The impact of public information on bidding in highway procurement auctions

A number of papers in the theoretical auction literature show that the release of information regarding the seller's valuation of an item can cause bidders to bid more aggressively. This widely accepted result in auction theory remains largely untested in the empirical literature. Recent theoretical work has also shown that this effect can be more pronounced in auctions with larger common cost uncertainty. We examine the impact of a policy change by the Oklahoma Department of Transportation that led to the release of the state's internal estimate of the costs to complete highway construction projects. We perform a differences-in-differences analysis comparing bidding in Texas, a state that had a uniform policy of revealing the same information all throughout the period of analysis, to bidding in Oklahoma. Our results show that, in comparison to Texas auctions, the average bid in Oklahoma fell after the change in engineers’ cost estimate (ECE) policy. This decline in bids was even larger for projects where the common uncertainty in costs is greater. Moreover, the within-auction standard deviation of bids fell after the change in ECE policy with the most significant decline observed again in projects with greater common cost uncertainty.     

Theory of negative consumption externalities with applications to the economics of happiness

This paper investigates the problem of obtaining Pareto efficient allocations in the presence of negative consumption externalities. In contrast to the conventional wisdom, we show that even if consumers’ preferences are monotonically increasing in their own consumption, one may have to dispose of resources to achieve Pareto efficiency when negative consumption externalities exist. We provide characterization results on destruction both for pure exchange economies and for production economies. As an application, our results provide an explanation to Easterlin’s paradox: average happiness levels do not increase as countries grow wealthier. We thank an anonymous referee, Xiaoyong Cao, Li Gan, and Tapan Mitra for helpful comments and suggestions that improved the exposition of the paper. The first author thanks the National Natural Science Foundation of China and Private Enterprise Research Center at Texas A&M University for financial support.     

International policy coordination mechanism with respect to the moral hazards of financial intermediaries

This paper examines the impact of cross-border financial externalities on moral hazards of the banking sector, and an international policy coordination mechanism to reduce the moral hazards of the banking sector considering cross-border financial externalities. We demonstrate that the moral hazard of banking, such as reducing the monitoring efforts, is aggravated by cross-border financial externalities, while the introduction of an international policy coordination mechanism might reduce the moral hazard caused by these externalities. Moreover, international policy coordination is less likely to be sustained when the policy maker is short-sighted and the banking sector has greater political influence. However, when the distortionary cost of a liquidity aids policy is lower with high administrative transparency, and cross-border financial externality is greater, the coordination mechanism is more likely to be sustained. The results imply that efforts to launch an effective international financial coordination mechanism should start with countries with higher administrative transparency, more political stability, and enhanced financial integration.     

The Uncommon Insight of Elinor Ostrom

Standard economic approaches to the problem of overuse of common property resources have emphasized two competing remedies: the Pigovian approach of corrective taxation, and the property rights approach of internalizing externalities by means of assigning marketable property rights to individual owners with exclusive claim on the entire commons. Elinor Ostrom pursues a third approach, which is based on case studies of existing communities that have established successful and durable systems of managing common property resources. This paper discusses her work and suggests that economists with an interest in public policy have much to gain from becoming familiar with the work of Ostrom and her co‐authors.     

A model of techno-economic evaluation for eco-industrial park project

An eco-industrial park or estate is a community of manufactaring and service businesses located together on a common property. The goat of ElP is to create a win-win harmonious development aspect of ecooomic development and environmental protection. This paper emphasizes that the external .effect of an EIP is its main characteristic of technoeconomic evaluation for eco-industrial park project. From the view of the property, rights, the EIP＇s product is typicalty public-private. The government should take some inca.rares for the quantitative analysis on ecological positive externalities of the enterprises in EIP, and also should adopt Coase＇s Theorem, which supports that the market transaction is the best way to deal with positive externalities （external economics or diseconoraics）, or Pigou＇s Theorem, which holds that the government anti-positive externalities programs are the best way to cope with positive externalities, to internalize the EIP＇s external effects, which is also a fundamental tool to encourage investors to actively invest in EIP projects, Furthermore. this paper thinks that the EIP ＇s income should be equal to the income of staple products of the private property, and that of its by-products of the public property. According to this principle, this paper has put forward three major indicators, net present value （NPV）, internal rate of renan （IRR）, and investment repayment period （IRP）, which are also extensively used indicators in ardinary project techno-economic evaluation model to evaluate EIP technoeconomic effects. Theoretically, the indicatory not only can be used in EIP project evaluation, but also can provide a quantitative measure toot for the government to support EIP＇s construction to the maximum. In the end. a case is analyzed.     

