Property Enforcement as Organized Consent

This article develops and tests a theory of the institutionsthat make property rights viable, ensuring their enforcement,mobilizing the collateral value of assets, and promoting growth.In contrast to contractual rights, property rights are enforcedin rem, being affected only with the consent of the right holder.This ensures enforcement but is costly when multiple, potentiallycolliding rights are held in the same asset. Different institutionsreduce the cost of gathering consents to overcome this trade-offof enforcement benefits for consent costs: recording of deedswith title insurance, registration of rights, and even a regimenof purely private transactions. All three provide functionallysimilar services, but their relative performance varies withthe number of transactions, the risk of political opportunism,and regulatory consistency. The analysis also shows the rationalityof allowing competition in the preparation and support of privatecontracts while requiring territorial monopoly in recordingand registration activities, this to ensure independence andprotect third parties.     

Hold-up and externality: the firm as a nexus of incomplete rights?

The Coasean theory of the firm (Coase in Economica 4:386–405, 1937) has flourished with the theory of incomplete contracts. Transaction costs in the form of enforcement costs have been deemed to be the main determinants of the decision to ‘make’ versus ‘buy’. Surprisingly, this stream of literature has almost neglected that transaction costs may also generate incomplete property rights (Coase in J Law Econ 3:1–44, 1960). As firm’s activities entail both contractual and property rights, these two domains interfere each other on the decision to carry out a transaction within the firm. When property rights are incomplete, potential externalities may increase the cost of using the price mechanism to procure the assets needed in a given transaction. The resulting ‘Coasean firm’ would not only centralize incomplete contracts under a unified governance system, but it will also aggregate incomplete property rights under a unified ownership structure.     

跨国基金的产权关系:一种新诠释

本文在假定基金产权划分为直接产权与间接产权、物质产权与价值产权的基础上,以离岸基金为例探讨跨国基金的产权关系.基金产权相互分离,且归属于相对独立的不同产权所有者,是基金实施跨国经营和跨国融资的产权基础,其中关键是,基金的国家间接物质产权与国家间接价值产权相分离并分别归属于不同国家的政府.实现跨国基金的制度创新和管理创新需要,规范各类基金产权所有者的权利和行为,降低基金内部的交易费用,重新构建基金治理机制.     

Property as an economic concept: reconciling legal and economic conceptions of property rights in a Coasean framework

Adopting a simplistic view of Coase (J Law Econ 3:1–44, 1960), most economic analyses of property rights disregard both the key advantage that legal property rights (that is, in rem rights) provide to rightholders in terms of enhanced enforcement, and the difficulties they pose to acquirers in terms of information asymmetry about legal title. Consequently, these analyses tend to overstate the role of “private ordering” and disregard the two key elements of property law: first, the essential conflict between property (that is, in rem) enforcement and transaction costs; and, second, the institutional solutions created to overcome it, mainly contractual registries capable of making truly impersonal (that is, asset-based) trade viable when previous relevant transactions on the same assets are not verifiable by judges. This paper fills this gap by reinterpreting both elements within the Coasean framework and thus redrawing the institutional foundations of both property and corporate contracting.     

Pollution abatement with limited enforcement power and citizen suits

Federal environmental laws in the U.S. can be enforced by government agencies or by private parties through citizen suits against polluters. Here, I extend the standard enforcement model to examine the role played by citizen suits. The main results from the paper suggest that in a model with limited enforcement power and citizen suits the regulator fully exercises his enforcement power when the expected penalty from a citizen suit is low, but increases his reliance on citizen suits as the expected penalty rises. Whether an enforcement regime that allows private enforcement is efficient depends not only on the relative costs of private and agency enforcement, but also on the changes in inspection costs that may be caused by private enforcement and the expected penalty from losing a citizen suit. These results suggest that in practice private enforcement may lower social costs as long as relatively inexpensive agency enforcement options, such as administrative proceedings, do not preclude citizen suits.      

On the dual nature of weak property rights

In the natural-resource literature, conventional wisdom holds that weak property rights will cause a resource to be over-exploited. This is because weak property rights are typically perceived as a problem of input exclusion – or theft of un-extracted resources. We present evidence to the effect that weak property rights often take the form of contestable outputs – or output theft – and that this has an impact on resource use. We propose a model of resource use under generally weak property rights – or weak state presence – when resource users face the dual problem of input exclusion and output appropriation. We show that introducing the possibility that outputs be contested acts as an output tax, with the added twist that resource users effectively determine the tax level. This tax has a depressive effect on input use. Whether the resource is under- or over-exploited depends on the relative severity of output appropriation and input exclusion problems. Increasing enforcement measures against theft may lead to severe resource overuse. Efficiency considerations require to account not only for direct resource input use, but also for thieves’ efforts and gains as well as the costs of enforcement against theft and trespass.     

