learning from its use. Specifically, this research extends the existing literature by using a framework for the study of learning from decision aid use and by using cognitive load theory to explain the failure of certain decision aid design alternatives to promote learning. We define learning as the acquisition of problem-type schemata, and an experiment is performed in which cognitive load is manipulated by the placement of explanations in a computerized tax decision aid to determine its effect on schema acquisition. Schemata are general knowledge structures used for basic comprehension, and cognitive load refers to the burden placed on working memory when acquiring schemata. We find that increased cognitive load produced by the location of explanations in a decision aid leads to reduced schema acquisition. Our results indicate that when explanations in a computerized decision aid are integrated into its problem solving steps, cognitive load is reduced and users acquire more knowledge from aid use. This appears to be an important design consideration for accounting firms buying or building computerized decision aids.     

Mobilizing grassroots’ technological innovations and traditional knowledge, values and institutions: articulating social and ethical capital

The Honey Bee Network has helped provide a sort of loose platform to converge creative, but uncoordinated individuals across not only Indian states having varying cultural, linguistic and social ethos, but also in 75 other countries around the world. What the Network is trying to do in a rather quiet manner may transform the way the resources—in which poor people are rich—are used in the future. These resources are their knowledge, innovations and sustainable practices.I first argue that the classical concept of social capital does not distinguish between the trust in society created for social good versus social ‘bad’. For instance, the trust among members of the mafia and other socially undesirable networks does not constitute social capital. I am also trying to emphasize that part of social trust which is guided by higher ethical values which may not have become social norms as yet. This is being characterized as ethical capital. Finally, I conclude that the Honey Bee Network has tried to articulate the social and the ethical capital of society at the grassroots to demonstrate how local individuals and communities are trying to solve local problems without any outside help.