Storytelling that moves people. A conversation with screenwriting coach Robert McKee

When executives need to persuade an audience, most try to build a case with facts, statistics, and some quotes from authorities. In other words, they resort to "companyspeak," the tools of rhetoric they have been trained to use. In this conversation with HBR, Robert McKee, the world's best-known screenwriting lecturer, argues that executives can engage people in a much deeper--and ultimately more convincing--way if they toss out their Power-Point slides and memos and learn to tell good stories. As human beings, we make sense of our experiences through stories. But becoming a good storyteller is hard. It requires imagination and an understanding of what makes a story worth telling. All great stories deal with the conflict between subjective expectations and an uncooperative objective reality. They show a protagonist wrestling with antagonizing forces, not a rosy picture of results meeting expectations--which no one ends up believing. Consider the CEO of a biotech start-up that has discovered a chemical compound to prevent heart attacks. He could make a pitch to investors by offering up market projections, the business plan, and upbeat, hypothetical scenarios. Or he could captivate them by telling the story of his father, who died of a heart attack, and of the CEO's subsequent struggle against various antagonists--nature, the FDA, potential rivals--to bring to market the effective, low-cost test that might have prevented his father's death. Good storytellers are not necessarily good leaders, but they do share certain traits. Both are self-aware, and both are skeptics who realize that all people--and institutions--wear masks. Compelling stories can be found behind those masks.     

Evidence-based management

For the most part, managers looking to cure their organizational ills rely on obsolete knowledge they picked up in school, long-standing but never proven traditions, patterns gleaned from experience, methods they happen to be skilled in applying, and information from vendors. They could learn a thing or two from practitioners of evidence-based medicine, a movement that has taken the medical establishment by storm over the past decade. A growing number of physicians are eschewing the usual, flawed resources and are instead identifying, disseminating, and applying research that is soundly conducted and clinically relevant. It's time for managers to do the same. The challenge is, quite simply, to ground decisions in the latest and best knowledge of what actually works. In some ways, that's more difficult to do in business than in medicine. The evidence is weaker in business; almost anyone can (and many people do) claim to be a management expert; and a motley crew of sources--Shakespeare, Billy Graham,Jack Welch, Attila the Hunare used to generate management advice. Still, it makes sense that when managers act on better logic and strong evidence, their companies will beat the competition. Like medicine, management is learned through practice and experience. Yet managers (like doctors) can practice their craft more effectively if they relentlessly seek new knowledge and insight, from both inside and outside their companies, so they can keep updating their assumptions, skills, and knowledge.     

Introducing T-shaped managers. Knowledge management's next generation

Most companies do a poor job of capitalizing on the wealth of expertise scattered across their organizations. That's because they tend to rely on centralized knowledge-management systems and technologies. But such systems are really only good at distributing explicit knowledge, the kind that can be captured and codified for general use. They're not very good at transferring implicit knowledge, the kind needed to generate new insights and creative ways of tackling business problems or opportunities. The authors suggest another approach, something they call T-shaped management, which requires executives to share knowledge freely across their organization (the horizontal part of the "T"), while remaining fiercely committed to their individual business unit's performance (the vertical part). A few companies are starting to use this approach, and one--BP Amoco--has been especially successful. From BP's experience, the authors have gleaned five ways that T-shaped managers help companies capitalize on their inherent knowledge. They increase efficiency by transferring best practices. They improve the quality of decision making companywide. They grow revenues through shared expertise. They develop new business opportunities through the cross-pollination of ideas. And they make bold strategic moves possible by delivering well-coordinated implementation. All that takes time, and BP's managers have had to learn how to balance that time against the attention they must pay to their own units. The authors suggest, however, that it's worth the effort to find such a balance to more fully realize the immense value of the knowledge lying idle within so many companies.     

