上市公司控制权类型、治理机制与代理成本——家族企业与非家族企业的比较分析

本文采用2006年1329家上市公司的数据,分析治理机制对代理成本的影响,对家族企业与非家族企业治理机制的影响效果进行比较分析.研究结果发现,对全体上市公司而言,大股东持股比例、机构投资者持股比例、流动负债比例与代理成本呈负相关,股权制衡度、两职合一、资产负债率与代理成本呈正相关,董事会规模、独立董事比例与代理成本的关系不显著;家族企业治理机制对代理成本的影响效果比非家族企业要弱.在非家族企业中,大股东持股比例、股权制衡度、两职合一与代理成本有显著的相关性,但上述治理机制对家族企业的代理成本没有显著影响.     

媒体关注对家族企业税收激进的影响——家族所有权、家族管理涉入的调节作用

纳入企业双重代理成本与家族社会情感财富因素,选取2011—2015年中国A股家族上市公司2717个有效样本,实证分析媒体关注对家族企业税收激进的影响,并考察家族所有权与家族管理涉入两个家族企业特征变量对上述影响关系的调节效应。研究结果显示:媒体关注对家族企业税收激进具有抑制作用;家族所有权比例越高,媒体关注对家族企业税收激进的抑制作用越强;家族管理涉入会弱化媒体关注对家族企业税收激进的抑制作用。研究结论能够为政府税收监管、家族控股股东治理以及投资者保护提供有益启示。     

家族企业上市的目标选择与存在的问题

本文分析了家族企业选择公开上市的目标和动机,发现家族上市可以解决资金支持问题、获得声誉资本、改善公司治理,但家族企业中一股独大的股权结构带来了大股东剥夺小股东利益的代理冲突,在法律法规和证券市场监管不够完善的情况下,家族股东通过各种关联交易方式进行隧道挖掘,掏空上市公司以谋取私利的倾向明显。     

双重委托代理关系下的公司治理模式选择

本文对在深市上市的50家广东家族企业进行分析,研究发现,交叉持股控股股东比金字塔控股股东更倾向于控制企业,家族参与企业经营管理的控股股东更倾向于控制企业在企业采取不同公司治理模式比较中,聘用职业经理人并实现所有权和控制权的完全分离是一种不错的选择,而对于聘用职业经理人但是家族仍控制企业经营权的公司,可能会由于家族控制产生所有者意愿与职业经理人战略实施之间出现矛盾,由此造成较高的代理成本,从而降低企业绩效.     

家族企业契约治理模型、模式及其选择研究——基于代理理论与管家理论融合视角

文章以显性契约与隐性契约为主线,构建了家族企业契约治理三环模型,建立了家族企业契约治理方格理论,得到9种契约治理模式,并对其中5种常见模式的特征和优缺点进行分析;然后从代理理论与管家理论视角探讨家族企业契约治理模式选择问题。研究表明:代理理论指出管理者为"经济人",强调显性契约治理;管家理论指出管理者为"社会人",强调隐性契约治理;事实上代理理论与管家理论是完全可以融合的,管理者是"复杂人",同时具有代理和管家两种行为,因此不仅注重显性契约治理,也要注重隐性契约治理;短期而言,家族企业可以根据不同发展阶段而采取相应的治理模式,但长远来说,强隐性契约治理、强显性契约治理,即"强强模式"是中国家族企业的管理模式。     

公司治理中的两类代理问题研究

普遍认为公司治理的主要目标是使得投资者能够获得相应的投资回报。然而,伴随着现代股份公司中的所有权和控制权相分离以及不同利益体之间存在的利益冲突,公司治理中主要存在两类代理问题制约着这一目标的实现,即股东与经理人之间的代理问题和控制股东与小股东之间的代理问题。国外学者对这两类代理问题分别进行了研究,发现对这两类代理问题的解决都存在一些比较有效的公司治理机制安排。我国上市公司中这两类代理问题都存在,因此需要构建新的理论模型来分析我国上市公司的治理问题。     

家族涉入、家族理性与家族企业目标偏好——基于一项比较案例的探索

家族涉入是家族企业的基本特征,它影响了家族社会资本的结构分布,进而决定了家族理性的效用构成,并通过对家族企业二元目标的不同偏好表现出来。其中,家族理性反映为家族企业对家族整体责任的兼顾,二元目标指的是对企业即期利润的追求以及对家族非货币化利益的追求。这种家族涉入决定家族理性,家族理性体现家族企业目标偏好的理论构念,通过一项比较案例分析得以验证。案例中的两家家族企业背景相似,但由于企业传承上的不同选择影响了家族涉入情况,进而两家企业表现出显著的经营目标差异。     

