Company Tax Reform in the European Union

The European Commission recently proposed to move towards a consolidated tax base for European multinational companies, to be allocated across EU member states through a system of formula apportionment. This paper argues that while the Commission's blueprints for company tax reform may reduce existing problems of transfer pricing, they will also create new distortions as long as existing tax rate differentials are maintained. The paper also investigates the changes in international tax spillovers which will occur as a result of a switch from the current system of separate accounting to formula apportionment. The final part of the paper discusses whether more conventional corporate tax harmonization should still be a long term policy goal for the EU and presents quantitative estimates of the efficiency gains from harmonization.     

How Much Tax Coordination in the European Union?

This paper examines the trade-offs between tax autonomy and fiscal neutrality that the Member States of the European Union face in coordinating their taxes on consumption, labor and capital. One of the main messages is that in many cases tax reform should precede tax harmonization, mainly because the costs of distortions within Member States may be greater than the gains from reducing intergovernmental tax competition.     

当前我国国内横向税收竞争的实证分析

目前我国理论研究的不足阻碍了对现实生活中各类税收竞争问题的有效治理。为此,着眼于我国国内横向税收竞争的实践,对其进行总结和归类,剖析其背后的体制与制度原因,评价其经济效应,并由此提出促进我国国内横向税收有序发展的政策措施是必要的。     

Exploring Formula Allocation for the European Union

This paper explores the efficiency impacts of two methods of consolidated base taxation with formula allocation under consideration in the European Union. The first method, common (consolidated) base taxation (CCBT), would allow companies to choose a single tax base for their EU-wide operations. This tax base would be common throughout the participating member states. The second method, Home State taxation (HST), would also allow companies to choose a single tax base for their EU-wide operations. But, unlike with CCBT, the tax base would be defined according to the rules in the company's residence, or home, state. Thus, several different tax bases would exist within the EU. Both methods would use a common formula to distribute profits across countries. This paper finds that since countries continue to set corporate income tax rates, economic inefficiencies continue to exist under both methods. However, under HST, since the tax base differs according to residence, additional inefficiencies may arise depending on whether countries reduced their tax rates to combat the incentive for companies to relocate to locations with narrow tax bases.     

Tax Competition and Fiscal Equalization

This paper analyzes the relation between tax competition and fiscal equalization. In particular, it asks the question whether fiscal equalization schemes can mitigate inefficient tax competition. Two transfer schemes are considered: tax revenue and tax base equalization schemes. The paper shows that equalizing transfers may internalize fiscal externalities. In particular, in a small open economy tax base equalization yields efficient tax rates. Thus, transfer mechanisms with an explicit redistributive character do not always impair efficiency.     

Tax Coordination and Unemployment

This paper analyses the implications of unemployment for fiscal competition and tax coordination among small open economies. Unemployment is modeled as resulting from wage bargaining. The analysis focuses on the effect of labour and capital tax coordination on welfare. We show that, while coordinated capital and labour tax increases unambiguously raise welfare if labour markets are competitive, different results emerge if labour markets are unionised. It turns out that coordinated capital and labour tax increases may reduce welfare. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

Optimal International Taxation and Growth Rate Convergence: Tax Competition vs. Coordination

Optimal international taxation and its implications for convergence in long run income growth rates are analyzed in the context of an endogenously growing world economy with perfect capital mobility. Under tax competition (i) the residence principle will maximize national welfare; (ii) the optimal long run tax rate on capital incomes from various sources will be zero in all countries; and (iii) long term per capita income growth rates will be equalized across countries. Under tax coordination, (i) becomes irrelevant while (ii) and (iii) will continue to hold. In other words, optimal tax policies are growth-equalizing with and without international policy coordination. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date.     

欧盟统一市场的间接税协调

间接税协调是欧盟统一市场在发展过程中的一个重要问题,其协调的重点是增值税与消费税。在协调过程中,各成员国基于自身利益所发生的争议以及由此所采取的抵制行为在很大程度上阻碍了间接税协调的进程。展望未来,欧盟间接税协调依然面临着许多难以克服的困难,协调的结果将主要取决于各成员国彼此之间能够做出多少妥协和让步。     

Education, Mobility of Labour and Tax Competition

We show that wage-taxfinanced subsidies encourage investment in risky education andoffer welfare gains. Tax competition and labour mobility maylead to substantial erosion of regional taxation. On the otherhand, mobility insures against region-specific shocks encouraginginvestment in education. Thus, welfare effects on the educatedand the owners of the fixed factor may go in either direction.Tax competition is especially fierce if the governments careabout the owners of the fixed factor. Elimination of their interestsfrom the governments' objective functions results in a Pareto-improvementin a federation with tax competition.     

