Comparative precautionary saving under higher-order risk and recursive utility

Measuring and comparing the precautionary saving motive rest almost exclusively on the expected utility framework, and only focus on income risk or coefficients of the Arrow–Pratt type. We generalize the standard approach by characterizing comparative precautionary saving under recursive utility for increases in income risk and increases in risk on the saving return, including higher-order risk effects. We express the comparisons in terms of precautionary premia. In addition, we define a new class of preference coefficients, and derive the associated conditions to predict a stronger precautionary motive. The coefficients provide a detailed picture of the preferences sustaining precautionary saving and could be useful in applications.     

A life-cycle model of unemployment and disability insurance

A general equilibrium life-cycle model is developed, in which individuals choose a sequence of saving and labor supply faced with search frictions and uncertainty in longevity, health status and medical expenditures. Unemployed individuals decide whether to apply for disability insurance (DI) benefits if eligible. We investigate the effects of cash transfer and in-kind Medicare component of the DI system on the life-cycle employment. Without Medicare benefits, DI coverage could fall significantly. We also study how DI interacts with reforms of Social Security and Medicare and find that DI enrollment amplifies the effects of reforms.     

Financing constraints and unemployment: Evidence from the Great Recession

This paper shows that financing constraints of small firms were one of the drivers of unemployment dynamics during the 2007–2009 recession in the United States. Specifically, workers in small firms were more likely to become unemployed during the 2007–2009 recession than comparable workers in large firms, but only if they were employed in industries with high financing needs. We find very similar results for the 1990–1991 recession, but not for the 2001 recession, where only the former was associated with a reduction in loan supply. The findings support the credit constraints hypothesis and underscore the role of bank lending in explaining labor market activity.     

The Swedish State unemployment insurance and the reinsurance problem of the funds

Abstract

In 1901 the town of Gent appropriated a municipal grant to societies paying benefit to their members in case of unemployment. The decision was founded on a committee report principally written by the lawyer Louis Varlez. The societies should claim individual contributions of the members constituting the right to unemployment allowance under certain conditions. In order to prevent a dissipating risk selection the sphere of activity of a society should join with some society existing before. Such societies had been erected at several places as well in Belgium as in other states, in Gent as early as in 1867. In most cases they were attached to trade unions. It may thus be said that a subsidized unemployment insurance was — for the first time — introduced in Gent 1901. The principles applied are usually called the »Gentsystem». In general accordance with this system state subsidized unemployment insurance was introduced in France 1905, in Norway 1906 and in Denmark 1907. Later several states have established unemployment insurance on a voluntary basis. In modern voluntary state insurance, however, a decisivestress is laid upon the fact that the allowance shall be regulated in accordance with the general rules for public relief of unemployment. Some conditions of the insurance scheme are thus compulsorily laid down in the regulations concerning the subsidy. In some states the unemployment insurance has been wholly established on a compulsory basis. For the first time a compulsory insurance was introduced in England in 1911 covering certain occupational groups. Compulsory unemployment insurance has then been erected in Italy 1919, Poland 1924, Bulgaria 1925 and Norway 1938. In 1938 a law bearing on a change of the voluntary unemployment insurance of Belgium to a compulsory one is being prepared.     

Life insurance demand and borrowing constraints

The literature devoted limited attention to exploring the relationship between financial development and life insurance demand. Financial development supports life insurance supply by providing confidence in the financial system, more efficient payment systems, and higher availability of financial instruments. However, financial development reduces households' needs to save by relaxing borrowing constraints, indirectly affecting life insurance demand. We contribute by providing a demand‐driven explanation of the negative consequences of financial development on life insurance development. We find that more credit‐constrained countries have higher life insurance penetration on average. Indirectly, the role of borrowing constraints signifies the importance of life insurance policies as a financing tool in case of the realization of various background risks. This study integrates the knowledge from life insurance theory, life insurance lapse, policy loans demand, and saving under liquidity constraints literature and produces implications for researchers, policymakers, and life insurers.     

