信息化冲击、交易成本与企业TFP——基于国家智慧城市建设的自然实验

智慧城市建设一般伴随着城市信息化水平的“意外”提升。本文将中国2012年智慧城市试点建设作为信息化冲击的自然实验,构建了智慧城市建设影响企业全要素生产率(TFP)的交易成本理论分析框架。基于2003—2016年中国地级市和上市公司匹配面板数据,运用双重差分法(DID)、倾向得分匹配双重差分法(PSM-DID)和三重差分法(DDD)实证检验了智慧城市建设产生的信息化冲击对企业全要素生产率的影响及其机制。实证结论表明,智慧城市建设这一信息化冲击显著提升了企业全要素生产率。机制检验表明,信息化冲击通过降低企业交易成本,从而提高企业全要素生产率。进一步异质性检验表明,智慧城市建设产生的信息化冲击对资本密集度更高、规模更大企业的全要素生产率促进作用更加明显;相对于非国有企业,智慧城市建设产生的信息化冲击对国有企业产生了较大影响;相对于非交易行业,交易行业由于智慧城市建设导致的交易成本下降,企业全要素生产率提升更明显。     

Non-preferential trading clubs

This paper examines the welfare implications of non-discriminatory tariff reforms by a subset of countries, which we term a non-preferential trading club. We show that there exist coordinated tariff reforms, accompanied by appropriate income transfers between the member countries, that unambiguously increase the welfare of these countries while leaving the welfare of non-members unaltered. In terms of economic policy implications, our results show that there exist regional, MFN-consistent arrangements that lead to Pareto improvements in world welfare.     

Infant industry protection with oligopoly and learning-by-doing

I use a simple two-period learning-by-doing model to examine optimal home country protection policy. In some cases, as in Dasgupta and Stiglitz (Oxford Economic Papers 40 (1988), 246–68), the home government will impose an import ban to protect the home firm from foreign competition. On the other hand, a protective tariff often provides greater welfare than when an import ban is imposed. In these cases, the first-period dynamic tariff is greater than the static Brander and Spencer ‘profit shifting tariff’. Protection in the form either of a tariff or an import ban encourages the home firm to invest in current output which reduces future costs. In addition to dynamic profit shifting, protection can bc valuable because the home firm does not consider the effect of its current learning on future consumer surplus. Tariffs can thus encourage the growth of infant industries while benefiting consumers in the future. Furthermore, the home firm can have an incentive to price below cost if the potential cost savings are sufficiently valuable.     

Welfare and market-access effects of piecemeal tariff reforms on environmentally preferable products

We examine how welfare and market access are affected by piecemeal tariff reforms on environmentally preferable products (EPP) in a small open economy. We define EPP as clean goods that, when consumed, have no impact on pollution. First, we show that a uniform reduction of all tariffs improves welfare if a country’s imports consist only of clean goods. If a clean good is a net substitute for all other goods in excess demand, then reducing the highest tariff on the clean good improves welfare. Second, we show that a proportional tariff reduction leading to a welfare improvement also increases the value of imports if all tariffs are set at the same ad valorem rates. If the clean good is a net substitute for all other goods in excess demand, then reducing the lowest tariff on the clean good increases the value of imports. Finally, we explore the link between the change in welfare and the change in the value of imports in response to the tariff reforms, and we show that unlike a proportional tariff reduction, a tariff reduction on the clean good does not necessarily lead to improvements in both welfare and market access.     

Welfare computations and the optimal staging of tariff reductions in models with adjustment costs

This is an analysis of the second-best problem of choice of tariff level for period two given a positive tariff in period one. The models presented take the allocation of all factors of production except labor as fixed, and allow labor to transfer between industries at a positive cost. The period two tariff may then optimally be set to some positive level. Although these models involve voluntary unemployment, no adjustment to the goods market welfare triangle is necessary to compensate for the adjustment burden in computing the gains from tariff reduction. Lastly, it is shown that a staged reduction of tariffs may be preferred for income distribution reasons to a once-and-for-all reduction.     

