Manufacturer marketing initiatives and retailer information sharing

This research examines a retailer’s incentive to share information with its supplier when the supplier can also undertake initiatives to increase retail demand. It is well known that a retailer is averse to sharing market information with a manufacturer due to concern for a manufacturer’s strategic use of such information. This research shows that despite such strategic exploitation of market information, a retailer may want to establish information sharing channels with its supplier. Information sharing essentially shifts power upstream which, in turn, enhances the manufacturer’s incentive to bear costs to boost retail demand: the manufacturer is induced to invest merely by knowing that information is on its way. Hence, the retailer benefits from information sharing ex ante despite the costly ex post exploitation by the manufacturer. This finding is a stark contrast to the most of previous results which consistently point out how bad it is for the manufacturer to have the retailer’s demand information before setting prices. In fact, due to the investment effect, information sharing can lead to gains for the retailer, manufacturer, and consumers alike.     

Do channel members value the multiple-cooperation strategy?

When the manufacturer distributes his products through online and traditional channels, what type of innovative marketing strategy can be utilized to solve the channel conflict and improve the performances of all channel members? Our research addresses this important question by initiating a triple cooperative strategy for channel members to employ in a manufacturer – retailer dual-channel supply chain. Our results show that when the product is less compatible with online channel than with traditional channel, channel members can utilize a triple cooperative strategy to improve channel coordination and their individual performances effectively and efficiently. First, the manufacturer can utilize supportive retail sales effort as a valuable coordination mechanism to improve the performances of all channel members in the dual-channel distribution. Second, a channel coordinative price strategy can be utilized to further improve the performance of whole channel. Finally, a profit sharing mechanism is needed to create a Pareto result for both the manufacturer and the retailer. Furthermore, we extend our model to study the value of triple cooperative strategy in a manufacturer – two competitive retailers supply chain and derive the optimum marketing strategy.     

The impact of information sharing and bullwhip effects on improving consumer services in dual-channel retailing

Data sharing among the supply chain players can be an exceptionally significant factor for the retailing industry. In this consideration, an improved retailing methodology for a dual-channel supply chain with a single retailer and manufacturer is built under the bullwhip effect and asymmetric data sharing. Retailer provides asymmetric information to the manufacturer regarding demand to increase their profit. In this scenario, measuring the bullwhip effect is essential in retailing strategy. By adopting an online-to-offline retailing strategy, industries can earn more profit and increase the satisfaction level of customers. The present study focuses on dual-channel retailing, where the demand for the product in both channels varies with the selling price. Keeping in mind the goal of sustainable development, an advanced transportation strategy is utilized in this study, along with some carbon emission costs. Autonomated inspection is utilized to identify defective products. Finally, centralized and decentralized profit functions are formulated for this study. Several cases and numerical examples are provided to validate this study. It is clear from the numerical findings that information sharing within the players provides 1.26% more profit compared to a decentralized case. Due to asymmetric information, which leads to the bullwhip effect, the retailing system faces loss. Thus, information sharing is 0.19% beneficial for dual-channel retailing. Sensitivity analysis for key parameters ensures the findings' applicability in the real world.     

Reciprocal value sharing in manufacturer-retailer relationships: the case of new product introductions

Prior literature examined reciprocity in the context of value creation. However, research has yet to examine whether reciprocity exists in value sharing. To address this gap, the authors examine retailer’s reciprocal value sharing with its manufacturer in relation to new product introductions. The authors test, via a survey of retail managers, whether reciprocal value sharing is influenced by an interaction of manufacturer’s prior new product success with innovativeness of a manufacturer’s products and the frequency of new product introduction. The results indicate that a retailer’s reciprocal value sharing is greater when the manufacturer historically launched successful new products, and that this effect is decreased with the innovativeness of a manufacturer’s products but increased with the frequency of new product introduction.     

Investigating a three-way interaction of manufacturer control,retail control and dependence on salesforce performance. Does the role of frontline employees matters ?