On the dual nature of weak property rights

In the natural-resource literature, conventional wisdom holds that weak property rights will cause a resource to be over-exploited. This is because weak property rights are typically perceived as a problem of input exclusion – or theft of un-extracted resources. We present evidence to the effect that weak property rights often take the form of contestable outputs – or output theft – and that this has an impact on resource use. We propose a model of resource use under generally weak property rights – or weak state presence – when resource users face the dual problem of input exclusion and output appropriation. We show that introducing the possibility that outputs be contested acts as an output tax, with the added twist that resource users effectively determine the tax level. This tax has a depressive effect on input use. Whether the resource is under- or over-exploited depends on the relative severity of output appropriation and input exclusion problems. Increasing enforcement measures against theft may lead to severe resource overuse. Efficiency considerations require to account not only for direct resource input use, but also for thieves’ efforts and gains as well as the costs of enforcement against theft and trespass.     

Insecurity of property rights and social matching in the tenancy market

This paper shows that insecurity of property rights over agricultural land can have large efficiency and equity costs because of the way it affects matching in the tenancy market. A principal-agent framework is used to model the landlord's decision to rent when he takes into account the risk of losing the land to the tenant and when contract enforcement is decreasing in social distance with the tenant. These effects are quantified for the case of local land rental markets in the Dominican Republic. Results show that insecure property rights lead to matching in the tenancy market along socio-economic lines, severely limiting the size of the rental market and the choice of tenants for landlords, both with efficiency costs. Social segmentation reduces access to land for the rural poor, with high equity costs. Simulations suggest that improving tenure security would increase rental transactions by 21% and the area rented to the poor by 63%. Increased property rights security is hence beneficial not only to asset owners, but also to those with whom they might interact in the market.     

Bankruptcy and firm finance

This paper analyzes how an enforcement mechanism that resembles a court affects firm finance. The court is described by two parameters that correspond to enforcement costs and the amount of creditor/debtor protection. We provide a theoretical and quantitative characterization of the effect of these enforcement parameters on the contract loan rate, the default probability and welfare. We analyze agents’ incentive to default and pursue bankruptcy and show that when the constraints that govern these decisions bind, the enforcement parameters can have a sharply non-linear effect on finance. We also compute the welfare losses of “poor institutions” and show that they are non-trivial. The results provide guidance on when models which abstract from enforcement provide good approximations and when they do not.      

Plea bargaining: on the selection of jury trials

We consider a model of the criminal court process, focusing on plea bargaining. A plea bargain provides unequal incentives to go to trial because innocent defendants are more willing to plead not guilty. We show that the court process implements the preferences of the person or group who is most concerned about wrongful conviction. If a prosecutor is more concerned about wrongful conviction than the jury, the prosecutor can shape the defendant pool at trial so that jurors act according to prosecutor’s preferences against judicial mistakes. Our model also connects insights from strategic jury models that usually omit plea bargaining with the actual criminal court process where most cases are resolved through plea bargaining. As an example, we show that the inferiority of the unanimity rule established in Feddersen and Pesendorfer (Am Polit Sci Rev 92(1):23–35, 1998) persists in spite of the addition of plea bargaining.     

Transaction costs and the property rights approach to the theory of the firm

The standard property rights approach is focused on ex ante investment incentives, while there are no transaction costs that might restrain ex post negotiations. We explore the implications of such transaction costs. Prominent conclusions of the property rights theory may be overturned: A party may have stronger investment incentives when a non-investing party is the owner, and joint ownership can be the uniquely optimal ownership structure. Intuitively, an ownership structure that is unattractive in the standard model may now be desirable, because it implies large gains from trade, such that the parties are more inclined to incur the transaction costs.     

Property Rights,Public Enforcement,and Growth

We study the link between public enforcement of property rights, innovation investments, and economic growth in an endogenous growth framework with an expanding set of product varieties. We find that a government can assure positive equilibrium growth through public employment in the enforcement of property rights, if the economic environment is sufficiently favorable to growth and/or if public enforcement is sufficiently effective. However, in terms of welfare, an equilibrium path without property‐rights protection and growth might be preferable. In this case, the enforcement of property rights involves too much reallocation of labor from production and research towards the public sector.     

Hybrid Carbon Incentive Mechanisms and Political Acceptability

This paper analyses how hybrid systems of carbon taxes and tradeable permits optimize some conflicting dimensions of political acceptability related to the design of these instruments. Pure systems like taxes without exemptions or auctioned tradeable permits cause problems for political acceptability in open economies due to high overall costs (abatement cost plus payments on the tax or auctions) for current polluters. Unfortunately, pure systems based on grandfathering of emission rights across the board do not provide a feasible alternative because of monitoring and enforcement problems. In contrast, consciously designed hybrid systems employ grandfathering of emission rights together with either carbon taxes or auctioned carbon permits in order to overcome acceptability problems of pure systems, while leaving incentives to reduce emissions at the margin untouched. Moreover, monitoring and enforcement costs of the hybrid systems are less due to the lower number of participating agents compared with the pure systems, while opportunities for cost- or burden-sharing exist as well.     

