Organizational relationship termination competence: A conceptualization and an empirical test

Most firms are involved in a number of customer relationships that drain the firm's resources. However, many firms are hesitant to address this problem. This paper investigates customer relationship termination at the organizational level. We develop and analyze the organizational dimensions of organizational termination in order to improve our understanding of the management of termination. The impact of these termination dimensions on the percentage of unwanted customers is developed and tested using PLS on data gathered from a cross-sectional survey of more than 800 sales representatives. We find that a firm's percentage of unwanted customers decreases significantly as acceptance of termination increases, if the firm's definition of unwanted customers is well understood, and if a firm has clear termination routines. In addition, general focus on profitability and external constraints on relationship termination are found to significantly affect a firm's relationship termination competence. The findings suggest that managers should regard termination as a legitimate option in customer relationship management. In order to decrease the number of unwanted customers, managers must accept termination as a valid option, clearly define the types of customers that the organization does not want to serve, and implement termination routines within the organization.     

Are pricing policies an impediment to the success of customer solutions?

In an era of declining pricing power and increased global competition, customized solutions appear to be an effective way to build competitive advantages without the debilitating effects of price competition. Solutions involve provision of an integrated combination of goods and services that are designed to meet a business customer's specific needs. Premium prices and higher margins can be extracted by solution providers, who now have considerable incentives to design and market innovative solutions for their customers. We examine the applicability of various pricing frameworks and pricing practices in the context of two industries — business process outsourcing and power generation equipments. Our interviews suggest that firms predominantly use traditional pricing strategies; new strategies for solution pricing are only emerging; and, successful firms are currently using hybrid pricing models. We find that the solutions that we observed among practitioners are not what theory would suggest as true solutions but what would be described by theory as bundled products. We also find that solutions are in the eye of the beholder, i.e., if customers can de-bundle offerings, they are not true solutions. We extend our findings to academic theory and to the practice of developing and pricing solutions.     

Pricing process as a capability: a resource‐based perspective

Strategists following the resource‐based view argue that firms can generate rents through value creation. To create value, firms develop and use resources and capabilities that other firms cannot imitate, trade for, or substitute other assets for. Even a firm that has created value, however, may not capture the potential rents associated with that value. To capture rents, a firm must set the right prices for what it sells. Most views of pricing assume that a firm can readily set appropriate prices. In contrast, we argue that pricing is a capability. To develop the ability to set the right prices, a firm must invest in resources and routines. We base our argument on a study of the pricing process of a large Midwestern manufacturing firm. We show that pricing resources, routines, and skills may help or inhibit a firm in setting the right price—and hence in appropriating value created. Our view of pricing as a capability contributes to the resource‐based view because it suggests that strategists should consider the portfolio of value creation and value appropriation capabilities a firm uses to create competitive advantage. Our view also contributes to economics because it suggests that strategic decisions about pricing capabilities have important implications for a fundamental economic action, determining prices. Managers in firms without effective pricing processes may be unable to set prices that reflect the wishes of its customers, so the customers may misuse their resources. As a result, resources may be used ineffectively. Our view of pricing as a capability therefore takes the resource‐based‐view straight to the heart of what is perhaps the central economic question: the best use of resources. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Behavior based price personalization under vertical product differentiation

We study price personalization in a two period duopoly with vertically differentiated products. In the second period, a firm not only knows the purchase history of all customers, as in standard Behavior Based Price Discrimination models, but it also collects detailed information on its old customers, using it to engage in price personalization. The analysis reveals that there exists a natural market for each firm, defined as the set of customers that cannot be poached by the rival in the second period. The equilibrium is unique, except when firms are ex-ante almost identical. In equilibrium, only the firm with the largest natural market poaches customers from the rival. This firm has highest profits but not necessarily the largest market share. Aggregate profits are lower than under uniform pricing. All consumers gain, total welfare is higher herein than under uniform pricing if firms’ natural markets are sufficiently asymmetric. The low quality firm chooses the minimal quality level and a quality differential arises, though the exact choice for the high quality depends upon the cost specification.     

