Broadening the concept of international entrepreneurship: ‘Consumers as International Entrepreneurs’

We integrate theories from international business, entrepreneurship, innovation, marketing and network economics to develop a four-part typology of ‘consumers as international entrepreneurs’. This broadens the concept of international entrepreneurship and complements the firm-level focus customary in research on international new ventures and entrepreneurs within those ventures. We develop our arguments in the context of the new economy and discuss areas for investigation in this emerging area of inquiry.     

Crowdfrauding: Avoiding Ponzi entrepreneurs when investing in new ventures

Crowdfunding has gained substantial interest in the U.S., allowing entrepreneurs to raise startup capital in exchange for equity in their ventures. This approach to equity capital can open up new sources of venture finance to legitimate entrepreneurs, but little attention has been given to how it offers new opportunities for illegal entrepreneurs to defraud investors. We adopt a forensic approach to examine entrepreneurs who launch Ponzi ventures—businesses that continually bring in new investors in order to use their money to pay returns to earlier investors—to demonstrate the ease, creativity, and audacity with which these illegal entrepreneurs operate. The provided examples of Ponzi entrepreneurs show how easily they can circumvent the safeguards purported to protect investors: screening by ‘the crowd,’ transparency and documentation requirements, independent audit reports, and withholding of funds until the venture's financial goal has been met. In this article, we offer possible solutions to help protect investors, legitimate entrepreneurs, and business in general from the damage created by illegal entrepreneurs.     

What happens to international new ventures beyond start-up: An exploratory study

Since its inception, research in international entrepreneurship has focused mainly on how and why international new ventures internationalize early on. To date, there has been hardly any research regarding the issue of continuing corporate growth in such ventures beyond their start-up phase or initial internationalization. Theoretically, we ground our study within the dynamic capabilities view of the firm and through an inductive theory building research explore how and whether international new ventures made-it beyond the start-up phase, aiming to generate early theoretical constructs to guide international entrepreneurship research in this substantive area. Grounded in data, we develop the following constructs related to made-it points: strategic experimentation, tensions in organizational gestalt, and legitimacy lies. To get to a made-it point, entrepreneurs experiment with their venture at several levels: organizational, business model, and operational. These experimentation efforts are fueled by tensions that exist in the organizational gestalt, such as ownership structure, business proposition to the market, and product development process. To legitimate themselves and their venture in the stakeholders’ eyes, entrepreneurs may tell legitimacy lies. We maintain that international new ventures do not reach a made-it point if they only manage to develop substantive capabilities to produce desired outputs at various levels within the venture but fail to create dynamic capabilities to change and reconfigure existing substantive capabilities.     

Missing the boat or sinking the boat: a study of new venture decision making

Taking two conceptualizations of risk, Dickson and Giglierano's [J. Mark. 50 (1986) 58] nautical analogy of entrepreneurial risk (sinking vs. missing the boat) to represent the likelihood of loss element of new venture risk, and March and Shapira's [Manage. Sci. 33 (1987) 1404] risk as hazard (boat size) to represent the magnitude of loss element of new venture risk, we investigated how two contextual factors, the suitability of entrepreneurs' skills and their sources of funds, and two individual differences factors, the entrepreneurs' risk propensities and their perceptions of risk, influence their new venture decision making. Metaphorically speaking, we found that most entrepreneurs would rather risk missing than sinking the boat, and that they preferred to pilot bigger craft than smaller ones. Perhaps surprisingly, our sample of highly successful entrepreneurs made relatively risk-averse choices, with 83% choosing either of the two ventures for which the chances for loss were lowest. We also found that the source of new venture funding—the entrepreneur's own money versus that of investors—influenced our subjects' choices between ventures whose chances for loss or gain differed. A similar effect was found for the entrepreneur's risk propensity. On the other hand, we found that the risk the entrepreneurs perceived in the choice set also influenced choices, but only where the magnitude of the new venture's potential gain or loss varied. When viewed in total, our study and results suggest a risk- and reward-based typology of new venture opportunities, one that may provide a conceptual foundation for future explorations of a variety of questions relevant for entrepreneurs and theorists alike.     

