Corporate performance and CEO compensation in China

This paper examines the compensation of CEOs in China's listed firms. First, we discuss what is known about the setting of CEO compensation and then we go on to examine factors that may help explain variations in the use of performance related pay. In China, listed firms have a dominant or controlling shareholder and we argue that the distinct types of controlling shareholder have different impacts on the use of incentive pay. We find that firms that have a State agency as the major shareholder do not appear to use performance related pay. In contrast, firms that have private blockholders or SOEs as their major shareholders relate the CEO's pay to increases in stockholders' wealth or increases in profitability. However the pay–performance sensitivities for CEOs are low and this raises questions about the effectiveness of firms' incentive systems.     

Impact of directors' networks on corporate social responsibility: A cross country study

We investigate the impact of directors' networks on corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities by using an unbalanced panel data of 2023 publicly listed firms from 17 countries during 2003–2018. Drawing on network theory, stakeholder theory, and institutional theory, we find that directors' networks is positively related to their decision of CSR activities. Additionally, we find a positive relation between directors' networks and CSR during financial crises. Our results still hold after a set of sensitivity tests. The findings in our study expand the academic literature related to directors' networks and CSR activities, and assist policymakers and investors in understanding the importance of directors' networks as determining factor of CSR policies.     

The Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) Trend

Corporate Social Responsibility, or “CSR,” has recently become a subject of study by financial economists. While there is no shortage of anecdotal evidence to support all variety of positions, broad‐based statistical evidence about the CSR movement is in short supply. This article presents some new empirical evidence that aims to answer three related questions about CSR: First, are corporations increasing their “investment” in what is considered socially responsible behavior? Second, does corporate investment in social responsibility affect a company's financial performance and shareholder value? Third, why do companies invest in CSR: to increase shareholder value, or to uphold a “moral” commitment to non‐investor stakeholders and “society”? Using a social responsibility metric that measures the net CSR strengths (i.e., strengths less concerns) of each S&P 500 and Domini 400 company, the authors report that the average net CSR for both indexes decreased during the 15‐year period (1991‐2005) of the study—though the Domini 400, as might be expected, experienced a smaller decline. The authors also report that corporate strengths have increased, on average, but at a slower rate than the “concerns,” which suggests that corporate CSR efforts may be aimed at a moving target with steadily rising expectations and requirements. Second, the authors report that companies with more CSR strengths or fewer CSR weaknesses produced higher ROA over the same 15‐year period. The authors' findings here suggest a “circular” causality in which profitable companies are more likely to invest in CSR initiatives to begin with, but then find their performance further improved by such investment. Third, the authors' findings suggest that most companies devote resources to CSR initiatives as a means of maximizing long‐run value rather than out of a prior commitment to stakeholders. More specifically, the study shows that companies appear to invest more heavily to build CSR strengths than to eliminate CSR concerns. And as the authors conclude, this behavior is consistent with a strategy of using CSR as a form of “risk management” that promotes corporate strengths in order to limit the potential negative effects of—perhaps by diverting attention from—their weaknesses.     

Cultural diversity among directors and corporate social responsibility

We examine the relationship between board diversity and a firm's corporate social responsibility (CSR) performance in a novel way. The relation between visible forms of board diversity (gender, ethnic, age diversity) and CSR may arise endogenously due to visible diversity management. In contrast, we focus on cultural diversity (based on directors' ancestry), which is less visible. We demonstrate that cultural diversity, unlike visible diversity, is not considered in director replacements, consistent with cultural diversity not being affected by firms signaling their CSR commitment by ‘looking’ diverse. We show that board cultural diversity is positively related to CSR performance. This result holds when we control for visible board diversity, directors' foreignness and diversity in nationalities, and endogeneity. We also show that CSR performance decreases when a firm increases its visible board diversity at the cost of cultural diversity.     

Do climate risk beliefs shape corporate social responsibility?

