Government debt spillovers in a monetary union

This paper presents estimates of the impact of debt issued by one government in a monetary union on the yields of the bonds issued by other governments in the union. These debt spillovers may occur if there is a risk of monetary accommodation, implicit or explicit inter-jurisdictional bailout provisions, or interdependent revenues. The analysis empirically distinguishes between two channels through which debt spillovers may affect bond yields: currency depreciation risk and default risk. Data on the yields of individual Canadian provincial government bonds for the period 1983–2005 are employed. No evidence is found of debt spillovers between provinces, but a one percentage point increase in the central government's debt to GDP ratio raises the yield on provincial government bonds by 4.2 basis points—2.9 basis points by increasing the expected depreciation rate of the Canadian dollar and 1.3 basis points by raising the risk of provincial government default. These results imply that a rise in the Canadian central government debt to GDP ratio from 0.25 to 0.58, equivalent to the rise that occurred between 1983 and 1995, would lead to an increase in provincial government bond yields of approximately 140 basis points.     

Long-run and short-run determinants of sovereign bond yields in advanced economies

We analyze determinants of sovereign bond yields in 22 advanced economies over the 1980–2010 period using panel cointegration techniques. The application of the cointegration methodology allows distinguishing between long-run (debt-to-GDP ratio, potential growth) and short-run (inflation, short-term interest rates, etc.) determinants of sovereign borrowing costs. We find that in the long run, government bond yields increase by about 2 basis points in response to a 1 percentage point increase in government debt-to-GDP ratio and by about 45 basis points in response to a 1 percentage point increase in the potential growth rate. In the short run, sovereign bond yields deviate from the level determined by the long-run fundamentals, but about half of the deviation adjusts in one year. When considering the impact of the global financial crisis on sovereign borrowing costs in euro area countries, the estimations suggest that spreads against Germany in some European periphery countries exceeded the level determined by fundamentals in the aftermath of the crisis, while some North European countries have benefited from “safe-haven” flows.     

Democratic transition and fiscal policy in the Arab world

This paper investigates the relationship between democracy and public debt in the Arab world over the period 2002–2013. The results show strong evidence of an inverted U-shaped relationship between democracy and public debt. This means that democratization is associated with lower debt only when a certain level of democracy is reached. In an attempt to explain these findings, we assume that the effect of democracy on public debt operates mainly through its impact on government spending and government revenue. Our results show that the inverted U-shaped relationship between democracy and public debt stems from the inverted U-shaped democracy-government spending path and the U-shaped democracy-government revenue pattern. This implies that, at the earlier stages of democratization, democracy is associated with an increase in government spending and a decrease in government revenue, which stimulates public debt. However, beyond a certain level of democracy, further democratization reduces government spending and enhances government revenue, leading to lower levels of public debt. Hence, achieving some level of democracy is a key prerequisite to improve the effectiveness of public spending, enhance tax compliance, and thereby control public debt.     

GOVERNMENT SIZE AND GROWTH: A REJOINDER

In our 2011 survey of the literature in the Journal of Economic Surveys on the effect of government size on economic growth in wealthy countries we find a relatively consistent pattern: An increase in government size by 10 percentage points is associated with a 0.5–1 percentage point lower annual growth rate. This conclusion is questioned by Colombier. In this rejoinder we present a rebuttal of Colombier's argument based on a detailed scrutiny of his own statistical evidence and regression results. Furthermore, we note that several new papers that have appeared since our original paper was published give support to our main conclusion.     

Causality-in-variance and causality-in-mean between the Greek sovereign bond yields and Southern European banking sector equity returns

This paper adopts the robust cross-correlation function methodology developed by Hong (J Econom 103:183–224, 2001) in order to test for volatility and mean spillovers between Greek long-term government bond yields and the banking sector stock returns of four Southern European countries, namely Greece, Portugal, Italy, and Spain. Its primary focus is on investigating the potential impacts of the recent European sovereign debt crisis. While most previous studies have focused on within-country causalities, we rather assess cross-country transmission effects. The presented results provide evidence of bidirectional volatility spillovers between Greek long-term interest rates and the banking sector equities of Portugal, Italy, and Spain that emerged during the European sovereign debt crisis. We also find significant unidirectional causality-in-mean from bank stock returns in Greece to Greek long-term bond yields during the crisis period as well as significant causality at the mean level from the bank equity returns in Portugal, Italy, and Spain to Greek bond yields.     

