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1.
Sigmund Wagner-Tsukamoto 《Constitutional Political Economy》2010,21(3):288-307
Buchanan’s constitutional economics takes social conflict (the ‘Hobbesian jungle’, ‘Hobbesian anarchy’) as the starting point
for the analysis of social contract. Buchanan argues that in the presence of social conflict either some social contract (e.g.
some system of formal laws) or some generally shared moral precepts are needed to resolve the predicament that social conflict
presents. The present paper argues that a social conflict model also served the Old Testament as an analytical starting point.
However, contrary to both standard theological interpretation and Buchanan’s explicit claims, I argue that the Old Testament
had already made an attempt to model ‘Hobbesian anarchy’ in order to approach social conflict in an essentially modern, non-metaphysical manner. I argue that figures like Adam and Eve or Jacob,
in the tradition of Hobbesian anarchists, questioned godly authority and the associated imposed, authoritarian, metaphysical
social contract. In this way, one can detect a modern, contractarian constitutional economics in pre-Enlightenment literature
(and in Genesis, specifically) in direct contrast to Buchanan’s claims. 相似文献
2.
Anderlini Luca; Felli Leonardo; Postlewaite Andrew 《Jnl. of Law, Economics, and Organization》2007,23(3):662-684
We study a contracting model with unforeseen contingencies inwhich the court is an active player. Ex ante, the contractingparties cannot include the risky unforeseen contingencies inthe contract they draw up. Ex post, the court observes whetheran unforeseen contingency occurred and decides whether to voidor uphold the contract. If the contract is voided by the court,the parties can renegotiate a new agreement ex post. There aretwo effects of a court that voids contracts. The parties' incentivesto undertake relationship-specific investment are reduced, andthe parties enjoy greater insurance against the unforeseen contingenciesthat the ex ante contract cannot account for. In this context,we fully characterize the optimal decision rule for the court.The behavior of the optimal court is determined by the trade-offbetween the need for incentives and the gains from insurancethat voiding in some circumstances offers to the agents. 相似文献
3.
This article analyzes the pretrial settlement process among an uninformed plaintiff and multiple defendants who share information
about the winning chances of their cases. We show that when the chances are negatively correlated, cross-type subsidization occurs to circumvent the possibility of signal jamming, that is, the settlement offer of a strong defendant (a weak defendant)
is distorted upward (downward), as far as the no-distortion equilibrium is not viable. In this equilibrium, the plaintiff
settles with defendants with probability one. 相似文献
4.
Rob Hart 《Environmental and Resource Economics》2009,42(4):429-450
We model long-run economic development through technology adoption under scientific uncertainty about environmental effects.
There are four possible long-run equilibria in a socially planned economy: ‘High-growth’, adopt rapidly, but abandon damaging
technologies once revealed (DDT, CFCs); ‘Cautious’, brake the introduction of new technologies to avoid mistakes (genetically
modified organisms); ‘No-growth’, halt technological progress to preserve secondary knowledge; and ‘Collapse’, adopt rapidly
without ever abandoning damaging technologies. In the base parameterization a short-sighted social planner chooses the cautious
strategy. A far-sighted planner chooses the high-growth strategy, unless damages are irreversible in which case the cautious
strategy again dominates. Regulatory options in the market economy are investigated. Pollution taxes do not affect the firm’s
level of precaution if they can only be applied after the adopting firm has reaped the benefits; however, they do encourage
the abandonment of damaging technologies. Liability rules do affect precaution, but may lead to excessive caution, or even
a no-growth trap. 相似文献
5.
《European Economic Review》2002,46(4-5):725-733
6.
Mark D. White 《Forum for Social Economics》2010,39(1):53-60
This note points out a neglected parallel between the philosophies of Adam Smith and Immanuel Kant related to their views
on self-interest, morality, and society. First, I explain the distinction between Kant’s perfect and imperfect duties, and
how they result from his moral philosophy. Next, I summarize Smith’s two major perspectives on human behavior, as presented
in The Theory of Moral Sentiments and The Wealth of Nations, and discuss the apparent conflict between them. Finally, I use Kant’s two types of duties, along with his concept of the
kingdom of ends, to explicate my interpretation of the relationship between Smith’s two strains of thought. By explaining
these dual aspects of Kant’s ethical system in relation to Smith, I hope to give a new perspective on the apparent duality
in Smith’s thought, as well as help bring out the oft-neglected social aspects of Kant’s. 相似文献
7.
Edward E. Schlee 《Economic Theory》2008,34(1):127-155
Except for a knife-edge case of preferences, the percentage error from using the change in expected consumer’s surplus (ECS) to approximate the willingness to pay for a change in the distribution of a random price is unbounded, in contrast
to Willig’s (Am Econ Rev 66:589–597; 1976) famous approximation result for nonrandom prices. If the change is smooth on the
space of random variables, and either the initial price is nonrandom or state-contingent payments are possible, then the change
in ECS locally approximates the willingness to pay well. Unfortunately, this smoothness fails in some important applications.
