Reciprocity in Corporate Tax Compliance—Evidence from Ozone Pollution

In a tax—public goods reciprocity framework between citizens and the state, managers view taxes as a payment to the government in exchange for public goods, and hence they adjust their willingness to pay taxes as public good quality changes. We show that corporate tax planning intensity increases with ground-level ozone pollution. Revisions in ozone pollution regulations cause counties that failed the revised and more stringent standards to reduce ozone pollution. Consequently, firms headquartered in these counties reduced corporate tax planning intensity relative to firms in other counties. The ozone-tax link varies in the predicted directions with public attention to pollution, potential welfare loss due to ozone, managers’ stakeholder orientation, taxpayers’ polluting status, political preferences, and civic norms. We also find consistent results for Superfund cleanups of hazardous waste sites. Our research sheds light on reciprocity as a potential mechanism influencing corporate tax compliance.     

Fiscal Policy Reforms in a Global Economy

Two countries are populated by workers and capitalists. Their governments collect taxes to finance productive expenditure and income redistribution. The share of income redistributed defines the size of the welfare state. Although both groups benefit from an abolition of the welfare state in the long run, the optimal fiscal policy in autarky can be characterized by maintaining a large welfare state since transfer cuts would induce transitional losses. Starting in such a position of policy inertia free trade and capital mobility is introduced. Fiscal policy competition leads to a reduction of tax rates and a relative increase of productive expenditure. If both countries coordinate their fiscal policy the reduction of taxes and income transfers is less pronounced. Quantitative effects of increasing globalization are assessed in a calibrated model for an average Europe G-4 country and the United States.     

Simple Monetary Rules under Fiscal Dominance

This paper asks whether interest rate rules that respond aggressively to inflation, following the Taylor principle, are feasible in countries that suffer from fiscal dominance. We find that if interest rates are allowed to also respond to government debt, they can produce unique equilibria. But such equilibria are associated with extremely volatile inflation. The resulting frequent violations of the zero lower bound make such rules infeasible. Even within the set of feasible rules the welfare optimizing response to inflation is highly negative. The welfare gain from responding to government debt is minimal compared to the gain from eliminating fiscal dominance.     

Why Do Countries Mandate Accrual Accounting for Tax Purposes?

This study investigates why countries mandate accruals in the definition of corporate taxable income. Accruals alleviate timing and matching problems in cash flows, which smoothes taxable income and thus better aligns it with underlying economic performance. These accrual properties can be desirable in the tax setting as tax authorities seek more predictable corporate tax revenues. However, they can also make tax revenues procyclical by increasing the correlation between aggregate corporate tax revenues and aggregate economic activity. We argue that accruals shape the distribution of corporate tax revenues, which leads regulators to incorporate accruals into the definition of taxable income to balance the portfolio of government revenues and expenditures. Using a sample of 26 OECD countries, we find support for several theoretically motivated factors explaining the use of accruals in tax codes. We first provide evidence that corporate tax revenues are less volatile in high accrual countries, but high accrual countries collect relatively higher (lower) tax revenues when the corporate sector grows (contracts). Critically, we then show that accruals and smoother tax revenues are favored by countries with higher levels of government spending on public services and uncertain future expenditures, while countries with procyclical other tax collections favor cash rules and lower procyclicality of corporate tax revenues.     

Firm-specific determinants of continuous corporate disclosures

Continuous disclosure is the immediate release of material information by issuers within a regulatory and information dissemination framework. Under such a regime, the market is informed at all times and no investor is disadvantaged by lack of access to information. We attempt to identify the firm-specific determinants of these disclosures.We examine the frequency and regularity of online announcements on the stock exchange websites of companies included in the Morgan Stanley Capital Index for small-cap firms in eight developed markets in Asia and Europe. We find that firms with higher information asymmetry have a higher frequency and regularity of continuous online reporting. Our results also show that the frequency and regularity of online disclosure is positively associated with agency costs, earnings, and analyst following and is inversely related to the length of the product cycle of a firm. Our results are more robust for discretionary disclosures. We also find variations in the frequency of disclosures by countries, some of which are explainable by the online disclosure settings of the countries.     

