The perils of the imitation age

Imitation exerts enormous influence over society, and business and finance in particular. And its influence has grown as the avenues by which people imitate--and are imitated--have multiplied and the process has gotten faster. Thousands of communications channels make it possible for virtually anyone in the developed world to know, almost instantaneously, what others do, think, believe, claim, or predict. More significantly, we can and do act upon such knowledge. The resulting fads and fashions, bubbles and crashes are ever more frequent, severe, and complex. The information age has cast up more than its share of paradoxes, including this one: When information is plentiful, we often use it not to make better decisions but to imitate others--and their mistakes. In consumer purchases, financial markets, and corporate strategy, what others do matters more to us than the facts. When there's too much information, imitation becomes a convenient heuristic. This is the basis for a self-referential society. Imitation has its virtues, but it also promotes instability and unpredictability. That's because, by definition a multiplier, it can swell a single opinion into a mass movement or catapult the smallest player to the forefront of a market. Mastering the dynamics of self-reference won't ensure mastery of its consequences. But businesses that understand how imitation works can at least attempt to gird themselves against its worst effects--by accounting for it in their forecasts and risk-management plans, by becoming more sensitive to unexpectedly changing circumstances, and by avoiding mindless imitation of other companies' moves. In some instances, they may even be able to build strategies around self-reference and use the tools of imitation to capture new business. That won't make the world any less confusing. But it may make it more profitable.     

资本革命:艰辛与惊险

9月7日,深沪证券交易所《上市公司股权分置改革业务操作指引》出台,至此,股权分置改革的三大文件《指导意见》、《管理办法》和《操作指引》全部公布完毕,股改全面铺开。回首第二批试点走过的风风雨雨,不仅感叹资本革命的艰辛与惊险。其中,诚信“负”溢价、股市定位之变、股市生态治理方构成这场变革的内在核心     

Auditor benchmarking of client disclosures

Review of Accounting Studies - We examine auditors’ disclosure benchmarking, which we define as auditors’ acquisition of nonclient financial statement information for the purpose of...     

Immigration and equity home bias

Why do investors hold such large positions in domestic equity when there are gains to be made from international diversification? This equity home bias puzzle has received considerable attention in the literature, with asymmetric information on domestic and foreign assets (whether by individual choice or by market imperfection) emerging as the most plausible explanation. What happens when we consider a subset of investors whose information sets are closer to investors in foreign countries? I assess the relationship between immigration and equity home bias and find that inward migration is positively correlated with increased foreign equity positions and reduced home bias. Looking across income groups, outward migration reduces home bias for relatively rich countries, but may actually increase home bias when migration occurs to or from a developing country. These results suggest that immigration generates a positive externality of increased information flows for developed countries, but not for developing nations. The effects of immigration on investment are strongest within the Euro-Zone, suggesting that this positive externality of immigration is largest when barriers to portfolio diversification (such as currency risk) are lowest.     

A bias in the volatility smile

We show that even if options traded with Black–Scholes–Merton pricing under a known and constant volatility, meaning essentially in perfect markets, one would still obtain smiles, skews, and smirks. We detect this problem by pricing options with a known volatility and reverse engineering to back into the implied volatility from the model price that was derived from the assumed volatility. The returned volatilities follow distinctive patterns resulting from algorithmic choices of the user and the quotation unit of the option. In particular, the common practice of penny pricing on option exchanges results in a significant loss of accuracy in implied volatility. For the most common scenarios faced in practice, the problem primarily exists in short-term options, but it manifests for virtually all cases of moneyness of at least 10 % and often 5 %. While it is theoretically possible to almost eliminate the problem, practical limitations in trading prevent any realistic chance of avoiding this error. It is even more difficult to identify and control the problem when smiles also arise from market imperfections, as is widely accepted. We empirically estimate a very conservative lower bound of the effect at about 16 % of the observed smile for 30-day options. Thus, we document a previously unknown phenomenon that a portion of the volatility smile is not of an economic nature. We provide some best-practice recommendations, including the explicit specification of the algorithmic choices and a warning against using off-the-shelf routines.     

