Do Funds Make More When They Trade More?

We model fund turnover in the presence of time‐varying profit opportunities. Our model predicts a positive relation between an active fund's turnover and its subsequent benchmark‐adjusted return. We find such a relation for equity mutual funds. This time‐series relation between turnover and performance is stronger than the cross‐sectional relation, as the model predicts. Also as predicted, the turnover‐performance relation is stronger for funds trading less‐liquid stocks and funds likely to possess greater skill. Turnover is correlated across funds. The common component of turnover is positively correlated with proxies for stock mispricing. Turnover of similar funds helps predict a fund's performance.     

More punishment, less default?

The extent of lender recourse following contractual default varies greatly across economies. Intuitively, one would expect these differences to matter for default behavior at the micro-economic level and for equilibrium quantities. The objective of this paper is to study an equilibrium model in the spirit of Dubey et?al. (Econometrica 73(1):1–37, 2005) where the implications of recourse for default patterns can be characterized. Under plausible conditions, broader recourse causes yields at origination and default rates to fall for a given set of observable borrower characteristics. On the other hand, the effect of broader recourse on average default rates and the quantity of loans issued is deeply ambiguous because the composition of the pool of borrowers can change. Raising the fraction of assets subject to recourse can well increase equilibrium default rates. I discuss the implications of these results for how one should test empirically whether recourse statutes matter for loss severity rates and the frequency of default in secured loan markets.     

Do Women Pay More for Mortgages?

This paper documents women on average pay more for mortgages than men. The disparity cannot be fully explained by traditional variables such as mortgage features, borrower characteristics, and market conditions. While the persistence of gender disparity may suggest discrimination, we offer a different explanation: women pay higher rates because they are more likely to choose lenders by recommendation while men tend to search for the lowest rate. Our empirical test confirms that search effort is rewarded in marketplace, and suggests that gender disparity in mortgage rates may be addressed by policies aimed at improving women’s financial literacy and search skills.     

When Is Sticky Information More Information?

This paper uses sectoral data to study survey‐based balance indices designed to capture changes in the business cycle in real time. The empirical framework recognizes that when answering survey questions regarding their firm's output, respondents potentially rely on infrequently updated information. The analysis then suggests that their answers reflect notable information lags, on the order of 7^1/2 months on average. Moreover, information stickiness implies that noisy output fluctuations will be attenuated in survey answers and, consequently, helps explain why balance indices successfully track business cycles. Conversely, in an environment populated by fully informed identical firms, as in the standard RBC framework, for example, balance indices instead become degenerate. Finally, information regarding changes in aggregate output tends to be sectorally concentrated. The paper, therefore, illustrates how this feature of the data may be relevant for the construction of balance indices.     

Do Entrenched Managers Pay Their Workers More?

Analyzing a panel that matches public firms with worker-level data, we find that managerial entrenchment affects workers' pay. CEOs with more control pay their workers more, but financial incentives through cash flow rights ownership mitigate such behavior. Entrenched CEOs pay more to employees closer to them in the corporate hierarchy, geographically closer to the headquarters, and associated with conflict-inclined unions. The evidence is consistent with entrenched CEOs paying more to enjoy private benefits such as lower effort wage bargaining and improved social relations with employees. Our results show that managerial ownership and corporate governance can play an important role for employee compensation.     

Why Don't We Know More About Housing Supply?

This paper reviews the main themes in the empirical literature on housing supply and outlines suggestions for future research. Much of the literature has focused on the determinants of new housing supply, particularly the supply of single family detached homes, and the renovation and repair decisions of homeowners. We have learned a great deal from the work that has been done but many important puzzles remain. Much of the literature has focused on aggregate data because there is so little information where the unit of observation is the builder, investor, or landlord. We need to focus on bringing new data to bear on the decision-making processes of these important actors to build our understanding of the micro foundations of housing supply.     

Who Charges More: Hedge Funds or Mutual Funds?*

Explicit mutual fund fees are typically less than 1% of the assets under management. By comparison, the typical hedge fund charges a base fee of 2% plus a performance fee equal to 20% of net profits. Thus, hedge funds appear to charge far more for even comparable performance—unless one takes account of the following:

• ? For most mutual funds, a very high percentage of performance is driven by its passive exposure to the market, even though the fee is applied to the total fund.
• ? Many hedge funds are designed to provide returns that are completely independent of market performance.

