A Generic Framework for Automated Multi-attribute Negotiation

Agents in a negotiation may have to negotiate multiple issues simultaneously. Automated multi-attribute negotiation provides an important mechanism for distributed decision makers to reach agreements on multiple issues. Moreover, it also furnishes the opportunity to reach “win–win” solutions. In this paper, we first provide a survey that synthesizes the research on multi-attribute negotiation. We discuss the limitations of the existing research and conclude that three key issues need further study: incomplete information, Pareto optimality, and tractability. We then present a generic framework for automated multi-attribute negotiation with two new mechanisms that address the above issues. Finally, we discuss the challenges and directions for future work.     

Loss Aversion and Reference-Dependent Preferences in Multi-Attribute Negotiations

Negotiation analysis and game theoretic bargaining models usually assume parties to have exogenous preferences from the beginning of a negotiation on and independent of the history of offers made. On the contrary, this paper argues that preferences might be based on attribute-wise reference points changing during the negotiation process. Aversion against losses relative to the reference point determines negotiators’ decisions in the negotiation and after its termination. The emergence and implications of reference points in a negotiation context are motivated, exemplified, and modeled formally. Furthermore, data from an internet experiment on endogenous preferences in bilateral multi-attribute negotiations is presented. The data supports the behavioral model.     

欧盟贸易协定谈判机制研究

国际协定是欧盟法律体系的重要组成部分。与贸易有关的国际协定,包括贸易协定、合作协定以及联系协定等,也是欧盟贸易政策的重要组成部分。本文通过介绍欧盟贸易协定谈判权的法理依据、各参与主体的法律地位和作用、参与主体内部及之间的权力平衡关系,分析和研究了欧盟贸易协定谈判机制,以利于进一步了解欧盟法律和贸易政策,也有益于发展中欧贸易关系。     

Cultural Differentiation of Negotiating Agents

Negotiations proceed differently across cultures. For realistic modeling of agents in multicultural negotiations, the agents must display culturally differentiated behavior. This paper presents an agent-based simulation model that tackles these challenges, based on Hofstede’s model of national cultures. The context is a trade network for goods with a hidden quality attribute. The negotiation model is based on the ABMP negotiation architecture and applies a utility function that includes market value, quality preference and risk attitude. The five dimensions of Hofstede’s model are the basis for the modification of ABMP parameters and weight factors in the utility function. The agents can observe each other’s group membership and status. This information is used, along with the indices of Hofstede’s dimensions, to differentiate behavior in different cultural settings. The paper presents results of test runs that verify the implementation of the model. The model helps to explain behaviors of actors in international trade networks. It proves that Hofstede’s dimensions can be used to generate culturally differentiated agents. Further validations of the model with case studies from literature and experiments have yet to be conducted. Extensions can make this model a useful tool for training traders who engage in cross-cultural negotiation and for implementation in negotiation support systems.     

A Recursive Protocol for Negotiating Contracts Under Non-monotonic Preference Structures

Negotiating contracts with multiple interdependent issues may yield non-monotonic preference spaces for the participating agents. These negotiations are specially challenging because of the complexity and dimension of the search space. Automated negotiation mechanisms designed and proven useful for monotonic utility spaces may fail in these negotiation scenarios. This paper presents a novel solution to the problem of automated multi-issue negotiations in the context of complex utility spaces. We seek to address the challenge of intractably large contract spaces and utility functions with multiple local optima in automated negotiation scenarios. A protocol for automated bilateral multi-attribute negotiation processes is proposed, in which the individual agents??preferences can be non-monotonic and discontinuous. The protocol is based on a recursive non-mediated bargaining mechanism, which involves two agents who simultaneously exchange proposals defined as regions within the negotiation space. An agreement on a region implies a new bargaining which is restricted to that region. This recursive process is governed by a set of rules which modulate the joint exploration of the negotiation space until an agreement is found or a deadline expires. The protocol is experimentally evaluated under monotonic and non-monotonic preference scenarios, confirming that the protocol is able to produce outcomes close to the Pareto frontier in acceptable negotiation time, outperforming previous approaches.     

