What matters in audit pricing: industry specialization or overall market leadership?

Ferguson et al. (2003) report that audit industry fee premia primarily reside with joint national and city‐specific industry leadership as opposed to merely firm‐wide (national) industry expertise, suggesting auditor choice among the Big 5 is best conceptualized on joint industry specialization in city‐specific markets and nationally. The present study examines whether the prior results could be confounded by the presence of city‐specific overall market leadership effects. Our findings reaffirm that joint local and national auditor industry expertise is valued by audit clients. Furthermore, overall city‐specific leadership, by itself, also matters in fee determination and results in higher fees, although at a slightly weaker level of statistical significance.     

Do seasoned industry specialists provide higher audit quality? A re-examination

The purpose of this paper is to re-examine the recent findings in Gaver and Utke (2019) (GU) who find that seasoned industry specialist auditors provide higher audit quality. We first illustrate how the magnitude of residuals from the accruals model can vary significantly by industry, thus highlighting the importance of including industry fixed effects when the dependent variable is discretionary accruals. We next replicate GU’s findings. We first attempt to replicate prior literature after including industry fixed effects in the audit quality (discretionary accruals) models. This is an important control, as the relevant benchmark for a firm with an industry specialist auditor is a peer firm in the same industry with a non-specialist auditor. We find that after including industry fixed effects, there is no association between seasoned industry specialist auditors and discretionary accruals. We also find that the association between industry specialization and discretionary accruals is very sensitive to the way in which the researcher calculates specialization. Our findings are informative for shareholders of public companies who vote on auditor ratification.     

Audit quality,accruals quality and the cost of equity in an emerging market: Evidence from Vietnam

This study explores the relationship between audit quality, accruals quality, and the cost of equity in the context of Vietnam. Particularly, we examine the impact of auditor size and accruals quality on the industry-adjusted earnings – price ratio. Using a sample of Vietnamese listed companies, the study shows that firms audited by a Big Four auditor are associated with a lower cost of equity than firms with a non-Big Four auditor. The results indicate that the auditors' information role is more relevant than the insurance role in a civil law context with a relatively low auditor litigation risk. In addition, the findings show that companies with better accruals quality are associated with a lower cost of equity. The study has implications for managers and regulators. The findings highlight the importance of ensuring sound auditing practices and maintaining high-quality financial reporting for corporations.     

Does sharing the same network auditor in group affiliated firms affect audit quality?

We contribute to the literature on audit quality by examining whether sharing the same network auditor among group affiliated firms is related to lower or higher audit quality in China. We find that choosing the same network audit firm among group affiliated firms is associated with more sanctions by regulators regarding fraudulent financial reporting, higher abnormal accruals, larger standard deviation of abnormal accruals, higher likelihood of a downward restatement in earnings, and lower likelihood of receiving a going concern modified opinion. We further identify contexts that moderate audit quality. Higher audit quality is associated with the use of a specialist auditor and firms that operate in more homogeneous industries. Lower audit quality is associated with longer auditor tenure (more than five years), greater geographic distance between a parent company and its subsidiaries, and greater control by a parent company over its subsidiaries.     

Effects of audit committee chair characteristics on auditor choice,audit fee and audit quality

We investigate whether the characteristics of audit committee (AC) chairs are associated with decisions about auditor choice, audit fees and audit quality. Using hand-collected Australian data, firms with AC chairs who have longer tenure and multiple AC memberships across several boards are found to be more likely to choose Big 4 and/or industry specialist auditors, pay higher audit fees and have lower discretionary accruals. Those AC chairs with higher business qualifications are more likely to hire a Big 4 auditor, pay higher audit fees and have lower discretionary accruals, while AC chairs with professional qualifications are more likely to hire a Big 4 and/or industry specialist auditor. In contrast, firms with AC chairs who are executive directors are less likely to hire a Big 4 auditor and have higher discretionary accruals. Our findings contribute to the literature by documenting that various characteristics of AC chairs are important for enhancement of auditor selection and audit quality.     

