Foreign Debt and Economic Development

This paper characterizes the optimal path of foreign public debt that can support politically unanimous (Pareto welfare improving) economic growth under uncertainty. The feasibility of the plan depends on whether the maintenance of political consensus in the debtor country requires additional loans that are high relative to the country's outstanding debt. If a program is feasible, then the creditors will have an incentive to preserve political support for the plan, in case of adverse developments, by offering debt relief. Unlike the certainty case, where only total debt matters, uncertainty makes also the timing of debt repayments critical for economic development.     

EXTERNAL BALANCE SHEETS: CONCEPTS AND EMPIRICAL APPROXIMATION*

International financial relationships should be interpreted in the context of a comprehensive conceptual framework; this paper advocates the use of concepts developed to measure and analyze balance of payments flows. Broad-based, empirical estimates of the international wealth of most countries of the western world are presented on the basis of cumulating balance of payments flows over a lengthy period. Among the more interesting aspects of the results are: the importance of intra-industrial country capital flows in a global context; the propensity of debtors to regard a larger share of their aggregate external debt as long term than do their creditors; the overwhelming importance of banks located in the industrial countries in global external asset and liability positions, and the preponderance of short-term positions taken by those banks; and the tendency for balance of payments records to report more direct investment assets than liabilities. The paper also contains some observations, based on the cumulations of balance of payments capital flows, concerning the nature and size of certain deficiencies in alternative sources–particularly the World Bank's Debtor Reporting System, and the Bank for International Settlements' banking data–of information on outstanding external debt positions.     

Optimal Debt Relief Under Threat of Trade Punishments

The theory of optimal debt relief hinges critically on the assumption that the output of a defaulting debtor country can be partially confiscated by the creditors. This assumption is at odds with the crucial feature of international credit relationships. The present paper focuses on an alternative enforcement method, namely the impediment of international trade. It is shown that a similar result can be derived. Additionally, it can be rational to grant further credit to countries with very little initial endowment, even though it is clear to the creditors that they will grant debt relief afterwards.     

THE FISCAL POLICY RESPONSE TO PUBLIC DEBT IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

Theoretical models on fiscal sustainability hypothesize that indebted governments can lower their current debt by generating future primary surpluses, ceteris paribus. While both developed and developing countries struggle with the issue of debt stabilization, the latter, in particular face heightened sensitivity from creditors, which provides them an impetus to respond more strongly to stabilize their debt. Based on a panel of 53 developing countries, we examine the fiscal response of these countries to changes in their debt‐to‐gross domestic product ratio. We find evidence of a positive relationship between the debt and primary surplus and that countries adjust along both the revenue and expenditure margins at roughly the same rate. (JEL E62, H50, O11)     

Debt Overhang and Barter in Russia

This paper develops a model in which costly barter is used by firms to protect working capital against outside creditors. Although creditors could agree to postpone debt payments and to avoid destroying the firm's working capital, if the firm cannot commit not to divert cash ex post, the outcome of renegotiation still provides ex ante incentives to use barter. We show that the greater is the debt overhang, the more likely is the use of barter, with and without the possibility of debt restructuring. Empirical evidence from Russian firm-level data is shown to be consistent with the model's predictions. J. Comp. Econ., December 2002, 30(4), pp. 635–656. New Economic School, CEFIR, CEPR, and WDI, Nakhimovsky pr. 47, Moscow 117418, Russia; Sloan School of Management, M.I.T., 50 Memorial Drive, Cambridge, Massachusetts 02142; and ROSES–CNRS and CEPR, Maison des Sciences économiques, 106–112 Bd de l'Hôpital, 75647 Paris Cedex 13, France. © 2002 Association for Comparative Economic Studies. Published by Elsevier Science (USA). All rights reserved.Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: E41, G34, P31.     

On the Causality between Trade Credits and Imports: Evidence and Possible Implication for Trade Penalties on Debt Defaults

Abstract

This study investigates the association between trade credits and imports of developing countries. Made available by its creditors, the main function of trade credits is to facilitate cross-border transactions of goods and services. This study finds that the reliance of imports on trade credits varies across regions and income: towards the end of the 1990s, the trade credits to imports ratio ranged from 0.20 for East Asia & the Pacific to 0.87 for Africa, and from 0.24 for high-income countries to 0.79 for low-income countries. Applying panel and cross-country estimation, we find that past trade credits help predict current imports, but past imports do not alter the future path of trade credits. Further, the positive association between trade credits and imports is larger for countries more dependent upon trade credits. The findings support the notion that countries make debt repayments to avoid any potential disruption on the line of trade credits. We also find that the trade credits penalty could materialize within less than two quarters.     