Disruptive change. When trying harder is part of the problem

When a company faces a major disruption in its markets, managers' perceptions of the disruption influence how they respond to it. If, for instance, they view the disruption as a threat to their core business, managers tend to overreact, committing too many resources too quickly. But if they see it as an opportunity, they're likely to commit insufficient resources to its development. Clark Gilbert and Joseph Bower explain why thinking in such stark terms--threat or opportunity--is dangerous. It's possible, they argue, to arrive at an organizational framing that makes good use of the adrenaline a threat creates as well as of the creativity an opportunity affords. The authors claim that the most successful companies frame the challenge differently at different times: When resources are being allocated, managers see the disruptive innovation as a threat. But when the hard strategic work of discovering and responding to new markets begins, the disruptive innovation is treated as an opportunity. The ability to reframe the disruptive technology as circumstances evolve is not an easy skill to master, the authors admit. In fact, it might not be possible without adjusting the organizational structure and the processes governing new business funding. Successful companies, the authors have determined, tend to do certain things: They establish a new venture separate from the core business; they fund the venture in stages as markets emerge; they don't rely on employees from the core organization to staff the new business; and they appoint an active integrator to manage the tensions between the two organizations, to name a few. This article will help executives frame innovations in more balanced ways--allowing them to recognize threats but also to seize opportunities.     

Six IT decisions your IT people shouldn't make

Senior managers often feel frustration--even exasperation--toward information technology and their IT departments. The managers complain that they don't see much business value from the high-priced systems they install, but they don't understand the technology well enough to manage it in detail. So they often leave IT people to make, by default, choices that affect the company's business strategy. The frequent result? Too many projects, a demoralized IT unit, and disappointing returns on IT investments. What distinguishes companies that generate substantial value from their IT investments from those that don't? The leadership of senior managers in making six key IT decisions. The first three relate to strategy: How much should we spend on IT? Which business processes should receive our IT dollars? Which IT capabilities need to be companywide? The second three relate to execution: How good do our IT services really need to be? Which security and privacy risks will we accept? Whom do we blame if an IT initiative fails? When senior managers aren't involved in these decisions, the results can be profound. For example, if they don't take the lead in deciding which IT initiatives to fund, they end up overloading the IT department with projects that may not further the company's strategy. And if they aren't assessing security and privacy risks, they are ignoring crucial business trade-offs. Smart companies are establishing IT governance structures that identify who should be responsible for critical IT decisions and ensure that such decisions further IT's strategic role in the organization.     

UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS ROUNDTABLE ON ENERGY DERIVATIVES AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE U.S. CORPORATE ENERGY SECTOR

In this roundtable, a successful oil entrepreneur and a group of ex‐bankers whose careers have taken them into the energy business discuss the deregulation of energy markets and the emergence of energy derivatives, and how these two developments have affected both the way companies do business with each other, and how the companies themselves are organized internally. The first part of this two‐part discussion explores how derivatives and corporate risk management have produced a strikingly new business model for a number of once traditional energy companies, including Enron Corp. and Mirant Corporation (until recently, Southern Energy). In addition to its ability to change corporate strategy, the panelists also consider how the hedging of price risks can affect a company's financing strategy and cost of capital. A notable feature of the new business model is a corporate structure that differs greatly from that of conventional large energy companies. And in the second half of the discussion, the focus shifts from risk management and strategy to issues of corporate structure, such as: How do companies divide themselves into business centers for reporting and accountability; how much decision‐making authority is entrusted to the managers of those divisions; and how many layers of corporate management are necessary to coordinate and control the activities of the business units? Also discussed at great length are questions of performance evaluation and incentive compensation: How do companies evaluate their own performance on a year‐to‐year basis? And what basis do they use for rewarding their managers?     

The fine art of friendly acquisition

It's no secret that the track record of corporate acquirers has been dismal. But there is a group that's had consistent success. A recent study on M&A reveals that between 1984 and 1994, fund investors at some 80% of LBO firms enjoyed returns equal to or greater than their cost of capital on their M&A investments. And this was true even though in many cases the prices paid for the companies were pushed up by competing bidders. Why are financial acquirers so much more successful than their corporate counterparts? It's because they approach the negotiation process differently. Most corporate managers treat acquisitions as a direct-march-up-the-hill kind of exercise: "I want to buy this company. Let's find out what it's worth, offer less, and see if we get it." The actual deal management is delegated to outside experts--investment bankers and lawyers. But fund investors treat deal management as a core part of their business conducted by a permanent group of experienced executives, and they have well-established processes that they stick to. The authors examine how the best acquirers approach all five stages of deal negotiations--screening potential deals, reaching initial agreement, conducting due diligence, setting final terms, and reaching closure--comparing good practice with bad, to reveal the secrets of their success.     