I thank Hector Chade, Glenn Ellison, Peter Hammond, Manuel Santos, seminar participants at Arizona State, Stanford and Yale
and participants of the Midwest Economic Theory meetings at Indiana University and the 2004 Summer Econometric Meetings for
comments. 相似文献
8.
Rupert Gatti Timo Goeschl Ben Groom Timothy Swanson 《Environmental and Resource Economics》2011,48(4):609-628
We employ cooperative bargaining theory and Nash’s ‘rational threats’ idea to cast light on the biodiversity bargaining problem. The problem of global environmental negotiations is argued to be of the nature of a bargaining problem, in which bargainers
must agree on the distribution of cooperative surplus in order to move to the bargaining frontier. We discuss the importance
of both efficiency (bargaining frontier) and fairness (recognition of characteristics of bargainers) in the choice of the
appropriate contract. We show that the incremental cost contract, used to resolve the biodiversity bargaining problem, is
of the form of an extreme point contract that fails to recognise the contributions of the South to the production of cooperative
surplus. A rational response to such a contract is the use of threats of biodiversity destruction. Contracts must evince both
efficiency and fairness in order to represent lasting solutions. 相似文献
9.
Xue Qiao 《Journal of Economics》2012,105(3):263-279
The AIDS-fighting communities have spent their limited resource on improving people’s awareness of the risk of contracting
AIDS, and yet these programs have not resulted in sustained behavior change. This paper offers a possible explanation of why
agents in poor countries choose to engage in more unsafe sexual activities when they are perfectly cognizant of the risk involved. It is shown that agents may rationally choose to do so when they are poor, since future is not attractive due to poverty and agents care more about current-period
utility. Our results indicate that safe sexual practice is essentially a “normal good” and that development may be key to
reduce the HIV infectivity by modifying agents’ sexual behavior. The model is then extended to consider the role of public
health expenditure. We find that the relationship between protected sexual activity and development is no longer monotonic:
unsafe sexual activity may increase slightly after a critical level of development has been reached. Finally, we examine the
impacts of AIDS on development by considering individual’s saving decision. It is shown that agents tend to save more and
accumulate more capital when economy grows. 相似文献
10.
Marco Stimolo 《International Review of Economics》2012,59(1):67-80
In this paper, I provide a defence of Robert Sugden’s contribution to evolutionary game theory against Donald Ross’s accusation
of eliminating the individual’s autonomy by denying the explanatory role of rationality, utility maximization and rational
beliefs. In this regard, I claim that Sugden’s methodological remarks on evolutionary game theory do not imply a characterization
of real agents as automata. On the methodological level, Sugden claims that it is not correct to conceive the empirical phenomenon
of social evolution in terms of normative concepts, whose empirical status is not obvious. However, Sugden proposes a theory
that explains the agent’s behaviour in terms of inductive reasoning, adaptive beliefs, salience and pattern recognition. The
latter are psychological features that describe the way agents manage to self-determine their own actions. From these clarifications,
I draw the conclusion that Ross’s critique misunderstands Sugden’s contribution both on the methodological and empirical level. 相似文献
11.
Daniel B. Klein 《The Review of Austrian Economics》2010,23(4):403-410
Alan Kahan’s Mind vs. Money: The War between Intellectuals and Capitalism (Transaction Publishers, 2010) treats intellectuals as a class and tells of intellectuals’ yearning to play the role of cleric
and aristocrat. Kahan says that intellectuals are necessarily alienated from “capitalism.” In this essay, I discuss Kahan’s
erudite and insightful—though sometimes exasperating—work, and I take the opportunity to develop some ideas on the topic,
ideas in line with Hayek’s thought. 相似文献
12.
This paper develops a two stage game model with two competing firms in a mixed oligopolistic market, a public firm and a private
firm, and only the public firm giving its manager an incentive contract. The paper presents three types of public firm owner’s
objective function and each objective function corresponds to three types of delegation, either of a profit-revenue type,
or of a relative performance, or, finally, of a market share one. In an equilibrium, the public firm owner has a dominant
strategy to reward his manager with an incentive contract combining own profits and competitor’s profits. Different from Manasakis
et al. (2007), this paper suggests that the dominant strategy of the public firm owner is to reward his manager with a profit-revenue
type of contract or a market-share type of contract, that is to say profit-revenue is identical with market-share. Using relative-performance
type of contract will move the manager away from the owner’s true objective function when the public firm owner only pursues
maximizing the social welfare. The private firm will be crowded out and the public firm is the only producer of the market.