Qualitative One-to-Many Multi-Issue Negotiation: Approximating the QVA

When there is one buyer interested in obtaining a service from one of a set of sellers, multi-attribute or multi-issue auctions can ensure an allocation that is efficient. Even when there is no transferable utility (e.g., money), a recent qualitative version of the Vickrey auction may be used, the QVA, to obtain a Pareto-efficient outcome where the best seller wins. However, auctions generally require that the preferences of at least one party participating in the auction are publicly known, while often making this information public is costly, undesirable, or even impossible. It would therefore be useful to have a method that does not impose such a requirement, but is still able to approximate the outcome of such an auction. The main question addressed here is whether the Pareto-efficient best-seller outcome in multi-issue settings without transferable utility (such as determined by the QVA) can be reasonably approximated by multi-bilateral closed negotiation between a buyer and multiple sellers. In these closed negotiations parties do not reveal their preferences explicitly, but make alternating offers. The main idea is to have multiple rounds of such negotiations. We study three different variants of such a protocol: one that restricts the set of allowed offers for both the buyer and the seller, one where the winning offer is announced after every round, and one where the sellers are only told whether they have won or not after every round. It is shown experimentally that this protocol enables agents that can learn preferences to obtain agreements that approximate the Pareto-efficient best-seller outcome as defined by the auction mechanism. We also show that the strategy that exploits such a learning capability in negotiation is robust against and dominates a Zero Intelligence strategy. It thus follows that the requirement to publicly announce preferences can be removed when negotiating parties are equipped with the proper learning capabilities and negotiate using the proposed multi-round multi-bilateral negotiation protocol.     

Computer-Assisted Negotiations of Water Resources Conflicts

This paper describes the algorithms within and results obtained using an interactive computer program developed to assist those involved in negotiating agreements among parties having conflicting objectives. This Interactive Computer-Assisted Negotiation Support system (ICANS) can be used during the negotiation process by opposing parties or by a professional mediator. On the basis of information provided to the program, in confidence, by each party, it can help all parties identify feasible alternatives, if any exist, that should be preferred to each party's proposal. If such alternatives do not exist, the program can help parties develop counter proposals. Through a series of iterations in which each party's input data, assumptions, and preferences may change, ICANS can aid each party in their search for a mutually acceptable and preferred agreement. This paper describes the algorithms used for analyzing preferences and for generating alternative feasible agreements. Also presented a re the results of some limited experiments involving water resource system development and use conflicts that illustrate the potential of programs such as ICANS.     

Logrolling Procedure for Multi-Issue Negotiation

In order to better deal with the complexity in multi-issue negotiation, a quantitative method which produces Pareto optimal solutions through jointly improving exchange of issues is proposed. The trade-off process is modelled using logrolling, in which loss in some issues is traded for gain in others, resulting in overall gain for all parties. This mutual gain approach is designed based on the integrative negotiation strategy. The objective of the logrolling method is in negotiation support by providing a structure and systematic analysis for ill-defined multi-issue negotiation problems. This study presents a formal representation of logrolling, the sequential logrolling procedure that is based on the exchange of two issues, and the general properties of the efficient frontier produced by logrolling under a linear preference assumption. The study also includes some discussion on implementation aspects of the logrolling method.     

A method for examining learning in negotiation

The impact of feedback on interpersonal learning in negotiation was examined. An interactive computer program was developed to isolate the effect of individual judgment on performance. Subjects negotiated three times with a computerized opponent whom they were led to believe was another subject. Some subjects received a complete diagnosis of their opponents' interests following each negotiation (full feedback); others only learned about their opponents' payoffs (outcome feedback); some did not receive any information about the opponent (control). The prediction was that subjects who received a complete diagnosis would make more accurate judgments about their opponents' interests and reach more integrative agreements in subsequent negotiation situations. The results provided weak support for the model. Two indices of performance were studied: negotiators' ability to recognize compatible issues and logrolling, or the ability to make mutually beneficial tradeoffs among issues. The pattern of findings was dramatically different for the two performance measures: Whereas logrolling improved as negotiators gained experience, recognition of compatible issues worsened over trials. The degradation of performance for compatible issues was curbed for negotiators who were provided with full feedback. The feedback did not affect logrolling performance.The research reported in this article was supported by a grant from the National Science Foundation #SES89211926.     