On the aggregate welfare cost of Great Depression unemployment

The potential benefit of policies that eliminate a small likelihood of economic crises is calculated. An economic crisis is defined as an increase in unemployment of the magnitude observed during the Great Depression. For the U.S., the maximum likelihood estimate of entering a depression is found to be about once every 83 years. The welfare gain from setting this small probability to zero can range between 1% and 7% of annual consumption in perpetuity. For most estimates, more than half of these large gains results from a reduction in individual consumption volatility.     

Optimal unemployment insurance design: Time limits, monitoring, or workfare?

This paper analyses crucial design features of unemployment insurance (UI) policies. We examine three different means of improving the efficiency of UI: the duration of benefit payments, monitoring in conjunction with sanctions, and workfare. To that end we develop a quantitative model of equilibrium unemployment. The model features worker heterogeneity in preferences for leisure. The analysis suggests that a system with monitoring and sanctions restores search incentives most effectively, since it brings additional incentives to search actively so as to avoid the sanction. Therefore, the UI provider can offer a more generous UI replacement rate in a system with monitoring and sanctions than in the other two systems. Workfare appears to be inferior to the other two systems. JEL Code J64 · J65 · J68     

为客户降低保险成本提供“一个窗口”全面服务——访中国出口信用保险公司总经理唐若昕

党的十七大报告指出：“加快转变经济发展方式”、“统筹城乡发展”、“健全社会信用体系”、“拓展对外开放广度和深度”。中国出口信用保险公司（以下简称“中国信保”）履行政策性职能，认真贯彻党的十七大提出的各项要求，强化信用保险对我国经济发展的保障作用，全面推行“一个窗口”服务模式，努力提高信用保险的覆盖水平，不仅提升了自身的市场化运营水平，而且使信用保险服务更加满足市场的需要，贴近客户的需求。中国信保总经理唐若昕就“一个窗口”服务客户接受了记者专访。     

中国城镇失业保险的供求矛盾及对策研究

失业保险是指个人在失去工作或等待就业期间能从政府或社会得到保证基本生活需要的物质帮助。我国的失业保险制度从无到有逐渐发展壮大到今天,虽然已初步形成体系,但伴随着我国失业人口的与日俱增,现行的失业保险供给远远满足不了实际需求,在政府资金缺口的约束下,这一供求矛盾还将继续存在甚至有扩大的趋势。将失业保险制度的创新与促进就业的政策措施相结合,对于解决城镇失业保险的供求矛盾,实现标本兼治有着重要的意义。     

Adverse selection and moral hazard: Quantitative implications for unemployment insurance

A model of optimal unemployment insurance with adverse selection and moral hazard is constructed. The model generates both qualitative and quantitative implications for the optimal provision of unemployment insurance. Qualitatively, for some agents, incentives in the optimal contract imply consumption increases over the duration of non-employment. Calibrating the model to a stylized version of the U.S. economy quantitatively illustrates these theoretical predictions. The optimal contract achieves a welfare gain of 1.94% relative to the current U.S. system, an additional 0.87% of gains relative to a planner who ignores adverse selection and focuses only on moral hazard.     

The cost of operational risk loss insurance

Using the Algo FIRST operational risk database, this paper computes the cost of operational risk loss insurance for a sample of banks over a 1-year horizon. The estimated cost of 1-year operational risk loss insurance for an average bank is 1.24% as a percentage of firm value on December 31, 2006, while an average AA bank is 0.24%. These estimates far exceed the typical 1-year default insurance premiums as reflected in market CDS rates for similarly rated banks. These insurance premiums confirm the economic importance of operational risk in the management of financial institutions.     

Effects of perceived cost,service quality,and customer satisfaction on health insurance service continuance

This paper aims to contribute to the universal discourse on financial services continuance behavior by examining the impact of service cost on customers’ service-quality perception and service continuance intention. It presents the results of an empirical study that has explored the impacts of service cost, service quality, and customer satisfaction on health insurance customers’ behavioral intention toward continuing or discontinuing with their service providers. Very few studies had examined the impact of service cost on service-quality perception. Our study attempts to fill that gap. A sample of 820 customers was surveyed, and 624 usable responses were analyzed with ANOVA, standard multiple regression, and logistic regression. Our findings indicate that, although highly satisfied health insurance customers will most likely retain their current service providers, customer dissatisfaction does not necessarily lead to discontinuance. Our results also provide some operational implications for health insurance managers, with strategies for reducing attrition and improving customer retention.     