非国有股东治理与国企分红——兼论混合所有制改革

国有企业缺乏有效的分工动机已成为国企改革中一直未能有效克服的顽疾,而国企混合所有制改革对公司的治理绩效的提升无疑会起到积极的作用,其中能否改善公司的财务政策、提升公司的分红动机?本文以2008-2014年的国有上市公司数据为样本,利用手工收集的非国有股东持股比例和委派高管人员比例,检验非国有股东治理对国企分红的影响及作用机制。结果表明,非国有股东治理能够显著地提升国企分红的倾向和水平,该结论在控制了内生性后依然成立;同时非国有股东治理对国企分红的提升效应是通过降低国有企业内部代理成本实现的。进一步研究还表明,良好的法律环境和竞争性行业特征能够对上述影响产生正向的调节作用。本文的研究从非国有股东治理的角度,为混合所有制改革的经济效果提供了一定的证据支持。     

家族企业治理转型问题探究——基于美的“换帅”案例分析

家族企业是我国经济发展中的一支重要力量。家族控制主导式治理模式使企业具有较强的向心力和合聚力,在发展初期能够减少交易成本和委托代理成本,但存在着用人机制不科学、组织结构不规范、存在继承风险等问题。家族控制主导式的治理模式向职业经理人治理企业的理想模式的转变,应从企业自身方面有规划的聘用职业经理人、完善企业激励约束机制、注重家族企业文化的创建,逐步向职业经理人治理模式转型。同时,政府也应该给予家族企业支持,完善相应的法律法规,规范职业经理人市场,促进社会信用与诚信的建设,使家族企业完成治理转型。     

党组织参与公司治理与企业绿色创新

绿色发展是构建高质量现代化经济体系的必然要求,企业绿色创新是解决环境污染问题,实现经济绿色可持续发展的关键所在。文章利用2013—2021年A股上市公司数据,实证检验了党组织参与公司治理对企业绿色创新的影响。研究发现：党组织参与治理有效促进了企业绿色创新“量质齐升”。分析绿色治理效果的作用路径,发现党组织参与治理能够通过提升高管绿色认知水平和强化政府资源支持两条路径发挥作用。考察党组织参与公司治理的约束性因素,从地方政府自身建设角度分析,发现地方政府环保注意力和财政透明度的提升均能促进党组织参与发挥绿色治理效果。从金融政策支持角度分析,发现绿色信贷和绿色基金政策与党组织参与治理能够起到内外部协同治理的效果。分析产生的经济后果,发现党组织参与治理不但有利于减少企业碳排放,实现企业环境目标,还能提升企业经济绩效,实现企业的经济发展目标。文章从企业内部治理的角度出发,为如何提升企业自主绿色创新意愿,促进经济绿色发展提供了有益思考。     

Corporate Governance in Asia: A Survey

Corporate governance has received much attention in recent years, partly due to the Asian financial crisis. We review the literature on corporate governance issues in Asia to develop region‐specific and general lessons. Much attention has been given to poor corporate sector performance, but most studies do not suggest that Asian firms were badly run. The literature does confirm the limited protection of minority rights in Asia, allowing controlling shareholders to expropriate minority shareholders. Agency problems have been exacerbated by low corporate transparency, associated with rent‐seeking and relationship‐based transactions, extensive group structures and diversification, and risky financial structures. The controlling shareholder bears some of agency costs in the form of share price discounts and expenditures on monitoring, bonding and reputation building. The Asian financial crisis further showed that conventional and alternative corporate governance mechanisms can have limited effectiveness in systems with weak institutions and poor property rights. Overall, the understanding of the determinants of firm organizational structures, corporate governance practices and outcomes remains limited, however.     

Do financial constraints in an unstable emerging economy mitigate the opportunistic behavior of entrenched family owners?

Prior research is not conclusive whether information asymmetries or managerial discretion are the cause of observed investment-cash flow sensitivity. This paper examines the effect of family firms' governance heterogeneity on firm's investment-cash flow sensitivity in Brazil. The Brazilian economic and corporate governance context present several idiosyncratic features, including weak minority shareholder protection, an underdeveloped capital market, macro-economic uncertainties, the presence of controlling shareholders (especially families), and the excessive use of control-enhancing mechanisms, allowing us to explore in greater detail the drivers of investment-cash flow sensitivity. We find that investment is more sensitive to cash flow for firms with a highly entrenched family presence (divergence between corporate control and voting rights coupled with family management) than in less entrenched family firms. This result emerges primarily due to financial constraints from asymmetric information, rather than agency problems of free cash flow from abuse of managerial discretion. Our findings shed new light on the role of excessive control rights in investment decisions, allowing family managers to reallocate capital to cope with financial constraints in times of economic uncertainties.     