On automated e‐business negotiations: Goal,policy, strategy,and plans of decision and action

In recent years, there has been increasing interest in automated e‐business negotiations. The automation of negotiation requires a decision model to capture the negotiation knowledge of policymakers and negotiation experts so that the decision‐making process can be carried out automatically. Current research on automated e‐business negotiations has focused on defining low‐level tactics (or negotiation rules) so that automated negotiation systems can carry out automated negotiation processes. These low‐level tactics are usually defined from a technical perspective, not from a business perspective. There is a gap between high‐level business negotiation goals and low‐level tactics. In this article, we distinguish the concepts of negotiation context, negotiation goals, negotiation strategy, and negotiation tactics and introduce a formal decision model to show the relations among these concepts. We show how high‐level negotiation goals can be formally mapped to low‐level tactics that can be used to affect the behavior of a negotiation system during the negotiation process. In business, a business organization faces different negotiation situations (or contexts) and determines different sets of goals for different negotiation contexts. In our decision model, a business policymaker sets negotiation goals from different perspectives, which are called goal dimensions. A negotiation policy is a functional mapping from a negotiation context to some quantitative measures (or goal values) for the goal dimensions to express how competitive the policymaker wants to reach that set of goals. A negotiation expert who has the experience and expertise to conduct negotiations would define the negotiation strategies needed for reaching the negotiation goals. Formally, a negotiation strategy is a functional mapping from a set of goal values to a set of decision‐action rules that implement negotiation tactics. The selected decision‐action rules can then be used to control the execution of an automated negotiation system, which conducts a negotiation on behalf of a business organization.     

A Secure and Fair Protocol that Addresses Weaknesses of the Nash Bargaining Solution in Nonlinear Negotiation

Negotiation with multiple interdependent issues is an important problem since much of real-world negotiation falls into this category. This paper examines the problem that, in such domains, agent utility functions are nonlinear, and thereby can create nonconvex Pareto frontiers. This in turn implies that the Nash Bargaining Solution, which has been viewed as the gold standard for identifying a unique optimal negotiation outcome, does not serve that role in nonlinear domains. In nonlinear domains, unlike linear ones, there can be multiple Nash Bargaining Solutions, and all can be sub-optimal with respect to social welfare and fairness. In this paper, we propose a novel negotiation protocol called SFMP (the Secure and Fair Mediator Protocol) that addresses this challenge, enabling secure multilateral negotiations with fair and pareto-optimal outcomes in nonlinear domains. The protocol works by (1) using nonlinear optimization, combined with a Multi-Party protocol, to find the Pareto front without revealing agent’s private utility information, and (2) selecting the agreement from the Pareto set that maximizes a fair division criterion we call approximated fairness. We demonstrate that SFMP is able to find agreements that maximize fairness and social welfare in nonlinear domains, and out-performs (in terms of outcomes and scalability) previously developed nonlinear negotiation protocols.     

A Model of Bargaining over Hazardous Waste Cleanup

We put forward a formal model of a bargaining problem in which two parties suspected of contaminating the environment are responsible for clean-up costs. If the parties do not negotiate an agreement on a cost allocation, one will be imposed by the government. This process is commonly used in environmental cleanups performed under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA or Superfund). Passed by the US Congress in 1980 and administered by the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), CERCLA provides the U.S. government with authority to manage releases (or threatened releases) of hazardous substances that may endanger public health or the environment. We conclude that potentially responsible parties will be induced to settle only in the face of specific allocations of clean-up and explicit threats. For example, at the Middlefield–Ellis–Whisman Superfund site in Mountain View, California, the responsibilities of the different parties for soil and groundwater contamination are understood by all, yet our negotiation model predicts that without the threat that additional costs will be imposed, agreement on the allocation of clean up costs will never be reached.     