Trade policy under firm-level heterogeneity in a small economy

We explore the effect of trade policy on productivity and welfare in the now standard model of firm-level heterogeneity and product differentiation with monopolistic competition. To obtain sharp results, we restrict attention to an economy that takes as given the price of imports and the demand schedules for its exports (a “small economy”). We first establish that welfare can be decomposed into four terms: productivity, terms of trade, variety and curvature, where the last is a term that captures heterogeneity across varieties. We then show how a consumption subsidy, an export tax, or an import tariff allows our small economy to deal with two distortions that we identify and thereby reach its first-best allocation. We also show that an export subsidy generates an increase in productivity, but given the negative joint effect on the other three terms (terms of trade, variety, and curvature), welfare falls. In contrast, an import tariff improves welfare in spite of the fact that productivity falls.     

Multilateral stability and efficiency of trade agreements: A network formation approach

We study the endogenous network formation of bilateral and multilateral trade agreements by means of hypergraphs and introduce the equilibrium concept of multilateral stability. We consider multicountry settings with a firm in each country that produces a homogeneous good and competes as a Cournot oligopolist in each market. Under endogenous tariffs, we find that a multilateral trade agreement governing the rules and norms of tariff setting, that is the WTO/GATT regime itself, together with a bilateral preferential trade agreement (PTA) is multilaterally stable. We also find that the existence of the WTO is necessary for the stability of the trading system. We further analyse the impact of PTAs on multilateral tariffs within the WTO. We find that the formation of PTAs increases countries' incentives for multilateral tariff reduction.     

Financial Crisis and Productivity Evolution: Evidence from Indonesia

We examine how the productivity of different industries changes over the course of a financial crisis by exploiting cross‐firm, within‐industry differences in productivity resulting from the Asian financial crisis of 1997. We show that the crisis coincided with dramatic changes in productivity and that many of these changes were sustained in the long run. In particular, an increasing number of industries experienced decreases in average firm productivity during the crisis and did not recover. Further, we find that changes in industrial productivity in the recovery period are driven not by increases in the productivity of existing firms, but rather by the entry of new firms and changes to the reallocation of market share. Finally, we find that foreign exporters' productivity was the least impacted by the crisis, suggesting that only access to alternate forms of both capital and international markets can help to smooth investment and maintain productivity over a financial crisis.     

Does real exchange rate depreciation increase productivity? Analysis using Korean firm‐level data

We examine the effects of real exchange rate (RER ) depreciation shocks on firm productivity. Using the firm‐level data of Korean manufacturing industries for 2006–13, we distinguish between yearly RER movement and persistent RER depreciation during 2007–09 and analyse how each affects productivity. We find the positive effect of RER depreciation on productivity among exporters, and this positive effect increases with higher export exposure. However, the positive productivity gain disappears when the depreciation persists. Our findings suggest that while immediate depreciation leads to productivity upgrade via price competitiveness and scale expansion, persistent depreciation nullifies the productivity gain by slackening the innovation effort.     

Tariffs, quality reversals and exit in vertically differentiated industries

In a vertically differentiated industry a domestic and a foreign firm first choose the quality of their goods and then compete in quantities, or prices, in the home market. We investigate the cases in which a tariff is chosen before, or after, the firms’ quality decision. These cases are referred to as the ex-ante and the ex-post game, respectively. Optimal ex-post tariffs are positive and ensure that the domestic firm always produces the high quality good. The optimal ex-ante tariff is prohibitive and welfare under domestic monopoly is lower than under ex-post tariffs, unless firms compete in prices and the domestic firm is high quality.     

The impact of trade liberalization on productivity: Evidence from India's formal and informal manufacturing sectors

Despite a large literature investigating the impacts of trade on firm productivity, there is almost no evidence on how small firms react to trade liberalization. Using a unique dataset of firm-level surveys that are representative of the entire Indian manufacturing industry, I show that India's unilateral reduction in final goods tariffs increased the average productivity of small, informal firms, which account for 80% of Indian manufacturing employment but have been excluded from previous studies. In contrast, the increase in productivity among larger, formal firms was driven primarily by the concurrent reduction in input tariffs. By examining the effect of the tariff liberalization on the distributions of productivity and firm size, I find evidence consistent with the exit of the smallest, least productive firms from the informal sector. In addition, I find that although the decline in final goods tariffs did not significantly impact average formal sector productivity, it did increase productivity among the top quantiles of the distribution.     