Debt Concentration and Bargaining Power: Large Banks,Small Banks,and Secondary Market Prices

Commerical bank debts of developing countries are held by large international banks and smaller domestic banks. This paper investigates how debt concentration—the proportion of a country's debt held by large banks relative to small banks—affects the secondary market price for these loans. We find that countries with higher concentrations have higher secondary-market prices. We explain this empirical finding in a bargaining model that endogenizes the maximum penalty that banks can credibly impose on a recalcitrant debtor. We show that the banks' bargaining power increases with the degree of debt concentration, thus increasing repayment and secondary-market prices.     

Profitable Buybacks in Sovereign Debt

Since the 1982 debt crisis, several debtor countries have repurchased fractions of their debts. Bulow and Rogoff have argued that these buybacks benefit the banks but not the countries. Krugman argues the opposite. This paper provides an explanation of why buybacks benefit both countries and banks. A lending environment with terms-of-trade shocks is considered. If a country defaults, banks impose a penalty on the country and incur some costs. It is shown that with a buyback, the country defaults on a smaller loan, if at all, and the economy saves part of these costs, if not all.     

A Note on the (Un)Pleasant Arithmetic of Fiscal Policy: The Case of Italian Public Debt

Using the simple arithmetic of government budget constraint, we perform an illustrative analysis on the Italian case, investigating the consequences on the main public finance aggregates of the adoption of a fiscal policy rule responding to past real debt/GDP ratio. Such a rule, firmly grounded in the economic analysis, would allow the reduction of Italy's outstanding stock of debt without requiring the strict adherence to the 3 per cent criterion for deficit/GDP ratio, as prescribed by SGP (Stability and Growth Pact). We perform a forecasting exercise under five alternative scenarios and analyse the details of a structural debt reduction strategy with alternative yearly step.     

ON THE IMPACT OF PUBLIC DEBT ON ECONOMIC GROWTH: DOES COUNTRY RISK MATTER?

This study examines the nonlinear impacts of four country risk indices on the debt‐growth nexus for 61 countries in a panel data framework. Our results show evidence of the different debt‐growth nexus under the different degrees of country risk. Under a high‐risk environment, a country's economic growth is harmed by raising its public debt. The negative effects public debt has on economic growth become weak under low political and financial‐risk environments, while an increase in public debt could help to stimulate economic growth under low composite and economic risk environments. In addition, the differences of countries' income and debt levels also lead country risks to have different effects on the debt‐growth nexus, suggesting that a country should borrow appropriately based on its current risk environments while improving economic performance. (JEL C33, E02, H63, O43)     

The Perverse Effect of Debt Tax Benefits on Firm Investment Decisions

In this paper we question the idea that the deduction of debt interest is always an effective policy instrument to spur firm investment. We analyse the investment decision in presence of a borrowing constraint on the amount of debt that the firm can raise. We show that if the debt interest rate is decreasing in the firm's capital accumulation and another financial resource more expensive than debt is available (at least for levels of debt lower than the upper bound), then the deduction of the debt interest from taxes on capital income may reduce firm investment. This theoretical result is relevant for economic policy decisions when financial intermediaries are not willing to finance beyond a certain threshold but firms have access to other sources of finance.     

A BALANCE OF PAYMENTS ANALYSIS OF THE LATIN AMERICAN DEBT CRISIS

In this paper we offer a definition of a country "debt crisis" based upon the amount of new borrowing relative to the cost of servicing past debt. Policy implications for both debtor countries and their creditors are examined. An empirical application is made to Latin American countries, 1978–82. The causes of the debt problems created during this period are investigated with respect to the extent they were the result of rising interest rates vis à vis increased borrowing.     

Global banking,global crises? The role of the bank balance-sheet channel for the transmission of financial crises

We examine whether shocks to leveraged creditors with cross border holdings have an incidence on debtor countries׳ risk of suffering financial turmoil. We construct a new proxy of shocks to international banks׳ balance-sheets using credit ratings and the structure of their international assets. This allows us investigating the effect of (foreign) bank balance-sheet shocks on domestic financial turmoil in a large sample of 146 developed and emerging economies from 1984 to 2011. Our proxies of shocks towards bank balance-sheets are strong predictors of systemic banking crises in their debtor countries. Confirming these results, bilateral bank flows significantly decrease when creditor banks׳ assets are hit by negative shocks, as measured by credit rating downgrades from third-party countries. Short-term liabilities towards global banks appear to increase roll-over and funding risks, thereby amplifying the impact of shocks to foreign lenders’ balance-sheets. Domestic banking sectors vulnerabilities, such as illiquid assets and a low deposit-asset ratio, are found to increase crisis contagion risk. In contrast, a high level of global liquidity attenuates the transmission of shocks to international banks׳ assets to debtor countries.     

