Price-Formation Process of an Emerging Futures Market: Call Auction Versus Continuous Auction

This study assesses the market qualities of alternative price-formation processes for an emerging futures market—the Taiwan futures market. In 2002, the price formation process in the market changed during the period of trade between call auction and continuous auction. The performances of call auction and continuous auction are compared using intraday data. Empirical results show that the market is more liquid, and volatility is slightly lower, under continuous auction than under call auction. Also, there is robust evidence that continuous auction improves informative efficiency. The study suggests that for an emerging futures market like that of Taiwan, continuous auction offers a better trading environment for futures trading. In addition to demonstrating the virtue of continuous auction, this study also finds that the asymmetry in volatility is related to the price formation process. The asymmetry effect exists under continuous auction, but not under call auction.     

How does the call market method affect price efficiency? Evidence from the Singapore Stock Market

On August 21, 2000, the Singapore Exchange (SGX) adopted the call market method to open and close the market while the remainder of the day’s trading continued to rely on the continuous auction method. The call method significantly improved the price discovery process and market quality. A positive spillover effect is observed from the opening and closing calls. Day-end price manipulation also declined after the introduction of the call market method. However, the beneficial impact from the call market method is asymmetric, benefiting liquid stocks more than illiquid stocks.     

Continuous Trading or Call Auctions: Revealed Preferences of Investors at the Tel Aviv Stock Exchange

We use the move of Israeli stocks from call auction trading to continuous trading to show that investors have a preference for stocks that trade continuously. When large stocks move from call auction to continuous trading, the small stocks that still trade by call auction experience a significant loss in volume relative to the overall market volume. As small stocks move to continuous trading, they experience an increase in volume and positive abnormal returns because of the associated increase in liquidity. Overall, though, a move to continuous trading increases the volume of large stocks relative to small stocks.     

Market structure and bid-ask spreads: IBIS vs Nasdaq

A comparison is made between the bid-ask spreads of 30 high volume German stocks traded on IBIS and 30 high volume US stocks traded on Nasdaq. IBIS and Nasdaq are best described as agency and dealer auction markets, respectively. On average, the market spread for these IBIS and Nasdaq stocks is the same, but for the 10 most active stocks in each market, IBIS spreads are considerably lower. For these latter stocks, IBIS spreads change in a predictable manner throughout the day. Nasdaq spreads do not. The critical factor appears to be the unrestricted access of suppliers of immediacy that is distinctive for agency auction markets.     

Liquidity in auction and specialist market structures: Evidence from the Italian bourse

Several studies find that bid-ask spreads for stocks listed on the NYSE are lower than for stocks listed on NASDAQ. While this suggests that specialist market structures provide greater liquidity than competing dealer markets, the nature of trading on the NYSE, which comprises a specialist competing with limit order flow, obfuscates the comparison. In 2001, a structural change was implemented on the Italian Bourse. Many stocks that traded in an auction market switched to a specialist market, where the specialist controls order flow. Results confirm that liquidity is significantly improved when stocks commence trading in the specialist market. Analysis of the components of the bid-ask spread reveal that the adverse selection component of the spread is significantly reduced. This evidence suggests that specialist market structures provide greater liquidity to market participants.     

Price synchronicity: The closing call auction and the London stock market

In this paper, we consider the impact of the introduction of a closing call auction on market quality of the London Stock Exchange. We employ the market model, RDD and MEC metrics of market quality. These signify substantial improvements to market quality at both the close and open for migrating stocks. We note that these improvements are larger at the open than the close. An important contribution of our paper is that we show that changes to market quality are stronger in those securities that have the lowest liquidity in the pre-call period. In contrast, market quality changes following the introduction of a closing call auction are approximately neutral for high-liquidity securities. We conclude that the implementation of a closing call auction, for high-liquidity securities may not enhance market quality.     

Market structure, informational efficiency and liquidity: An experimental comparison of auction and dealer markets

We report the results of 18 market experiments that were conducted in order to compare the call market, the continuous auction and the dealer market. Transaction prices in the call and continuous auction markets are much more efficient than prices in the dealer markets. The call market shows a tendency towards underreaction to new information. Execution costs are lowest in the call market and highest in the dealer market. The trading volume and Roll's (Journal of Finance (1984) 1127–1139) serial covariance estimator are inappropriate measures of execution costs in the present context. The relation between private signals, trading decisions and trading profits is analyzed.     

