On the suboptimality of single-factor exercise strategies for Bermudan swaptions

This paper examines the interaction between momentum in the returns of equities and corporate bonds. We find that investment grade corporate bonds do not exhibit momentum at the three- to 12-month horizons. Instead, the evidence suggests that they exhibit reversals. However, significant evidence exists of a momentum spillover from equities to investment grade corporate bonds of the same firm. Firms earning high (low) equity returns over the previous year earn high (low) bond returns the following year. The spillover results are stronger among firms with lower-grade debt and higher equity trading volume, seem robust to various risk and liquidity controls, and hold even after controlling for past earnings surprises. In examining the source of the spillover, we find that the bond ratings of firms with positive (negative) equity momentum continue to improve (deteriorate) in the future, suggesting underreaction to the information in past equity prices about changing default risk is a likely source of the spillover effect. Overall, our results suggest that both equity and debt underreact to firm fundamentals, but past equity returns is a better proxy of firm fundamentals than past bond returns.     

Value versus Growth: The International Evidence

Value stocks have higher returns than growth stocks in markets around the world. For the period 1975 through 1995, the difference between the average returns on global portfolios of high and low book-to-market stocks is 7.68 percent per year, and value stocks outperform growth stocks in twelve of thirteen major markets. An international capital asset pricing model cannot explain the value premium, but a two-factor model that includes a risk factor for relative distress captures the value premium in international returns.     

CONVERTIBLE BOND VALUATION: AN EMPIRICAL TEST

This research applies the options pricing model to the valuation of convertible bonds. A numeric algorithm is used to obtain theoretical values for a sample of 103 convertible bond issues. When market prices are compared with model valuations, the means are not significantly different, and 90 percent of model predictions are within 10 percent of market values. As a further test, the sample is divided on the basis of whether the model prices are (1) greater or (2) less than market prices. Returns are compared over a subsequent three-year holding period. The results indicate that without risk adjustment, the returns for the subsample identified by the model as “undervalued” (model prices exceed market prices) are significantly greater than returns for the subsample identified by the model as “overvalued” (market prices exceed model prices).     

Transparency,idiosyncratic risk,and convertible bonds

We first investigate the relationship among a company's information transparency, idiosyncratic risk, and return of its convertible bonds. The effects of a company's idiosyncratic risk on its equity's value volatility and its credit risk are also examined. The findings indicate that when a company discloses a significant amount of information, it is likely to have a higher idiosyncratic risk and a lower credit risk, with no impact on returns on convertible bonds. The volatility of stock returns is positively related to returns on convertible bonds, and it is found that diversified strategies and returns on a company's equity help to improve its credit rating and that a better credit rating triggers an increase in returns on convertible bonds and idiosyncratic risk, indicating that evaluations of the value of convertible bonds must take pure bonds and equity (option) values into account. After excluding conversion values and estimating the idiosyncratic risk on daily, weekly, and monthly bases, this study suggests that there is a positive relation between returns on convertible bonds and information transparency when estimating idiosyncratic risk on a monthly basis and that a positive association also exists between credit rating, idiosyncratic risk, and returns on bonds.     

Liquidity risk and expected corporate bond returns

This paper studies the pricing of liquidity risk in the cross section of corporate bonds for the period from January 1994 to March 2009. The average return on bonds with high sensitivities to aggregate liquidity exceeds that for bonds with low sensitivities by about 4% annually. The positive relation between expected corporate bond returns and liquidity beta is robust to the effects of default and term betas, liquidity level, and other bond characteristics, as well as to different model specifications, test methodologies, and a variety of liquidity measures. The results suggest that liquidity risk is an important determinant of expected corporate bond returns.     

The New Issues Puzzle

Companies issuing stock during 1970 to 1990, whether an initial public offering or a seasoned equity offering, have been poor long-run investments for investors. During the five years after the issue, investors have received average returns of only 5 percent per year for companies going public and only 7 percent per year for companies conducting a seasoned equity offer. Book-to-market effects account for only a modest portion of the low returns. An investor would have had to invest 44 percent more money in the issuers than in nonissuers of the same size to have the same wealth five years after the offering date.     