Dependence and retailer control on manufacturer's salesforce imply several challenges in retail channels. This research addresses how they affect the relationship between manufacturer control and salesforce performance due to the high level of salesforce investment. We conduct a moderated-moderation analysis.We investigate the moderating roles of retailer control and dependence on the relationship between manufacturer control and salesforce performance. To take into account the importance of the store frontline employee, we next studied the influence of his perception of the salesforce on the sales control systems in retailing. First, our results show that salesforce performance is influenced directly by manufacturer process control and, retail control and dependence moderate this relationship in two-way and three-way interactions. The salesforce subject to process control by manufacturer improves his performance under strong retailer outcome control while the manufacturer is in a low relative dependence. Second, employee perception of the salespeople mediates the link between manufacturer process and retailer outcome controls. We test our model in two studies and theoretically integrate retailer control, dependence, and employee perception of the salesforce, in the sales control literature. In the end, we provide practical implications to further improve salesforce performance and employee perception of the salespeople and future research suggestions.     

Optimal generic and brand advertising efforts in a decentralized supply chain considering customer surplus

While the previous researches of advertising efforts decisions focus on only the firms' profit target, no literature introduces corporation social responsibility target into advertising efforts decisions of a supply chain (SC). To fill this gap, we consider a two-stage SC with a manufacturer and a retailer where the SC members consider the customer surplus. Both the retailer and the manufacturer can invest in generic advertising efforts to influence and increase the products' sales volumes. This paper investigates the following four scenarios: (1) The retailer cares the customer surplus (Model I); (2) The manufacturer cares the customer surplus (Model II); (3) Both the retailer and the manufacturer care the customer surplus (Model III); (4) We then extend the model III to the case that the manufacturer invests in both the generic and brand advertising efforts (Model IV). The objective of this paper is to determine the optimal retail price, the optimal advertising efforts, and the optimal profits of SC members, and find the influence of customer concern level on the SC performance. Finally, numerical examples are conducted to investigate the influence of the customer concern levels of the retailer or the manufacturer on the profits of the SC members and the entire SC. We also study the joint impacts of the customer concern levels of the retailer and the manufacturer on the SC performance. We find that the SC obtains the highest profits when the retailer's customer concern level and the manufacturer's customer concern level are relatively high, and the best cooperative strategy for the retailer and the manufacturer is that they improve customer concern level simultaneously.     

Information Technology Use and Firm's Perceived Performance in Supply Chain Management

Purpose: This article proposes a theoretical model to investigate (a) a positive direct relationship between the specific use of ITs (applied to management) and the firm's performance as perceived by retailers and (b) a positive indirect relationship through information quality and information sharing.

Design/Methodology/Approach: The theoretical model proposed in this paper is contrasted using structural equation modelling of the retail distribution channel for home appliances.

Findings: The research shows that there is no positive direct relationship between the specific use of ITs and the retailer's perceived performance in the relationship with the provider. The results do, however, provide evidence for a positive indirect relationship through both information sharing and satisfaction obtained from the relationship with the provider.

Research Limitations: The analysis has been developed from the retail perspective. We suggest that future research focus on the retailer's and the provider's perspectives.

Practical Implications: In the context of SCM, the competitive advantages achieved through IT use derive from a better network of relationships between the firms involved as a result of greater information quality and information sharing. Specific use of ITs stimulates greater information sharing between retailer and provider and thus greater satisfaction and better perceived performance of the retailer in the relationship with the provider. However, the effect of IT use on information sharing occurs only through the quality of the information shared.

Originality/Value: The study shows that information quality is an antecedent of information sharing and that both information quality and information sharing act as necessary conditions for improving the retailer's perceived performance in the relationship with the provider. This article develops a measurement scale to evaluate the intensity of IT use. Finally, the research confirms that firm performance can be modeled as a second-level latent variable composed of three different dimensions (economic benefits, marketing benefits, and adaptation benefits).     