Pricing issues in industrial marketing

Developing an effective pricing strategy today is becoming a difficult task for industrial marketing managers. The failure of firms to totally understand the implications of their pricing decisions often leads to missed opportunities and eventually lowers profits. Price setting and implementation are multidimensional processes affecting customers, products, cost recovery efforts, produce margin levels, customer retention, market share, and domestic and international sales. This issue of Industrial Marketing Management provides some insights into the complexities of this process for managers by examining pricing on several levels, including the organizational influences on industrial pricing, the factors affecting international pricing, the importance of pricing in controlling supply chain costs, the influence of information on pricing decisions, the degree to which the Internet and reverse auctions are affecting customer relationships with their suppliers, and the importance of developing a strategic pricing plan.     

The Role of Value‐Informed Pricing in Market‐Oriented Product Innovation Management*

Although the positive effect of a market orientation on new product success is widely accepted and the market orientation literature has increased its understanding of how a market orientation leads to performance, the extant literature has overlooked the role of value‐informed pricing in the relationship. Value‐informed pricing is a pricing practice in which the decision makers base the price of the new product on the customers' perceptions of the benefits that the product offers and how these benefits are traded by customers against the price (that has yet to be determined). Considering that pricing mistakes may hit hard on the profitability of product innovations, it is important to firms to have a good understanding of its role. This study develops a framework in which value‐informed pricing is integrated in the relationship between market orientation and new product performance. A distinction is made between customer and competitor orientations, and relative product advantage is also included in the conceptual model. The model is tested on data obtained from managers based on a cross sectional sample of 144 firms. The respondents were involved in a decision‐making process of the pricing of a new product. The model is tested using structural equations modeling. The results show that value‐informed pricing has a strong effect on new product performance. It also reveals that each component of a market orientation fulfills a specific role in a market‐oriented organization. Value‐informed pricing is found to have important mediating effects in the market orientation–new product performance relationship. Results show that firms with a strong customer orientation engage in value‐informed pricing and develop superior benefits to customers in an advantageous product. In turn, both value‐informed pricing and relative product advantage positively affect new product market performance. However, no significant effect of competitor orientation on value‐informed pricing is found. Combined with the finding that competitor orientation negatively affects relative product advantage, this suggests that competitor orientation may hurt new product performance when this orientation is not balanced with a strong customer orientation. The results also portray that value‐informed pricing leads to higher product advantage. Interestingly, this relation is contingent on the degree of interfunctional coordination within the firm. This suggests that the relationship between market orientation and new product performance is strongest if firms integrate value‐informed pricing in the new product development process. In this sense, a market‐oriented firm mirrors the customer value perception that makes a trade‐off between benefits and price.     

定价权约束下的经销商机会主义行为防范——转售价格维持的新解释

在电子商务和服务营销大行其道的今天,转售价格维持的经典理论依然囿于品牌内服务竞争的狭窄视野,对现实问题解释力不足。本文认为,企业采取RPM的动机,不是被动的避免销售服务市场失灵,而是更多地体现在掌握终端市场定价上。制造商掌握定价权有利于防范零售交易中机会主义行为,从而维护品牌商誉,树立消费者信心,同时也便于进取型企业积极展开市场价格竞争。     

Pricing in revenue management for multiple firms competing for customers

We consider the pricing strategies of multiple firms providing the same service in competition for a common pool of customers in a revenue management context. The firms have finite capacity and the demand at each firm depends on the selling prices charged by all firms, each of which satisfies demand up to a given capacity limit. We use game theory to analyze the systems when firms face either a deterministic demand or a general stochastic demand. The existence and uniqueness conditions of a Nash equilibrium are derived, and we calculate the explicit Nash equilibrium point when the demand at each firm is a linear function of price. We also conduct sensitivity analysis of the equilibrium prices with respect to cost and capacity parameters.     

Spatial competition and price discrimination with capacity constraints

We characterize mixed-strategy equilibria when capacity-constrained suppliers can charge location-based prices to different customers. We establish an equilibrium with prices that weakly increase in the costs of supplying a customer. Despite prices above costs and excess capacities, each supplier exclusively serves its home market in equilibrium. Competition yields volatile market shares and an inefficient allocation of customers to firms. Even ex-post cross-supplies may restore efficiency only partly. We show that consumers may benefit from price discrimination whereas the firms make the same profits as with uniform pricing. We use our findings to discuss recent competition policy cases and provide hints for a more refined coordinated-effects analysis.     