中国——东盟贸易自由化中的税收竞争与协调

中国和东盟国家同是发展中国家,为吸引外资发展本国经济,长期以来都采取了税收优惠等税收竞争手段。目前,中国——东盟自由贸易区正在构建,并已进入了“早期收获”阶段。本文主要围绕中国——东盟贸易自由化进程中各方利益的博弈和国际税收竞争与协调这两大因素,就自由贸易区建成前后的两个阶段,分析中国和东盟国家在吸引外资方面的税收竞争的影响,并认为在贸易自由化启动后,中国和东盟国家应走竞争与协调相结合之路。     

Tax Competition, Income Differentials and Local Public Services

This paper examines strategic tax setting between fiscal authorities in the presence of mobile workers who locate across these jurisdictions in response to differing tax structures and congestable local public amenities. We find that the nature of the tax setting outcomes depend crucially on the proximity between cities. For distant cities with the same size populations, the pressure on tax rates of a more mobile workforce depends on the whether mobile workers are net beneficiaries or net contributors. If mobile workers are either high or low income earners, cities lower tax rates. If mobile workers are middle income earners, cities raise tax rates. For close or neighbouring cities, workers locate in one of the cities and tax rates and local public amenities are dispersed.     

税收竞争理论发展综述

上世纪80年代中后期以来,税收竞争理论研究已经成为公共经济学领域研究的重要课题之一。近年来,国外对税收竞争的研究取得了众多的研究成果。而我国的研究起步较晚,仍处于介绍与评析国外理论阶段。随着全球化进程的加快,跨国公司活动的日益活跃,国家与国家之间的联系日益密切,如何充分运用税收竞争理论完善我国涉外税收制度、维护我国在对外经济交往中的税收利益、促进我国国内经济的发展将成为以后重要的研究方向。     

Tax Evasion and Auditing in a Federal Economy

This paper analyzes the relation between tax auditing and fiscal equalization in the context of fiscal competition. We incorporate a model of tax evasion by firms into a standard tax competition framework where regional governments use their audit rates as a strategic instrument to engage in fiscal competition. We compare the region’s choice of audit policies for three different cases: A scenario of unconfined competition without interregional transfers, a scenario with a gross revenue equalization (GRS) scheme and finally, a scenario with net revenue sharing (NRS), where not only the revenues from taxation but also the regions auditing costs are shared. Without regional transfers, fiscal competition leads to audit rates which are inefficiently low for revenue-maximizing governments. While in general GRS aggravates the inefficiency, NRS makes the decentralized choice of auditing policies more efficient.JEL Code: H26, H71, H77     

Tax Competition and Foreign Capital

This paper derives welfare equivalence of double taxation rules in a tax competition model with discriminatory home taxes and the ability to finance subsidiary operations with host country capital. For a more general model, we provide sufficient conditions on the number of host sectors and factors that support double-tax-rule equivalence. Examples violating these conditions help identify economic factors under which a home country has strict preferences over double taxation rules. If the home tax rate can influence host factor prices, the home country weakly prefers deductions over credits as in the pure-home-equity financing case.     

Is Targeted Tax Competition Less Harmful than its Remedies?

Some governments have recently called for international accords restricting the use of preferential taxes targeted to attract mobile tax bases from abroad. Are such agreements likely to discourage tax competition or conversely cause it to spread? We study a general model of competition for multiple tax bases and establish conditions for a restriction on preferential regimes to increase or decrease tax revenues. Our results show that restrictions are most likely to be desirable when tax bases are on average highly responsive to a coordinated increase in tax rates by all governments, and when tax bases with large domestic elasticities are also more mobile internationally. Our analysis allows us to reconcile the apparently contradictory results of the previous literature.     

税收竞争和税收套利对国际税收制度的挑战

当前被动投资的税收竞争、主动投资的税收竞争和税收套利等问题阻碍了单一税收原则和受惠原则的实践运用。本文介绍了税收竞争和税收套利对国际税收制度的挑战,并以OECD成员国的应对为例,阐述了OECD成员国不断与时俱进修订税收法规的历程,试图引起人们关注国际税收制度的完善。     

Tax Competition and International Public Goods

A well known result in the tax competition literature is that tax rates are set too low in the Nash equilibrium to finance an efficient level of public consumption goods. In this model we introduce international spillovers in public goods provision and show that such spillovers reduce, and in the limiting case of perfect spillovers, eliminate tax competition. There is, however, always underprovision of the public good in equilibrium, since larger spillovers increase the problem of free riding. In an extension to the model, we demonstrate that congestion costs may result in overprovision of the public good.     

Tax Mimicking and Yardstick Competition Among Local Governments in the Netherlands

This paper provides a spatial-econometric analysis of the setting of property tax rates by Dutch municipalities. We find evidence of tax mimicking: a ten percent higher property tax rate in neighboring municipalities leads to a 3.5 percent higher tax rate. Mimicking is less pronounced in municipalities governed by coalitions backed by a large majority. This points to yardstick competition as the most likely source of tax mimicking. We also find that Dutch voters seem to be able to penalize incumbents for anticipated tax rate differentials, but not for unanticipated tax rate differentials. This limits the effectiveness of yardstick competition as a mechanism to reduce political rent-seeking.JEL Code: D72, H71     

Environmental Tax Competition in the Presence of Multinational Firms

We study the design of environmental policy in a two country model with an imperfectly competitive polluting industry. We show that when the firms are multinational, non-cooperative policy design leads to too severe emission taxation regardless of the mode of competition. The reason is twofold. First, when firms are multinational, changes in environmental policy do not influence the market shares of the firms. Second, when designing their policies, national governments ignore profits accruing to foreign shareholders of multinational firms.