Corporate tax reforms and tax-motivated profit shifting: evidence from the EU

This paper examines whether the profit-shifting trend in Europe during 2003–2013 can be explained by tax policy changes. Consistent with prior literature, we find that affiliates’ profits are sensitive to tax rate changes. However, we document that tax base–broadening reforms have mitigated the incentives for both inward and outward profit shifting. In particular, we find that anti-avoidance rules prevent multinational companies from shifting profits out of their foreign affiliates, whereas other tax base–broadening rules, such as restrictions on the deductibility of tax losses or on group tax relief, reduce the incentives for multinational companies to shift profits into foreign affiliates. Furthermore, we find evidence of a downward trend in profit shifting across European countries, especially when the tax enforcement is stricter. Overall, these results suggest that broader tax bases and stricter tax enforcement have successfully curbed this particular tax strategy.     

Public Investment in Europe: Evolution and Determinants in perspective*

We describe the evolution of public investment and public capital stocks in Europe over the past three decades. Against this background, we analyse the macroeconomic determinants of public investment, with a special focus on its long‐term trend. We find that public investment has been determined by national income, the stance of budgetary policies and fiscal sustainability considerations. Neither the cost of financing nor the fiscal rules embodied in EMU have had a systemic impact on public investment. The significant downtrend that characterises the evolution of public investment in non‐cohesion countries is chiefly determined by drawn‐out episodes of fiscal consolidation, unrelated to EMU.     

The composite dividend tax rate

Dividends often impose taxes on investors. However, as certain prior financial models indicate, they also can produce a tax gain from leverage. Hence the composite marginal dividend tax rate can be specified as the nominal rate minus the offsetting tax gain from leverage. Although this principle has been embedded in theoretical models for more than 40 years, no prior study has examined empirically whether the dividend-induced tax gain from leverage influences dividend policy. We address this empirical void and find dividends decrease in the nominal dividend tax rate and increase in the offsetting tax gain from leverage. In addition, we find the composite tax rate outperforms traditional measures in explaining dividend policy for our full sample of firms. Consistent with prior theory, we also find the composite rate varies in influence according to the financing source for a dividend.     

企业集团合并纳税：比较及启示

我国的合并纳税制度目前只针对特批企业,这不利于企业集团之间公平竞争。对企业集团合并纳税范围及不同国家合并纳税模式的比较与分析表明:我国应进一步完善所得税法等法律法规,保证税收公平,积极建设我国的"集团纳税制度"。     

Out of Site,Out of Mind? The Role of the Government-Appointed Corporate Monitor

We study the role of a relatively new type of external firm monitor, an on-site government-appointed Corporate Monitor, and assess whether such appointments reduce firms' propensity to violate laws. Using a sample of deferred and nonprosecution agreements, we first document the determinants of Monitor appointment. We find firms that voluntarily disclose wrongdoing and have more independent directors are less likely to have Corporate Monitors, whereas those with more severe infractions, mandated board changes, and increased cooperation requirements are more likely to have Monitors. We find such appointments are associated with an 18%–25% reduction in violations while the Monitor is on site, however, the effect does not persist after the Monitorship ends. Using a semisupervised machine learning method to measure changes in firms' ethics and compliance norms, we find that the reduction in violations is associated with changes in ethics and compliance that also do not persist. Finally, we document that firms under Monitorship experience a persistent reduction in innovation, highlighting a previously unexplored cost of these interventions. Overall, our results suggest that, although Corporate Monitors on site are associated with fewer violations, firms revert to previous levels of violations following Monitors' departure.     

Political Fragmentation and the Evolution of National Tax Structures in the OECD

This paper considers how tax structures in OECD countries change over time and how these changes are related to political fragmentation. Tax structures amongst OECD countries have become more uniform in the recent past (1965–1995) but it is less clear that this convergence satisfies time-series requirements. Evidence on stochastic convergence tends to suggest that there is evidence of persistence of shocks remaining over a considerable time period. A consideration of the countries where this persistence is most prevalent shows that there is significant correlation between high persistence and weak (coalition) governments, giving further weight to the theories of weak government.     

中国与TPP国家关税减让的宏观经济效应：基于GTAP模型的分析

采用GTAP模型,模拟分析中国与TPP国家关税减让合作的宏观经济效应.结果显示:中国与TPP国家双边关税减让会强化双边的贸易联系,其中,制造业双边关税壁垒的取消比农业双边关税壁垒取消对中国及TPP国家的对外贸易影响更大;双边关税减让将提升双边的福利水平,同时也会使中国与TPP国家的贸易不平衡进一步扩大.结果表明,考虑到单边关税减让将损害减让国福利水平,采用双边关税减让以平衡双方利益是一个可行的合作途径.     

