The Effect of New Product Announcements and Preannouncements on Stock Price

Previous event studies which deal with new products do notdistinguish between preannouncements (made in advance of a new productintroduction into the marketplace) and new product announcements (made closeto the time when the new product is introduced). Methodologically, eventstudies implicitly assume that information is homogeneous; that is, they donot consider the amount of information contained in the news release or thetype (e.g., whether detailed or not). This paper argues that new productevent studies should distinguish between announcements and preannouncementsbecause both types of information release events (IRE) are strategicallydistinct and convey different information signals to the marketplace.Methodologically, event studies should allow for informationalheterogeneity. We analyze a large sample of IREs from the 1980–1989period for firms whose stock is publicly traded, distinguishing betweenpreannouncements and announcements. We use content analysis to classify IREsaccording to the type and amount of information provided. The results showthat it is incorrect to jointly analyze announcements and preannouncements.On average, only preannouncements have a significant positive effect onstock prices. However, the signaling effect of preannouncements on stockprice is industry-specific. In particular, the results support Klein andLefflers theory (1981) that preannouncements in the manufacturing industryare effective strategic tools. We also investigate the impact of IREs onthe market risk (i.e., the risk that stockholders cannot diversify away) ofthe announcing and preannouncing firms. The results show that firm-specificand informational variables do not have any effect on market risk,regardless of the type of IRE (i.e., announcement or preannouncement).     

Entry deterrence/accommodation with imperfect strategic thinking capability

Both through empirical research and laboratory experiments it has been shown that managers are heterogeneous in strategic thinking-i.e., not all the managers can accurately conjecture their competitors’ behavior and actions. In this paper, we examine the entry deterrence/accommodation strategy of an incumbent firm facing a potential entrant that may behave less strategically than the incumbent in the way of conjecturing competitors’ actions and beliefs. We adapt the Cognitive Hierarchy model to capture this heterogeneity among the managers of the entrant firm and the incumbent firm. Surprisingly, we show that the incumbent can deter entry by investing in expanding the market size and the competition may increase the incumbent’s incentive to invest in market expansion. If entry does occur, the market expansion in our model also benefits entrant comparing to the case without market expansion. This feature of our result sets it apart from the standard result in the entry deterrence literature, which tends to suggest that incumbent has to either over-invest in actions harmful to entrant if entry occurs. In our model investing in expanding the market size makes the entrant to update its belief about the incumbent’s strategic thinking capability downward and thus, decreases the entrant’s expected profitability, which in turn deters entry. Our research has important implications especially for emerging markets given that the lack of management talent is a particularly severe problem among local firms in emerging markets and multinational companies pioneer in the emerging markets with great market expansion opportunities have to face the potential entry of local companies.     

Defending the Beachhead: Telstra versus Optus

Much less has been written about market defence strategy than about market attack. This article focuses on one aspect of defensive strategy, defending against a new market entrant – though much of the thinking would also apply to other competitive assaults, like a major new product launch. The article outlines a model of the response of the Australian telecoms incumbent, Telstra, after deregulation. The authors conclude that market leaders should avoid price wars, understand the points in the consumer decision process that are defendable and use inertial strategies. Consumers' views of the incumbent can dramatically change their perceptions of the new entrant too.     

New product preannouncements,advertising investments,and stock returns

This study examines the synergistic effects of advertising spending and new product preannouncements (NPPAs) on stock market responses. The empirical results indicate that returns of preannouncing firms over both the short- and long-term could be improved by an increase in advertising expenditure. Additionally, the results also show that the positive impacts of earnings and revenues can be enhanced, while the negative influence of trading costs can be reduced, for preannouncing firms with higher advertising expenditures. The holding returns of institutional investors can also increase with greater spending on advertising. Therefore, marketing communication strategies that aim to reduce information asymmetry within NPPAs, coupled with greater advertising expenditures, would yield more favorable investor responses.     

How incumbent firms foster consumer expectations, delay launch but still win the markets for next generation products

Consumers learn quality of many durable products through word-of-mouth information while firms launch new and improved products frequently in these markets. This paper examines firm incentives to invest in R&D to compete for patents in makets where consumers rely on word-of-mouth information and have expectations about the new products before launch. When its loss due to a possible entry is above a threshold, an incumbent has more incentives than a potential entrant to invest in R&D for patents. Moreover, if the current product is more profitable, its true quality is above consumer priors and the quality of the new product is below a threshold, it is optimal for the incumbent to launch the new product after a time lag. The later the optimal time of launch, the greater is the incumbent’s potential loss if entry occurs and greater its incentives is to invest in R&D versus that of the entrants. While potential entrants are generally thought to have more incentives to invest in a drastic innovation which results in a race to launch the new products, we show that the more drastic the innovation, the later the optimal time of launch and greater are the incumbent’s incentives to invest in R&D when the value added of the new product can be conveyed to all the consumers. Only when consumers are uncertain about the value added of the new product, the incumbent’s incentives are lower. We also demonstrate that by promoting consumer expectations about the new product before launch, an incumbent has more time to launch and higher probability of dominating its market.     