Why leaders don't learn from success

What causes so many companies that once dominated their industries to slide into decline? In this article, two Harvard Business School professors argue that such firms lose their touch because success breeds failure by impeding learning at both the individual and organizational levels. When we succeed, we assume that we know what we are doing, but it could be that we just got lucky. We make what psychologists call fundamental attribution errors, giving too much credit to our talents and strategy and too tittle to environmental factors and random events. We develop an overconfidence bias, becoming so self-assured that we think we don't need to change anything. We also experience the failure-to-ask-why syndrome and neglect to investigate the causes of good performance. To overcome these three learning impediments, executives should examine successes with the same scrutiny they apply to failures. Companies should implement systematic after-action reviews to understand all the factors that led to a win, and test their theories by conducting experiments even if "it ain't broke."     

Why business models matter

"Business model" was one of the great buzz-words of the Internet boom. A company didn't need a strategy, a special competence, or even any customers--all it needed was a Web-based business model that promised wild profits in some distant, ill-defined future. Many people--investors, entrepreneurs, and executives alike--fell for the fantasy and got burned. And as the inevitable counterreaction played out, the concept of the business model fell out of fashion nearly as quickly as the .com appendage itself. That's a shame. As Joan Magretta explains, a good business model remains essential to every successful organization, whether it's a new venture or an established player. To help managers apply the concept successfully, she defines what a business model is and how it complements a smart competitive strategy. Business models are, at heart, stories that explain how enterprises work. Like a good story, a robust business model contains precisely delineated characters, plausible motivations, and a plot that turns on an insight about value. It answers certain questions: Who is the customer? How do we make money? What underlying economic logic explains how we can deliver value to customers at an appropriate cost? Every viable organization is built on a sound business model, but a business model isn't a strategy, even though many people use the terms interchangeably. Business models describe, as a system, how the pieces of a business fit together. But they don't factor in one critical dimension of performance: competition. That's the job of strategy. Illustrated with examples from companies like American Express, EuroDisney, WalMart, and Dell Computer, this article clarifies the concepts of business models and strategy, which are fundamental to every company's performance.     

How to identify your enemies before they destroy you

We've all heard the stories about corporate giants who ignored disruptive innovations and paid a steep price: Think what the personal computer did to Digital or Japanese economy cars did to the Big Three automakers. Big companies now spend a lot of time and money trying to make sure they don't get blindsided by their smaller, leaner counterparts. But it's not easy to distinguish genuine threats from also-rans as they emerge. Most of the nascent technologies that typically bombard executives will not amount to competitive threats and deserve to be ignored. As a result, disruptions are usually not taken seriously until they become obvious--when it's often too late. A disruptive innovation is a technology, product, or process that creeps up from below an existing business and threatens to displace it. Usually, the disrupter offers lower performance and less functionality at a much lower price. The product or process is good enough to meet some customers' needs; others welcome the disruption's simplicity. Gradually, it improves to the point where it displaces the incumbent. But, the authors argue, disruption isn't inevitable. They have developed a tool that can help companies detect potential disruptive innovations while management still has time to respond effectively. The tool's decision-making methodology harnesses the organization's collective wisdom to determine how likely it is that a particular innovation will seriously damage an incumbent's business. The methodology has two components: an analytical instrument and an organizational process. There's nothing magical about it--but it gets managers to think systematically about identifying and addressing threats to the core business. And the tool's rigorous approach can spell the difference between flailing around and acting effectively in the face of a serious competitive threat.     