Public and private sector auditors and accruals quality in English NHS hospital Trusts

To promote auditor independence and audit quality in English NHS Trusts the Audit Commission regulates auditor rotation, fees and the appointment of its own and private sector auditors. NHS sanctioned departures from GAAP, some of which allow the financial breakeven target to be achieved, have been criticised by the Audit Commission as detrimental to financial discipline. In this paper, we investigate the association between abnormal accruals and the achievement of financial breakeven in NHS hospital Trusts over the period 1998–2005. We also investigate the association between abnormal accruals, audit fees and the Trusts audited by public and private sector auditors. We find evidence that abnormal accruals are used to achieve financial breakeven and they differ across different types of auditor. We also identify a negative relationship between abnormal accruals and NHS Trust star ratings. These findings raise questions about the ‘quality’ of NHS audit where compliance with NHS-specific regulations overrides the wider GAAP-based requirement for financial statements to show a true and fair view and they warrant reconsideration of the nature of audit in NHS Trusts.     

The effect of mandatory auditor assignment and non-audit service on audit fees: Evidence from Korea

In Korea, regulators could assign auditors to firms. We investigate the relationship among audit fees, mandatory auditor assignment, and the joint provision of non-audit and auditor services in Korea. We find that assigned auditors charge significantly higher audit fees than freely selected auditors. We also find that the joint provision of non-audit and audit services does intensify the relation between auditor assignment and audit fees. Combined with the results of other studies that have shown that firms audited by assigned auditors report smaller amounts of discretionary accruals than firms audited by freely selected auditors, our results suggest the possibility that mandatory auditor assignment may improve auditor independence.     

Financial reporting consequences of natural disasters: Evidence from the impact of resource constraints at audit offices on non-affected clients

Disaster-affected clients demand significant additional effort from their audit office, and hence strain the audit office’s resources available to other non-disaster-affected clients. We consider audit offices with disaster-affected clients to be strained offices and find that, compared with clients audited by non-strained audit offices, non-disaster-affected clients audited by strained audit offices are more likely to have their financial statements restated. This result suggests the financial reporting quality of companies not directly exposed to disasters could also be negatively affected by the disasters, due to their auditors’ strained-resource issue. We further find such a negative effect is more pronounced when the degree of resource constraints is greater and when the audit office lacks client experience or industry expertise. We offer novel evidence of financial reporting consequences of natural disasters, focusing on the externality of disasters on companies not directly affected by disasters. The findings have important implications for regulators in making disaster-related policies, for auditors in managing their client portfolios, and for companies in making auditor choice decisions.     

The Effect of Client Industry Agglomerations on Auditor Industry Specialization

Prior research on auditor industry specialization documents fee premiums for local audit offices that are industry specialists. This research assumes that the effects of specialization are uniform across markets. We examine industry specialization based on the economic theory of industry agglomeration (geographic areas with high industry concentration). Agglomeration economies can facilitate access to knowledge for auditors serving a specific industry in those locations. We find that industry specialists in agglomerations earn a fee premium in excess of specialists in other markets. We find that nonspecialist offices in agglomerations also earn fee premiums in that industry when compared to nonspecialists in other markets even when controlling for these groups’ absolute share of the national market. We also address whether or not this expertise can be shared among offices in an agglomeration specialist's firm. We find that audit offices that have easy connections to a within-firm office in an agglomerated market can earn a fee premium relative to more distant offices, suggesting a benefit from knowledge transfer. This fee premium accrues to offices that would not be considered a specialist using traditional market share measures in a given industry. These findings indicate that the benefit of industry specialization depends on more than local market share.     