The impact of trade liberalization on productivity: Evidence from India's formal and informal manufacturing sectors

Despite a large literature investigating the impacts of trade on firm productivity, there is almost no evidence on how small firms react to trade liberalization. Using a unique dataset of firm-level surveys that are representative of the entire Indian manufacturing industry, I show that India's unilateral reduction in final goods tariffs increased the average productivity of small, informal firms, which account for 80% of Indian manufacturing employment but have been excluded from previous studies. In contrast, the increase in productivity among larger, formal firms was driven primarily by the concurrent reduction in input tariffs. By examining the effect of the tariff liberalization on the distributions of productivity and firm size, I find evidence consistent with the exit of the smallest, least productive firms from the informal sector. In addition, I find that although the decline in final goods tariffs did not significantly impact average formal sector productivity, it did increase productivity among the top quantiles of the distribution.     

Optimal trade policy with quality-differentiated goods

In this article we apply the model of vertically differentiated products to international trade. A foreign firm competes with a domestic firm in the latter's market, producing products of varying quality. We examine the nature of the equilibrium in this case, assuming the firms compete in prices. Contrary to the popular belief, we show that a protectionist policy of imposing a tariff on the foreign firm raises overall welfare in the domestic economy, as well as induces the domestic firm to upgrade the quality of its product, if it produces the lower quality product. Furthermore, if minimum quality standards are imposed on the foreign firm, the domestic firm upgrades quality, and overall welfare in the domestic economy is higher.     

International trade in services: A portrait of importers and exporters

We provide a novel set of stylized facts on firms engaging in international trade in services, using unique data on firm-level exports and imports from the world's second largest services exporter, the United Kingdom (UK). We show that only a fraction of UK firms engage in international trade in services, that trade participation varies widely across industries and that service traders are different from non-traders in terms of size, productivity and other firm characteristics. We also provide detailed evidence on the trading patterns of service exporters and importers, such as the number of markets served, the value of exports and imports per market and the share of individual markets in overall sales. We interpret these facts in the light of existing theories of international trade in services and goods. Our results demonstrate that firm-level heterogeneity is a key feature of services trade. Also, we find many similarities between services and goods trade at the firm level and conclude that existing heterogeneous firm models for goods trade will be a good starting point for explaining trade in services as well.     

不完全竞争市场上的贸易和产业政策——以合成橡胶行业为例的经验分析

战略性贸易政策理论研究不完全竞争市场的贸易政策和产业政策。本文将该理论作为分析框架，以合成橡胶行业为分析对象，使用2003年的数据对我国在该行业实施贸易政策和产业政策进行经验分析。文章分析比较了4种不同的政策或政策组合，即自由贸易政策、进口关税政策、生产补贴政策、进口关税与生产补贴结合使用。研究发现，相对于自由放任政策，各种干预政策可增加国民福利，但幅度不大；而干预政策对不同行业厂商利润和政府收入的影响则要大得多，并使合成橡胶的数量和价格发生明显变化。最后，笔者考察了进口关税政策在多期的实施效果。研究结果支持传统幼稚工业保护论：贸易保护程度应随时间减弱，并且政策将在多期中不断降低厂商的市场力量。     

An Analysis of Mercosur's Regional Trading Arrangements

After six years of stop‐start negotiations, Mercosur is no closer to signing a regional trading agreement (RTA) with the EU, whilst negotiations to finalise a Free Trade of the Americas Agreement (FTAA) have also stalled. This is due to various factors: economic crises in Mercosur, intransigence by member countries and uncertainty surrounding the outcome of the Doha Round. Estimates from the trade literature predict welfare gains to Mercosur from both RTAs whilst only one study assesses the additional benefits of removing non‐tariff barrier (NTB) trade costs which have remained largely unchallenged within the multilateral forum. In this paper, we improve the treatment of NTB estimates employing a theoretically consistent gravity specification, where calculated tariff‐equivalent estimates are subsequently implemented into a modified computable general equilibrium (CGE) model. Relative to a realistic baseline, and incorporating trade‐induced productivity and capital accumulation effects, we reassess the benefits of both regional initiatives to Mercosur, revisiting the claim that NTB trade cost abolition doubles the ‘standard’ welfare estimates. Contrary to previous studies, the results suggest that an FTAA yields greater gains to Mercosur than an EU RTA whilst the claim of Monteagudo and Watanuki (2003 ) pertaining to trade cost elimination is understated.     