Social Embeddedness in Electronic Negotiations

This study contributes to electronic negotiation research by analyzing the role of social embeddedness of actors in a controlled laboratory experiment. In particular, we analyze the effect of prior negotiator relationship in different conflict levels in web-based negotiations. We hypothesize that with increasing intensity of conflicts, negotiators who have a personal relationship use more value creating strategies compared to anonymous negotiators. As a consequence, we also hypothesize to find fewer impasses in electronic negotiations involving subjects who are socially embedded. Our results confirm that, in fact, in severe conflicts socially embedded actors reach significantly more agreements than subjects of the control group while such an effect is not found in weak conflict situations. These findings are related to more yielding between embedded actors but not to more value creating behavior. From these results, we can conclude that socially embedded negotiators better manage to reach agreements in difficult situations. Furthermore, an institutionalized pre-negotiation phase which allows negotiators to establish a personal relationship can counteract the threat of impasses.     

Loose with the Truth: Predicting Deception in Negotiation

Using a simulated, two-party negotiation, we examined how characteristics of the actor, target, and situation affected deception. To trigger deception, we used an issue that had no value for one of the two parties (indifference issue). We found support for an opportunistic betrayal model of deception: deception increased when the other party was perceived as benevolent, trustworthy, and as having integrity. Negotiators’ goals also affected the use of deception. Individualistic, cooperative, and mixed dyads responded differently to information about the other party’s trustworthiness, benevolence, and integrity when deciding to either misrepresent or leverage their indifference issue. Mixed dyads displayed opportunistic betrayal. Negotiators in all-cooperative and all-individualistic dyads used different information in deciding whether to leverage their indifference issues and used the same information (benevolence) differently in deciding whether to misrepresent the value of their indifference issue. Mara Olekalns is a Professor of Management (Negotiations) at the Melbourne Business School, University of Melbourne. Her research focuses on communication processes in negotiation. In her research, she has investigated how strategy sequences shape negotiation outcomes. She is extending this research to investigate how impressions and communication shape trust in negotiation. Her work on communication processes in negotiation has been published in Journal of Applied Psychology, Human Communication Research, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, and Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes. Philip L. Smith is a Professor in the Department of Psychology, University of Melbourne. His primary research interest is in building quantitative models of the human visual system. He also applies his modeling expertise to analyses of communication processes in negotiation, focusing on the relationships between situational and dispositional factors, strategy sequences and negotiation outcomes. It has been published in leading management and psychology journals, including Human Communication Research, Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, and Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes. Authors' Note The research reported in this paper was supported by a Discovery Grant from the Australian Research Council. We thank Ania Ratzik and Rudi Crncec for assistance with data coding. Correspondence should be addressed to Mara Olekalns, Melbourne Business School, University of Melbourne, 200 Leicester St, Carlton, Victoria, 3053, Australia or via email to m.olekalns@mbs.edu     

NegoManage: A System for Supporting Bilateral Negotiations

In this paper we present the NegoManage system, which aims at supporting the bilateral negotiation during all negotiation phases. The support includes the problem structure identification, the analysis of individual preferences of both parties, the messaging and offers exchange and the post-negotiation improvements of the agreement. The preference analysis is supported with a novel mechanism involving the specification of the classes of alternatives’ quality that represent particular levels of potential satisfaction from accepting this alternative as the negotiation solution. The consistency of preferences is also checked. The actual negotiation phase is performed in a typical way, namely the negotiators exchange multiple offers and messages. The novelty introduced in this phase is the mechanism for profiling the negotiators based on the classification of exchanged messages. The post-negotiation optimization phase employs the concept of a bargaining solution for improving the solution obtained in the previous negotiation phase. We present the way the mechanisms proposed work using simple numerical examples.     