Peripheries well able to cope with wider bond spreads

• While a four‐year golden period for many peripheral Eurozone governments of rising GDP growth and falling global bond yields may be coming to an end, we doubt that we will see a sharp widening of Eurozone bond spreads in 2017.
• Although higher yields are clearly not positive news for heavily indebted peripheral governments, our view is that the pace of increase in risk‐free long‐term yields will be fairly gradual this year – we expect ten‐year Bund yields to climb to just 0.6% or so by the end of 2017. Such a development is unlikely to prompt markets to demand far higher compensation for the higher risk associated with holding peripheral debt.
• Indeed, both the Italian and Spanish governments should be able to borrow at long maturities and at rates comfortably below their average rate on their outstanding stock of debt of 3% or so, throughout this year and probably beyond, even if spreads rise.
• Meanwhile, a key factor behind the rise in bond yields – the prospect of higher inflation – will have some positive effects. Higher inflation will erode the real value of outstanding debt and make it easier for intra‐Eurozone imbalances to be resolved. At the margin, a steeper yield curve will also help to boost banks' profits on lending.
• Finally, although populists support has grown, the risk of populist governments taking power in the periphery are fairly low. Italy and Spain may hold early elections, but it is not a given that elections will be held this year. And in the event of an election, we do not attach a high chance to the election of populist parties in either economy.
• Overall, while 2017 may be a bumpy one for spreads, particularly in Italy, we see only a modest widening from their current levels, reflecting improvements in the debt sustainability positions of the peripheral governments. But even these modest gains will mean Bunds would still outperform Italian and Spanish government bonds over the next year on a total returns basis.

     

Evaluating the sustainability of Italian public finances

Are Italy’s primary-surplus policies compatible with the sustainability of government debt? We address the question by examining historical budget data in post-unification Italy, from 1861 to 2016. Controlling for temporary output, temporary spending and world war-time periods in assessing whether primary surpluses significantly reacted to changes in debt, we find the following results: (i) the hypothesis of nonlinearity in the surplus-debt relationship significantly outperforms the hypothesis of linearity; (ii) there exists a threshold level in the debt-GDP ratio, approximately equal to 105 percent, above which Italian fiscal policy makers are concerned with corrective actions to avoid insolvency; (iii) the robustly positive reaction of primary surpluses to debt beyond the trigger point ensures fiscal sustainability.     

政府债务对经济增长的影响及作用渠道

基于1960～2010年113个国家的面板数据集,运用系统广义矩动态面板方法和稳健性分析,比较发达国家和发展中国家政府债务经济增长效应的差异,并尝试分析政府债务影响经济增长的渠道。研究结果显示,政府债务对经济增长有非线性影响;发达国家政府债务对经济增长、投资以及全要素生产率均无显著影响;发展中国家对政府债务的直接承受力更弱,但在一个宽松的临界点内,政府债务的增加可以提高投资率。     

DEFINING THE GOVERNMENT'S DEBT AND DEFICIT

Although the budget deficit and the public debt feature prominently in political debate and economic research, there is no agreement about how they should be measured. They can be defined for different sets of public institutions, including the nested sets corresponding to central government, general government, and the public sector, and, for any definition of government, there are many measures of the debt and deficit, including those generated by four kinds of accounts (cash, financial, full accrual, and comprehensive), which can be derived from four nested sets of assets and liabilities. Each debt and deficit measure says something about public finances, but none tells the whole story. Each is also vulnerable to manipulation, and is likely to be manipulated if it is subject to a binding fiscal rule or target. Narrow definitions of government encourage the shifting of spending to entities outside the defined perimeter of government. Narrow definitions of debt and deficit encourage operations involving off‐balance‐sheets assets and liabilities, while broad measures are susceptible to the mismeasurement of on‐balance‐sheet assets and liabilities. Reviewing the literature on these issues, the paper concludes that governments should publish several measures of the debt and deficit in a form that clearly reveals their interrelationships.     

The US debt–growth nexus along the business cycle

We use the US data gathered by Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) to assess whether debt affects economic growth differently at different phases of the business cycle. In order to do that, we extend the threshold regression model of Chudik et al. (2017) and propose a new threshold quantile ARDL regression model. Our results show that to stimulate growth policy makers can manage the debt/GDP percentage according to how well the economy is doing. The estimated quantile thresholds (range 31–53 per cent) are larger than the one found by Lee et al. (2017) using median regressions, but still (much) smaller than the 90 per cent of Reinhart and Rogoff. In particular, when the US economy observes growth rates above their median value, that is when a smaller debt-to-GDP threshold affects the performance of the economy. In a steady-state situation, in general, regardless of the position of the business cycle and whether the debt-to-GDP ratio is below or above its threshold effect, less debt as a percentage of GDP boosts the US growth. Remarkably, this effect was always greater before than after World War II. Moreover, the most recent decades have witnessed the negative (positive) effect of more (less) debt when the economy had growth rates at their first quartile (median and third quartile). That is, the US policy makers are advised to reduce the debt-to-GDP ratio during expansions to promote growth.     

