卷首语

存在决定意识。任何物质文明的进步,最终都以相应的精神文明形式表现出来。我们往往忽略的是事情的另一面:精神文明自成体系,有其本身的发展规律。精神文明与物质文明不是主仆关系,而是伙伴关系,它可以独立,可以超前。所以,每一个人,每一个群体,不论物质的贫     

编辑主体蠡测

从社会普遍性的高度审视，编辑主体即为最一般意义上的、具有共性特征和普遍概括性的编辑集合体，即社会主体；能以此抽象出各类媒体中从事各种编辑活动的人的本质特征，从而提升出具有普遍指导意义的编辑主体属性与编辑活动原理。编辑主体论不是编辑个体论，不是编辑群体论，也不能替代编辑本体论。     

三代领导人社会发展主体本位思想之比较

人作为思维活动的主体，可以分为个体主体、群体主体和类主体。主体在进行思维活动时，必然有其立足点，有其本位的问题，三代领导人在不同的历史时期，提出不同的社会发展观，其主体本位也不尽相同。毛泽东强调集体主义、群众观点和群众路线，其立足点是群体主体；邓小平继承毛泽东的观点，同时又强调要尊重个人利益，是群体主体与个体主体的统一；第三代领导集体则是把群体主体、个人主体与类主体三者有机结合起来，提出符合时代发展需要的科学发展观。     

网络组织文化集成

文化把一个人群体与另一个人群体区别开。网络组织是跨地域、跨组织、跨时间的协作安排 ,必定面临不同的组织文化、地域文化和国家文化的差异。而这些差异是合作失败的一个关键因素之一。文章提出了网络组织集成 ,并对集成措施进行了设定。     

“启蒙”的精神现象学——谈谈王安忆《启蒙时代》里的虚无与实在

《启蒙时代》里的启蒙不是我们以前说的那种“资产阶级启蒙”或“小资产阶级启蒙”。而是社会主义革命和文化革命意义上的启蒙，所以南昌的成长，也必须是他克服自己、超越自己的过程。在这个意义上。王安忆的作品在精神气质上是属于革命文学和现实主义文学范式的。这也是她说“我就是我”。“张爱玲对我们这一代的影响并不大”、“我不是海派文学的传人”的底气所在。     

百年西部人物林则

他是一个外国人，但他却被称为“中国现代口腔医学之父”。“为中国每一个县培养～名口腔医生”是他的心愿，也是他留守成都43年的重要理由。从这个意义上看，他又何尝不是另一个值得中国人记住的“白求恩”呢!     

阶级的言说和改造——劳心与劳力、性别与阶级之二

大多数雇佣家政工的专业人士和其他精英群体一方面希望保持自己的阶级优越感，另一方面也认可社会流动。开明的雇主们认识到“合适的”雇佣关系需要培训外来家政工的新的主体，才能最大程度调动她们的劳动积极性和情感劳动付出。从这个意义上说，提高素质的概念，既是一个作用于每个个体的社会流动的话语，又是一个阶级在日常生活实践中向另一个阶级言说、对这个阶级施加作用的支配过程。除了阶级问题之外，雇佣家务劳动中的性别问题仍然存在，那些可以依靠性别替身来解决家务问题的职业妇女也仍然没能从话语中解放出来。任何对家务劳动价值的严肃讨论都必须正视家务劳动的社会价值，并且通过性别问题和阶级问题的关联来寻求解放性的方案。     

本土投行的小众化生存

在券商逐渐成为我国投行主体的今天,另一个投行群体长期潜伏着.他们惯常的名字是投资管理公司、财务顾问公司或者资产管理公司.这些公司游刃于大型投行业务缝隙之间,专注单一业务,以个性化、长期服务见长.     

以人的现实存在看市场经济发展的必然

以人的现实存在看市场经济发展的必然程占林尤秀斌编者按：人学是本世纪八十年代以来在世界范围内蓬勃兴起的一门新兴科学。它的产生与发展是人类历史发展的必然，是客观规律的要求。社会是由群体人组成的，他们是社会存在发展的主体，是个体人通向社会的桥梁，研究群体人...     

财金黄埔力量——黄埔系打造者

对这个群体威功原因的另一个层面的探讨集中在这个班级的打造身上，他们的言传身教对于这个群体的性格塑造起到了至关重要的作用。     

Dynamic risk-sharing with two-sided moral hazard

A group of risk-averse agents repeatedly produce a perishable consumption good; individual outputs are observable but efforts are not. The contracting problem admits a recursive formulation, and the optimal value function is the fixed point of a contraction mapping. When the agents can be punished to the full extent in a single period, every continuation contract of an optimal contract is itself optimal; the marginal utility ratio between one agent and another is a submartingale. The results imply that it is in general important to restrict an agent whose moral hazard constraint is binding from saving through another agent within the risk-sharing group. Limited commitment and long-run implications of optimal contracting are also examined.     