Ownership–efficiency relationship and the measurement selection bias

This study analyses the bias in the selection of performance measures for ownership comparisons, which depends on the specific objectives of the firms being compared. Our sample includes 13 Canadian state‐owned enterprises (SOEs), commercialized and/or privatized between 1976 and 2001. To replace profitability measures and reduce biases, we propose the use of technical efficiency, which provides for SOEs’ specificities. Overall, the results clearly support the view that privatization has no impact on a firm's technical efficiency, the only positive impact being related to a change in the objectives of the firm while using profitability measures. The results of this study raise the question of the validity of comparisons between SOEs and private firms when using profitability indicators. The potential bias in favour of the private firms contributes to a misleading image of the public sector being presented as inferior and inefficient. The use of more sophisticated measures, such as data envelopment analysis, suggests conflicting conclusions. This study also casts doubt on the legitimacy of the privatization program initiated around the world and more specifically in Canada in which the main justification for such a reform has been to increase the performance of SOEs.     

Equity home bias and corporate disclosure

I show that more comprehensive corporate disclosure reduces investors’ uncertainty about domestic companies’ payoffs at no cost, thereby decreasing investors’ equity home bias toward a country. Since investors should base their investment decisions on valid and easily interpretable company information only, more comprehensive disclosure will reduce the home bias only if domestic securities law is sufficiently stratified and domestic companies use international accounting standards. Using panel data for 38 countries from 2003 to 2008 I find that more comprehensive disclosure reduces investors’ home bias, though significantly only for countries that sufficiently enforce their securities law and implement international accounting standards.     

Information friction and investor home bias: A perspective on the effect of global IFRS adoption on the extent of equity home bias

This paper provides a perspective on the effect of IFRS adoption on the tendency of investors to under-invest in foreign equities. We consider explanations for the equity home bias described in prior research and discuss research relevant to the informational consequences of global adoption of IFRS. Specifically, we evaluate whether IFRS adoption reduces information processing costs or decreases investor uncertainty about either the quality of financial reporting or the distribution of future cash flows. We predict that the effect of any reduction in information processing costs from the adoption of IFRS is likely to be small relative to the effects of other determinants of home bias such as the strength of investor protection mechanisms in foreign countries, behavioral biases toward familiar equities, and informational advantages related to geographical proximity. We argue that the quality of the information that investors have (or perceive they have) decreases with distance, conclude that global IFRS adoption is unlikely to affect home bias, and propose avenues for future research.     

Patriotic name bias and stock returns

Companies whose names contain the words “America(n)” or “USA” earn positive abnormal returns of about 6% per annum during World War II, the Korean War, and the War on Terrorism. These abnormal returns are not realized immediately upon the outbreak of each of the wars but are accumulated gradually during wartime. Given that no such effect is observed for the Vietnam War, we hypothesize that major, victorious wars arouse investors' patriotic feelings and cause them to gradually and perhaps subconsciously gravitate toward stocks whose name has a patriotic flavor.     

Familiarity bias and earnings-based equity valuation

Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting - This study examines whether investors’ familiarity bias affects their earnings-based equity valuation. Building on theoretical and empirical...     

Survivor bias and mutual fund performance

Mutual fund attrition can create problems for a researcher becausefunds that disappear tend to do so due to poor performance.In this article we estimate the size of the bias by trackingall funds that existed at the end of 1976. When a fund mergeswe calculate the return, taking into account the merger terms.This allows a precise estimate of survivorship bias. In addition,we examine characteristics of both mutual funds that mergerand their partner funds. Estimates of survivorship bias overdifferent horizons and using different models to evaluate performanceare provided.     

Management disclosure bias and audit services

This paper considers the level of bias observed in management disclosures of earnings forecasts and historic earnings data in Australian prospectuses. Management forecasts and naïve forecasts derived from managements’ normalised historic data are analysed. A key focus is upon the possible association between such forecast bias and differential audit services performed upon the data. Audit firm size and level of engagement are modelled against bias. The full sample revealed no overestimation bias for any of the forecast models, but underestimation was observed for elements of the management and random walk naïve forecasts. Cross-sectionally, a significant association was observed between forecast bias and audit firm size across all three forecast models. Specifically, the audit firm size variable (Non Big-5/Big-5) was inversely associated with the extent to which forecasted and normalised historic earnings data were upwardly biased. On the other hand, the level of engagement was not a significant discriminator for forecast bias. These outcomes are contrasted against others reported elsewhere in the literature and suggest a risk in generalising across contexts. The findings imply a level of ‘disclosure management’ regarding company IPO forecasts and normalised historic accounting data, with forecast overestimation and error size more extreme when the monitoring expertise and/or reputation of auditors is lower (JEL D80, G14, M41, N27).     