Historic Changes in the High Yield Bond Market

In a history that now stretches about four decades, the high yield (HY) market has experienced growth in issuance and out‐standings that is remarkable both for its level (about 13% per annum, with HY bonds now accounting for about 25% of the total corporate bond market) and its cyclicality and sensitivity to the broad economy. The HY market has also experienced a notable shift away from B‐rated bonds and toward both lower‐risk Ba‐rated bonds and, to a lesser extent, more risky Caa‐rated bonds. Consistent with this development, studies of the performance of HY bonds show Ba‐rated bonds experiencing not only lower risk, but also higher returns than Caa‐rated bonds, which have produced surprisingly low average returns along with exceptionally high volatility. At the same time, studies of the correlation of HY bond returns with returns on other major asset classes report that all classes of HY bonds (but particularly the riskier B‐ and Caa‐rated bonds) have consistently stronger relationships with common stocks (especially small‐cap stocks) than with Treasuries and investment‐grade bonds. Analysis of the volatility of HY bond returns over time shows that during periods of stability in the economy and financial markets, the volatility of HY bond returns has been very similar to that of investment‐grade bonds. But during periods of political or economic uncertainty, the volatility of HY bonds has become two or three times that of investment‐grade bonds, approaching the volatility of common stocks. The main driver of the significant increase in the risk of the aggregate HY bond market during periods of uncertainty has been Caa‐rated bonds, whose risk pattern has been remarkably similar to that of small‐cap common stocks. Analysis of the credit risk spread (or CRS) series for both the composite HY bond market and each of its rating categories shows markedly non‐normal distributions with significant positive “skewness”—that is, periods of exceptionally high spreads (that are not counterbalanced by periods of exceptionally low spreads). The authors also report a consistently strong relationship of the CRS series with default rates and the general state of the economy, with major peaks occurring during or shortly after economic recessions. Near the end of 2008, however, there was a clear break in this relationship when the CRS reached an historic peak of 2,000 basis points, or more than five standard deviations above its long‐term mean, while the default rate (at 4%) was below its long‐term average. The authors offer two explanations for this break in CRS‐default rate relationship: the jump in the CRS caused by the extreme flight to quality and drop in liquidity for all risky securities during the second half of 2008; and the use of covenant‐lite securities and other sources of financial flexibility that appear to have enabled many HY issuers to defer defaults (if not avoid them entirely).     

The Presidential Puzzle: Political Cycles and the Stock Market

The excess return in the stock market is higher under Democratic than Republican presidencies: 9 percent for the value‐weighted and 16 percent for the equal‐weighted portfolio. The difference comes from higher real stock returns and lower real interest rates, is statistically significant, and is robust in subsamples. The difference in returns is not explained by business‐cycle variables related to expected returns, and is not concentrated around election dates. There is no difference in the riskiness of the stock market across presidencies that could justify a risk premium. The difference in returns through the political cycle is therefore a puzzle.     

Risk and return in real estate

Basic information is provided on the returns and risks from 1978 through 1985 for unleveraged equity real estate compared with stocks and bonds. Data sources include the Russell-NCREIF index, the Evaluation Associates index, and the Goldman Sachs equity real estate investment trust index. Findings reveal that the aggregate return for the publicly traded equity real estate investment trust index in nearly twice that of the other real estate series, and more than twice that of the Standard & Poor index. The equity real estate investment trust is far more volatile than the other two real estate series. Neither the Goldman Sachs nor the other two indexes exactly measure the returns or risks on equity real estate. The volatility of the equity real estate investment trust leads it to overstate the risk of this investment category, while the other two indexes are not return indexes. Estimates from this study indicate that real estate risk lies plausibly midway between that of stocks and bonds, in the 9 percent to 13 percent range.     

Seasonals,price adjustment delays and estimated systematic risk

This article analyzed potential interactions between seasonals and price adjustment delays on estimated systematic risk. It was shown that seasonals in unobservable true security returns can induce inconsistencies into the generalized Scholes and Williams estimator of systematic risk. An alternative estimator was proposed that is consistent in the presence of seasonals in the unobservable true returns. The direction of induced bias is unpredictable a priori, thereby representing a potentially important research consideration in market efficiency tests using abnormal returns. NASDAQ and Dow Jones 30 Industrial return data for the period 1983–87 were used to evaluate the proposed estimator against the OLS and generalized Scholes and Williams (GSW) alternatives. The absolute difference between the GSW and our estimator, that is the seasonal-induced bias, for NASDAQ stocks was negatively correlated with market capitalization. Moreover, seasonal-induced bias was larger for NASDAQ stocks than more highly capitalized Dow stocks. These empirical findings indicate that seasonals and price adjustment delays can interact to bias estimated systematic risk, where price adjustment delays would be projected to be more acute for smaller capitalization stocks.     

Characteristics of Risk and Return in Risk Arbitrage

This paper analyzes 4,750 mergers from 1963 to 1998 to characterize the risk and return in risk arbitrage. Results indicate that risk arbitrage returns are positively correlated with market returns in severely depreciating markets but uncorrelated with market returns in flat and appreciating markets. This suggests that returns to risk arbitrage are similar to those obtained from selling uncovered index put options. Using a contingent claims analysis that controls for the nonlinear relationship with market returns, and after controlling for transaction costs, we find that risk arbitrage generates excess returns of four percent per year.     