Capturing the real value in high-tech acquisitions

Eager to stay ahead of fast-changing markets, more and more high-tech companies are going outside for competitive advantage. Last year in the United States alone, there were 5,000 high-tech acquisitions, but many of them yielded disappointing results. The reason, the authors contend, is that most managers have a shortsighted view of strategic acquisitions--they focus on the specific products or market share. That focus might make sense in some industries, where those assets can confer substantial advantages, but in high tech, full-fledged technological capabilities--tied to skilled people--are the key to long-term success. Instead of simply following the "buzz," successful acquires systematically assess their own capability needs. They create product road maps to identify holes in their product line. While the business group determines if it can do the work in-house, the business development office scouts for opportunities to buy it. Once business development locates a candidate, it conducts an expanded due diligence, which goes beyond strategic, financial, and legal checks. Successful acquires are focused on long-term capabilities, so they make sure that the target's products reflect a real expertise. They also look to see if key people would be comfortable in the new environment and if they have incentives to stay on board. The final stage of a successful acquisition focuses on retaining the new people--making sure their transition goes smoothly and their energies stay focused. Acquisitions can cause great uncertainty, and skilled people can always go elsewhere. In short, the authors argue, high-tech acquisitions need a new orientation around people, not products.     

Post-privatization performance and organizational changes: Case studies from Ghana

A significant number of less developed countries (LDCs), including Ghana, have embraced the World Bank/IMF led economic reforms. Ghana has been implementing these reforms since the early 1980. One of the conditions of the reforms is the privatization of former state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Such privatization activities have however generated debates among academics, practitioners, and policy makers. Research findings so far have been mixed. This paper analyzes the performance of two large privatized companies in Ghana. Both companies have been paraded by the Ghanaian authorities and the international financial community as success stories of privatization. Our objective is to examine how and why these firms have been claimed to be successful. Drawing on the dimensions of the balanced scorecard, we examine the performance of the firms from five main perspectives—financial, customers, internal business process, learning and growth, and the community. The analysis is based on data gathered from diverse sources, namely, semi-structured interviews and discussions with managers of the selected companies and with personnel from key government departments, and analysis of internal and external documents. We conclude that, overall the performance of both organizations improved after privatization under all the performance dimensions examined. These improvements were also accompanied by certain organizational changes, including changes in the accounting and control systems. However we are not claiming that all privatization programs in Ghana have been successful. In fact there are stories in the Ghanaian media of several other privatization failures in the country. Instead what we have demonstrated is the need to explain the performance of privatized firms beyond the myopic macro-level and financial analysis which has been widely adopted by the international financial community and policy makers and we encourage other researchers to adopt such multidimensional approaches.     

Why change programs don't produce change

Faced with changing markets and tougher competition, more and more companies realize that to compete effectively they must transform how they function. But while senior managers understand the necessity of change, they often misunderstand what it takes to bring it about. They assume that corporate renewal is the product of company-wide change programs and that in order to transform employee behavior, they must alter a company's formal structure and systems. Both these assumptions are wrong, say these authors. Using examples drawn from their four-year study of organizational change at six large corporations, they argue that change programs are, in fact, the greatest obstacle to successful revitalization and that formal structures and systems are the last thing a company should change, not the first. The most successful change efforts begin at the periphery of a corporation, in a single plant or division. Such efforts are led by general managers, not the CEO or corporate staff people. And these general managers concentrate not on changing formal structures and systems but on creating ad hoc organizational arrangements to solve concrete business problems. This focuses energy for change on the work itself, not on abstractions such as "participation" or "culture." Once general managers understand the importance of this grass-roots approach to change, they don't have to wait for senior management to start a process of corporate renewal. The authors describe a six-step change process they call the "critical path."     

