论战略性贸易政策的经济合理性及其应用

国际经济与贸易的进一步发展,在世界范围内不完全竞争格局的事实存在,战略性贸易政策便成为一种催生事物应运而生,由于各国的贸易顺差与逆差的不平衡,战略性贸易政策在一段时间内很难达成共识。本文从战略性贸易政策的理论、实施环境、实施效果来对其进行分析,对政府干预作用重新定义论证战略性贸易政策的经济合理性;在经济贸易全球化进程进一步加快的今天,对战略性贸易政策的全球应用环境分析也是探索在中国的政策选择及发展机遇。     

美国战略性贸易政策的发展

战略性贸易政策最初从美国开始兴起.发展至今,如今它成为美国对外贸易的主要战略政策.本文通过对战略性贸易政策的再次阐述,时间上从二战后的美国战略性贸易跨越到特朗普时代的美国的战略贸易政策,空间上与重商主义以及幼稚工业保护政策相对比,总结得出结论,并且预测是否能在发展中国家实施战略性贸易政策.     

对中国战略性石油贸易政策的实证分析

战略性贸易政策是政府通过实施合适的干预手段改，变或维持不完全竞争企业的某种战略行为，使国际贸易朝着有利于本国获取最大限度利益的方向改进。文章首先通过分析战略性贸易政策理论的基本内容和适用条件，并结合中国石油产业的自身特点，得出可以利用“校正模型”的方法对中国的战略性石油贸易政策的实施效果进行实证的结论；继而通过计算和对比五种政策组合下原油进口价格和数量、国内外企业利润、消费者剩余以及整体国民福利的变化，得出了一定的关税和补贴政策确实能起到“利润转移”效果，但是介于石油资源本身的特殊性及其在当代经济发展中扮演的战略角色，中国政府还是决定选择次优的贸易战略等结论。     

基于战略性贸易政策理论的"战略性自主创新政策"研究

在对战略性贸易政策重要成果综述的基础上,提出引入自主创新对战略性贸易政策理论在中国进行应用具有重要的意义,并构建了一个战略性自主创新政策理论的基本框架.     

论战略性贸易政策与制度环境的稳定性

战略性贸易政策理论主张政府应积极干预存在超额利润或技术外溢效应的寡头垄断产业以实现本国社会净福利的最大化.然而最终是否能实现预期的干预效果与制度环境密切相关.本文通过研究表明保持一个稳定的制度环境对欲实施战略性贸易政策的国家而言是最优的选择.     

战略性贸易政策的影响因素研究文献综述

战略性贸易政策的核心特征在于政府对贸易进行干预,使本国企业获得竞争性优势。但在是否实施战略性贸易政策以及如何实施的问题上,政府部门有不同的考虑因素。政府分类鼓励和统一鼓励的选择,对企业信息的掌握程度、产品特征（产品耐用程度、产品的需求弹性等）、成本差异、行业特征、产业集中度等都是近年来战略性贸易政策研究讨论的重点因素。另外,也有学者从知识外溢、实验实证、委托—代理和FDI等角度进行研究。     

战略性贸易政策在发展中国家的应用分析

战略性贸易政策是贸易保护理论的重要组成部分,最早在发达国家得到应用。本文以战略性贸易政策在印度软件业的应用为例,分析了发展中国家是否适合战略性贸易政策的应用。最后结合我国实际,对今后我国贸易政策选择的方向提出一些建议。     

自主创新与战略性自主创新政策

本文在对R&D、创新和自主创新进行比较的基础上,结合战略性贸易政策理论,提出了战略性自主创新政策,并且讨论实施战略性自主创新政策的几个条件.     

论日本战略性贸易政策的有效实施

日本经济政策对世界经济贸易的发展有较大影响。本文针对日本战略性贸易政策实施的途径和目标产业的特征进行了分析 ,探讨了战略性贸易政策的实施对整个世界经济秩序的可能影响     

战略性贸易政策在中国的实施探索道路

作为发展中国家的我国,在新时期正确实施战略性贸易政策是极为关键的,本文通过对一些发达国家的贸易政策研究得出一系列的经验启示,比较了我国与发达国家在实施战略性贸易政策上的不同,总结了我国作为发展中国家因遵循的贸易原则。     

Environmental policy instruments and imperfectly competitive international trade

Policy makers, industrialists and environmentalists express concern that the imposition of tough environmental policies in some countries displaces production, and hence pollution, to countries which impose less tough environmental policies. Yet empirical studies of such impacts suggest they are small. However, these findings are derived from models in which international trade is modelled as being perfectly competitive. In this paper I model trade as imperfectly competitive with scope for strategic behavior by producers, in this case investment in capital. I show that the choice of environmental policy instrument can have a marked impact on the incentives for producers to act strategically, with environmental standards significantly reducing the incentives for strategic overinvestment relative to environmental taxes or no environmental policy at all. Whether welfare is higher using standards or taxes depends on whether producing countries are also significant consumers of the polluting product, and on whether all producing governments act to reduce emissions or only some subset of governments. To assess the quantitative significance of these theoretical results I conduct policy simulations on a calibrated model of the world fertilizer industry. These simulations show that the impact of environmental policy on strategic behaviour can be large.     