Under profits-revenues type of contract, the owner’s objective of maximizing the summation of the profit and consumer surplus
leads the manager more aggressive. Different combinations give us different results. By comparing the results, each type of
incentive contract is an owner’s best response to his decision. 相似文献
13.
Botond Kőszegi 《Economic Theory》2010,44(3):415-444
I develop a dynamic model of individual decisionmaking in which the agent derives utility from physical outcomes as well as
from rational beliefs about physical outcomes (“anticipation”), and these two payoff components can interact. Beliefs and
behavior are jointly determined in a personal equilibrium by the requirement that behavior given past beliefs must be consistent with those beliefs. I explore three phenomena made
possible by utility from anticipation, and prove that if the decisionmaker’s behavior is distinguishable from a person’s who
cares only about physical outcomes, she must exhibit at least one of these phenomena. First, the decisionmaker can be prone to self-fulfilling expectations. Second, she
might be time-inconsistent even if her preferences in all periods are identical. Third, she might exhibit informational preferences,
where these preferences are intimately connected to her attitudes toward disappointments. Applications of the framework to
reference-dependent preferences, impulsive behaviors, and emotionally difficult choices are discussed. 相似文献
14.
Ana Espínola‐Arredondo Felix Munoz‐Garcia Pitchayaporn Tantihkarnchana 《Journal of Public Economic Theory》2018,20(2):136-155
This paper studies an incomplete information model in which a preventable accident occurred. The judge determining punitive damages observes the firm's (defendant) investment decisions, but is uninformed about the firm's experience adopting safety measures. Our model allows firms to file an appeal if the judge's verdict is incorrect, which the judge may accept or reject. We identify under which conditions a separating equilibrium exists where the firm's investment decisions signal its type to the judge, who responds with a correct verdict, thus avoiding future appeals. Our paper also finds conditions under which a pooling equilibrium exists whereby the firm's investment in precaution conceals its type from the judge, who can respond with an incorrect verdict thus giving rise to appeals. Furthermore, we show that the separating equilibrium is more likely to arise if the percentage of revenue that defendants are required to pay in punitive damages decreases, if the punitive‐to‐compensatory ratio increases, and if the legal cost of filing an appeal increases. 相似文献
15.
We study contracts designed to remunerate a farmer for the production of an ecosystem service with the payment dependent on the results of the farmer’s actions and on weather conditions. Two contracts are proposed: the first takes into account both the results of the farmer’s actions and a weather variable that reflects the actual atmospheric conditions during the life of the contract; the second bases the payment on the results alone incorporating only the average effect of weather. Social welfare is optimal when both the results and the specific atmospheric conditions are taken into account; however, this type of contract may be less acceptable to the farmer due to his perception of the level of risk involved.We thank two referees for valuable comments. 相似文献
16.
Nicolas Jacquemet 《Experimental Economics》2007,10(2):187-188
Agency theory has established that appropriate incentives can reconcile the diverging interests of the principal and the agent.
Focusing on three applications, this dissertation evaluates the empirical relevance of these results when a third party interacts
with the primary contract. The analyses provided rely on either laboratory or natural experiments.
First, corruption is analyzed as a two-contract situation: a delegation contract between a Principal and an Agent and a corruption pact concluded between this Agent and a third player, called Briber. A survey of the recent microeconomic literature on corruption
first highlights how corruption behavior results from the properties of those two agreements. We thereafter show that the
Agent faces a conflict in reciprocities due to those two conflicting agreements. The resulting delegation effect, supported by observed behavior in our three-player experimental game, could account for the deterrence effect of wages on
corruption.
Second, health care is governed by contradictory objectives: patients are mainly concerned with the health provided, whereas
containing health care costs is the primary goal of health care administrators. We provide further insights into the ability
of incentives to balance these two competing objectives. In this matter, our theoretical and econometric analysis evaluates
how a new mixed compensation scheme, introduced in Quebec in 1999 as an alternative to fee-for-services, has affected physicians’
practice patterns. Free switching is shown to be an essential feature of the reform, since it implements screening between
physicians.
Finally, the demand for underground work departs from the traditional Beckerian approach to illegal behavior, due to the dependence
of benefits from illegality on competitors’ behavior. We set up a theoretical model in which the demand for underground work
from all producers competing on the same output market is analyzed simultaneously. We first show that competition drastically
undermines the individual benefits of tax evasion. At equilibrium, each firm nonetheless chooses evasion with a positive probability,
strictly lower than one. This Bertrand curse could then account for the “tax evasion puzzle” i.e. the overprediction of evasion in models that ignore market interactions.
We thereafter show that allowing firms to denounce competitors’ evasion is not likely to solve this curse—by providing a credible
threat against price cuts, it fosters illegal work. Empirical evidence from a laboratory experiment confirms these predictions.