Putting the enterprise into the enterprise system

Enterprise systems present a new model of corporate computing. They allow companies to replace their existing information systems, which are often incompatible with one another, with a single, integrated system. By streamlining data flows throughout an organization, these commercial software packages, offered by vendors like SAP, promise dramatic gains in a company's efficiency and bottom line. It's no wonder that businesses are rushing to jump on the ES bandwagon. But while these systems offer tremendous rewards, the risks they carry are equally great. Not only are the systems expensive and difficult to implement, they can also tie the hands of managers. Unlike computer systems of the past, which were typically developed in-house with a company's specific requirements in mind, enterprise systems are off-the-shelf solutions. They impose their own logic on a company's strategy, culture, and organization, often forcing companies to change the way they do business. Managers would do well to heed the horror stories of failed implementations. FoxMeyer Drug, for example, claims that its system helped drive it into bankruptcy. Drawing on examples of both successful and unsuccessful ES projects, the author discusses the pros and cons of implementing an enterprise system, showing how a system can produce unintended and highly disruptive consequences. Because of an ES's profound business implications, he cautions against shifting responsibility for its adoption to technologists. Only a general manager will be able to mediate between the imperatives of the system and the imperatives of the business.     

The founder's dilemma

Why do people start businesses? For the money and the chance to control their own companies, certainly. But new research from Harvard Business School professor Wasserman shows that those goals are largely incompatible. The author's studies indicate that a founder who gives up more equity to attract cofounders, new hires, and investors builds a more valuable company than one who parts with less equity. More often than not, however, those superior returns come from replacing the founder with a professional CEO more experienced with the needs of a growing company. This fundamental tension requires founders to make "rich" versus "king" trade-offs to maximize either their wealth or their control over the company. Founders seeking to remain in control (as John Gabbert of the furniture retailer Room & Board has done) would do well to restrict themselves to businesses where large amounts of capital aren't required and where they already have the skills and contacts they need. They may also want to wait until late in their careers, after they have developed broader management skills, before setting up shop. Entrepreneurs who focus on wealth, such as Jim Triandiflou, who founded Ockham Technologies, can make the leap sooner because they won't mind taking money from investors or depending on executives to manage their ventures. Such founders will often bring in new CEOs themselves and be more likely to work with their boards to develop new, post-succession roles for themselves. Choosing between money and power allows entrepreneurs to come to grips with what success means to them. Founders who want to manage empires will not believe they are successes if they lose control, even if they end up rich. Conversely, founders who understand that their goal is to amass wealth will not view themselves as failures when they step down from the top job.     

Entering China: an unconventional approach

Conventional wisdom has it that the best way to do business in China is through an equity joint venture (EJV) with a well-connected Chinese partner. But pioneering companies are starting a trend toward a new way to enter that market: as a wholly foreign-owned enterprise, or WFOE. Increasingly, says the author, joint ventures do not offer foreign companies what they need to succeed in China. For example, many companies want to do business nationally, but the prospects for finding a Chinese partner with national scope are poor. Moreover, there are often conflicting perceptions between partners about how to operate an EJV: Chinese companies, for example, typically have a more immediate interest in profits than foreign investors do. By contrast, the author asserts, WFOEs are faster to set up and easier to manage; and they allow managers to expand operations more rapidly. That makes them the perfect solution, right? The answer is a qualified yes. First, foreign companies will still need sources of guanxi, or social and political connections. Second, managers must take steps to avoid trampling on China's cultural or economic sovereignty. Third and perhaps most important, foreign companies must be prepared to bring something of value to China-usually in the form of jobs or new technology that can help the country develop. Companies willing to make the effort, says the author, can reap the rewards of China's burgeoning marketplace.     

Value innovation: the strategic logic of high growth

Why are some companies able to sustain high growth in revenues and profits--and others are not? To answer that question, the authors, both of INSEAD, spent five years studying more than 30 companies around the world. They found that the difference between the high-growth companies and their less successful competitors was in each group's assumptions about strategy. Managers of the less successful companies followed conventional strategic logic. Managers of the high-growth companies followed what the authors call the logic of value innovation. Conventional strategic logic and value innovation differ along the basic dimensions of strategy. Many companies take their industry's conditions as given; value innovators don't. Many companies let competitors set the parameters of their strategic thinking; value innovators do not use rivals as benchmarks. Rather than focus on the differences among customers, value innovators look for what customers value in common. Rather than view opportunities through the lens of existing assets and capabilities, value innovators ask, What if we start anew? The authors tell the story of the French hotelier Accor, which discarded the notion of what a hotel is supposed to look like in order to offer what most customers want: a good night's sleep at a low price. And Virgin Atlantic challenged industry conventions by eliminating first-class service and channeling savings into innovations for business-class passengers. Those companies didn't set out to build advantages over the competition, but they ended up achieving the greatest competitive advantages.     