Using machine learning to predict auditor switches: How the likelihood of switching affects audit quality among non-switching clients

In this paper, we utilize machine learning techniques to identify the likelihood that a company switches auditors and examine whether increased likelihood of switching is associated with audit quality. Building on research that finds a deterioration in audit quality associated with clients that engage in audit opinion shopping, we predict and find lower audit quality among companies that are more likely to switch auditors but remain with their incumbent auditor. Specifically, we find that companies more likely to switch auditors have a higher likelihood of misstatement and larger abnormal accruals. These results are consistent with auditors sacrificing audit quality to retain clients that might otherwise switch. Our findings are especially concerning because there is no public signal of this behavior, such as an auditor switch. Our methodology is designed such that it could be implemented by investors, audit firms and regulators to identify companies with a higher probability of switching auditors and preemptively address the deterioration in audit quality.     

Non-audit Service Fees and Audit Quality: The Impact of Auditor Specialization

We posit that the effect of non‐audit fees on audit quality is conditional on auditor industry specialization. Industry specialist auditors are more likely than nonspecialists to be concerned about reputation losses and litigation exposure, and to benefit from knowledge spillovers from the provision of non‐audit services. We find evidence that audit quality measured by increased propensity to issue going‐concern opinion, increased propensity to miss analysts' forecasts, as well as higher earnings‐response coefficients increases with the level of non‐audit services acquired from industry specialist auditors compared to nonspecialist auditors.     

Does Auditor Industry Specialization Improve Audit Quality?

This study examines whether auditor industry specialization, measured using the auditor's within‐industry market share, improves audit quality and results in a fee premium. After matching clients of specialist and nonspecialist auditors on a number of dimensions, as well as only on industry and size, there is no evidence of differences in commonly used audit‐quality proxies between these two groups of auditors. Moreover, there is no consistent evidence of a specialist fee premium. The matched sample results are confirmed by including client fixed effects in the main models, examining a sample of clients that switched auditors, and using an alternative proxy that aims to capture the auditor's industry knowledge. The combined evidence in this study suggests that the auditor's within‐industry market share is not a reliable indicator of audit quality. Nevertheless, these findings do not imply that industry knowledge is not important for auditors, but that the methodology used in extant archival studies to examine this issue does not fully parse out the effects of auditor industry specialization from client characteristics.     

Do the Big 4 and the Second-tier firms provide audits of similar quality?

In this paper, we examine audit quality for Big 4 and Second-tier auditors during 2003–2006. We utilize the auditor’s propensity to issue a going concern audit report for distressed clients as a measure of audit quality. In addition, since the purpose of an audit is to improve financial reporting quality, we utilize abnormal accruals as an observable proxy for audit quality. Further, we utilize the client- and year-specific ex ante equity risk premium as a proxy for audit quality as perceived by investors. We control for auditor self-selection bias using the matched-pairs sample approach discussed by Francis and Lennox (2008). We find weak evidence that the Big 4 have a higher propensity to issue going concern audit opinions for distressed companies. However, the level of performance-adjusted abnormal accruals for Big 4 and Second-tier audit firm clients appears to be similar. With respect to investor perceptions, we find the client-specific ex ante equity risk premium to be lower for Big 4 clients than for Second-tier audit firm clients. Overall, our findings suggest little difference in actual audit quality but a more pronounced difference in perceived audit quality. Collectively, the evidence we provide informs the current discourse on audit quality, auditor choice, and the viability of Second-tier auditors as an alternative to the Big 4.     

Evaluating the effect of industry specialist duration on earnings management

This study examines whether auditor industry specialist duration (i.e., the cumulative number of years an audit firm can be deemed an industry specialist) affects earnings management. Using a sample of 17,546 observations during the period of 2006 to 2014, we find that audits performed by firms with longer industry specialist durations are associated with lower levels of earnings management, as proxied by the absolute value of discretionary accruals. This finding enhances the industry specialization literature by showing that, in the long run, specialist auditors constrain the accrual management activities of their clients. However, we also find that audits performed by firms with longer industry specialist durations are associated with greater levels of real earnings management. In turn, this is consistent with real earnings management surfacing as an unintended consequence of specialist auditors being able to better constrain the accrual management activities of their clients (Chi, Lisic, & Pevzner, 2011).     