国际货币的惯性及对人民币国际化的启示

随着人们对人民币国际化问题的普遍关注,货币的国际化成为国际金融领域的热点问题。利用货币竞争模型分析由于货币的网络外部性和转换成本的存在所造成的国际货币的惯性,从而解释世界上到底需要多少种国际货币、为什么在每个时期只能有一种货币可以成为真正意义上的国际货币、为什么一种货币想要取代已有的国际货币的过程都十分漫长等问题。对上述问题的解释启示我们在人民币国际化的过程中,要关注货币网络外部性和转换成本的影响,可以通过贸易逆差输出人民币和中国金融市场的发展来培育人民币的网络外部性。     

Decentralization with externalities

In this paper, we examine in a systematic way the problem of decentralization in an economy with all types of externalities. We show that decentralization with artificial markets requires strong convexity assumptions which are typically not fulfilled for negative externalities on producers. A milder form of decentralization with taxation is shown to obtain under weaker convexity assumptions. A new example is given to explain the role of a non-interiority assumption. Finally, new types of non-convexities are described and the problem of rights to externalities is clearly defined in the framework of this general theory.     

Incentive to Work versus Disincentive to Invest: The Case of China's Rural Reform, 1979–1984

An institutional change from the communal system to the household responsibility system in rural China brought about an increase in productivity during 1979–1984, but it has also opened up a set of new problems, including decreased investment. I argue that the new responsibility system is effective in providing work incentives to peasants by rendering residual claims, but not so in internalizing positive externalities of investment, resulting in underinvestment. Remedies such as agricultural investment subsidies, investment tax credits, the roles of such institutions as township and village enterprises in undertaking investment in agricultural infrastructure, and most fundamentally, well-defined property rights are discussed.     

Economic Competition,Policy Interdependence,and Labour Rights

Extant scholarship treats national policies concerning labour rights as a function of economic factors and yet neglects influences of policies among economically competing states. Relying on the policy interdependence theory, this study argues that labour rights policy in a state is dependent on its economic competitors’ labour policy decisions. It specifically maintains that the intensifying competition for foreign direct investment and exports as well as against imports channels negative externalities of deteriorating labour protection in competing states which drives expansive downward policy mimicking and leads to a global decline in labour rights – a race to the bottom. Utilising spatial econometric technique to analyse a new data on labour rights for the period 1994–2009, it finds that labour rights practices are interdependent among economic competitors and experience global deteriorations; whereas labour rights laws remain largely independent due to high policy and reputational costs of lowering them and show more fluctuations.     

企业家人力资本外部性及其内在化路径研究

具有创新型生产力形态的企业家人力资本,在社会实践中的运用呈现出较强的正向外部性,这源于企业家人力资本的私人收益率与社会收益率的极大不一致。由于外部性的存在,阻碍了企业家创新精神的发挥及企业家人力资本的生成和供给．故完整界定企业家人力资本产权是克服外部性的有效手段．企业家人力资本的股权化是其外部性内在化的具体路径选择。     

From private to public common agency

This note establishes that two propositions in the theory of private common agency by Laussel and Le Breton (J. Econ. Theory 100 (2001) 93) extend to a larger class of games, in which each principal's gross monetary payoff does not depend exclusively on the quantities she receives. A new result is offered to demonstrate that Proposition 4.3 is robust to the introduction of negative externalities. An existing result is reinterpreted to show that Proposition 4.2 is robust to the introduction of positive externalities.     

Sustainability and externalities: Is the internalization of externalities a sufficient condition for sustainability?

In an important contribution in Ecological Economics, van de Bergh (2010) correctly concludes that sustainability does not imply zero externalities. However, he continues with the Delphic statement "(Delphic statements were uttered by the renowned oracle of ancient Greece at Delphi. They were phrased in such a way as to be self-fulfilling because alternative interpretations covered every possibility.)" "Without externalities the problem of sustainability vanishes". If this statement refers to an impossible economic process that produces no externalities then he is right. However, it might be interpreted as stating that whenever environmental policy internalizes environmental externalities then sustainability will be ensured. In this note, I assert that in the real world where externalities prevail, their internalization or neutralization in the traditional way cannot lead to sustainability. Only if internalization takes a very specific form that results in the inviolable preservation of environmental rights of future generations in pure biological terms can sustainability be ensured. After revised the original commentary I resubmit it. The issues raised by the editor have been carefully considered.     

Externalities,communication and the allocation of decision rights

The assignment of authority entitles the decision maker to undertake decisions that impose externalities on the payoffs of other members of the organization. This paper studies how the optimal allocation of decision rights depends on the preferences of the organization’s members. It adopts a mechanism-design approach to show how the communication of private information affects the efficient allocation of authority. An extension to multiple decision areas shows that decentralized control rights may enhance organizational efficiency unless there exist strong complementarities between different decisions.     