Entry mode selection and its impact on an incumbent supply chain coordination

This paper considers a supply chain where a manufacturer sells its product through a retailer. In such a market, a potential entrant can make a substitute product by imitating the incumbent's product and then sells it to the common market with one of three alternative entry modes: (i) selling through the incumbent's retailer, (ii) selling through another independent retailer, or (iii) selling directly to consumers. Faced with the entrant's entry, the manufacturer has managed to offer a value-added service to add to its product's value at a cost. We investigate the entrant's optimal entry mode when the manufacturer offers profit-sharing contracts to the retailer and when it does not, and discuss the impact of the potential invader's entry on the incumbent firms' performances. The results show that: (1) the entrant sells directly to consumers when faced with weak value competition, and sells through another retailer against fierce value competition. (2) If the value competition is relatively fierce and the efficiency of the value-added service is relatively high as well, the incumbent firms can benefit from the new entry. (3) A profit-sharing contract, as a coordination policy, can fully coordinate the incumbent supply chain no matter whether there exists a potential entrant or not, yet the entry can affect the distribution of the profits between the incumbent manufacturer and retailer.     

How to protect your premium product from low-price competitors: Price,quality, or portfolio adjustment?

In a game-theoretic framework, I analyze how a brand manufacturer can thwart new entrants into its market. Three strategic options are considered, a price adjustment of the premium product, a quality adjustment of the premium product and a portfolio adjustment of adding a fighter brand. In a basic setup, I show that the incumbent's best response to entry is to choose a portfolio adjustment. If, however, the incumbent is uncertain about whether the rival firm will enter the market, a price adjustment of the premium product might be the better alternative if launching the fighter brand is associated with costs. Moreover, if technological progress improves the efficiency of product development, a combined quality and portfolio adjustment might be the best alternative for the incumbent.     

Flirting with the enemy: online competitor referral and entry-deterrence

Internet retailers often compete fiercely for consumers through expensive marketing efforts like search engine advertising, online coupons and a variety of special deals. Against this background, it is somewhat puzzling that many online retailers have recently begun referring their website visitors to their direct competitors. In this paper, using an analytical model, we examine this counterintuitive practice and posit that an entry deterrence motive can potentially explain this marketplace puzzle. Specifically, we develop a model where two incumbents compete for consumers” business while facing a potential entrant who is deciding whether to enter the market. In addition to setting the price, each incumbent firm could potentially display a referral link to its direct competitor. Our analysis reveals that when confronted with a potential entry, an incumbent may refer consumers to its competitor, intensifying the market competition that could result in shutting off the entrant. Furthermore, we show that when referral efficiency is exogenous, it is possible that in equilibrium only one incumbent refers its customers to competitor (i.e., one-way referral) or both incumbents refer their customers to each other (i.e, two-way referral). When referral efficiency is endogenous, the ex-ante symmetric incumbents may choose asymmetric referral efficiencies ex-post. We extend the model in a number of directions including making the entrant share endogenous and allowing incumbents to be asymmetric. Overall, our results indicate that firms may be motivated by entry deterrence to voluntarily refer consumers to their direct competitors even when they are paid nothing for the referral.     

Consumer ethnocentrism,product necessity and quality perceptions of Russian consumers

Retail buyers in Russia have indicated that some customers have expressed a desire to purchase domestically produced products over imports. Consumer ethnocentrism has been proposed as a measure to provide retail buyers with the information necessary to market to these consumers. The purpose of this research is to determine if perceived product quality of products differs based on country of origin, product necessity and consumer ethnocentric tendency. A repeated measures ANOVA test indicates that perceived quality differs by necessity, by product, by country. A consumer ethnocentrism effect on the overall model, however, was not significant. We conclude that Russian consumers do perceive differences in product quality based on country of origin and product necessity, but that consumer ethnocentrism does not have an effect on perceived product quality.     