Strategic Decentralization and Channel Coordination

In this paper, we show that under certain conditions, strategic decentralization through the addition of a retailer in the distribution channel can increase a manufacturer's profits. The specific case on which we focus is the quantity coordination (double marginalization) problem for a manufacturer selling durable goods in a two-period setting. We show that the standard solution that coordinates a channel for non-durables does not coordinate the channel for durables. In particular, even though a manufacturer can achieve channel coordination by offering per-period, two-part fees, the equilibrium wholesale price in the first period is strictly above the manufacturer's marginal cost. This is in stark contrast to the two-part solution for non-durables where the equilibrium wholesale price is equal to marginal cost. We also identify a strategy that solves both the channel coordination and the Coase problem associated with durable goods. In this strategy, at the beginning of period 1, the manufacturer writes a contract with the retailer specifying a fixed fee and wholesale prices covering both periods. We show that by adding a retailer and using this contract, the manufacturer makes higher profits than it could if it were to sell directly to consumers.     

The effects of multi-channel assortment integration on customer confusion

Abstract

The effects of assortment strategy on customer confusion have been discussed for singular channels in the past. However, multi-channel retailers also have to coordinate their assortment across channels. Recent literature has started to investigate which assortment integration strategy is most favourable for retailers, but theoretical and empirical research is still scarce. Until today, customer confusion has not been considered in this discussion. This article seeks to identify the impact of a retailer’s assortment integration on customer overload confusion, assortment perception and their consequences. In an experiment, we manipulate assortment integration internally (online and offline channel of the focal retailer; full and asymmetrical integration) and externally (online channel of the focal retailer and a competing online retailer; full, asymmetrical and no integration). The results indicate that both internal and external assortment integration have an impact on overload confusion and assortment perception. Asymmetrical internal integration induces less overload confusion in terms of its cognitive and affective components and leads to superior assortment perception. Full and asymmetrical external integration evoke less confusion with regard to its cognitive component. Eventually, overload has detrimental short- and long-term effects for the retailer. Multi-channel retailers should consider our results when implementing an assortment integration strategy.     

Reconciling conflict of interests in a green retailing channel with green sales effort

In this paper, we address conflicting objectives in a two-echelon retailer-manufacturer green retailing channel (GRC) with two types of substitutable green and non-green products. In the investigated model, the government pays (charges) the manufacturer a certain amount of subsidies (penalties) for producing green (non-green) products. The retailer can implement a green sales effort program to encourage customers to purchase green items instead of non-green products. In so doing, the retailer can transfer an uncertain amount of non-green demand to the green demand, while the total demand over both products remains constant. However, while producing green products is advantageous for the manufacturer due to governmental interventions, this is not the case for the retailer. To mitigate this conflict, we develop a game-theoretical model and a coordination mechanism that reconciles both members' interests. By applying the novel revenue-cost sharing along with a buyback (RCS&B) contract as an incentive mechanism, we mitigate conflicts and coordinate ordering and sales effort decisions throughout the channel. Our results show that the RCS&B contract may be quite effective in managing conflicting objectives toward aligning both GRC members’ interests. The proposed contract creates an economically viable, ambidextrous GRC by devising Pareto-improving solutions.     

Communication and Promotion Decisions in Retailing: A Review and Directions for Future Research

Communication and promotion decisions are a fundamental part of retailer customer experience management strategy. In this review paper, we address two key questions from a retailer's perspective: (1) what have we learned from prior research about promotion, advertising, and other forms of communication and (2) what major issues should future research in this area address. In addressing these questions, we propose and follow a framework that captures the interrelationships among manufacturer and retailer communication and promotion decisions and retailer performance. We examine these questions under four major topics: determination and allocation of promotion budget, trade promotions, consumer promotions and communication and promotion through the new media. Our review offers several useful insights and identifies many fruitful topics and questions for future research.     