Using these two assumptions, the author provides a simple example that shows that a representative mutual fund's performance can be replicated by combining an index fund, which represents the mutual fund's passive component, with a hedge fund, representing the mutual fund's active component. When analyzed in this way, the fee of the combined fund turns out to be remarkably close to the actual fee of the mutual fund. This in turn suggests that the implicit fee for the mutual fund's small active component is comparable to the fees of the hedge fund.     

Do Family Firms Provide More or Less Voluntary Disclosure?

We examine the voluntary disclosure practices of family firms. We find that, compared to nonfamily firms, family firms provide fewer earnings forecasts and conference calls, but more earnings warnings. Whereas the former is consistent with family owners having a longer investment horizon, better monitoring of management, and lower information asymmetry between owners and managers, the higher likelihood of earnings warnings is consistent with family owners having greater litigation and reputation cost concerns. We also document that family ownership dominates nonfamily insider ownership and concentrated institutional ownership in explaining the likelihood of voluntary disclosure. Using alternative proxies for the founding family's presence in the firm leads to similar results.     

“More than Diamonds”送给所有懂得真爱的情侣

圆润、饱满的指环上,两片较大的叶形主爪把钻石牢牢的固定。两片较小的叶形辅爪在呵护钻石亭部的同时让我们有机会欣赏到钻石优美的腰身。     

Monetary policy inertia: More a fiction than a fact?

Empirical estimates of monetary policy reaction functions feature a very high estimated degree of monetary policy inertia. This evidence is very hard of reconcile with the alternative evidence of low predictability of monetary policy rates. In this paper we examine the potential relevance of the problem of weak instruments to correctly identify the degree of monetary policy inertia in forward-looking monetary policy reaction function of the type originally proposed by Taylor [1993. Discretion versus policy rules in practice. Canergie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy, 39, 195–214]. After appropriately diagnosing and taking care of the weak instruments problem, we find an estimated degree of policy inertia which is significantly lower than the common value in the empirical literature on monetary policy rules.     

联迪商用金融展大秀 "电子支付 One For More"

9月17日，第十四届金融展在京隆重举行。国内商用设备产业劲旅——福建联迪商用设备有限公司（简称联迪商用）携麾下电子支付、商用信息家族全线精品亮相，接受全行业的“检阅”。这也是自去年底正式成立以来，联迪商用首次对外全面亮相。本届金融展上联迪商用以“电子支付One For More”为主题，在古色古香富有民族元素的展台设计里，巧妙地延伸出过去、现在、将来三个展区，大秀以UNIMARS统一支付平台为核心的全系列产品，向与会人员展示了一个创新的、先进的、安全的电子支付应用过程。作为代表电子支付民族品牌的自主创新之作，UNIMARS以其在高性价比、高安全性和多应用方面的突破性优势赢得了与会专家、代表和各行业用户的高度评价。面对UNIMARS所开创的电子支付多应用时代的到来，各位与会者更是寄予厚望。     

Is Sell‐Side Research More Valuable in Bad Times?

Because uncertainty is high in bad times, investors find it harder to assess firm prospects and hence should value analyst output more. However, higher uncertainty makes analysts’ tasks harder, so it is unclear whether analyst output is more valuable in bad times. We find that in bad times, analyst revisions have a larger stock‐price impact, earnings forecast errors per unit of uncertainty fall, and analyst reports are more frequent and longer. The increased impact of analysts is also more pronounced for harder‐to‐value firms. These results are consistent with analysts working harder and investors relying more on analysts in bad times.     

联迪商用金融展大秀“电子支付One For More”

9月17日～20日，国内商用设备产业劲旅福建联迪携麾下电子支付、商用信息、家族全线精品亮相第十四届金融展。这是自去年底正式成立以来，联迪商用首次对外全面亮相。本届金融展上，联迪商用以“电子支付One For More”为主题，在古色古香富有民族元素的展台设计里，巧妙地延伸出过去、现在、将来三个展区，大秀以UNIMARS统一支付平台为核心的全系列产品，向与会人员展示了一个创新、先进、安全的电子支付应用。作为代表电子支付民族品牌的自主创新之作，UNIMARS以其在高性价比、高安全性和多应用方面的突破性优势赢得了与会专家、代表和各行业用户的高度评价。     

Greenspan:More Than 50 Percent Chance of U.S.Recession

There is more than a 50 percent chance the UnitedStates could go into recession,former Federal Reservechairman Alan Greenspan told El Pais newspaper in an     

Beyond Bank Competition and Profitability: Can Moral Hazard Tell Us More?