Caveat Compounder: A Warning about Using the Daily CRSP Equal-Weighted Index to Compute Long-Run Excess Returns

This paper issues a warning that compounding daily returns of the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) equal-weighted index can lead to surprisingly large biases. The differences between the monthly returns compounded from the daily tapes and the monthly CRSP equal-weighted indices is almost 0.43 percent per month, or 6 percent per year. This difference amounts to one-third of the average monthly return, and is large enough to reverse the conclusions of a paper using the daily tape to compute the return on the benchmark portfolio. We also investigate the sources of these biases and suggest several alternative strategies to avoid them.     

The Long-Run Stock Returns Following Bond Ratings Changes

Using essentially all Moody's bond ratings changes between 1970 and 1997, we find no reliable abnormal returns following upgrades. However, we find negative abnormal returns on the magnitude of 10 to 14 percent in the first year following downgrades. Additional results reveal that this underperformance is especially pronounced for small, low-credit-quality firms. Also, downgrades underperform in nearly all years in the sample, and a large part of the abnormal returns occur at subsequent earnings announcements. Thus, the evidence suggests that the poor returns result from an underreaction to the announcement of downgrades, rather than from lower systematic risk.     

TIME VARIATIONS IN RISK PREMIA,VOLATILITY, AND REWARD-TO-VOLATILITY

In this paper I relate the risk premia in the stock and bond markets to the conditional volatility of returns and time-varying reward-to-volatility variables. I find that the relation between the expected returns on the stocks and bonds and the volatility of returns is time varying. I provide an approach for evaluating the relative importance of the time-varying volatility of returns and reward-to-volatility variables to explain the predictability of risk premia for stock and bond returns. I show that changing reward-to-volatility variables explain more predictable variation in the risk premia for stocks and bonds than changing volatility of returns.     

A mean/variance approach to long-term fixed-income portfolio allocation

Abstract

Long-term investments in bonds offer known returns, but with risks corresponding to defaults of the underwriters. The excess return for a risky bond is measured by the spread between the expected yield and the risk-free rate. Similarly, the risk can be expressed in the form of a default spread, measuring the difference between the yield when no default occurs and the expected yield. For zero-coupon bonds and for actual market data, the default spread is proportional to the probability of default per year. The analysis of market data shows that the yield spread scales as the square root of the default spread. This relation expresses the risk premium over the risk-free rate that the bond market offers, similarly to the risk premium for equities. With these measures for risk and return, an optimal bond allocation scheme can be built following a mean/variance utility function. Straightforward computations allow us to obtain the optimal portfolio, depending on a pre-set risk-aversion level. As for equities, the optimal portfolio is a linear combination of one risk-free bond and a risky portfolio. Using the scaling law for the default spread allows us to obtain simple expressions for the value, yield and risk of the optimal portfolio.     

Is Information Risk a Determinant of Asset Returns?

We investigate the role of information–based trading in affecting asset returns. We show in a rational expectation example how private information affects equilibrium asset returns. Using a market microstructure model, we derive a measure of the probability of information–based trading, and we estimate this measure using data for individual NYSE–listed stocks for 1983 to 1998. We then incorporate our estimates into a Fama and French (1992) asset–pricing framework. Our main result is that information does affect asset prices. A difference of 10 percentage points in the probability of information–based trading between two stocks leads to a difference in their expected returns of 2.5 percent per year.     

盈余重述的市场反应及其影响因素研究——基于我国2004-2010年数据的经验分析

本文以2004-2010年盈余重述为样本,检验了我国盈余重述的市场反应及其影响因素。根据重述披露的时点选择特征,首次提出聚合重述和分离重述概念。研究发现,年报的利好消息或非利好消息对盈余重述负面影响的"抵减效应"或"加剧效应"都十分显著;剔除年报影响的分离重述的市场反应显著为-3%。研究还发现,相对于被动重述,主动重述被认为是"主动说真话"的表现,具有"坦白从宽"的效果;重述追溯调整的幅度、公司盈利能力、财务风险和债务水平,都会显著影响重述公告时的市场反应程度。     

Modeling Corporate Bond Returns

We propose a conditional factor model for corporate bond returns with five factors and time-varying factor loadings. We have three main empirical findings. First, our factor model excels in describing the risks and returns of corporate bonds, improving over previously proposed models in the literature by a large margin. Second, our model recommends a systematic bond investment portfolio whose high out-of-sample Sharpe ratio suggests that the credit risk premium is notably larger than previously estimated. Third, we find closer integration between debt and equity markets than found in prior literature.     

Another Look at the Cross-section of Expected Stock Returns

Our examination of the cross-section of expected returns reveals economically and statistically significant compensation (about 6 to 9 percent per annum) for beta risk when betas are estimated from time-series regressions of annual portfolio returns on the annual return on the equally weighted market index. The relation between book-to-market equity and returns is weaker and less consistent than that in Fama and French (1992). We conjecture that past book-to-market results using COMPUS-TAT data are affected by a selection bias and provide indirect evidence.