To diversify or not to diversify

One of the most challenging decisions a company can confront is whether to diversify. The rewards and risks are extraordinary. Success stories such as General Electric, Disney, and 3M abound, but so do stories of failure-consider Quaker Oats' entry into the fruit juice business with Snapple. What makes diversification such an unpredictable, high-stakes game? First, companies usually face the decision in an atmosphere that is not conducive to thoughtful deliberation. For example, an attractive company comes into play, and a competitor is interested in buying it. Or the board of directors urges expanding into new markets. Suddenly, senior managers must synthesize mountains of data under intense time pressure. To complicate matters, diversification as a corporate strategy regularly goes in and out of vogue. In short, there is little conventional wisdom to guide managers as they consider a move that could greatly increase shareholder value or seriously damage it. But diversification doesn't need to be quite such a roll of the dice, argues the author. His research suggests that if managers consider six questions, they can reduce the gamble of diversification. Answering the questions will not lead to an easy go-no-go decision, but by helping managers weigh risks and opportunities, it can help them assess the likelihood of success. The issues that the questions raise, and the discussion they provoke, are meant to be coupled with the detailed financial analysis usually conducted before a diversification decision is made. Together, these tools can turn a complex and often pressured decision into a more structured and well-reasoned one.     

What's wrong with strategy?

Why is it that successful strategies are rarely developed as a result of formal planning processes? What is wrong with the way most companies go about developing strategy? Andrew Campbell and Marcus Alexander take a common sense look at why the planning frameworks managers use so often yield disappointing results. Companies often fail to distinguish between purpose (what an organization exists to do) and constraints (what an organization must do in order to survive), the authors say. Many executives mistakenly believe, for example, that satisfying stakeholders is an objective that drives thinking about strategy. In fact, it's a constraint, not an objective. Companies that don't win the loyalty of stakeholders will go out of business. Strategy is not about plans but about insights, the authors add. Strategy development is the process of discovering and understanding insights and should not be confused with planning, which is about turning insights into action. Furthermore, because executives develop most of their insights while actually doing the real work of running a business, it is important for companies not to separate strategy development from implementation. Is there a better way? The answer is not new planning processes or more effort. Instead, managers must understand two fundamental points: the benefit of having a well-articulated, stable purpose and the importance of discovering, understanding, documenting, and exploiting insights about how to create value.     

Take command of your growth

Ask senior managers to pare costs by 10%, and they know just what to do. Ask them to boost growth by 10%, and they're stymied, assuming that growth is not really something they can influence. But managers can control their company's growth if they have better information about where their revenues are coming from. Rather than sort sales by geographic market, business unit, or product line, they should break them out in a way that reveals which part of their strategy is responsible for what part of their revenue. This article presents a tool--the sources of revenue statement (SRS)--that does just that. Through straightforward calculations using data taken from a company's balance sheet, along with estimations of customer-churn and industry growth rates, the SRS enables managers to classify their revenue according to five sources of growth: continuing sales to established customers (base retention); sales won from the competition (share gain); sales that fell into their laps because the market was expanding (market position); sales from moves into adjacent markets; and sales from entirely new lines of business. Once sorted in this way, revenue can be viewed as the outgrowth of manageable circumstances. At one company, seemingly healthy 10% total revenue growth masked substantial customer defections counter-balanced only by sales in a fast-expanding market--a market that actually grew faster than the company did. Rather than doing well, the company was ceding customers and market share to competitors. Comparing the sources of revenue across divisions can uncover similarly profound insights, which can suggest smart ways to change strategy or set stretch goals. Hundreds of companies are perched atop enormous potential that they can't see and so don't exploit. The SRS can endow them with sight and, more important, with understanding.