Issue linkage and issue tie-in in multilateral negotiations

We describe a model of international, multidimensional policy coordination where countries can enter into selective and separate agreements with different partners along different policy dimensions. The model is used to examine the implications of negotiation tie-in — the requirement that agreements must span multiple dimensions of interaction — for the viability of multilateral cooperation when countries are linked by international trade flows and transboundary pollution. We show that, while in some cases negotiation tie-in has either no effect or can make multilateral cooperation more viable, in others a formal tie-in constraint can make an otherwise viable joint multilateral agreement unstable.     

Positive affect and decision frame in negotiation

This study examined decision frame (“gain” vs. “loss”) and negotiator affect (positive vs. control) in a simulated bilateral negotiation where negotiators dealt with a programmed opponent and made offers and counteroffers on three issues that differed in value. Direct comparisons between the gain and loss frame conditions, in the control-affect condition, revealed a replication of the standard frame effect: a loss frame produced fewer concessions than a gain frame. However, an interaction effect indicated that the frame effect reversed in the positive affect condition: under positive affect, a loss frame produced greater concessions than a gain frame. In addition, the data indicated a replication of earlier work showing that positive affect can lead to more integrative agreements in negotiation. The results suggest that positive affect can influence location of a reference point in evaluating prospective outcomes; one implication is that prospect theory can be useful for understanding the effects of affect in bilateral negotiation.     

Anger in social conflict: Cross-situational comparisons and suggestions for the future

This paper reviews research on the role of anger in conflict. We distinguish between intrapersonal and interpersonal effects of anger, the former referring to the impact of parties’ feelings of anger on their own behavior and the latter referring to the impact of one parties’ anger on the other’s behavior. We further compare the effects of anger across a variety of conflict settings, including negotiation, ultimatum bargaining, prisoner’s dilemma, resource dilemma, and coalition formation. At the intrapersonal level, anger is associated with competition in all conflict settings. In contrast, the interpersonal effects of anger differ across situations, with anger sometimes eliciting cooperation, sometimes eliciting competition, and sometimes having no effect. Based on the research reviewed, we conclude that the interpersonal effects of anger in conflict are determined by the level of interdependence of the parties, their information processing tendencies, and the justifiability of the anger expressions. Preparation of this paper was facilitated by a Veni grant from the Netherlands Organization for Scientific Research (NWO 451–05–010) awarded to Gerben A. Van Kleef.     

Personality Traits and Peace Negotiations: Integrative Complexity and Attitudes toward the Middle East Peace Process

Much of the literature on negotiation focuses on the effect that various personality factors, characterizing the parties or mediators involved in the process, have on negotiation outcomes. Nevertheless, there hardly can be found a study, which examines these factors with psychometrically reliable and valid tools. The present study uses psychodiagnostic projective method for measuring the personality trait known as integrative complexity, which is considered as a basic factor that connects cognitive traits to attitudes toward conflict resolution. In a sample of 26 Israeli students this trait, assessed by two Rorschach measures - the blend responses and the frequency of organizational activity - has been revealed as a personality characteristic that might explain seeking compromise agreements in negotiation. Individuals low in integrative complexity tend to rely on highly competitive and less cooperative tactics much more than highly integrative complex individuals. Projective measures for integrative complexity, assessed in this study, are suggested to test people as they are assigned to teams charged with important tasks involving complex group decisions and negotiation. In future studies of complex group decisions this psychodiagnostic approach might be used as a part of the support systems in the process of group negotiation.     

Negotiation processes,Evolutionary Systems Design,and NEGOTIATOR

A negotiation accord is often the result of an intense, laborious, and evolutionary negotiation process. During this process, disputing parties are confronted with goal, judgment, and outcome conflict. This article demonstrates the utility of a conflict resolution framework—Evolutionary Systems Design (ESD)—by using a Negotiation Support System. ESD seeks to guide negotiators to move their individual goals and judgments in such a way as to enhance the chance of achieving a common solution. As illustrated by the use of NEGOTIATOR, a multiattribute utility negotiation support system, we argue that computer mediation can prove to be an effective means to implement the ESD framework.