信息共享下双渠道制造商与零售商协调研究

随着internet的应用越来越广泛,许多制造商不仅使用传统的销售商渠道销售产品,而且通过网上直销的方式进行产品销售,双渠道增加了渠道之间的竞争。零售商为了在渠道竞争中获得优势,可以通过花费一定的成本增加零售产品价值。通过建立博弈模型分析强势制造商在对零售商信息完全、信息不完全情况下的定价策略,分析得出制造商获得零售商信息的价值,以及零售商愿意向制造商分享成本信息时的临界收益,旨在提出参考建议。     

Pure Components versus Pure Bundling in a Marketing Channel

This paper examines how channel interactions influence product bundling decisions by channel members. Specifically, what products or bundles should be offered, at what prices, and by which channel members, in equilibrium. To answer this, we analyze Stackelberg games between a manufacturer and retailer, with pricing and bundling as decision variables, under discrete and uniform continuous distributions of reservation prices. We find that selling pure components by both manufacturer and retailer is the equilibrium except in a narrow region of the parameter space. However, if the manufacturer can sell bundles and prevent unbundling, then such a bundling strategy is optimal in many cases. Interestingly, the channel and retailer also benefit from this strategy.     

Forecast information and traditional retailer performance in a dual-channel competitive market

Independent firms in a dual-channel competitive market are expected to have their own information about the nature of the market. In this research, we develop a game-theoretic model to examine the value of forecast information about consumers' willingness to pay. The model is based on a simultaneously played Bertrand game. Our results indicate that the profits of online as well as traditional retailers always increase with forecast accuracy, and that forecast accuracy has a greater effect on the performance of the traditional retailer than on that of the online retailer. Our results also show that the difference in profit between that of the traditional retailer and the online retailer increases with forecast accuracy. In addition we find that forecast accuracy is much more valuable to the traditional retailer when there is an increasing volatility in the market, an increasing level of consumer valuation of the product, and an increasing intensity in market competition. Based on our results, we derive optimal market strategies and identify directions of future research.     

How a novel option contract helps a green product to enter a traditional product's retailing channel: A mathematical modeling approach

Multi-sourcing is a practical strategy in retail channels that allows retailers facing uncertainties to respond more effectively to consumers' needs by distributing market demand across multiple supply sources. In this respect, this research investigates a price-setting retailing channel, including two manufacturers (a traditional manufacturer and a green manufacturer) and one retailer where end-of-life products can be collected. The retailer faces an uncertain price-dependent demand and sets orders from both supply directions based on a low-cost ordering approach. The primary purpose of this study is to develop an optimal solution to allow the green product to enter the retailing channel of the non-green product. Accordingly, this research develops and compares two different contractual mechanisms from the standpoint of the green manufacturer/retailer and the supply chain (SC): (1) a penalty-based contract and (2) a modified call option contract mixed with a cost-sharing mechanism. The main contribution of the current paper is to investigate an option contract for the effective management of a closed-loop supply chain and combine it with a cost-sharing contract as a new approach. Another contribution is that the developed model considers two practical channels for collecting and returning obsolete products to the green manufacturer: (1) the retailer is responsible for collecting and returning obsolete products, and (2) collecting and returning obsolete products is outsourced to a third-party logistics provider (3PL). Eventually, the models' efficiency is verified by investigating different numerical experiments, discovering that the proposed reservation-based contract outperforms the penalty-based contract for both parties' profitability and retailing channel's improvement. Besides, the present study finds that hiring 3PL significantly increases the green manufacturer's profit compared to other scenarios.     

How does the added new online channel impact the supporting advertising expenditure?

