We Want Them All Covered! Collective Bargaining and Firm Heterogeneity: Theory and Evidence from Germany

This article establishes a link between the degree of productivity dispersion within an industry and collective bargaining coverage of the firms in the industry. In a stylized unionized oligopoly model, we show that differences in productivity levels can affect the design of collective wage contracts a sector‐union offers to heterogeneous firms. Using German linked employer–employee data, we test a range of our theoretical hypotheses and find empirical support for them. The dispersion of sector‐level labour productivity decreases the likelihood of firms being covered by a collective bargaining agreement on the industry level, but increases the likelihood of firms being covered by firm‐level agreements. The results hold for different subsamples and (panel) estimation techniques.     

Collective Bargaining and Wage Dispersion in Europe

The level at which collective bargaining takes place is usually considered important in determining wage levels and wage inequalities. Two different situations are considered: a first in which bargaining is only ‘multi‐employer’, and a second in which it is ‘multi‐level’, in the sense that workers can be covered by both a ‘multi‐employer’ and a ‘single‐employer’ contract at the same time. The purpose of this paper is to analyse the impact of these different institutional settings on pay dispersion. The study is carried out using the European Structure of Earnings Survey, which is a large dataset containing detailed matched employer–employee information for the year 1995. The countries analysed are Italy, Belgium and Spain. The empirical results generally show that wages of workers covered by only a ‘multi‐employer’ contract are no more compressed than those of workers covered by both ‘multi‐employer’ and ‘single‐employer’ contracts. This implies that where workers are not covered by single‐employer bargaining, they receive wage supplements paid unilaterally by their employers.     

Collective Bargaining and Within-firm Wage Dispersion in Spain

This paper analyses the effect of collective bargaining on within‐firm wage dispersion for the case of Spain. What is relevant in the Spanish case is to compare the effect of the two basic levels of bargaining (firm and sector) on wage dispersion. By using the Oaxaca–Blinder decomposition, this paper concludes that collective agreements at firm level have a negative effect on wage dispersion. At the same time, firms that have signed these types of agreements show greater wage dispersion than those covered by agreements at the sector level, owing to the positive and compensating effect of firms’ and workers’ features.     

The Rise of Experimentalism in German Collective Bargaining

This paper addresses the debate on union strategies by analysing industrial relations change in three of Germany's most internationalized sectors: chemicals, metalworking and construction. It characterizes two logics of change in German industrial relations: a battlefield logic and an experimentalist logic. It demonstrates historical trends towards centralization of wage bargaining in each sector before looking at recent pressures for decentralization and flexibility. In chemi‐cals, the social partners control decentralization. In metalworking increasing flexibility is characterized by a mismatch between the national‐level union and the district‐level employers. Finally, the construction union seeks to replace the centralized bargaining system with a state minimum wage.     

Worker Turnover, Job Turnover and Collective Bargaining in Spain

This paper analyses the relationship between the presence of organized labour in firms (approximated by the scope of collective bargaining) and the extent of gross worker and job flows. According to the voice theory of Freeman, those firms having a union presence will have lower worker mobility. However, there is no analysis of the effects of the presence of organized labour on gross job flows. Using a Spanish data base, we find evidence of the existence of a voice effect on gross worker flows but not clear support for a voice effect on gross job flows.     

Collective Bargaining and the Evolution of Wage Inequality in Italy

Italian male wage inequality has increased at a relatively fast pace from the mid‐1980s until the early 2000s, while it has been persistently flat since then. We analyse this trend, focusing on the period of most rapid growth in pay dispersion. By accounting for worker and firm fixed effects, it is shown that workers' heterogeneity has been a major determinant of increased wage inequalities, while variability in firm wage policies has declined over time. We also show that the growth in pay dispersion has entirely occurred between livelli di inquadramento, that is, job titles defined by national industry‐wide collective bargaining institutions, for which specific minimum wages apply. We conclude that the underlying market forces determining wage inequality have been largely channelled into the tight tracks set by the centralized system of industrial relations.     

Collective Bargaining Coverage under Trade Unionism: A Sociological Investigation

Does high union density lead to high collective bargaining coverage? Since collective bargaining is seen as the raison d'être of trade unions, this is often assumed to be the case; some observers think that union density is ‘a floor’ below which collective bargaining coverage is unlikely to fall. With its very high union density, Denmark is a case in point. This article investigates the collective bargaining coverage issue in the Danish case, based on an individual-level employee survey with 1720 respondents. Collective bargaining coverage is shown to be much lower than union density, and some methodological issues in this connection are considered. In order to find some possible explanations for this surprising finding, the question of variance of collective bargaining coverage between groups of employees is discussed in the light of theories of service society and recent research results and theories. The impact of central variables is investigated through multivariate analysis, and it turns out that by far the most important variable predicting an employee's collective bargaining coverage is a variable mostly neglected in comparative analyses: occupational status. Salaried employees have a much lower collective bargaining coverage than manual workers in Denmark, and some possible reasons for this are given.     

Collective Bargaining Coverage of Union Members and Nonmembers in the Public Sector

Arguably, models of union status and union wage effects in the public sector should' consider workers in three categories: not covered, covered nonmember, and covered member. Estimates show that stronger union security laws are associated with higher percentages of covered members and nonmembers, that right-to-work laws do not affect union coverage or membership relative to where no union security law exists, and that the wages of covered members are higher than those for covered non-members.     

Canadian Strike Replacement Legislation and Collective Bargaining: Lessons for the United States

Opponents of U.S. and Canadian strike replacement legislation contend that restricting the use of strike replacements significantly alters bargaining power and increases strike activity. This article uses data on Canadian manufacturing collective-bargaining agreements to investigate these hypotheses. Although a general ban on strike replacements is found to be associated with longer strikes, little evidence is found to suggest that banning permanent strike replacements significantly influences strike incidence, strike duration, or negotiated wages.     

创新行为与企业经营绩效:微观实证

创新是企业保持长久竞争力的不竭动力,创新行为对企业经营绩效会产生重要影响.运用面板随机效应模型和分位数回归方法,以2007年、2008年及2009年共3年的微观企业数据为样本,就创新行为与创业板公司的经营绩效进行了实证分析,研究表明:创新投入对经营绩效有正向促进作用,但缺乏弹性,并且其对经营业绩不好与经营业绩很好的公司影响都较小,最大受益者是经营业绩一般的公司.专利与企业经营绩效正相关,但专利对公司经营绩效条件分布的影响幅度并不稳定,表现出较大的波动性,非参数BootSrap方法表明以上回归结果具有稳健性.