Perceived risks and choices in entrepreneurs' new venture decisions

Though risk plays a central role in most entrepreneurial decision making, little empirical research has explicitly examined how the elements of risk, risk perceptions, and entrepreneurs' propensities to take risks influence choices among potentially risky entrepreneurial ventures. This experimental study asked a sample of entrepreneurs leading America's fastest growing firms to make choices among a series of hypothetical new ventures. The results indicate that such choices are influenced by the risks inherent in the new ventures, as evidenced by the pattern of outcomes anticipated in each venture, the entrepreneurs' differing perceptions of those risks, and differences in their personal propensities to take risks.The subjects in our sample of entrepreneurs tended not to choose ventures having a high degree of variability in their pattern of anticipated outcomes. This avoidance of outcome variability suggests that the sensitivity analyses commonly prescribed for examining new venture attractiveness may inhibit risk taking, and may deter potential investors from investing in their firms. New approaches to assessing and presenting new venture risk, other than the traditional best case/expected case/worst case approach, may be advisable, as well as sufficiently through market research to provide evidence of the degree to which market acceptance is likely for the venture's products or services.We also found an effect of differences in risk propensities among entrepreneurs on their new venture choices. This effect suggests not only that entrepreneurs should be wary of any biases they bring to their new venture decisions, but that prospective investors should consider the degree to which entrepreneurs in whom they choose to invest are well-matched to the investors' own risk-taking propensities.Finally, while our sample of entrepreneurs tended to shun high levels of variability in their new venture choices, they appeared willing to accept a considerable degree of hazard, or possible downside, in their new venture choices, presumably in pursuit of potentially significant gains. Entrepreneurs are advised to seek a clear understanding of the downside entailed in their proposed ventures, and develop strategies to mitigate the likelihood of adverse outcomes. Thus they will not jeopardize chances for near term success and attracting support of investors and others in later stages of the venture or in subsequent ventures.Our research did not attempt to examine how our subjects' choices would have played out in terms of performance, but the apparent biases which entrepreneurs' risk propensities bring to their assessment of proposed new ventures is a potentially important issue that merits further scrutiny. On one hand, such biases may lead to patterns of suboptimal decisions. On the other hand, our results suggest that investors should entrust their new venture investments to entrepreneurs whose risk propensities (and perhaps other personal characteristics) best match the needs of both the opportunity at hand and the investor's objectives. As many venture capitalists attest, the management of a proposed new venture should lie at the heart of their investment decision.     

The paradox of new venture legitimation within an entrepreneurial ecosystem

The current rise in research on entrepreneurial ecosystems notes that many questions are still unanswered. We, therefore, theorize about a unique paradox for entrepreneurs trying to establish legitimacy for their new ventures within and beyond an entrepreneurial ecosystem; that is, when pursuing opportunities with high levels of technological or market newness, entrepreneurs confront a significant challenge in legitimizing their venture within an entrepreneurial ecosystem, while those entrepreneurs pursuing ventures using existing technologies or pursuing existing markets have a much easier path to garnering legitimacy within that ecosystem. However, the diffusion of that legitimacy beyond the ecosystem will be wider and more far-reaching for those pursuing the newer elements compared to those using existing technologies or pursuing existing markets, thus, creating a paradox of venture legitimation. Prior research outlines approaches for new venture legitimacy but it is unclear when these approaches should be applied within and beyond an entrepreneurial ecosystem. To address this paradox, we integrate ideas from the entrepreneurship and innovation literature with insights from the legitimacy literature to describe how different types of venture newness employ different legitimation strategies which results in different levels of legitimacy diffusion beyond an ecosystem. We conclude with a discussion of our concepts and offer suggestions for future research efforts.     