This research addresses the strategic effect of a newly added online channel on a manufacturer’s supportive advertising expenditure once a manufacturer opts to open an online channel to compete with its retailer. We first study the manufacturer–traditional retailer supply chain and consider three different scenarios: (1) product is less compatible with the online channel than with the traditional channel; (2) product is more compatible with the online channel than with the traditional channel; (3) product has the same compatibility with the online channel as with the traditional channel. Our results show that the added online channel significantly impacts the manufacturer’s investment in supportive advertising. Depending on the different product categories, the impact of the newly added online channel on the supportive advertising expenditure also will be different. Furthermore, we extend our model to study the manufacturer–online retailer supply chain and investigate the effect of that added online channel on the manufacturer’s supportive advertising to the online retailer. Based on our results, the manufacturer can utilize our findings to improve its decision-making when it plans to open an online channel to improve its product distribution.     

基于物流合作与信息共享的供应链战略研究

探讨基于物流合作与信息共享的供应链战略。分析表明制造商将MRP滚动表上信息与供应商共享,可以使双方获益;制造商和物流服务商合作决策,订货频次增高,使订货批量小型化,可以大幅降低制造商的库存水平,提高经济效益。通过信息共享的水平层次和物流合作的程度,总结出五种信息共享战略。     

Efficient replenishment in the distribution channel

Efficient replenishment (ER), a business process that involves the reduction of order cost to facilitate deliveries of goods from the manufacturer to the retailer, is becoming increasingly important in distribution channel management. While a well-executed ER program is expected to lower total channel costs and increase channel profit, very little is known about how this incremental channel profit is distributed between the manufacturer and the retailer and how it varies across the two common channel relationship structures, retailer price leadership and manufacturer price leadership.In this paper, we develop the conditions under which the manufacturer and the retailer gain more or less from the adoption of ER based on a game theoretic channel model of bilateral monopoly under the two channel relationship structures. We develop analytic results on the impact of ER on purchase quantity, price and the distribution of profits in three cases, namely, (1) when only the retailer adopts ER, (2) when both the manufacturer and the retailer adopt ER, and (3) when the manufacturer and the retailer are vertically integrated in the distribution channel, which adopts ER.The results, which can be generalized for all demand functions, show that the manufacturer benefits from the retailer's adoption of ER only when the manufacturer's holding cost relative to the retailer's is sufficiently large, relative to its order cost relative to the retailer's. By adopting ER, the retailer gains more than what the manufacturer gains even if the manufacturer is the price leader. Both the parties are likely to gain more if they both adopt ER than if only the retailer adopts ER. The incremental channel profit due to the retailer's ER adoption is highest in a vertically integrated distribution channel and is greater in a retailer-led channel relationship than in a manufacturer-led relationship.     

Effect of strategy,structure and performance variables on store brand market share

The results obtained by store brands in a large number of markets have been favoured by a set of factors. Prominent among these factors are the actions by manufacturers and distributors on price and differentiation, market competition at both a manufacturer and a retailer level, and the economic-financial results of the latter for the product categories in which they work with a store brand. This research presents an explanatory fixed effects panel model of the market share of these brands that shows clearly the influence of the variables of competitive strategy, structure and performance. The study is applied to the Spanish market for 50 consumer product categories over 5 years, from 1996 to 2000.     

供应链成员企业投资RFID技术的激励机制：共享收入与谈判批发价的比较

许多已有研究发现供应链成员投资RFID技术的动机是一致的，它们假定投资前后的批发价能以相同方式制定。然而，供应链成员在投资前可能已达成固定的批发价。考虑包含一个制造商(她)和一个零售商(他)的供应链系统，成员可采用如分享销售收入(RS)、重新谈判批发价格(WR)、二者并用(B)的激励机制。结果发现在WR和B下，当制造商的谈判权力中等且标签成本较小时，投资RFID能实现双赢，但两家企业的投资动机不总是完全一致；当初始批发价足够高时，若制造商的谈判权力足够强，制造商和零售商对WR的偏好都高于N，对B的偏好都高于RS；当初始批发价较低时，若制造商的谈判权力中等，双方对RS的偏好都高于WR。若制造商的谈判权力较强，供应链系统在B下的收益比WR下的高；若制造商的谈判权力中等或较弱，供应链系统在B或WR下的收益都比N和RS下的高。