Not all call auctions are created equal: evidence from Hong Kong

On 25 March 2002, the Hong Kong Exchanges and Clearing Ltd (HKEx) introduced an opening call auction. This trading mechanism is designed to facilitate price discovery in the presence of asymmetric information at the market open, increasing opening price efficiency. The design of the HKEx differs significantly from opening auctions in other markets. Contrary to previous research, the results indicate a decrease in market quality following the introduction of the opening call auction. This decline is largest in the less actively traded stocks.

Opening and closing behavior following the introduction of call auctions in Singapore

The Singapore Exchange introduced opening and closing call auctions in August 2000. We find that the frequency of call trades is lower than on other markets. However, when auctions are used, the percentage of daily volume traded in the auction is high. Many days without call trades have quotes during the pre-call periods so that there is an opportunity for learning about equilibrium prices even when there are no call trades. Consistent with prior research, the introduction of call auctions enhances market quality at the open and the close. The call auctions also helped to address the issues that motivated their introduction in Singapore. That is, they increased the volume traded at the opening in initial public offerings and reduced the incidence of closing price manipulation.     

A Regime-Level Empirical Model of the Specialist Quote Revision Process

NYSE trading is a continuous auction process distinguished by order flow imbalances and non-coincident revision of the bid and the ask. To deal with the aggregation problem presented by non-coincident revision of the quotes, we propose a regime-level empirical model and use it to test the Brock and Kleidon queuing theory of a continuous auction. Using transactions data for IBM for calendar year 1988, Harris, McInish, and Chakravarity (1995) performed a Hausman-type specification test that confirmed the exogeneity of order flow volumes at the bid and the ask. Extending their work, this paper estimates two simultaneous autoregressive ask and bid equations for 50 randomly selected stocks and contrasts thinly traded and volatile stocks. The results support Brock and Kleidon's distinguishing implication—namely, exogenous increases in trading volume raise the ask and lower the bid. Although some queuing system characteristics prove endogenous in thinly traded stocks and in especially volatile stocks, exogenous order flow volume continues to increase spreads across the 50 stock sample. The paper draws conclusions about the appropriate specification of endogeneity, cross-equation disturbances from the bid to the ask, and cross-equation queuing information flows.     

开盘集合竞价透明度与市场质量

通过采用个股与市场同步法和价格反转的分析方法研究开盘集合竞价透明度与市场质量之间的关系,发现从日内效应来看,开盘集合竞价透明度提高以后,交易者的执行成本增加,整体来说市场的流动性是降低了;从事件前后市场模型的拟合优度比较结果来看,开盘集合竞价透明度提高以后股票个股与市场反应不一致,价格发现效率降低,市场质量降低。     

Impact of the introduction of call auction on price discovery: Evidence from the Indian stock market using high-frequency data

Call markets are claimed to aggregate information and facilitate price discovery where continuous markets may fail. The impact of the introduction of call auction has not been found uniformly beneficial, possibly due to poor design or due to ‘thick market externalities’. This paper examines the reintroduction of opening call auction at the National Stock Exchange of India in 2010. The results suggest that the auctions attract very little volume, the intraday pattern of volume and volatility in the continuous market remains unchanged and a large fraction of price discovery, measured by the Weighted Price Contribution, still takes place in the first 15 min of continuous market. However, the market synchronicity has improved after the introduction of the auction. Our findings suggest that the ability to attract volume in the call auction for effective price discovery depends on the institutional settings and the characteristics of liquidity supply in the market.     

Call auction algorithm design and market manipulation

It is commonly accepted that closing call auctions provide investors with access to closing prices, reduce volatility and reduce price manipulation. This paper argues that call auction design may influence the achievement of these objectives. The paper focuses on one aspect of call auction design, namely the matching algorithm used to set auction prices. Analysis of two real market cases indicates that different algorithms set different prices. The results also indicate that manipulation has a significant impact on call auction prices, with some algorithm designs more effective than others at reducing the impact of manipulation. Alternate call auction design features, such as volatility extensions, may be necessary to more effectively reduce closing price manipulation.     