Mobile termination charges: Calling Party Pays versus Receiving Party Pays

In many countries there is widespread concern at the level of mobile termination charges. This is attributable to the bottleneck monopoly created by the Calling Party Pays (CPP) principle. It has led to increasingly severe price controls on termination charges. Regulatory experience in the three foremost such countries (UK, Australia and New Zealand) suggests that price controls are of limited effectiveness in aligning termination charges with costs, that net welfare gains from controls are small and that costs of setting controls are high.The Receiving Party Pays (RPP) principle, which applies in North America and several Asian countries, avoids the bottleneck monopoly problem. After allowing for various economic and technical average revenue (price) per call is significantly lower with RPP, average minutes of usage per subscriber are significantly higher and the mobile penetration rate is not significantly different. Handset subsidies seem to be lower in the US (with RPP) than in the UK (with CPP). Surprisingly, CPP regulators have either ignored RPP or rejected it for various alleged disadvantages. These do not withstand investigation. However, in CPP countries there is still concern about the idea of paying to receive calls.There is a way to get the benefits associated with RPP without this disadvantage. RPP is based on a ‘bill and keep’ regime. Some mobile operators in RPP countries are now offering customers the option of calling plans with free incoming calls. Changing to a ‘bill and keep’ regime would avoid the bottleneck monopoly and associated distortions of conventional CPP regimes, yet enable operators and customers themselves to choose how to pay for calls—in effect, to choose between CPP and RPP.     

Violations of rational choice principles in pricing decisions

Research on behavioral and psychological aspects of pricing is concerned with violations of rationality. This paper presents a comprehensive overview of the current literature by highlighting those studies that have specific relevance for industrial pricing. I hereby examine two different perspectives. First, by taking the customer perspective, I analyze under which circumstances customer purchase decisions violate basic principles of rational choice. Second, by taking the perspective of managers, I examine which biases affect the process of price setting within firms. This overview meaningfully advances industrial pricing theory and practice: It allows both customers and managers to guard themselves against widely diffused traps in decision making. It also enables managers to favorably influence customer perceptions of value and price without actually changing the price. Finally, by pulling together a number of different research areas into a more parsimonious framework and a tighter narrative, this framework offers systematic directions for future research.     

ASYMMETRIC MARKET SHARES,ADVERTISING AND PRICING: EQUILIBRIUM WITH AN INFORMATION GATEKEEPER*

We analyze how asymmetric market shares impact advertising and pricing decisions by firms that have loyal, non‐shopping customers and can advertise to shoppers through a ‘gatekeeper.’ In equilibrium, the firm with the smaller loyal market advertises more aggressively but prices less competitively than the firm with the larger loyal market. Our results differ significantly from earlier literature which assumes that shoppers observe all prices and finds that the firm with the smaller loyal market adopts a more competitive pricing strategy. The predictions of the model are consistent with advertising and pricing behavior observed on price comparison websites such as http://Shopper.com .     

Competition between multiple asymmetric networks: Theory and applications

This paper presents a tractable model of network competition with many firms, elastic subscriber demand, off-net price discrimination, call externalities, and cost and market share asymmetries. We characterize stability in expectations and equilibrium under firm- and market-level network effects. The model is applied to simulate the effects of termination rates, market maturity, and retail pricing strategies. We show that predictions based on duopoly models can be misleading, in particular concerning the effects of termination rates.     

Servitization,digitization and supply chain interdependency

This study draws on literature at the intersection of servitization, digital business models and supply chain management. Work empirically explores how digital disruption has affected Business-to-Business (B2B) interdependencies. Dematerialization of physical products is transforming the way firms are positioned in the supply chain due to a reduction in production and transport costs and the different ways business engage with customers. Specifically, we propose that these new market conditions can empower downstream firms. We further propose that upstream firms can still capture additional value through digital service if their servitized offer includes difficult to imitate elements. The context of the analysis is the publishing industry. The Payment Card method employed is used to test UK and US consumer's perceptions of digital formats (eBooks) and assess their willingness to pay in relation to printed formats. The method undertaken enables us to elicit aggregated consumer demand for eBooks which in turn identifies optimal pricing strategies for the digital services. Analysis demonstrates that during digital servitization upstream firms should seek to deploy unique resources to ensure their strategic position in the supply chain is not diminished.     