债务率、偿债压力与地方债务的经济增长效应

研究目标：中国地方政府债务对于经济增长的门限效应。研究方法：基于债务率,即债务存量与地方政府综合财力的比值的视角,利用中国30个省份2010~2014年年底的地方债务余额数据,对地方债务的经济增长效应进行了实证研究。研究发现：中国地方债务存在明显的经济增长门限效应：当债务率高于112%左右之后,原本正向显著的经济增长促进作用基本趋近于无,而其作用渠道可以明确为如下传导机制,债务率高企带来地方政府偿债压力从而影响经济发展导向的财政支出。研究创新：引入债务率指标并基于偿债压力视角分析了地方债务对于经济增长的作用机制。研究价值：对于我国地方政府债务的管控治理和风险防范,具有重要的参考价值。     

GOVERNMENT SIZE AND GROWTH: A SURVEY AND INTERPRETATION OF THE EVIDENCE

Abstract The literature on the relationship between the size of government and economic growth is full of seemingly contradictory findings. This conflict is largely explained by variations in definitions and the countries studied. An alternative approach – of limiting the focus to studies of the relationship in rich countries, measuring government size as total taxes or total expenditure relative to GDP and relying on panel data estimations with variation over time – reveals a more consistent picture. The most recent studies find a significant negative correlation: an increase in government size by 10 percentage points is associated with a 0.5% to 1% lower annual growth rate. We discuss efforts to make sense of this correlation, and note several pitfalls involved in giving it a causal interpretation. Against this background, we discuss two explanations of why several countries with high taxes seem able to enjoy above average growth. One hypothesis is that countries with higher social trust levels are able to develop larger government sectors without harming the economy. Another explanation is that countries with large governments compensate for high taxes and spending by implementing market‐friendly policies in other areas. Both explanations are supported by ongoing research.     

Japan’s impactful augmentation of quantitative easing sovereign-bond purchases

This article examines how and to what extent large-scale government bond purchases in the Bank of Japan’s monetary policy affected two components of long-term interest rates over the period 2009–2015. The article divides market yields on popular 5 and 10-year government bonds into future policy-rate expectations with uncertainty and a specific type of term premia required by investors for the bonds’ demand/supply imbalances, by using overnight index swap rates as a proxy for the former. The Bank of Japan augmented the purchases substantially by starting Quantitative and Qualitative Monetary Easing (QQME) in 2013. The QQME became impactful in the sense that it encouraged investors to improve the first component whilst reducing the second component. These appeared mainly as persisting announcement-effects – upward level shifts of the expectations and downward ones of the term premia. The reduction of term premia was much greater for the 10-year maturity than for 5-year one and strengthened after an additional expansion of the QQME in 2014. The QQME is estimated to have enhanced 5-year sovereign bond yields by 11.9 basis points (bps) a month on average whilst reducing 10-year ones by 8.3 bps. The impact on the 5-year yields turned to be negative after the QQME expansion.     

Government debt,learning and the term structure

Does a change in the public׳s holdings of government debt affect the term structure of interest rates? Empirical analysis using a VAR model indicates that a rise in these holdings of the real debt-to-GDP ratio increases both the three-month and ten-year U.S. nominal yields in a statistically significant manner. The maturity composition of debt is also found to matter: innovations in holdings of long-term debt affect the term structure, while increases in short-term debt affect inflation expectations. These effects of changes in holdings of debt on the yield curve can be derived in a general equilibrium model in which the government issues exponentially-maturing riskless debt, financed by lump-sum taxes, and the optimizing agents are adaptive learners. On calibrating the average maturity of debt in the model to match that of U.S. Treasury debt since the 1980s, I find that positive innovations in government debt lead to increases in asset yields. This is because agents do not learn the principle of Ricardian equivalence exactly, and perceive increases in holdings of government bonds as a rise in their net wealth. Imposing rational expectations on the agents eliminates this channel, and changes in holdings of government debt have no effect on yields. The learning model also implies that as the real debt-to-GDP ratio increases, and the average maturity of debt becomes longer, the agents become less likely to learn that Ricardian equivalence holds.     