The influence of group size on distributional fairness under voting by veto

Voting by Veto [VBV], developed by Dennis C. Mueller, is a two-stage voting mechanism for committee decision making. In the first stage, every member of the committee makes a proposal. The proposals are joined with the current status quo (or another fallback option). For the second stage, a random mechanism determines the order of voting and the committee members sequentially eliminate one alternative each. After every committee member has exercised her veto, a single winning alternative remains. Game theory predicts that the equality of the resulting distribution under VBV varies with group size. Hence, decisions in two-member groups should result in highly unequal distributions of benefits. With increasing group size, however, VBV should generate more equally distributed outcomes. We examine the effect of group size under VBV in a series of laboratory experiments where groups with a varying number of members play a ‘divide the dollar game’. Our results confirm that larger groups choose more equal distributions than smaller groups. However, we also find deviations from the model's predictions. Some committees in our experiment do not select Pareto-optimal alternatives. An exploratory analysis of possible explanations suggests that individual behavior is most likely motivated by a combination of material self-interest and social preferences such as reciprocity and fairness.     

Against representative agent methodology

Garnett and Boettke both seek to identify the appropriate behavior for the representative scientist. The social structure of science is better represented, however, with a heterogeneous agent model. Social epistemology and epistemological naturalism provide context for the argument against representative agent methodology. Asking whether individual scientists should “commit themselves to an approach and pursue it doggedly” or make “a professional commitment to intellectual tolerance, openness, and broad-mindedness” is like asking whether it is better to be a bouncer or a bookkeeper. The question depends on particulars that vary from person to person. Down with representative agent methodology. Up with diversity.     

Perfect competition in asymmetric information economies: compatibility of efficiency and incentives

The idea of perfect competition for an economy with asymmetric information is formalized via an idiosyncratic signal process in which the private signals of almost every individual agent can influence only a negligible group of agents, and the individual agents’ relevant signals are essentially pairwise independent conditioned on the true states of nature. Thus, there is no incentive for an individual agent to manipulate her private information. The existence of incentive compatible, ex post Walrasian allocations is shown for such a perfectly competitive asymmetric information economy with or without “common values”. Consequently, the conflict between incentive compatibility and Pareto efficiency is resolved exactly, and its asymptotic version is derived for a sequence of large, but finite private information economies.     

Endogenous formation of multiple social groups

This paper explores a model of group membership formation in which agents decide to join or not multiple social groups. The membership formation process induces a bipartite graph structure with social groups listed on one side and agents listed on the other side. Among members of multiple social groups, we consider two decisive types of agents: the grand star and the mini star. The former type is the unique agent in a society who participates in all social groups. The latter type includes agents who participate in more than one, but not all, social groups such that every social group pair has one and only one common member. We analyze the efficiency and stability conditions of group membership formation, and we establish sufficient conditions under which a connected graph that contains either a grand star or a set of mini stars becomes the unique strongly efficient and stable graph.     

个人-团队匹配研究动态与未来展望

随着个人-团队匹配构念由个体层次向群体层次拓展,群体层次（个人-团队）匹配成为新兴的集体构念。在揭示个人-团队匹配定义、维度与测量、多维构念的基础上,重点围绕个人-团队匹配的前因变量和影响效应展开系统述评,构建了个人-团队匹配研究设计框架,指出未来研究的5个方向,即个人-团队匹配的结构维度与测量研究、前因与影响效应研究、多层次研究、纵向研究和跨文化比较研究。     

To be consumed with moderation

We study the optimal behavior of a hyperbolic discounting agent who has incomplete information about his own preferences and can only learn them through consumption. We show that, even if moderate current consumption and moderate future consumption always dominates abstinence, the agent may optimally decide not to consume as a commitment device against inefficient learning that would lead to future excesses. This provides a rationale for why smokers, gamblers or compulsive buyers stick to second-best personal rules of behavior - such as “abstinence” - without invoking standard habit formation arguments. We also study how urges modify the strategy of the individual.     

Single Object Auctions With Externalities: A Tractable Model

We consider the single object auction model with allocative externalities in a private valuation and quasi‐linear setting. We model externalities by assuming that every agent has a private valuation (for the object) and a strict ranking of other agents. The utility for an agent when another agent receives the object is the product of his own valuation and a real number that depends on the rank of this agent in his ranking. When the only private information is the valuation of the agents, we characterise the implementable allocation rules and use these to derive the optimal auction. The optimal auction collects payments from agents who do not receive the object.     

Coalitional manipulation and the Pareto rule

This paper examines aggregation procedures that map profiles of individual preferences into choice sets. An aggregation procedure is said to be “manipulable by a coalition” if there is a group of individuals, and a preference profile, such that every member of the group prefers the choice set obtained when they are misrepresenting their preferences, to the one obtained when they are honest. We show that the Pareto rule, which is an aggregation procedure that maps profiles of individual preferences into corresponding sets of Pareto optima, is not manipulable by any coalition of individuals under various behavioural assumptions which relate preferences over choice sets to preferences over alternatives. The non-manipulability of the Pareto rule by a single individual follows as a special case under these behavioural assumptions.     

Group lending and individual lending with strategic default

Papers that compare group lending and individual lending in the presence of strategic default suggest that unless group members can impose costly social sanctions on one another, or unless the bank uses cross-reporting mechanisms group lending may do worse than individual lending. In this paper, we show that if, (1) the amount that a successful borrower owes for his defaulting partner is optimally determined, and (2) the penalty is allowed to vary across group members, then even in the absence of any social sanctions or cross-reporting, (1) expected borrower welfare is strictly higher with group lending when both group lending and individual lending are feasible and (2) group lending is feasible for a greater range of opportunity cost of capital. These results are robust to collusion between borrowers.