Limited attention and the role of the venture capitalist

This research analyzes the venture capitalist's incentives to maximize the profits of the entrepreneurs of ventures and the limited partners of a venture fund. Venture capital is a professionally managed pool of capital invested in equity-linked private ventures. Entrepreneurs turn to venture capitalists for financing because high-technology startup firms have low or negative cash flows, which prevent them from borrowing or issuing equity. In addition, venture capitalists are actively involved in management of the venture to assure its success. This solves the problem of startup firms that do not have the cash flows to hire management consultants.Venture capital contracts have three main characteristics: (1) staging the commitment of capital and preserving the option to abandon, (2) using compensation systems directly linked to value creation, and (3) preserving ways to force management to distribute investment proceeds. These characteristics address three fundamental problems: (1) sorting the venture capital among the entrepreneurial ventures, (2) providing incentives to motivate venture capitalists to maximize the value of the funded ventures, and (3) providing incentives to motivate entrepreneurs to maximize the value of the ventures. Venture capitalists fund only about a dozen projects a year out of a thousand evaluated. Each project may receive several rounds of financing. Payoffs to VCs can be very high or be a complete loss.The typical venture capital (VC) firm is organized as a limited partnership, with the venture capitalists serving as general partners and the investors as limited partners. General partner VCs act as agents for the limited partners in investing their funds. VCs invest their human capital by placing their reputation on the line. The goal is to begin to convert the investment into cash or marketable securities, which are distributed to the partners. VC management companies receive a management fee equal to a percentage (usually 2.5%) of the capital of each fund. They also receive a percentage (15–30%) of the profits of each fund, called carried interest. Periodic reports are made by the VC firm to the limited partners. Usually these are only costs of managing the fund, and so revenues are negative. Most contracts specify the percentage of time that the VC will devote to managing the fund.The analysis of this research deals with the incentives of the VC who has limited attention to be allocated between improving current ventures and evaluating new ventures for possible funding. The analysis shows that the VC, as agent for both the entrepreneur and the general partners, does not have the incentives required to maximize their profits. The VC allocates attention among ventures and venture funds less frequently than required to maximize the entrepreneurs' and limited partners' profits. However, the VC does maximize the total profits of all ventures. Because the VC considers the opportunity cost of attention, the VC's allocation of attention is efficient. The implication of this result is that, although the entrepreneurs and limited partners could be made better off with a different allocation of the VC's time, this would be an inefficient use of the VC's time.     

The entrepreneur's search for capital

The popular media have been inundated with stories of the spectacular success of start-up companies whose very existence, let alone their meteoric growth, would not have been possible without the infusion of venture capital. By comparison, there is a dearth of scientific research on the topic of venture capital. In this article we take a systematic look at entrepreneurs in search of risk capital. This inquiry is based upon five data bases including surveys of venture capitalists and entrepreneurs. We have tracked 193 ventures which were denied venture capital, surveyed 179 new high-technology companies in Northern California, and reviewed the Dun & Bradstreet credit reports of 145 new ventures in California in SIC codes related to the high tech sector with follow-up interviews of 86 of these 145 start-ups.     

Navigating compromise: How founder authenticity affects venture identification amidst organizational hybridity

Founders of hybrid ventures encounter organizational tensions that can compel compromise in both their organizations' and their own personal values. Such compromises may, in turn, undermine founders' identification with their ventures. In a multi-case study analysis we examine why social entrepreneurs differ in their responses to organizational tensions, both at the firm- and individual-level, and how such differences relate to their venture identification. Specifically, our findings reveal that strategic decisions made in the context of values-based complexity are often accompanied by concerns regarding founder authenticity—that is, judgments about the alignment between founders' actions and the commitments or responsibilities associated with their identities as entrepreneurs. Yet, because founders differ in the basis from which they seek to maintain such alignment, these differences shape both hybridity management and subsequent venture identification. By unpacking such differences, our findings contribute new theory, bridging recent scholarship on founder authenticity with longstanding research on organizational identification and hybrid organizing.     