Global climate change is one of the most pressing issues of our time, potentially affecting everyone, both individuals and businesses. This paper examines whether differences in beliefs about climate change affect firms' decision-making in Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) commitment. Using county-level climate change beliefs data from Yale Climate Opinion Maps, we find that firms' Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) scores are higher if they are located in counties where more people believe in global climate change. We then use natural disasters as exogenous shocks to the beliefs about climate risk and continue to find a positive association between CSR and perceptions of climate risks. Furthermore, we discover a stronger correlation between CSR and climate risk beliefs when firms have more local investors.     

Ownership concentration and firm risk: The moderating role of mid-sized blockholders

This study analyzes the relationship between mid-sized blockholders and firm risk. We show that ownership structure matters for firm risk beyond the first largest blockholder. Firms with multiple blockholders take more risk than firms with just one blockholder, even when controlling for the stake of the largest blockholder. Consistent with the diversification argument, we find that firm risk increases by 22% when the number of blockholders increases from one to two. Our results are robust to controlling for blockholder type and firm characteristics. We carry out various robustness checks to tackle endogeneity issues. More generally, we provide evidence that firms’ decisions are affected by mid-sized blockholders and not merely the largest blockholder. This is in line with theoretical predictions.     

Does tunneling explain the sensitivity of executive compensation to other member firms’ performance?

This study examines how executive compensation is set when a firm is a business group member. Using Korea's unique setting of family-controlled business groups, we find that a member firm's executive cash compensation is positively linked to the stock performance of other member firms as well as its own. Further analyses reveal that this positive link is consistent with the hypothesis that corporate managers are rewarded for their decision to benefit the controlling family at the expense of the firm they manage. Specifically, we find that the sensitivity of executive pay to other member firms’ performance exists only in respect to firms in which the cash flow rights of the controlling family exceed those of the subject firm. We also find that this sensitivity is strengthened if the controlling family's control–ownership disparity in the subject firm is above the sample median.     

Lean against the wind: The effect of policy uncertainty on a firm's corporate social responsibility strategy

We examine the effect of policy uncertainty on firms' strategy of corporate social responsibility (CSR). During uncertain times, firms strategically increase their commitment to CSR causes. Policy uncertainty is positively associated with CSR performance regardless of the estimation method. CSR strategy can substitute for lobbying when firms attempt to manage policy uncertainty. Improved CSR performance can reduce firms' exposure to policy uncertainty which indicates that CSR commitment can deliver insurance-like benefits. The findings highlight the value of CSR commitments during uncertain times.     

Corporate social responsibility and stakeholder governance around the world

This paper examines the impact of stakeholder governance on corporate social responsibility (CSR) to determine whether CSR is employed as a mechanism to mitigate conflicts of interest between managers and diverse stakeholders, or used as managerial perquisites. To examine this relation properly, we not only employ an extensive sample of international firms, but also mitigate endogeneity by using various econometric methods. We find that stakeholder governance positively influences firms' CSR engagement with a greater magnitude than board governance after controlling for confounding factors. Stakeholders' influence in CSR engagement is more pronounced when investor protections and board governance are relatively weak.     

Multiple blockholders and earnings management

This paper examines the impact of multiple blockholders on earnings management when the main conflict of interest is between controlling shareholder and other shareholders. Using a sample of Chinese listed firms from 2000 to 2017 and controlling for potential sample selection and endogeneity, we find that firms with multiple blockholders tend to have higher earnings management than firms with a single controlling shareholder. The positive impact of multiple blockholders on earnings management is more pronounced when those blockholders are the same type – state or private. Earnings management is also enhanced with more large shareholders and higher relative ownership of other large shareholders to the controlling shareholder. The results are consistent with the cost-sharing hypothesis, where the other large shareholders shoulder the costs of earnings management with the controlling shareholder proportionally, but not the private benefits of control. Further tests show that the positive relation between multiple large shareholders and earnings management is less pronounced in firms with stronger internal or external governance. Overall, our paper demonstrates a potential dark side of multiple blockholders from the angle of financial reporting quality.     