Banking and sovereign debt crises in a monetary union without central bank intervention

We analyze the conditions of emergence of a twin banking and sovereign debt crisis within a monetary union in which: (i) the central bank is not allowed to provide direct financial support to stressed member states or to play the role of lender of last resort in sovereign bond markets, and (ii) the responsibility of fighting against large scale bank runs, ascribed to domestic governments, is ensured through the implementation of a financial safety net (banking regulation and government deposit guarantee). We show that this broad institutional architecture, typical of the Eurozone at the onset of the financial crisis, is not always able to prevent the occurrence of a twin banking and sovereign debt crisis triggered by pessimistic investors’ expectations. Without significant backstop by the central bank, the financial safety net may actually aggravate, instead of improve, the financial situation of banks and of the government.     

Network analysis of local currency Asian government bond markets: Assessments of the ABFI and the ABMI

The purpose of this paper is to assess local currency (LCY) Asian government bond markets using network analysis during the period 2001–2017. In particular, we (i) assess how the network of the markets is connected (integrated), (ii) assess how the risks over the network diverge following a risk shock in one market, and (iii) determine under what conditions rapid reconvergence occurs. We found that the network of LCY Asian government bond markets is fully connected by the Asian Bond Fund Initiative and the Asian Bond Market Initiative, and thus, risk can reach further out faster in the web of stronger relationships in the post-2008 period. The quarantine of and assistance for risks in the center market lead to rapid reconvergence compared with other markets. These findings suggest the success of LCY Asian government bond financing promoted by ABFI and ABMI, triggering LCY Asian corporate bond financing.     

Forecast in detail

The immediate fiscal consequences of the coronavirus pandemic are likely to be greater than those of the financial crisis in 2008–09. This reflects both the damage to the economy from containment measures and the cost of government policies to support incomes. But with gilt yields close to record lows and demand for UK government debt bolstered by BoE purchases, the interest cost of a temporary surge in the deficit should be modest.     

一种新的地方政府债务风险预警系统设计与应用

本文围绕构建地方政府债务风险预警系统,首先综合运用TOPSIS法和德尔菲法确定了样本的债务风险综合评价值;然后利用支持向量机,提出了基于结构风险最小化的地方政府债务风险预警模型,并将该模型的求解转化为非线性规划仅有线性约束问题,解决了传统方法中忽略模型置信范围、需要样本数量大及过度学习等缺陷。在实证研究中,基于训练样本的模型平均绝对百分精度达99. 69%,基于检验样本的模型平均绝对百分精度达96. 99%,数值结果表明本文所设计的地方政府债务风险预警系统是有效的,可行的。     

Public versus private provision of liquidity: Is there a trade-off?

To what extent is public debt private liquidity? Much policy advice given in the aftermath of the financial crisis rests on the assumption that increasing public debt relaxes borrowing constraints of private households. This is the case for ad-hoc debt limits, which are exogenous to public policy. Instead, if debt limits are fully endogenous, as e.g. in the case of the natural borrowing limit, public debt has no impact. We assume that borrowing limits arise because of limited contract enforceability and are therefore determined as equilibrium outcomes. Using an incomplete markets economy in which households are subject to uninsurable earnings shocks, we show that public debt provides some liquidity, but less so than it would if constraints were imposed ad-hoc. We show that generating borrowing constraints as an equilibrium outcome substantially alters the answers to other important questions, such as for the welfare effects of government debt or its impact on real economic activity.     

The impact of EMU on bond yield convergence: Evidence from a time-varying dynamic factor model

This paper examines the dynamics of long term sovereign bond yields for 21 OECD countries. Following Del Negro and Otrok (2008), we estimate a dynamic factor model, with time varying parameters and stochastic volatility, that decomposes the observed variation in bond yields for each country into a common factor, a regional factor (EMU/non-EMU), and an idiosyncratic country specific factor. We find that prior to the financial crisis of 2008, the common factor played a dominant role for most countries in our sample. In the post financial crisis period there is substantial heterogeneity in the relative importance of the EMU and the idiosyncratic factors across different countries. For instance, our results suggest that there was a decoupling between the EMU and bond markets of the periphery economies of Greece, Ireland and Portugal in the post-2008 period. We find that after the onset of sovereign debt crises in these economies, the idiosyncratic factor assumed an important role in driving the bond yield variation. Thereafter, the EMU’s share in bond yield changes in Ireland and Portugal increased considerably since 2012, whereas for Greece the idiosyncratic factor continued to play a significant role in driving bond yields. In contrast, the EMU factor consistently played a dominant role in explaining bond yield changes in Italy and Spain, the other two economies that also experienced severe debt crisis during this period. We argue such differences in the importance of the EMU factor between core and periphery economies can be attributed to the systemic importance of core members for the EMU. This is indicated by our finding that bond yields and credit default swap (CDS) are less sensitive to changes in debt-GDP ratios in countries where the EMU factor played a larger role in the post-2008 period.