Venture capitalists and serial entrepreneurs

Habitual entrepreneurship is receiving growing attention, much of which has focused on entrepreneurs who have started more than one venture. This paper examines the importance of habitual entrepreneurs to the venture capital industry, with particular emphasis on those who have exited from an initial investment in the venture capitalist's portfolio, termed serial entrepreneurs. As venture capital markets mature, increasing numbers of entrepreneurs are likely to exit from their initial enterprises, creating a pool of entrepreneurs with the potential for embarking on subsequent ventures. Venture capitalists making investments may invest both in entrepreneurs starting new ventures and those who purchase a venture through a management buy-out or buy-in. On this wider basis, the paper develops a classification of types of serial venture. A number of issues are raised for venture capitalists, notably the relative attractiveness of reinvesting in exited entrepreneurs and the policy they adopt in tracking and assessing such individuals.The paper addresses venture capitalists' perspectives on investing in serial entrepreneurs based on a representative sample of 55 UK venture capitalists (a response rate of 48.7%, and a follow-up survey of those who had more extensive experience of serial entrepreneurs (23 respondents). The results of the survey show that despite a strong preference for using an entrepreneur who had played a major role in a previous venture, the extent to which exiting entrepreneurs are funded from their own portfolio again is limited, though there is more extensive use of such individuals in a consultancy capacity. In screening entrepreneurs exiting from previous ventures for subsequent investments, venture capitalists scored attributes relating to commercial awareness, experience in a particular sector, and personal ambition of the entrepreneur most highly.Venture capitalists do make extensive use of serial entrepreneurs who have exited from other venture capitalists' portfolios, primarily to lead management buy-ins. Indications from the survey are that venture capitalists rarely assess entrepreneurs formally at the time of exit and that it is unusual to maintain formal links with entrepreneurs after they have exited. These apparent shortcomings suggest that perhaps investment opportunities are being missed. Those venture capitalists preferring serial entrepreneurs generally had a larger volume of funds under investment and were rather older than those venture capitalists who do not prefer to use serial entrepreneurs, reflecting the possibility that longer established venture capitalists have had more opportunity and experience in relation to second-time entrepreneurs.Investment appraisal factors were subject to a principal components analysis to identify underlying dimensions/relationships between them. With respect to the general investment appraisal factors, five factors were identified. Two factors were related to track record; one of these reflected ownership experience, while the other represented management experience. The third factor was related to personal attributes such as age, knowledge, and family background. The fourth factor represented links to the funding institution, and the final factor (a single variable factor) concerned financial commitment. The principal components analysis for screening factors on management buy-ins produced a single factor comprising all variables. These factors were then subject to a multivariate analysis of variance (MANOVA), with preference for use of a serial entrepreneur as the independent variable. The results suggest that there are significant differences between venture capitalists who prefer serial entrepreneurs and those who do not in respect to their business ownership experience, the length of their entrepreneurial careers, and the number of their previous ventures.The results of the study have implications for practitioners. First, the findings emphasize the importance of not considering previous venture experience in isolation but in the context of other key investment criteria. Second, the lack of strongly greater performance from serial, versus novice, entrepreneurs further emphasizes the care to be taken in assessing experienced entrepreneurs. Third, the relatively low degree of formal and rigorous post-exit assessment and monitoring by venture capitalists suggests that important opportunities to invest in experienced entrepreneurs may be missed.     