Multiple blockholders,power, and firm value

Using a comprehensive sample of US firms we show that most of them have multiple blockholders whose presence and ownership stakes lead to a significant difference between ownership and power. This difference matters. First, we find that insider power (ownership) is negatively (positively) related to firm value. Second, we show that outsider power is positively related to firm value. Our direct blockholder-level measure of power explains firm value over and above the explanatory power of firm-level measures used in the literature (such as the number of blockholders and the dispersion of their ownership stakes).     

Does corporate social responsibility help the survivorship of SMEs and large firms?

Using a sample of 2480 firms from 51 countries covering the period 2010–2015, we find that firms with more effective corporate governance mechanisms are more likely to be more engaged in CSR. Consistent with the stakeholder theory and the conflict resolution model, this result suggests that managers adopt effective governance mechanisms together with CSR engagement in an attempt to mitigate conflicts among stakeholders. Moreover, after controlling for endogeneity and simultaneity issues, we find that both CSR engagement and corporate governance mechanisms have a significantly negative influence on the firms' risk of financial distress measured by the Altman et al. model (1995). Our results also show that the favorable influence of CSR on the firms' capability of survivorship is more pronounced in SMEs than in large firms.     

Do managers listen to the market?

There are competing theories as to whether managers learn from stock prices. Dye and Sridhar (2002), for example, argue that capital markets can be better informed than the firm itself, while Roll [Roll, R., 1986, “The hubris hypothesis of corporate takeovers,” Journal of Business 59, 97–216.] argues managers may ignore market signals due to hubris. In this paper, we examine whether managers listen to the market in making major corporate investments, and whether agency costs and corporate governance mechanisms help explain managers' propensity to listen. We find that, on average, managers listen to the market: they are more likely to cancel investments when the market reacts unfavorably to the related announcement. Further, we find mixed evidence consistent with the notion that managers' propensity to listen is related to agency costs. We find that firms tend to listen to the market more when more of their shares are held by large blockholders, and when their CEOs have higher pay-performance sensitivities.     

Female leadership in corporate social responsibility reporting: Effects on writing,readability and future social performance

This study examines how the gender of corporate social responsibility (CSR) leaders (as signers of the CSR reports) could affect two psychometric properties (i.e., solidarity and certainty) and the readability of the reports. We also investigate how these gender-based differences are associated with firms' future perceived social performance. We conduct textual analyses on a sample of 346 firms in the S&P500 index that issued annual CSR reports during the period of 2006 to 2015. Our findings show that CSR reports with a female (vis-à-vis male) executive as the signer or co-signer are more readable, show more solidarity with readers, but express less certainty in the narratives. In examining their impacts, we find that readability and solidarity, but not certainty, are positively associated with firms' future social performance. Our results suggest the value relevance of leveraging greater female representation in firms' CSR reporting leadership teams so as to help firms enhance their social objectives and signal their future social performance.     

Do Large Blockholders Reduce Risk?

The conventional assumption in the asset pricing literature is that the identity of a company's owners is largely irrelevant, but studies of companies with “blockholders”—shareholders with large positions in a particular company—provide grounds for questioning this assumption. Unlike the well‐diversified investors of modern portfolio theory, blockholders have strong incentives to monitor corporate performance and, when necessary, to exert control over ineffective managements and boards. The findings of many studies support the idea that blockholders have a positive effect on rates of return. The authors of this article report the findings of their recent investigation of whether blockholders might also have a positive effect on shareholder value by reducing the risk of the companies in which their holdings are concentrated. After distinguishing between companies with individual as opposed to corporate blockholders, and those with one share, one vote as opposed to those with dual‐class shares, the authors find that ownership of large positions by individuals—but not corporations—was associated with lower systematic risk (when using both Fama‐French multiple factor and CAPM models). At the same time, they find that the firm‐specific risk of such companies was higher, but “biased” toward positive outcomes—that is, smaller downsides with larger upsides. What's more, this upward shift in performance and risk‐profile was achieved at least partly through increases in productivity as reflected in higher profit margins, profitability, profit per employee, and operating leverage, and lower costs of goods sold, SGA, and cash holdings. By contrast, in the case of blockholders in companies with dual‐class share structures, all of these positive associations with blockholders were either significantly weaker, or reversed. That is, whereas the presence of individual blockholders appears to increase productivity and value under a one share, one vote governance regime, blockholders in companies with dual‐class structures were associated with higher systematic risk and reduced productivity and value.     