保险企业质量成本管理实证分析

保险业的发展不仅带动了我国经济的进步以及基础建设的稳步前行,同时对稳定居民生活、保障国民的生命和财产安全起着不可替代的作用。在这种形势下,以顾客满意度为导向的质量成本管理对保险业的健康稳定发展意义重大,对保险业质量成本管理进行分析也就非常重要。本文在总结国内外研究基础上,引出了保险业的质量成本管理问题。针对保险业的特殊属性,本文建立了以顾客满意度为导向的质量成本管理模型,构建了保险业质量管理的项目设置及成本核算方式,并选取35家寿险公司作为样本,对保险业的质量成本管理模型进行了验证,并给出了加强保险业质量成本管理的建议。     

Optimal life insurance with no-borrowing constraints: duality approach and example

We solve an optimal portfolio choice problem under a no-borrowing assumption. A duality approach is applied to study a family’s optimal consumption, optimal portfolio choice, and optimal life insurance purchase when the family receives labor income that may be terminated due to the wage earner’s premature death or retirement. We establish the existence of an optimal solution to the optimization problem theoretically by the duality approach and we provide an explicitly solved example with numerical illustration. Our results illustrate that the no-borrowing constraints do not always impact the family’s optimal decisions on consumption, portfolio choice, and life insurance. When the constraints are binding, there must exist a wealth depletion time (WDT) prior to the retirement date, and the constraints indeed reduce the optimal consumption and the life insurance purchase at the beginning of time. However, the optimal consumption under the constraints will become larger than that without the constraints at some time later than the WDT.     

Considerations of cost trade-offs in insurance solvency surveillance policy

We propose a process for identifying potentially insolvent insurers on a cost-effective basis. A loss cost function is developed such that the effectiveness of monitoring is maximized relative to a cost constraint. The loss cost function is supported by a model that provides a rank ordering of financial institutions according to their probability of insolvency. When tested against a full sample of property-liability insurance companies , the procedure provides information critical to maximizing the effectiveness of regulatory resources available for solvency surveillance and performs well as a predictor of insolvency. Likewise, the rank ordering of insurers overcomes an estimation problem critical to establishing risk-adjusted guaranty assessments.     

The welfare cost of unpriced heterogeneity in insurance markets

We consider the welfare loss of unpriced heterogeneity in insurance markets, which results when private information or regulatory constraints prevent insurance companies to set premiums reflecting expected costs. We propose a methodology which uses survey data to measure this welfare loss. After identifying some “types” which determine expected risk and insurance demand, we derive the key factors defining the demand and cost functions in each market induced by these unobservable types. These are used to quantify the efficiency costs of unpriced heterogeneity. We apply our methods to the US Long‐Term Care and Medigap insurance markets, where we find that unpriced heterogeneity causes substantial inefficiency.     

Skills, search and the persistence of high unemployment

The persistence of high-unemployment rates in Europe has fueled theories advocating the existence of multiple natural rates of unemployment. Labor-market institutions and increasing returns to scale have been singled out as the main causes of multiplicity and, therefore, of high-unemployment traps. The contribution of this paper is both to expand the set of mechanisms leading to multiple natural rates of unemployment and to establish a minimum set of assumptions under which such multiplicity may arise. To this aim, a search-matching model is presented where households allocate time to market and non-market activities, and invest both in physical and human capital. It is shown that under the standard assumption of concavity in production and matching such a model yields multiple long-run equilibria with different rates of unemployment. This result does not rely on labor-market institutions or increasing returns to scale. Multiplicity in our model arises from differences in the intensity of use of human capital across time-consuming activities.