Venture capitalists' decision criteria in new venture evaluation

What criteria do venture capitalists use to make venture investment decisions? The criteria venture capitalists use to make their venture investment decisions are of interest for several reasons. First, venture capitalists are conspicuously successful in their investment decisions. The success rate of venture capital-backed ventures is significantly higher than the success rate of new ventures generally (Dorsey 1979: Davis and Stetson 1984). A better understanding of the criteria used could lead to a better understanding of the reasons for this success.Second, a better understanding of the criteria for successful new ventures could lead to an improvement in the success rate of new ventures. Although there is no clear agreement on the precise rate, the failure rate among new ventures is generally viewed as significantly higher than the average failure rate (Dun and Bradstreet 1984; Van de Ven 1980; Shapero 1981).Finally, venture capitalists' investment criteria are of enormous import to entrepreneurs seeking venture funding. Such entrepreneurs require a significant infusion of capital in order to grow their businesses, and knowledge of the criteria sought by venture capitalists can aid entrepreneurs in gaining the necessary financing.This study attempts to uncover the criteria used by venture capitalists through semistructured interviews and verbal protocol analysis of venture capitalists' evaluations of actual venture proposals. Sixteen verbal protocols—in which the participants “think aloud” as they review business proposals— were made of venture capitalists' venture evaluation decisions.The findings of this study suggest that venture capitalists screen and assess business proposals very rapidly: the subjects in this study reached a GO/NO-GO decision in an average of less than six minutes on initial screening and less than 21 minutes on proposal assessment. In venture capitalists' initial proposal screening, key criteria identified include fit with the venture firm's lending guidelines and the long-term growth and profitability of the industry in which the proposed business will operate. In the second stage of proposal assessment, the source of the business proposal also played a major role in the venture capitalists' interest in the plan, with proposals previously reviewed by persons known and trusted by the venture capitalist receiving a high level of interest.In addition to the specific criteria identified and how they were used in reaching GO/NO-GO decisions, the findings of this study also were surprising for the lack of importance venture capitalists attached to the entrepreneur/entrepreneurial team and the strategy of the proposed venture during these early stages of the venture evaluation process.     

Failed,not finished: A narrative approach to understanding venture failure stigmatization

This paper implements a qualitative, narrative approach to investigate entrepreneurs' personal experience of stigma associated with venture failure. Findings draw on the lived experience of 12 entrepreneurs and tell a collective story of how stigma affects entrepreneurs, shapes their actions, and engenders outcomes for them and their ventures. The story covers three episodes of entrepreneurs anticipating, meeting, and then transforming venture failure. Overall the paper shifts the focus of stigma research from the socio-cultural perspective pervading research to date, to micro-level processes underlying socio-cultural trends. Findings offer unexpected insights into failure stigmatization. First, findings suggest stigmatization is best viewed as a process that unfolds over time rather than a label. Second, this process begins before, not after, failure and contributes to venture demise. Third, there is a positive ending to the collective story in that stigmatization ultimately triggers epiphanies or deep personal insights which transform entrepreneurs' view of failure from a very negative to a positive life experience. This transformation results in entrepreneurs distributing learning from failure to the founding of future ventures, even when ventures are not their own.     

Out of sight but not out of mind: Why failure to account for left truncation biases research on failure rates

We note at least three major issues in entrepreneurship theory that can be clarified by studying the survival chances of new ventures: the extent to which entrepreneurs are so constrained by initial founding conditions that they are unable to learn; the degree to which heterogeneity and innovative capabilities are lost due to the failure of new ventures; and the imprinting effects of new ventures' early days on their subsequent development. However, previous research on these issues has been inconclusive because of problems in research design and data analysis. In this paper, we shed light on new venture failure rates by assessing the validity and generalizability of previous findings. We argue that research using registration data to study new ventures is very likely to generate biased results and that research attempting to track new ventures from a very early stage can still suffer from selection bias due to left truncation. Using a sample of new ventures from the Panel Study of Entrepreneurial Dynamics II, we provide evidence for the extent of such biases. We offer a statistical solution to left truncation that can be easily applied in widely used statistical programs.     