基于商品质量偏好的双边市场定价策略分析

本文研究了双边市场一方用户群体提供商品或服务的质量在垄断市场情形和单归属（接入）寡头垄断市场情形下对双边市场平台定价问题。研究结果表明：在寡头垄断情形下,消费方和厂商的接入费用和其本身对质量的敏感程度及质量成本系数相关,平台具有鼓励符合条件的用户接入平台的动机。在单归属的寡头垄断情形下,平台之间的厂商无质量差异时,平台倾向于定高价以获取由商品质量引起的双边市场的剩余价值,而消费者和厂商均没有提高商品质量的要求和激励;在寡头平台之间的商品或服务质量差距小,质量信息不透明时,优势平台会随着质量差距扩大而提高厂商的接入费用,其消费者的数量也会增多;若质量信息透明,质量劣势平台为了保持市场份额,其价格与另一寡头平台的消费者市场的接入费用差距与质量差距成正比,而在厂商市场的接入费用差距与质量差距成反比。     

Unlocking solution provision competence in knowledge-intensive business service firms

Business services markets are very competitive and a key challenge for knowledge-intensive business service (KIBS) firms is delivering effective solutions for business customers. As solution providers, KIBS firms need to invest competencies that supports their capacity to solve customers' problems. We examine how KIBS firms address this challenge by investigating how solution-provision competence (SPC), as a firm-level competence, contributes to the delivery of effective solutions, and how and when KIBS firms leverage SPC to transform knowledge gained from various search paths into effective solutions for customers. The results show that distal search enriches knowledge diversity, which helps foster solution-provision competence but only up to a point, after which the relationship turns negative, with distal search showing a diminishing effect on solution-provision competence. In addressing the diminishing returns of distal search to solution-provision competence, we show that higher levels of proximal search and strategic flexibility reverse the diminishing effect of high levels of distal search on solution-provision competence; however, employee collaboration did not help counter the diminishing returns (e.g., marginal benefits). Finally, we demonstrate that solution-provision competence helps KIBS firms offer effective solutions tailored to business customers' specific needs.     

Differential Pricing in Intermediate Good Markets

This paper studies differential pricing by an upstream monopolist whose cost to supply the intermediate good differs across buyers in the downstream. It is shown that, different from demand‐based price discrimination, cost‐based differential pricing shifts production efficiently. If total output (and consumer welfare) is weakly increased under differential pricing as opposed to uniform pricing, as is true for weakly convex final market demand functions, social welfare is strictly improved. The analysis is extended to the case in which both the upstream monopolist's cost to serve the downstream firms and the downstream firms’ cost to produce the final good differ.     

Testing dynamic oligopolistic interaction: evidence from the semiconductor industry

The objective of this paper is to test whether firms in the dynamic random access memory (DRAM) industry take the intertemporal strategic effect of their contemporaneous output decision on their rivals’ future output decision into account or whether they precommit themselves to a production plan. Learning-by-doing and spillovers are present in this industry and introduce an intertemporal component to firms’ strategies. A simplified version of Jarmin's [RAND J. Econ. 250 (1994) 441] dynamic oligopolistic model is applied to firm-level data. Demand and pricing relations for five DRAM generations are estimated. The empirical results show that firms behave strategically and price–cost margins are likely overestimated in a precommitment specification.     

Non-Discriminatory Pricing,Partial Backward Ownership,and Entry Deterrence

This article demonstrates that entry deterrence can occur when downstream incumbents hold non-controlling ownership shares of a supplier that does not price-discriminate. Such backward ownership implies a rebate on the input price for the incumbents and a competitive disadvantage for downstream entrants. An industry can use non-controlling ownership to change the pricing of a supplier in a way that appears to be accommodating but in fact deters entry. The supplier benefits from an obligation or a commitment to supply the customers under equal terms, as this induces profitable sales of ownership stakes to incumbent downstream firms.     

An assessment of Thailand’s new telecommunications plan

Thailand’s master plan for telecommunications policy for 1997–2006 envisages cautious steps towards liberalization. Among the new policies, the establishment of an independent regulatory agency is proposed. Desirable characteristics of the agency are discussed. Two salient features of the master plan, a proposal to split the country into six zones for licensing private firms and a commitment to a type of universal access to the system, are also discussed. Introduction of non-linear pricing, which is more economically efficient, may be possible in Thailand. Furthermore, it may help the achievement of the goals inherent in universal access and zoning, as well as another goal of the master plan, of making the system more competitive.