Duration, volume and volatility impact of trades

This paper presents a framework to model duration, volume and returns simultaneously, obtaining an econometric reduced form that incorporates causal and feedback effects among these variables. The methodology is applied to two groups of stocks, classified according to trade intensity. We find that: (1) all stocks exhibit trading volume clustering (which is significantly higher for frequently traded stocks); (2) times of greater activity coincide with a higher number of informed traders present in the market only for the frequently traded stocks; (3) the more frequently traded stocks converge more rapidly (in calendar time) to their long-run equilibrium, after an initial perturbation.     

Do Unexpected Land Auction Outcomes Bring New Information to the Real Estate Market?

Land and real estate are intrinsically related but generally traded in two different markets. Vacant land, being a major “raw material” for development of real estate, is traded by developers who actively manage development risk for profit. Real estate, being a long lived final product, is traded by end-users or investors for use or investment in the secondary market. This study examines price discovery between the two markets. The key question is whether land transactions, in the form of public auctions, convey any new information to the secondary real estate market. Our results suggest unexpected land auction outcomes have both market-wide and local effects on real estate prices. However, the impacts are asymmetric. We found that lower than expected land auction prices have a significant negative market-wide and local impact on real estate prices while higher than expect land auction prices have little or no impact.     

Stock Price Behavior over Trading and Non-trading Periods: Evidence from the Taiwan Stock Exchange

This paper examines the stock price behavior in the trading and non-trading periods for stocks listed on the Taiwan Stock Exchange over 1971-96. The results indicate that the trading-time return variances are higher than the non-trading-time return variances especially for the larger trading-volume quintiles. This result is consistent with the private information hypothesis. Moreover, open-to-open return variances are higher than close-to-close return variances. Since both the opening and the closing transactions are conducted by the call auction procedure, the results are consistent with the trading halt hypothesis but not with the trading mechanism hypothesis.     

Market quality changes in the London Stock Market

This paper examines the impact that the introduction of a closing call auction had on market quality at the London Stock Exchange. Using estimates from the partial adjustment with noise model of Amihud and Mendelson [Amihud, Y., Mendelson, H., 1987. Trading mechanisms and stock returns: An empirical investigation. Journal of Finance 42, 533–553] we show that opening and closing market quality improved for participating stocks. When we stratify our sample securities into five groups based on trading activity we find that the least active securities experience the greatest improvements to market quality. A control sample of stocks are not characterized by discernable changes to market quality.     

The immediate price impact of trades on the Australian Stock Exchange

We study the immediate price impact of a single trade executed in the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX). By ordering the top 300 stocks on the ASX in order of their free float market capitalization, a clear pattern emerges, with higher cap stocks experiencing lower price impact than lower cap stocks for the same traded volume. We investigate this relationship in detail, and show that the price impact and liquidity scale as a power of the market capitalization. This relationship is used to obtain a single market impact curve which shows average price shift as a function of volume traded. We obtain similar results for every year from 2001 to 2004.     

Market abuse under different close price determination mechanisms: A European case

We examine the presence and the severity of closing price manipulation across two regulatory shifts in the close price determination mechanism in the Athens stock exchange. First, we assess the transition from a value-weighted average price (VWAP) method to a plain-vanilla closing call auction method (CCAM). Second, we examine the effectiveness of additional features of CCAMs in deterring closing price manipulation. We use tick level data with full investor details for a group of highly traded stocks. Our results suggest that the CCAM managed to reduce - but not eliminate - closing price manipulation. CCAMs with additional anti-manipulation features are not effective in eliminating closing price manipulation either. Manipulation is dynamic and investors quickly adapt to new circumstances and opportunities; post-CCAM implementation sell-based closing price manipulation has increased, while part of the manipulation activity has shifted to the reference price formation.     

THE EFFECT OF TRADED OPTION INTRODUCTION ON SHAREHOLDER WEALTH

Several authors suggest that the opening of a market in traded options constitutes a “feasibility-expanding” change. In this paper evidence on changes in the price of underlying stocks at the time of option listing is examined to determine whether option listing constitutes such a change. Evidence supports the hypothesis that call option listing is feasibility expanding, that put option listing is not feasibility expanding, and that call listings closer to the initiation of organized option trading have a larger impact relative to later listings.