Evidence for the ineffectiveness of debt rescheduling as a policy instrument

Where an economy cannot meet its external debt service obligations, it is forced to appeal to creditors for rescheduling of the debt. As such, rescheduling is evidence of a country's incapacity to carry a debt burden. This article explores factors that explain the probability of a country requiring debt rescheduling in a panel framework. The current literature is extended by modelling a dynamic random effects panel probit, in order to identify a presence of state dependence after controlling for country heterogeneity. We find clear evidence of state dependence when a 2-year lag of the dependent variable is allowed for, suggesting that overall, the fact that a country has experienced a rescheduling arrangement in the past does indeed make them more likely to experience further rescheduling. The article stresses that in order to draw the appropriate policy conclusions from this finding, one must understand that the debt rescheduling variable is itself a policy response variable. The fact that further rescheduling is often required within 2 years of a previous action suggests that rescheduling as it took place in the 1980s and 1990s was an inadequate response that often did little to help countries move beyond their current debt crisis.     

FOREIGN ENTRY INTO U.S. SERVICE INDUSTRY BY TAKEOVERS AND THE CREATION OF NEW FIRMS

We study the relation between foreign entry in U.S. service sector industries and the revealed comparative advantage of the investing country using U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis firm‐level data on all foreign takeovers and new foreign‐owned firms from 1998 to 2008. We find foreign acquisitions in the service sector are in industries of U.S. comparative advantage while new foreign firms are in industries of investing country's comparative advantage. This suggests that foreign acquisitions in the service sector are not directly related to foreign investors' competitiveness in the industry of investment. In contrast foreign investors in new service sector firms come from countries with a competitive edge in the industries of investment. We also find that foreign investors of new service sector firms are from Organization for Economic Co‐operation and Development (OECD) countries with a comparative disadvantage in royalties and trademarks. (JEL F21, F23, G34)     

LEVERAGED BUYBACKS OF SOVEREIGN DEBT: A MODEL AND AN APPLICATION TO GREECE

The model presented in this article shows that the outcome of a leveraged buyback of sovereign debt depends on the priority structure of the deal. If the institution lending the funds needed for the buyback is senior, the debtor country benefits from the deal: the government debt is reduced, implying a lower probability of default; at the same time, the deal makes the price of outstanding bonds go down, since their recovery rate declines. The opposite holds if the lending institution is junior. If the loan is underpriced, the implied subsidy is shared between the borrowing country and its bondholders, who can benefit from a price increase of their bonds. This is actually what happened with the buyback of Greek sovereign bonds in 2012, as it is shown in the empirical section. Those results do not depend on the share of country's endowment devoted to debt repayment, which instead plays a crucial role in shaping the outcome of unlevered buybacks. (JEL F34, H63)     

Debt Relief Incentives in Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC): An Empirical Assessment

For more than two decades, the majority of countries in the African continent have experienced repeated episodes of rising external debt and debt service, which has led to numerous efforts of external debt relief. This paper provides new evidence on the effects of the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Initiative on different economic and social indicators in 60 low income countries (LICs). Results show that LICs that were included in the HIPC Initiative marginally performed better than non-HIPC countries. There is evidence that countries that have reached the completion point of the HIPC Initiative by 2005 have experienced an average improvement in investment, health care, gross secondary education enrollment, and GDP per capita growth.

对外负债与经济增长

本文分别在理论和实证上分析了对外负债与经济增长的关系。在拉姆齐-卡斯-库普曼斯框架下构建的理论模型预测结果显示:对于大国,对外负债率与经济增长之间可能呈现负向或正向的单调关系,也可能呈现倒"U"型的关系;对于小国,对外负债率与经济增长之间只存在负向或正向的单调关系。分别以发达国家和发展中国家为样本实证分析的结果表明:对于发达国家,当对外负债率处于较低水平时,负债率增加会促进经济增长,当对外负债率超过60%时,负债率增加不利于经济增长;对于发展中国家,不管对外负债率处于何种水平,负债率增加都会使经济增长的速度下降。实证分析的结果与理论模型的预测基本吻合。     

Credit risk and sustainable debt: a model and estimations of why the Euro is stable in the long-run

Sustainable debt has become the key issue in rating of private as well as sovereign debtors. The problem of how to estimate sustainable debt has also been at the center of the debate over the Asian 1997–1998 financial crisis. If the external value of the currency depends on the external debt of a country, it is necessary to estimate the creditworthiness of the country. This paper studies credit risk and sustainable debt in the context of a dynamic model. For a dynamic growth model with an additional equation for the evolution of debt, we demonstrate of how to compute sustainable debt and creditworthiness. The model is estimated by employing time series data for the core countries of the Euro-area. The computations show that the Euro-area has large external assets. Using time series methods, the sustainability of external debt (assets) is estimated for those core countries of the Euro-area. Those estimations show that the Euro will be a stable currency in the long-run.     

Sovereign Debt without Default Penalties

We develop a theory of sovereign borrowing where default penalties are not implementable. We show that when debt is held by both domestic and foreign agents, the median voter might have an interest in serving it. Our theory has important practical implications regarding (a) the role of financial intermediaries in sovereign lending, (b) the effect of capital flows on price volatility including the possible overvaluation of debt to the point that the median voter is priced out of the market, and (c) debt restructuring where creditors are highly dispersed.