Tie-in contracts with downstream competition

A tie-in contract has frequently come under scrutiny for its role as an exclusionary device. A firm that is a monopolist in a primary market can utilize such contracts to exclude a more efficient rival in a secondary market. When the firms sell through competing retailers, the leveraging firm may offer tie-in contracts to the retailers inducing them to purchase both primary and secondary products entirely from it such that the rival is excluded. We examine whether such tie-in contracts are profitable for an incumbent firm under different conditions of (i) the ability to commit to prices by the upstream firms and (ii) downstream competition among the retailers. We show that when retailers compete in prices, then regardless of whether the entrant is able to commit to its own prices, an exclusionary tie-in strategy is profitable (not profitable) for the incumbent when it is able (unable) to commit to prices. However, when retailers compete in quantities, the entrant’s commitment ability does matter. Specifically, an exclusionary tie-in strategy (i) may be unprofitable for an incumbent when both upstream firms are able to commit to their prices, depending on the degree of cost advantage of the entrant; (ii) is always profitable when it alone can commit to its price; and (iii) is unprofitable when both upstream firms cannot commit to their prices. Our results extend to situations where the products are complementary or substitutes and where the retailers may be asymmetric in nature.     

One‐Way Compatibility,Two‐Way Compatibility and Entry in Network Industries

We study the strategic choice of compatibility between two initially incompatible network goods in a two‐stage game played by an incumbent and an entrant firm. Compatibility may be achieved by means of a converter. We derive a number of results under different assumptions about the nature of the converter (one‐way vs two‐way), the existence of property rights and the possibility of side payments. With incompatibility, entry deterrence occurs for sufficiently strong network effects. In the case of a two‐way converter, which can only be supplied by the incumbent, incompatibility will result in equilibrium unless side payments are allowed and the network externalities are sufficiently low. When both firms can build a one‐way converter and there are no property rights on the necessary technical specifications, the unique equilibrium involves full compatibility. Finally, when each firm has property rights on its technical specifications, full incompatibility is observed at the equilibrium with no side payments; when these are allowed the entrant sells access to its network to the incumbent which refuses to do the same and asymmetric one‐way compatibility results in equilibrium.     

Capacity Constrained Firms and Expansion Subsidies: Should Governments Avoid Generous Subsidies?

This paper examines entry deterrence and signaling when an incumbent firm experiences capacity constraints. Our results show that if the costs that constrained and unconstrained incumbents incur when expanding their facilities are substantially different, separating equilibria can be supported under large parameter values whereby information is perfectly transmitted to the entrant. If, in contrast, both types of incumbent face similar expansion costs, subsidies that reduce expansion costs can help move the industry from a pooling to a separating equilibrium with associated efficient entry. Nonetheless, our results demonstrate that if subsidies are very generous entry patterns remain unaffected, suggesting a potential disadvantage of policies that significantly reduce firms’ expansion costs.     

Should Variable Cost Aid to Attract Foreign Direct Investment be Banned? A European Perspective

The purpose of this paper is to analyze the European Commission’s approach to state aid to attract foreign direct investment (FDI) in a competition policy framework. The Commission considers variable cost aid (VCA) to be more distortive than start-up or fixed cost aid (FCA). This paper addresses that issue and checks whether allowing FCA while banning VCA is an optimal strategy for a supranational Competition Authority maximizing welfare. The model shows that a domestic government maximizing welfare always prefers VCA to FCA if both the incumbent and the entrant are foreign firms and if granting VCA does not cause the incumbent firm to exit the market. The model shows that banning VCA may lead to sub-optimal equilibria where welfare is not maximized.     

The Effects of Management’s Preannouncement Strategies on Investors’ Judgments of the Trustworthiness of Management

This paper examines the role of management’s earnings preannouncements on judgments about its trustworthiness by nonprofessional investors. We predict that management’s preannouncement decision and the resulting direction (e.g., favorable vs. unfavorable) of the earnings surprise influence investors’ ethical judgments about management’s trustworthiness; these judgments, in turn, are associated with investors’ other investment related judgments. We test our predictions in an experiment in which MBA students make investment-related judgments under four different preannouncement strategies. Consistent with our predictions, the results of our study show that managers’ preannouncement decisions are significantly associated with investors’ evaluations of management’s trustworthiness. Specifically, holding the size of the earnings surprise constant, we find that judgments of management’s trustworthiness are damaged more following (a) a negative as opposed to a positive earnings surprise, and (b) the release of a preannouncement compared to when management does not issue a preannouncement. Also consistent with our predictions, we find that evaluations of management’s trustworthiness are significantly and positively associated with judgments of the attractiveness of the firm’s equity as an investment. Based on our findings, we encourage further research to explore whether managers understand the trust implications associated with their preannouncement decisions and the extent to which this understanding influences their disclosure decisions. Anna M. Cianci is an Assistant Professor in the Accounting Department at Drexel University. She received her Ph.D. from Duke University in Accounting. Her primary research interests are judgement and decision making issues in financial accounting and auditing. Steve Kaplan is a Professor of Accounting at Arizona State University, where he has been a member of the faculty since 1981. He received his Ph.D. from the University of Illinois. He␣has published widely in journals such as The Accounting Review, Journal of Accounting Research, Journal of Accounting and Public Policy, Business Ethics Quarterly and Journal of Business Ethics. He is the Previous editor of Behavioral Research in Accounting, a section journal of the American Accounting Association. His primary research interests are behavioral issues, judgment and decision making, and ethics     