On quality bias and inflation targets

Does Ramsey optimal policy call for adjusting the inflation target by the size of the quality bias in measured inflation? We find that if it is nonhedonic (or sticker) prices that are sticky, the conventional view, according to which it is optimal to adjust the inflation target upward by the size of the quality bias, is misguided. Furthermore, we establish that quality improvement is crucial for the determination of the optimal inflation target even in the absence of quality bias. In this case, if nonhedonic prices are sticky, sticker prices should fall at the rate of quality growth.     

Possible solutions to the forward bias paradox

This note outlines the economic theory behind the theory of uncovered interest parity and some of the econometric issues involved in testing and interpretation. I illustrate some of the issues involved by estimating a rolling regression of the forward premium regression from 22 years of eight major currencies. I also conclude that Pippenger's model is not consistent with the theory of UIP and that furthermore there are severe econometric problems in estimating his model. The forward premium anomaly remains a paradox in international finance that is important and worthwhile to understand more fully.     

The determinants of domestic and foreign bond bias

This paper studies the determinants of the domestic and the foreign bond biases and their evolution over time using aggregate bond allocation data from CPIS. Our results show that the home bias is prevalent across all countries, despite the decreasing of the domestic bias in most countries in the 1997–2009 period. We find that the domestic bond bias is lower in countries with higher economic development, higher restrictions on foreign capital transactions, more developed bond markets, higher familiarity, and higher efficiency of the judicial system. When investing overseas, investors also prefer to allocate their investments in countries with higher economic development, lower restrictions on capital flows, more developed bond markets, stronger judicial systems, and higher past returns. Additionally, we find that familiarity (i.e. geographic proximity, common language, and bilateral trade) is a major determinant to decrease the foreign bias. Finally, there is no evidence that investors’ bond allocations are explained by diversification opportunities as proxied by bond markets correlations.     

Australia's home bias and cross border taxation

The paper examines the impact of cross border taxation on Australia's free float home bias. The paper controls for various sources of home bias including familiarity, explicit cost, diversification motives and governance issues when examining the impact of cross border tax variables. In our sample of 44 foreign countries where Australia invests over the period 2001 to 2009, about 66% (82%) withhold taxes on realized capital gains (dividends) of foreign investors. A tax credit variable for foreign taxes paid on dividends is constructed and found to be statistically significant in reducing home bias.     

预期收益额的选择和确定

在收益法评估资产的过程中,收益额的确定会对评估结果产生重要影响,利润总额、净利润和现金流量的预期值均可以作为收益法中的预期收益,但采用净现金流量作为企业整体资产收益额来评估企业整体资产价值应该是一个发展趋势.     

Adverse Selection and the Required Return

An important feature of financial markets is that securitiesare traded repeatedly by asymmetrically informed investors.We study how current and future adverse selection affect therequired return. We find that the bid-ask spread generated byadverse selection is not a cost, on average, for agents whotrade, and hence the bid-ask spread does not directly influencethe required return. Adverse selection contributes to trading-decisiondistortions, however, implying allocation costs, which affectthe required return. We explicitly derive the effect of adverseselection on required returns, and show how our result differsfrom models that consider the bid-ask spread to be an exogenouscost.     

Loss aversion,asymmetric market comovements,and the home bias

Loss aversion has been used to explain why a high equity premium might be consistent with plausible levels of risk aversion. The intuition is that the first-order-different utility impact of wealth gains and losses leads loss-averse investors to behave similarly to investors with high risk aversion. But if so, should those agents not perceive larger gains from international diversification than standard expected-utility investors with plausible levels of risk aversion? They might not, because comovements in international stock markets are asymmetric: correlations are higher in market downturns than in upturns. This asymmetry dampens the gains from diversification relatively more for loss-averse investors. We analyze the portfolio problem of such an investor who has to choose between home and foreign equities in the presence of asymmetric comovement in returns. Perhaps surprisingly, in the context of the home bias puzzle we find that loss-averse investors behave similarly to those with standard expected-utility preferences and plausible levels of risk aversion. We argue that preference specifications that appear to perform well with respect to the equity premium puzzle should be subjected to this “test”.