The purpose of this paper is to investigate the relation between competition, profitability, and risk. The investigation uses bank-level panel data from 171 Chinese banks during 1993 to 2007. Throughout the whole sample, the empirical results divulge that increased bank concentration in China improves the profitability and the risk of its banks. These results support the structure-conduct-performance and the moral hazard hypotheses. In terms of persistence, both the profit and the risk of the banks rise significantly by showing the enhancement of profit and risk from one period to the next. When different types of banks are considered, joint-stock banks have the highest persistence in profit and risk, and therefore more stable profits. City banks support the moral hazard hypothesis. They have entrenched managers that tend to take on more risk when the bank’s charter value falls in a very competitive (less concentrated) environment. Further, deregulation which in 2003 China allowed foreign banks to formally enter China has a negative impact on the structure of China’s banking sector.     

Agricultural Tariffs or Subsidies: Which Are More Important for Developing Economies?

This article assesses the impact of the world price–depressingeffect of agricultural subsidies and border protection in OECDcountries on developing economies' exports, imports, and welfare.Developing economy exporters are likely to benefit from reductionsin such subsidies and trade barriers, whereas net importersmay lose as world prices rise. A simple partial equilibriummodel of global trade in commodities that benefit from domesticsupport or export subsidies is developed to estimate the relevantelasticities. Simulation results suggest that a 50 percent reductionin border protection will have a much larger positive impacton developing economies' exports and welfare than a 50 percentreduction in agricultural subsidies. Although there is significantheterogeneity across developing economies, the results suggestthat efforts in the Doha Round of negotiations should be directed at substantially reducing border protection.     

Introducing More IFRS Principles of Disclosure – Will the Poor Disclosers Improve?

Abstract

The current paper was prepared for the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) Research Forum 2017 and evaluates the effects of introducing more principles of disclosure as part of the IASB Disclosure Initiative. We perform a literature review of academic research on how entities have complied with disclosure requirements in the past. The review shows high levels of non-compliance and high volatility across entities, including poor disclosers being far below the average. We find no clear pattern of higher compliance for International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) with more reliance on disclosure principles as compared to specific requirements (i.e. IFRS 7, IFRS 8), but note the methodological problem of measuring compliance with disclosure principles. Academic research suggests that the degree of compliance depends on entities’ incentives for providing or withholding information in combination with local conditions for primary users, auditors and regulators. Based on our review, we argue that increased reliance on entities to act in ‘good faith’ when complying with disclosure requirements, in capital-market contexts where entities may be in high-incentive situations and have low costs of non-compliance, is potentially risky in terms of how well the Standards protect primary users from poor disclosers. More emphasis is needed on ensuring that the disclosure requirements are enforceable and auditable in order to secure a certain minimum level of disclosure.     

Are U.S. Multinational Corporations Becoming More Aggressive Income Shifters?

This paper examines income shifting of U.S. multinational companies over the past two decades. Domestic and foreign policy makers are increasingly concerned with the effect of income shifting on dwindling tax revenues, however, extant research on income shifting by U.S. multinational enterprises is mixed. We address the disconnect between the academic literature and the policy maker's perceptions by examining the extent of multijurisdictional income shifting by U.S. multinational companies. We directly address conflicting results in extant literature and show that using either multiperiod proxies or instrumental variables overcomes weaknesses of annual proxies in this setting. Our tests show that U.S. companies have become more active at shifting income out of the United States as the regulatory costs of shifting have changed. Holding tax rate differences between U.S. and foreign jurisdictions constant, our empirical estimates suggest that our sample of 380 corporations with low average foreign tax rates collectively shifts approximately $10 billion of additional income out of the United States annually during 2005–2009 relative to 1998–2002 due to varying regulatory costs of shifting.     

Have Rating Agencies Become More Conservative? Implications for Capital Structure and Debt Pricing

Rating agencies have become more conservative in assigning corporate credit ratings over the period 1985 to 2009; holding firm characteristics constant, average ratings have dropped by three notches. This change does not appear to be fully warranted because defaults have declined over this period. Firms affected more by conservatism issue less debt, have lower leverage, hold more cash, are less likely to obtain a debt rating, and experience lower growth. Their debt spreads are lower than those of unaffected firms with the same rating, which implies that the market partly undoes the impact of conservatism on debt prices. This evidence suggests that firms and capital markets do not perceive the increase in conservatism to be fully warranted.