Corporate social responsibility and degrees of operating and financial leverage

We examine the relationship between corporate social responsibility (CSR) and firms’ degrees of operating (DOL) and financial leverage (DFL). Combining the enlightened value maximizing and capital structure theories, we hypothesize that CSR as firms’ strategic choice to internalize the cost from implicit contracts between the firms and their non-investing stakeholders affects firms’ operating and financial leverage. We find empirical evidence that CSR and CSR strengths are positively (negatively) related to firms’ DOL (DFL). CSR concerns are positively related firms’ DOL and DFL. We also document that CSR is positively related to firms’ operating cost and we find evidence that CSR acts as a substitute for corporate debt tax shield when firms’ financial leverage is low.     

Shareholder election of CSR committee members and its effects on CSR performance

We examine the election of directors to corporate social responsibility (CSR) committees and whether shareholder votes influence CSR committee effectiveness. Our study is motivated by the importance that shareholders place on CSR and the responsibilities of the board in overseeing a firm's CSR practices. We find that CSR committee members receive greater shareholder support than other directors. We further find that among CSR committee members, those who are more experienced and skilled receive greater shareholder support. Furthermore, when a firm's CSR performance is poorer (better), CSR committee members receive lower (greater) shareholder support compared with other directors. Finally, we find that through voting, shareholders can increase the efficacy of the CSR committee, leading to improvements in CSR committee structure and performance. Overall, our results suggest that shareholders value the services and expertise of CSR committee members and hold them accountable for CSR performance. Shareholder votes are also effective in enhancing CSR performance.     

两权分离度、信息不对称与债务融资选择 — 基于中国民营上市公司的样本分析

本文主要探讨了我国民营上市公司终极控制人的两权分离程度与银行借款和公开 发债选择之间的关系,以2011-2015年我国民营上市公司的面板数据为样本,利用多元回归分 析方法进行研究。结果表明两权分离程度越大,公司进行债务融资时越倾向于银行借款;当信 息不对称程度越低、信息透明程度越高时,公司倾向于选择公开发债,两权分离程度较大导致 的代理问题也会得到弱化。结论符合有效市场理论。     

我国系统性金融风险测度研究

本文以金融压力指数作为系统性金融风险测度指标,基于金融部门、宏观经济、 房地产市场、外部经济等方面构建系统性金融风险测度指标体系,集成分析金融体系整体风 险状况。测度结果显示,2014年至今,我国金融压力指数呈上升趋势,系统性金融风险压力增 大,但整体可控,需要把防控金融风险放到更加重要的位置,切实防范系统性金融风险。     

A research note on standalone corporate social responsibility reports: Signaling or greenwashing?

Over the past two decades, more and more U.S. firms are voluntarily issuing costly standalone Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) Reports. Nevertheless, firms’ motivations for issuing standalone CSR Reports are not clear. In this paper, we consider two different explanations: signaling and greenwashing. The first explanation, signaling, proposes that firms use standalone CSR Reports as a signal of their superior commitment to CSR, which suggests firms with stronger social and environmental records will be more likely to issue standalone CSR Reports as compared to those without. The second explanation, greenwashing, proposes that firms use standalone CSR Reports to pose as “good” corporate citizens even when they do not have stronger social and environmental records. To provide insight into these explanations we compare the CSR performance scores of firms that issue CSR reports to those firms that do not. We control for firm size, leverage, profitability and industry. We find that firms that voluntarily issue standalone CSR Reports generally have higher CSR performance scores, which suggests that firms are using voluntary CSR Reports to publicize stronger social and environmental records to stakeholders.