Does money matter?: Wealth attainment as the motive for initiating growth-oriented technology ventures

The desire to attain personal wealth has long been regarded as the foremost motive for entrepreneurship. Other goals and values, however, may also contribute to entrepreneurial motivation. Thus, the extent to which money matters relative to other motives is an empirical question. In this study we examine the role of wealth as the motive for the decision to found new ventures. Three focal questions guide our research: 1) does money matter more relative to other decision dimensions in deciding to start a new high-technology venture? 2) does money matter more to entrepreneurs compared to non-entrepreneurs? and 3) does money matter in absolute terms, that is, does a decision model that focuses solely on the motive of wealth attainment parsimoniously predict entrepreneurs' start-up decisions?We conducted in-depth interviews with 51 entrepreneurs and a control group of 28 senior managers who decided not to start ventures (non-entrepreneurs) in the high-technology industry in British Columbia to address our research questions. The motives we examined are wealth attainment and an aggregate of other dimensions identified by entrepreneurs and managers. We considered three components of values: participants' ratings of the importance of various decision dimensions, their rating of the salience of these dimensions, and their satisfaction with prior levels of attainment on those decision dimensions. We assessed beliefs as participants' perceived probability of attaining their desired level of a particular decision dimension in each of three alternatives: the position held at the time the venture decision was made, the venture itself, and the next best career alternative at that time. The data were analyzed to compare entrepreneurs' values and beliefs regarding wealth with an aggregate of other decision dimensions (our relative hypotheses), and with those of non-entrepreneurs (our comparative hypotheses).Our findings do not support the common perception that money is the only, or even the most important, motive for entrepreneurs' decisions to start new ventures. Wealth attainment was significantly less important to entrepreneurs relative to an aggregate of 10 other decision dimensions, and entrepreneurs did not rate wealth as any more important than did non-entrepreneurs. Non-entrepreneurs rated wealth as no more important than other motives. Wealth attainment was also significantly less salient to entrepreneurs' decisions to venture than were other motives. Non-entrepreneurs reported that wealth was significantly more salient to their decision against founding a venture than other dimensions. In fact, non-entrepreneurs rated wealth attainment as significantly more salient to their decision against founding than entrepreneurs rated it for their decision to proceed with starting a high-technology business. A significant number of entrepreneurs started businesses even when they believed that doing so offered them a lower probability of obtaining their most desired level of wealth than did one of their other alternatives.Satisfaction ratings and stated beliefs also dispute classical predictions. Just prior to making the decision to venture, the entrepreneurs in our study were as satisfied with wealth as they were with other decision dimensions. The non-entrepreneurs were actually more satisfied with wealth attainment than with other dimensions. A comparison of the groups revealed no difference in satisfaction with wealth attainment levels. Entrepreneurs did believe that their chances of attaining their desired level of wealth were much greater through founding a new high-technology venture than through their other alternatives. This difference in beliefs, however, was not significantly greater than their optimistic beliefs about chances of attaining desired levels of other dimensions. It was significantly higher compared to the non-entrepreneurs' belief difference measures for wealth. In fact, the entrepreneurs' stated beliefs regarding the chances of attaining their desired levels of all dimensions were higher than those of the non-entrepreneurs, suggesting that entrepreneurs were simply more optimistic at the time of their decision than non-entrepreneurs.Salience findings suggest that these optimistic beliefs about wealth did not motivate the founding decision alone.We can distinguish those people who successfully started ventures by their regard for wealth as a less salient factor, and their beliefs in higher chances of a venture producing monetary and other returns. Other motives, such as innovation, vision, independence, and challenge were more important and much more salient to this sample of entrepreneurs.Our findings have implications for practice, teaching, and research. Venture capitalists who partially base their assessment of entrepreneurs on the extent to which they are motivated to make a great deal of money may benefit from reconsideration of this criterion. We have evidence of one group of high-technology entrepreneurs who achieved success without placing much decision weight on attainment of personal wealth. Nascent entrepreneurs and those who teach entrepreneurship can use this empirical finding to argue two main points: 1) not all entrepreneurs found a business for personal wealth reasons, and 2) one need not be motivated by personal wealth attainment to be a successful entrepreneur. Similarly, theoretical models that assume money is the primary motive for entrepreneurial activity require re-examination. Future research in entrepreneurship should focus less on wealth attainment and more on other motives for the venturing decision. A multiple-attribute decision model may be able to more fully explain venturing decisions.     