Ownership,Access, and Sequential Investment

We extend the property‐rights framework to allow for a separation of the ownership rights of access and veto and for sequential investment. Parties investing first do so before contracting is feasible. It is possible, however, that parties investing second can share (at least some of) their investment costs. Along with this cost‐sharing effect, the incentive to invest is affected by a strategic effect generated by sequential investment. Together these effects can overturn some of the predictions of the property‐rights literature. For example, the most inclusive ownership structure might not be optimal, even if all investments are complementary.     

THE EMERGENCE OF COPYING TECHNOLOGIES: WHAT HAVE WE LEARNED?

The past few decades have seen dramatic advancements in the technology of copying and the diffusion of copying technology to the general public. This paper surveys some of the recent academic literature dealing with this issue. We focus on (i) the effect of varying the extent of property rights enforcement by the government, and (ii) possible responses by producers of originals to consumers' ability to produce copies. The traditional view is that as the government increases property rights enforcement, there is a decrease in the social welfare loss due to underproduction and an increase in the social welfare loss due to under-utilization. In the first half of the paper, we show how the analyses contained in a number of recent studies throw doubt on this traditional viewpoint. In particular, varying the extent of property rights enforcement has effects that the traditional analysis ignores. As a result, the social welfare losses mentioned above can move in ways not recognized previously. The conclusion is that, contrary to what is sometimes suggested, choosing an optimal level of property rights enforcement by the government should not be viewed as a simple trade-off between these two social welfare losses. In the second half of the paper, we discuss possible market responses to consumers' ability to produce copies. Among other responses, we consider the role of price discrimination and complementary products when copying is possible.     

浅析知识产权保护中混合策略纳什均衡模型的应用

知识产权保护不但受制于立法的完善和执法的力度,而且取决于自觉维权的意识和守法的环境。我国企业和科研机构知识产权保护意识薄弱,缺乏维护自身合法权益的能力,尊重他人知识产权的观念尚未形成社会主流。本文运用博弈论方法,分析了一个知识产权保护博弈案例中的混合策略纳什均衡解,得出从增加知识产权主体自觉维权意识和加大侵权者成本两方面实现知识产权有效保护的结论。     

经济结构调整过程中农村土地制度的创新

二元经济结构的改善需要农地制度的创新.农地制度改革目标模式的设计必须兼顾社会保障与效率两重功能,国有制、个人所有制、土地股份制都不符合这一原则.作者的产权分析框架认为,产权效率取决于权利的界定及实施.中国农地制度改革的方向,是坚持集体所有制的前提,通过农地权利的界定、农村集体经济组织决策制度的创新,进一步理顺乡镇政府、村集体组织与农民的关系.     

Reevaluating the relationship between transferable property rights and command-and-control regulation

Economists generally assume that systems of transferable property rights are preferable to non-market systems. This paper suggests that the design of a market-based policy that dominates a command-andcontrol regime is more subtle than is commonly believed, even in theory. The subtlety arises because identical approaches to monitoring and enforcement will not generally yield the same results in different regulatory environments. The paper identifies conditions under which a kind of market dominance result obtains. The theory is then applied to the problem of trading rights to emit pollutants from motor vehicles.Mr. Hahn is a Resident Scholar at the American Enterprise Institute and an Adjunct Professor of Economics at Carnegie University. Mr. Axtell is a Research Associate at the Brookings Institution. We would like to thank Linda Cohen, Glenn Loury, Eric Stork, and participants in the Harvard environmental economics workshop and the Stanford environmental economics conference for constructive comments. Jeff Alson, Richard Wilcox, and Don Zinger helped identify useful data sources. This research was supported in part by a grant from the National Science Foundation.     

Union–firm bargaining: Order of play and efficiency

This paper shows that a modified alternating offers Rubinstein model can provide a Pareto superior outcome in the context of the right-to-manage union–firm bargaining. Two examples of bargaining protocols that yield a superior outcome are provided. In the first example, the parties engage in a game in which the order of play is determined as part of the bargaining. We show that the game has a unique subgame perfect equilibrium in which the firm always moves first in the wage bargaining game. The equilibrium wage is, therefore, unique. In the second example, we examine a two-part-tariff alternating offers bargaining protocol, where the parties bargain over the wage and transfer payments. We show that this bargaining protocol has a Pareto efficient, unique subgame perfect equilibrium. Thus, although the parties do not bargain over the level of employment, the outcome under this protocol is, nevertheless, socially optimal.     

分配承诺、产权与经济效率

在政府分配的承诺可置信时,地方政府分权竞争的结果是资方获得了最大利益,而劳方的利益被忽视了。而当政府分配的承诺不可置信时,资方的投资生产激励会受到较大的削弱,社会福利会受到较大损害。关于中国经济增长奇迹的经济解释,文章认为:在改革开放初期,中性政府对经济增长起到了很重要的作用;而随着改革开放的深入,地方政府分权的竞争激励机制可能起到了更为重要的作用。产业结构与产权保护有着密切的关系,要使产业结构完成升级,拥有良好的产权保护制度是一个重要条件。针对地方政府分权竞争带来的问题以及承诺可置信性缺失,文章引入第三方规制和以权力配置作为一种可信承诺等两种解决途径,并指出了其不足之处。