The Relationship between Family Firms and Corporate Governance*

This paper contributes to the agency theory literature by identifying relations between family control and corporate governance structure. Emerging literature supports the notion that family control creates strong incentives that have potentially competing influences on the manner in, and extent to, which internal corporate governance mechanisms are utilized. A sample of 100 listed companies (evenly divided between family and nonfamily firms) is used to test the hypotheses that corporate governance structures are different between family and nonfamily firms; and that family firms adopt optimal corporate governance structures. This research finds evidence that suggests that family firms utilize substantially different corporate governance structures from nonfamily firms and that these differences lead to performance differentials. Indeed, results suggest that family control creates, rather than negates, agency costs and future research may be well rewarded by pursuing this latter notion further.     

How Does Corporate Governance Affect Loan Collateral? Evidence from Chinese SOEs and Non‐SOEs

We examine the effect of corporate governance on the collateral requirements for firms' bank loans in China. We find that firms with lower excess control rights and other large shareholders face lower collateral requirements, which is more pronounced in non‐state‐owned enterprises (SOEs) than in SOEs. Regarding board characteristics, we find that smaller board size, more independent directors, separation of the positions of CEO and chairman, and larger supervisory board size can reduce a firm's use of collateral; the effect of all the preceding characteristics is more pronounced in SOEs. Overall, our research suggests that, in China, corporate governance structures are able to affect bank‐lending decisions in respect of collateral requirements and that the influence depends on the controlling shareholder type and associated agency problems.     

The value of family control during political uncertainty: Evidence from Thailand's constitutional change in 2014

We examine the effect of family control on firm value and corporate decision during Thailand's constitutional change arising from the 2014 coup d'état. We find that Thai family firms perform poorly when compared to non-family firms during the period of political uncertainty. The effect is more pronounced when firms have high expected agency costs from outside investors. Further, we find that family firms delay their investments, hold less cash, pay smaller dividends and have poorer access to debt financing sources relative to non-family firms. The reductions in investment and financing activities may at least partially account for their underperformance. Our evidence is consistent with the view that family control enhances firms' survivorship by establishing political connections in times of political uncertainty at the expense of minority shareholders.     

公司财务治理模式机制创新若干问题初探

传统的财务治理模式忽略了债权人和股东的冲突以及经营管理者和股东的冲突,从而导致传统财务治理模式不能涵盖"债权人——股东——经营管理者"这一委托代理关系的全部,更不能达到有效治理的目的。为了保证企业治理程序的完善,应进一步加强和优化企业财务治理,建立相应的财务信号系统和财务评价体系,制定合理的相机治理程序,建立一个由有债权人参与的共同治理和有经营管理者参与的相机治理相结合的机制。     

The role of the stock market in the provision of Islamic development finance: Evidence from Sudan

This paper assesses the impact of stock exchange funding in the Shari'ya compliant Islamic economy of Sudan. Evidence suggests that while Islamic financial instruments have considerable potential in facilitating development finance through their emphasis on partnership this is better achieved by the banking system rather than the Khartoum Stock Exchange. A case study of the Sudan Telecommunications company shows that larger firms able to cross-list elsewhere are likely to choose regional markets in preference to their domestic one thus benefiting from lower costs of equity. However, governance preferences are likely to favour block shareholders following the Islamic finance partnership concept.     

Family Firms’ Corporate Social Performance: A Calculated Quest for Socioemotional Wealth

This study investigates the engagement of family firms in corporate social responsibility. We first compare their corporate social performance (CSP) to non-family firms. Then, following recent evidence on the heterogeneity of family firms, we examine two factors that may influence CSP within family firms: the level of family control and the governance orientation of the country in which they operate. This research is based on a theoretical framework which considers both agency and socioemotional wealth (SEW) influences on family firms CSR engagements. Overall, we find that family firms exhibit lower CSP than non-family firms. But when focusing on family firms, our analyses show a curvilinear relationship between family control and CSP. At lower levels of control, family owners invest more in social initiatives to protect their SEW. Beyond a threshold level of control that we estimate at 36 % in our sample, economic considerations prevail over SEW and social performance starts decreasing. We also find that family firms operating in stakeholder-oriented countries are more attentive to social concerns than those operating in more shareholder-oriented countries.     

Family firms and corporate social performance: evidence from Korean firms

This study examines the effects of family firms on the corporate social performance of Korean firms and analyses how their effect varies depending on the presence of family CEOs or chaebols. Based on the agency theory, we find that family firms exhibit lower corporate social performance. In particular, there is no difference in the performance of related stakeholders, such as society, consumers, environment, and employees, compared to non-family firms, but corporate governance registers as low performance. We further find that family firms managed by family CEOs show lower corporate social performance, whereas chaebol firms show higher corporate social performance.