Pareto-superior trade policy

Current literature shows the welfare superiority of ad valorem over specific tariffs or domestic governments facing foreign monopolists. This note establishes the stronger result that, for any given specific tariff imposed on a foreign monopoly, there exists an ad valorem tariff that Pareto dominates it - that produces larger profit for the foreign firm as well as larger tariff revenue and consumer surplus for the domestic economy. This Pareto ranking can be extended to the case of foreign Cournot oligopoly under certain market conditions.     

Foreign direct investment and customs union: Incentives for multilateral tariff cooperation over free trade

The present article examines the implications of a customs union (CU) on the pattern of tariffs, welfare and the prospects for free trade when the non-member firm has an incentive to engage in foreign direct investment (FDI). First, I show that upon the formation of a bilateral CU, the non-member firm has greater incentives to engage in FDI. However, when FDI becomes a feasible entry option for the non- member firm under a CU, member countries have incentives to strategically induce export over FDI by lowering their joint external tariff. When fixed set-up cost of FDI is sufficiently low, this tariff falls below Kemp–Wan tariff and CU leads to a Pareto improvement relative to no agreement. Moreover, using an infinite repetition of the one-shot tariff game under a CU, I show that the presence of FDI incentive of the non-member firm makes the member countries more willing to cooperate multilaterally over free trade while the opposite is true for the non-member country. Finally, I find that, unless fixed cost of having an additional plant is sufficiently low, multilateral cooperation over free trade is easier to sustain when FDI incentive is present.     

Establishment heterogeneity,exporter dynamics,and the effects of trade liberalization

We study the effects of tariffs and iceberg trade costs in a two-sector dynamic variation of the Melitz (2003) model extended to include a sunk cost of exporting, establishment-level uncertainty in productivity, capital accumulation, and material usage. We calibrate the model to match both cross-sectional and dynamic aspects of US producers related to export participation and the establishment lifecycle. We find a tariff equivalent of fixed export costs of 30 percentage points. We also find that a sizeable share of export profits is a return to the organizational capital from investing in export capacity rather than creating an establishment. We use the model to estimate the effect of reducing tariffs on welfare, trade, and export participation. We find that eliminating an 8 percent tariff increases the ratio of trade to GDP from 3.9% to 7.4% and raises welfare by 1.02%. Along the transition, consumption overshoots its steady state, even as trade and the capital stock grow gradually, so that the change in steady state consumption understates the welfare gain. Models without a dynamic export decision generate more gradual aggregate transition dynamics and smaller gains from trade. Capital accumulation and material usage are important sources of the welfare gains to trade.     

Establishment heterogeneity,exporter dynamics,and the effects of trade liberalization

We study the effects of tariffs and iceberg trade costs in a two-sector dynamic variation of the Melitz (2003) model extended to include a sunk cost of exporting, establishment-level uncertainty in productivity, capital accumulation, and material usage. We calibrate the model to match both cross-sectional and dynamic aspects of US producers related to export participation and the establishment lifecycle. We find a tariff equivalent of fixed export costs of 30 percentage points. We also find that a sizeable share of export profits is a return to the organizational capital from investing in export capacity rather than creating an establishment. We use the model to estimate the effect of reducing tariffs on welfare, trade, and export participation. We find that eliminating an 8 percent tariff increases the ratio of trade to GDP from 3.9% to 7.4% and raises welfare by 1.02%. Along the transition, consumption overshoots its steady state, even as trade and the capital stock grow gradually, so that the change in steady state consumption understates the welfare gain. Models without a dynamic export decision generate more gradual aggregate transition dynamics and smaller gains from trade. Capital accumulation and material usage are important sources of the welfare gains to trade.