STRATEGIC TRADE POLICY WITH INTERNATIONALLY OWNED FIRMS*

The consequences of international firm ownership for strategic trade policy are examined both in a general and in a simple linear model of an international duopoly with two governments using production subsidies as policy instruments. At first sight, the case for strategic trade policy seems to be weakened, because international ownership reduces a government's incentive for rent-shifting. Closer inspection shows, however, that there are ownership structures leading to optimal policies which induce the duopolists to behave more collusively. This tends to resolve the conflict between national and international rationality in a policy game with retaliation and makes strategic trade policy look more attractive.     

新加坡的战略性贸易政策评析

本文首先对战略性贸易政策作了简单介绍,接着重点论述了新加坡经济发展过程中对战略性贸易政策的成功运用,介绍了这一政策运用的主要内容及其特点,文章最后就我国如何借鉴新加坡的经验提出政策建议。     

Dynamic Games of Environmental Policy in a Global Economy: Taxes versus Quotas

The effects of environmental policy on the global environment as an international public good with a stock externality and national welfare are examined in a model with trade in a polluting commodity. The welfare effects of environmental policy, decomposed into terms of trade, abatement cost, and environmental damage effects, induce governments to adopt a strategic use of their policy measures. In the absence of international cooperation on environmental policy, it is demonstrated that the emission tax game brings about larger strategic distortions than the emission quota game.     

战略贸易政策新进展与发展中国家贸易政策

通过对战略贸易政策在贸易的政治经济学、不确定性、不完全承诺和不完全信息等四个方面的新进展进行讨论,得出结论:新贸易理论的新进展使得脱胎于发达国家的战略贸易政策更加接近发展中国家市场经常失灵的现实,从而对发展中国家的贸易政策有重要的指导意义。     

Merger Profitability and Trade Policy

We study the profitability incentives for merger and the endogenous industry structure in a strategic trade policy environment. Merger changes the strategic trade policy equlilibrium. We show that merger can be profitable and welfare enhancing, even though it would not be profitable in a laissez‐faire economy. A key element is a change in the governments’ incentives to give subsidies to their local firms. National merger induces more strategic trade policy, whereas international merger does not.     

Strategic Trade Policy in the Presence of Network Effects

The paper analyzes strategic trade policy for national and international network effect goods. While tariffs are very effective in securing the domestic producer's sales in case of network effects, our results suggest that strategic trade policy does not pay from a welfare perspective. Another interesting result is the possibility of negative tariffs in equilibrium.     

Trade Policy in the Presence of Technology Licensing*

We consider strategic trade policy when a high‐cost and a low‐cost firm belonging to two different countries compete in quantities in a third country, and technology is transferable via licensing. We characterize the effects of subsidies on (i) licensing payments—a new source of rents, (ii) the decision to license, and (iii) the subsidy bill difference (compared to when licensing is infeasible). We find that, in the presence of licensing, optimal strategic trade policy has several interesting features. For example, even under Cournot competition, optimal policy can be an export tax instead of an export subsidy. Also, unlike results in strategic trade policy with asymmetric costs, we find that optimal export subsidies are not necessarily positively related to the cost‐competitiveness of firms. In other words, governments need not necessarily favor “winners” when licensing is possible. Furthermore, there exist parameterizations such that a government, if it can, might ban licensing.     

策略性环境政策:环境税和减排补贴的比较分析

文章把战略性贸易政策模型扩展到环境领域,策略性环境政策认为政府有动机通过降低环境标准补贴出口企业,以达到利润转移的目的.文章分析了策略性环境政策中比较受忽视的一部分--环境技术补贴,本国政府结合使用环境税和减排补贴,我们验证了政府使用策略性环境政策的动机,得到了最优的污染排放税率,认为虽然环境政策仍旧不能消除生产带来的环境损害,但是环境技术补贴提高了本国的环境标准,企业会更少地遇到绿色壁垒报复.