Note on audit fee premiums to client size and industry specialization

This research note examines the impact of client size on the estimation of audit fee premiums in the Australian market for audit services. Previous research suggests that higher audit fees are expected for both larger clients and for industry specialization. We find that in the Australian market for audit services, the fee premium attributed to industry specialist audit firms is concentrated in the audit fees paid by the largest clients in each industry. One reason for higher fees paid by larger clients is the demand for additional audit services. We find higher fees for companies cross‐listed on US exchanges. We also find that fee premiums to auditors that are city‐industry leaders are strongly related to client size.     

Non-audit fees, institutional monitoring, and audit quality

We posit that the effect of non-audit fees on audit quality is conditional on the extent of institutional monitoring. We suggest that institutional investors have incentives and the ability to monitor financial reporting quality. Because of the reputation concerns and potential litigation exposure, auditors are likely to provide high audit quality, when they also provide non-audit services to clients, particularly when clients are subject to high institutional monitoring. We find evidence that, as non-audit fees increase, audit quality (measured by performance-adjusted discretionary current accruals and earnings-response coefficients) reduces only for clients with low institutional ownership but not for clients with high institutional ownership. Our results are robust after controlling for auditor industry specialization, firms’ operating volatility, size effect, and potential endogeneity between institutional ownership and audit quality.     

Future Events—A Conceptual Study of their Significance for Recognition and Measurement A Review Article

A number of research papers present evidence of fee premiums paid to specialist auditors. In this paper, we explore for listed and unlisted New Zealand firms not only the question of whether such premiums exist, but perhaps more importantly why they exist. We find evidence of fee premiums for auditor specialisation defined at the city level but not at the national level. We extend testing to examine the issue of self-selection of auditors by clients; we examine several different industry classification schemes and a number of different specialisation measures; and we consider the issue of portfolio specialists. We find from these additional tests that self-selection does not account for the existence of specialisation premiums; various alternative classification schemes all result in premiums at the city level; and portfolio specialists also earn fee premiums when portfolio specialisation is measured at the city level. We find that these specialist premiums apply most consistently to larger client firms and to low-risk firms. We consider various explanations and conclude that this result is consistent with non-specialist auditors providing discounts to attract desirable clients. Desirable clients – those that are large or low risk – are not able to negotiate fees as successfully with auditors who have differentiated themselves via industry specialisation.     

Auditor selection and corporate social responsibility

This study examines the association between the selection of an industry‐specialist auditor and corporate social responsibility (CSR). We find that firms with higher CSR ratings are more likely to hire industry‐specialist auditors (national‐level industry leaders, city‐level industry leaders or joint city‐national industry leaders). Moreover, firms with better CSR performance related to product quality and the environment in controversial industries are found to select non‐specialized auditors. The results suggest that such firms may overinvest in CSR activities associated with the environment and product issues to disguise the sin nature of their manufactured goods, and simultaneously engage low quality auditors perhaps to avoid full disclosure of potential environmental and legal liabilities. Overall, we conclude that CSR is associated with the non‐controversial firms ensuring high quality financial reporting in response to societal expectations, and thus CSR firms in such industries have strong incentives to engage industry‐specialist auditors.     

The effect of auditor litigation risk on clients' access to bank debt: Evidence from a quasi-experiment

We exploit staggered state-level shocks to third-party auditor legal liability in the U.S. to test whether auditor litigation risk affects client companies' access to private debt markets. We find that an exogenous increase in auditor litigation risk leads to an increase in both clients' likelihood of receiving bank loans and the average amount of the bank loans that clients receive. In support of our proposed mechanism that auditor litigation risk leads to improvements in clients' audit and financial reporting quality, we find that these same shocks lead to a reduction in accruals, an increase in going-concern opinions, a decrease in restatements, and an improvement in accruals' ability to predict future cash flows. We also find that increased auditor litigation risk leads to an increase in the contractibility of clients’ accounting numbers, as proxied by the use of debt covenants, and a decrease in the cost of borrowing.