具有间接网络外部效应平台的动态竞争策略

双边市场是指平台两边有两组不同的代理人,通过一个公共平台发生交易,双边市场的重要特征是平台两边不同用户之间存在着间接网络外部性,用微分博弈的最优控制方法研究双边平台网络中在位者平台和高质量进入者的动态竞争,发现驱动市场成功的长期市场结构和市场效率的关键依赖于平台的质量和间接网络效应。均衡时两个平台或者共存或者占优,依赖于平台策略的选择。     

Local competition, entry, and agglomeration

This paper analyzes competition between two spatially differentiated multi-product retailers who encounter entry from a low-cost discounter. We assess how entry affects the pricing of the incumbent stores and the role played by the location of the entrant. Our primary objective is to identify how traditional retailers respond to new forms of low-cost retailing. Results show that post entry, the prices for some products are higher than the pre entry. However, which product prices increase depends on the incumbent’s location. Contrary to conventional wisdom, we find that the store closer to the entrant is better off compared to the incumbent located further away. We empirically demonstrate the main workings of our theory using sales data from several grocery stores that saw entry by discount stores in their trading areas.     

Discriminatory Prices,Predation and Signal-Jamming in a Horizontal Differentiation Model

We study the effects of predation in an asymmetric duopoly model à la Hotelling in which the incumbent is able to price discriminate while the entrant sets a uniform price. We show that when the discount factor is high (low) enough and the incumbent accommodates entrance the incumbent initially sets a uniform price (discriminatory prices) and then engages in price discrimination. Under certain conditions, the entrant prices aggressively in order to discourage predation from the incumbent: predation actually does not occur and all equilibrium prices are lower with respect to the case in which the threat of predation is absent. In a T-period model, we derive conditions under which the equilibrium prices increase over time until they stabilize at the level that would result in the absence of the threat of predation.     

Entry encouragement

In this paper, we investigate the possibility that a dominant firm will encourage rather than deter entry of a potential competitor. We find that entry can be encouraged by a dominant firm in order to induce a new entrant to resolve the demand uncertainty in a new market. We propose a specific incentive mechanism that the incumbent can use to encourage entry and find plausible circumstances under which entry encouragement is a dominant competitive strategy.INSEADInstituto de Analisis EconomicoINSEAD     

Strategic entrepreneurship's dynamic tensions: Converging (diverging) effects of experience and networks on market entry timing and entrant performance

In this paper, we return to the roots of strategic entrepreneurship research by examining the dynamic tension between opportunity-seeking and advantage-seeking activities and by testing key resources that affect both activities. More specifically, we identify the empirical manifestations of the two activities—market entry timing decisions and entrant performance—and examine the degree to which the type of resources (in particular, experience and networks) that enable firms to enter a new market space early converge with (or diverge from) the type of resources that enhance entrant performance. Through analysis of 78 new market spaces and the associated 6544 entrant games in the U.S. console video game industry between 1995 and 2012, we find that while some resources—particularly relevant experience—have convergent impacts on entry timing and entrant performance, the impacts of other resources—first-order and second-order embeddedness—on these two outcomes diverge. We demonstrate that this tension in terms of resource impact on the two aspects of strategic entrepreneurship persists as the markets evolve.     

Institutional quality and market selection in the transition to market economy

This paper investigates the impact of institutional quality on the productivity, profitability and survival of new entrants versus those of incumbent firms in a transitional setting, Vietnam. By integrating economic and institutional perspectives, we emphasize the importance of institutional quality in shaping the evolution of industry dynamics. We find that poor institutional quality that acts as institutional buffering for incumbents jeopardizes the Schumpeterian market selection process. In particular, despite being more productive and profitable, new entrants are still more likely to exit than incumbents on average. As a consequence, facing poor institutions, only new entrants with sufficiently high productivity and profitability are able to survive. However, improving institutional quality does not enhance new entrants' survival and entrepreneurial performance; rather, it removes the survival advantage of incumbents and thus reduces the differences in performance and exit hazard between new entrants and incumbents. We investigate this seemingly paradoxical relationship using Vietnamese census data from 2006 to 2013.