Did Open Access Integrate Natural Gas Markets? An Arbitrage Cost Approach

Several studies, using analyses that measure the correlation between prices in various markets, have argued that deregulation of natural gas pipeline contracts has reduced the transaction costs between natural gas markets. Correlations approaches, however, have potentially serious problems. Given these problems, this article estimates transactions costs directly. Deregulation is found to have lowered transactions costs to and from the Louisiana, Oklahoma, and Texas regions, but increased transactions costs from the Rocky Mountain area. Deregulation of pipeline contracts, by lowering the cost of using the market and therefore increasing demand for pipeline capacity, may therefore have differential impacts upon transactions costs between markets. This study implies that the transactions cost approach may be able to overcome several difficulties inherent in the correlations approach.     

Sovereign Risk, FDI Spillovers, and Growth

This paper studies the effect of sovereign risk on capital flows from rich to poor nations in the context of a two-country model, where Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) creates positive externalities in domestic production. We show that if externalities are large, a developing country never expropriates foreign assets, and behaves as under perfect enforcement of foreigners' property rights, jumping to the steady state in one period. If externalities are absent, a developing country always expropriates foreign assets and, then, there are no capital flows in equilibrium, as occurs in autarky. If externalities are of a medium size, our model can account for scarce capital flows from rich to poor nations, as well as other key features of the data, such as rising-over-time patterns of foreign capital and FDI in developing countries. In addition, the model offers an economic rationale for the FDI restrictions observed across nations.     

Learning to bid: The design of auctions under uncertainty and adaptation

We examine auction design in a context where symmetrically informed adaptive agents with common valuations learn to bid for a good. Despite the absence of private valuations, asymmetric information, or risk aversion, bidder strategies do not converge to the Bertrand–Nash equilibrium strategies even in the long run. Deviations from equilibrium strategies depend on uncertainty regarding the value of the good, auction structure, the agents? learning model, and the number of bidders. Although individual agents learn Nash bidding strategies in isolation, the learning of each agent, by flattening the best-reply correspondence of other agents, blocks common learning. These negative externalities are more severe in second-price auctions, auctions with many bidders, and auctions where the good has an uncertain value ex post.     

Trade and the governance of ecosystem services

We work with a basic general equilibrium model of an economy with an industrial good and a rural good. Industrial good production results in pollution that affects the provision of ecosystem services and thereby the production of the rural good. The assignment of ecosystem rights to the industrial polluters or to the rural pollutees results in differential transaction costs that affect production possibilities between the two goods. Ecosystem rights are assigned to maximize social welfare. Over time, technological change and differences in income superiority affect the choice of the assignment of rights. Opening to trade affects the choice of the assignment of ecosystem rights depending on the nature of technological change, but the relative income superiority of goods no longer affects the assignment of ecosystem rights in a small economy. Thus, among other findings, we demonstrate that the phenomena known as the environmental Kuznets curve does not hold for the protection of ecosystem services in production, or production externalities generally, because trade separates consumption from production.     

Resale Markets and the Assignment of Property Rights

The consumption of an indivisible good causes identity-dependent externalities to non-consumers. We analyse resale markets where the current owner designs the trading procedure, but cannot commit to future actions. We ask the following questions: (1) Does the identity of the initial owner matter for the determination of the final consumer? (2) Is the outcome always efficient? The major conclusion of our paper is that the irrelevance of the initial structure of property rights arises in resale processes even if there are transaction costs that hinder efficiency. This result complements the Coasian view where the irrelevance of the assignment of property rights is a consequence of efficiency.     

Comparing Environmental Policy Instruments Within an Incomplete Contract Framework

This paper compares three different legal means—no environmental policy (the pollutee pays), full liability (the polluter pays), and pollution standards—to reduce and regulate neighborhood externalities within an incomplete contract framework. It turns out that the relative efficiency of these instruments depends, in general, on details. However, moderate standards are preferable to no environmental policy and tight (but not too tight) standards dominate liability. This provides under the given assumptions (neighborhood externalities, incomplete contracts) a justification for “sensible” standards for three reasons. First, unilateral allocations of property rights are biased that distort allocations even if ex post bargaining takes place. Second, a standard is superior in the following sense: if it is set equal to the outcome under any allocation of rights, it will be improved in the process of ex post bargaining. Third, unilateral property rights encourage strategic ex ante investments up to the point that committing to no bargaining would be beneficial (if possible).     

Optimal Complementary Auctions*

This paper considers the situation where two products are sold by the same seller, but to disjoint sets of potential buyers. Externalities may arise from each market outcome to the other. The paper examines the nature of the seller's optimal mechanism, and, for example in the case of positive externalities, it is shown that the allocation decision in either market depends on the highest types in both markets. The optimal mechanism can be implemented by an indirect mechanism that essentially charges winning bidders for the value of their externalities. The analysis is applied to the sale of public sector franchises including exploration and development rights for oil and gas tracts.