Does common auditor have an impact on corporate tax avoidance? An investigation from the supply chain perspective

We find that, at both the audit firm and partner level, having a common auditor in the supply chain has a significant positive association with the supplier company's degree of tax avoidance. Companies report a higher level of tax avoidance when they are audited by an industry-expert or a tax expert common auditor, when the common audit partner is economically dependent on the supplier company, when the audit client is in a highly competitive industry, and when the company is subject to a high level of information asymmetry. Moreover, we find potential audit quality issues embedded in common audits in the supply chain.     

Exemption vs. Credit Method in International Double Taxation Treaties

This paper examines the choice of international double taxation relief methods by two small countries that mutually exchange foreign direct investment. At the first stage, each country chooses between the exemption and the credit method (as prescribed by the OECD model treaty) and at the second stage, each country sets nationally optimal non-discriminatory capital tax rates. It is shown that in the subgame perfect equilibrium both countries choose the exemption method. Mutual application of the exemption method is also shown to yield the highest welfare for each country. While the tax export effect generally induces both countries to choose inefficiently high tax rates, this effect is weakest when both countries exempt foreign earned profits from domestic taxation.     

Is a flat tax reform feasible in a grown-up democracy of Western Europe? A simulation study for Germany

The success of the flat rate income tax in eastern Europe suggests that this concept could also be a model for countries of western Europe. The present paper uses a simulation model to analyze the effects of revenue neutral flat rate tax reforms on equity and efficiency for the case of Germany. We find that a flat rate tax with a low tax rate and a low basic allowance yields positive static welfare effects amounting to approximately 1.8% of income tax revenue but increases income inequality. The increase in income inequality can be avoided by combining a higher tax rate with a higher basic allowance. But in this case, the efficiency gains vanish. We conclude that due to their limited efficiency effects and their problematic distributional impact, flat tax reforms are unlikely to spill over to the grown-up democracies of western Europe.      

Cross-country differences in the contribution of future migration to old-age financing

As life expectancy increases and fertility declines, population aging puts pressure on the financing of welfare states in Europe and other developed countries. Given that immigrant workers are younger than the domestic population, a continuous flow of immigrants reduces the old-age dependency ratio and improves financing. Existing general equilibrium estimates of the public finance contribution of migration, performed with different models, are not comparable across countries and sometimes differ even in sign. We use the same overlapping-generations model with a detailed representation of institutions and labor market activity to provide comparable estimates of the impact of immigration on public finance in four European countries. We find that future projected immigration flows are equivalent to 14.3 % points labor income taxes in Austria, 7.3 points in Germany, 6.2 points in the UK and 1.7 points in Poland in 2060. These differences are due to the projected volume of immigration and institutional setups, among other factors. For comparable volumes of immigration, future flows have largest impact in Germany and smallest in the UK.     

Attitudes towards Tax Levels: A Multi‐Tax Comparison*

We analyse Swedes' opinions about the levels of 11 different taxes to see which taxes people are most averse to and why. The most unpopular tax is the real estate tax, while the corporate tax is the least unpopular. We find a strong self‐interest effect in tax attitudes and that knowledge and education increase support for corrective taxes.     

Global diversification, growth, and welfare with imperfectly integrated markets for goods

In this article we examine the effect of the imperfect mobilityof goods on international risk sharing and, through that, onthe investment in risky projects, welfare, and growth. Our mainresult is that the welfare gain from integration of financialmarkets is not greatly reduced by the presence of goods marketimperfections, modeled as a cost of transferring goods fromone country to the other. We also find that the gain is nonmonotonicwith respect to investors' risk aversion and the aggregate volatilityof output growth. The policy implication to be drawn is thatfinancial market integration is a worthwhile goal to pursueeven when full goods mobility has not been achieved.     

Director and officer liability and corporate tax avoidance

We use the unique nature of the director and officer liability protection law applicable to Nevada incorporated firms to study how liability protection is related to corporate tax avoidance. We find that firms incorporated in Nevada avoid 32% more federal corporate tax as a fraction of total assets than firms incorporated in Delaware, and 40% more than firms incorporated in other states. Nevada-incorporated firms have a 15% lower cash effective tax rate and an 8% lower GAAP ETR. The results are robust to various specifications including instrumental variable and matching approaches. Greater tax avoidance is also associated with lower payouts to shareholders for Nevada-incorporated firms. The findings are consistent with theories about the complementarity of managerial diversion and tax avoidance for firms with poor monitoring, and they demonstrate how increases in liability protection lead to the unintended consequence of greater firm tax avoidance.