Without denunciation, experimental firms often choose evasion whereas evasion benefits are canceled out by competition. When
introduced, denunciation is rarely used by firms, but the threat makes evasion profitable.
JEL Classification K42, I18, D21, C25, C91 相似文献
17.
Nikolai Wenzel 《The Review of Austrian Economics》2010,23(1):55-78
This paper develops the concept of constitutional culture—the attitude, thoughts, and feelings about constitutional constraints
and the nature, scope, and function of constitutionalism. Constitutional culture is approached as a complex emergent phenomenon
bridging Hayekian cognitive and institutional insights. It can be studied as a mental model, a series of expectations and
understandings about the constitutional order, how it is, and how it ought to be. The “map” and “model” approach from Hayek’s
Sensory Order (1952) is employed to understand how individuals and (cautiously) groups of individuals at the national level approach constitutionalism.
This paper goes beyond the more traditional one-size-fits-all approach where all individuals respond uniformly to incentives,
as provided by the constitution qua contract. Instead, constitutionalism is tied up in the individual’s vision of the world,
that is, what Hayek (1948) labels “the facts of the social sciences.” The paper concludes with four areas where constitutional
culture can further the insights of constitutional political economy: comparative political economy, constitutional stickiness,
constitutional maintenance, and the new development economics. 相似文献
18.
Gerald H. Lander 《International Advances in Economic Research》2006,12(4):475-490
I investigate the mean reversion tendency of small growth stocks. Using a carefully articulated research design employing established and empirically tested principles, my findings should support or refute the anecdotal evidence that small growth stocks make superior investments. The primary motivation for the study springs from the documented differential preference among investors for value and growth stocks. Despite evidence that value stocks tend to outperform growth stocks, investors retain strong interest in growth stocks. Yet in examining the performance of Business Week’s (BW), smaller capitalization companies (called “Hot Growth Companies”) with respect to the overall financial market, Bauman et al. [2002] found positive excess returns in the pre-publication period but negative excess returns in the post-publication period. A limitation of their study is that their analyses relied on only three criteria: sales, BW rank and return on capital, which do not represent completely a firm’s financial health. I replicate Bauman et al.’s study but use a more robust and representative variable set to test the mean reversal hypothesis — Forbes’ financial criteria — and I focus on six variables. In the current study, I look at 4,200 companies listed in Forbes from 1980 to 2000. The results of the expanded study substantiate Bauman et al.’s [2002] study showing that there are positive excess returns in the pre-publication period, but negative excess returns in the post-publication period. An expanded future study will look at five additional variables to see if they make a significant difference on the effects of the returns of small growth stocks. 相似文献
19.
Kurt Dopfer 《Journal of Evolutionary Economics》2012,22(1):133-160
The paper starts from Schumpeter’s proposition that entrepreneurs carry out innovations (the micro level), that swarms of
followers imitate them (meso) and that, as a consequence, ‘creative destruction’ leads to economic development ‘from within’
(macro). It is argued that Schumpeter’s approach can be developed into a new—more general—micro-meso-macro framework in economics. Center stage is meso. Its essential characteristic is bimodality, meaning that one idea (the generic rule) can be physically actualized by many
agents (a population). Ideas can relate to others, and, in this way, meso constitutes a structure component of a ‘deep’ invisible macro structure. Equally, the rule actualization process unfolds over time—modelled in the paper as
a meso trajectory with three phases of rule origination, selective adoption and retention—and here meso represents a process component of a visible ‘surface’ structure. The macro measure with a view to the appropriateness of meso components is generic correspondence.
At the level of ideas, its measure is order; at that of actual relative adoption frequencies, it is generic equilibrium. Economic
development occurs at the deep level as transition from one generic rule to another, inducing a change of order, and, at the
surface level, as the new rule is adopted, destroying an old equilibrium and establishing a new one. 相似文献
20.
Ines Lindner 《Economic Theory》2008,35(3):607-611
We extend Condorcet’s Jury Theorem (Essai sur l’application de l’analyse à la probabilité des décisions rendues à la pluralité
des voix. De l’imprimerie royale, 1785) to weighted voting games with voters of two kinds: a fixed (possibly empty) set of
‘major’ voters with fixed weights, and an ever-increasing number of ‘minor’ voters, whose total weight is also fixed, but
where each individual’s weight becomes negligible. As our main result, we obtain the limiting probability that the jury will
arrive at the correct decision as a function of the competence of the few major players. As in Condorcet’s result the quota
q = 1/2 is found to play a prominent role.
I wish to thank Maurice Koster, Moshé Machover, Guillermo Owen and two anonymous referees for helpful comments. 相似文献