Entrepreneurship ecosystems and women entrepreneurs: a social capital and network approach

This study investigates the effects of venture typology, race, ethnicity, and past venture experience on the social capital distribution of women entrepreneurs in entrepreneurial ecosystems. Social network data from two municipal ecosystems in Florida, USA (Gainesville and Jacksonville), suggest that network connectivity and the distribution of social capital are significantly different for men and women entrepreneurs. This difference is contingent on the venture type. Male entrepreneurs show higher comparative scores of bridging social capital in aggressive- and managed-growth venture networks, while women entrepreneurs surpass their male counterparts’ bridging capital scores in lifestyle and survival venture networks. Lastly, experienced women entrepreneurs that self-identified as white showed a higher degree of network connectivity and bridging social capital in the entrepreneurial ecosystem than less experienced non-white female entrepreneurs. Implications for entrepreneurship practice and new research paths are discussed.

     

How On‐the‐Job Embeddedness Influences New Venture Creation and Growth

This study aims to answer why some employees choose to start their own ventures, whereas others choose to seek jobs in other organizations after leaving their current employment. Drawing insights from knowledge‐based view and social capital theory, we examine the impact of on‐the‐job embeddedness on the decision of employee entrepreneurship, industry choice, and new venture growth. We argue that on‐the‐job embeddedness provides key resources for employees to start new ventures and grow them. We test our hypotheses with Panel Study of Entrepreneurial Dynamics (PSED) data. Our results show that on‐the‐job embeddedness increases the probability of employees becoming entrepreneurs. Once they decide to become entrepreneurs, those employees with high on‐the‐job embeddedness are more likely to start new ventures in the industry in which they worked before. Moreover, employees' on‐the‐job embeddedness has a positive impact on new venture growth.     

Will the startup succeed in your eyes? Venture evaluation of resource providers during entrepreneurs' informational signaling

Experienced founders and investors are arguably the venture community members most likely to possess needed financial and social resources for startups. We present a model of venture evaluation where entrepreneurs solicit these resource providers for needed financial and social resources. Our model addresses how resource providers' venture investment propensity influences their evaluation of entrepreneurs' informational signals and how their venture evaluation predicts their willingness to provide financial and social resources. We test our model using real-time decisions and find resource providers with founding experience (both non-investor founders and investors with founding experience) leverage their investment propensity more than non-founder investors when evaluating new ventures. In addition, our post-hoc analysis reveals that resource providers' founding experience is associated with their willingness to confer social resources. Overall, this paper focuses on the perspective of resource providers and addresses how their investment propensity, types of venturing experience, and venture evaluation influence their willingness to render resource support to new ventures.     

Toward a theory of international new venture survivability

In this longitudinal study, we explore in-depth how entrepreneurs acquire legitimacy for their new ventures in an attempt to internationalise and survive before and after the dot.com bubble. We adopted a longitudinal multiple-case study methodology for the purpose of theory building. Five firms were selected on the basis of purposeful sampling logic from a homogeneous empirical context: they were small, software firms from Scotland that internationalised and struggled for survival between 1999 and 2001. To explore these companies’ critical events and episodes, the method of critical incident technique was employed. The method of constructing typologies by reduction was employed to advance the typology of hype defined as the overall sentiment of the environmental context, within which the firm is embedded, about the future. Grounded in data, there emerged a middle-range theory of international new venture survivability that postulates that the closer the new venture is to the hype, the higher the likelihood of failure. Several implications to the theory of new venture legitimacy could be singled out. The paper makes an attempt to understand the nature of a legitimacy threshold. The data in the study points to the continuous nature of the legitimacy threshold and suggest that it may be defined by the time when the emergent industry moves away from hype towards risk decision making settings. A set of propositions is put forward to stimulate future research in the area of new venture legitimacy.