Marshall and Walras: Incompatible bedfellows?

Abstract

The standard view about the relationship between the Marshallian and the Walrasian approaches is that they are complementary to each other. My aim in this paper is to show that, on the contrary, they constitute alternative sub-research programmes within the wider neoclassical paradigm. I make my point by contrasting the two approaches against the following benchmarks: the purpose of economic theory according to Marshall and Walras; their views as to the role of mathematics; their specific ways of tackling complexity; the conception of equilibrium underpinning their theories; and, finally, their trade organisation assumptions.     

The Marshallian Market and the Walrasian Economy. Two Incompatible Bedfellows

The aim of this paper is to question a view which is usually taken for granted, namely that the Marshallian partial equilibrium and Walrasian general equilibrium analysis stand in a relationship of continuity. It will be claimed that the contrary is true: the generalisation of the Marshallian market does not lead to a Walrasian economy or, conversely, the Walrasian economy is not composed of Marshallian markets. To bring this point home, the basic methodological choices underpinning the analysis of the Marshallian market and of the Walrasian economy will be compared. The issue of why no full-fledged Marshallian representation of the economy has arisen which might stand as an alternative to the Walrasian account will also be investigated and a series of reasons for this lack of generalisation of the Marshallian market will be considered. Finally, it will be claimed that if the Marshallian economy concept has no explicit existence, it has nonetheless an implicit one. It forms the background against which a series of reasoning about the working of the economy as a whole, which cannot fit the Walrasian economy framework, are developed. No less prestigious names than those of Keynes, Hicks, Patinkin, Friedman, Clower and Leijonhufvud will be adduced as witnesses.     

Average cost and marginal cost pricing in Marshall: Textual analysis and interpretation

Abstract

This paper proposes a textual analysis of Marshall's theory of firm pricing behavior under competitive conditions. Average cost and marginal cost pricing theories have very distinct origins as they are rooted, respectively, in the classical and marginalistic theory of competition. I analyze to what extent and under which circumstances the two theories joined in the work of Alfred Marshall; and I argue that, even though only partial evidence can be found to support the adoption of the notion of marginal cost pricing by Marshall, he developed some concepts, such as the distinction between short and long periods and the notion of quasi-rents, which turned out to be fundamental for the joint acceptance of marginal cost and average cost pricing principles by the Marshallian school.     

Backhouse and Boianovsky on “disequilibrium theory”. A review article of transforming modern macroeconomics. Exploring disequilibrium microfoundations, 1956–2003

Abstract

This article is an in-depth analysis of Backhouse and Boianovsky's book, Transforming Modern Macroeconomics: Exploring Disequilibrium Microfoundations, 1956–2003. I start with questioning Backhouse and Boianovsky's too broad understanding of the disequilibrium approach. Thereby they bring together theories that should be kept separate, those by Patinkin, Clower and Leijonhuvud on the one hand, and those by Barro and Grossman, Drèze and Benassy, on the other. I also substantiate my disagreement with their claim that an inner link exists between fixed price equilibrium theories and imperfect competition modelling. Finally, I put forward a few conjectures about the reason why fixed price modelling petered out.     

'Interrelated prices' and Sraffa's critique of partial equilibrium

The early Marshallian literature recognized that, in most significant cases, long-period equilibrium analysis must consider families of interdependent markets which are in direct relation with each other. This perspective, which is different from both standard partial equilibrium and general equilibrium analysis, was developed mainly by two Italian authors, Maffeo Pantaleoni (1857–1924) and Marco Fanno (1878–1964). This paper is aimed at showing that this ‘interrelated prices’ literature has some points of contact with Piero Sraffa's critique of partial equilibrium analysis. It is argued that Sraffa places the case of a Marshallian decreasing returns industry in a context (rivalry for the use of a common factor in fixed supply) which was familiar to Pantaleoni-Fanno: both maintain that the markets involved are interdependent, even though they evaluate differently the possibility of a sensible equilibrium analysis.     

FROM ONE TO MANY ISLANDS: THE EMERGENCE OF SEARCH AND MATCHING MODELS

The notion of frictional unemployment failed to grow into a full‐fledged theory in the writings of Beveridge, Pigou and Hicks, as these economists were unwilling and/or unable to go beyond the then‐prevailing Marshallian approach. Here, first we make explicit the trade organization assumptions underpinning Marshall's equilibrium theory. Next we examine Beveridge's, Pigou's and Hicks' early works on wages and unemployment. Finally, we look at the seminal papers that paved the way for search literature: McCall, Lucas and Prescott, Mortensen and Pissarides. We show that they succeed in providing an unemployment result, because they indeed depart from the Marshallian trade organization.     

Eriksson on Critical Realism: a rejoinder

Abstract

In this response to Andrew Mearman I argue that his critique suffers from a series of misrepresentations of my paper. For example, Mearman generalizes my arguments about Keynes to be about Critical Realism (CR), and he challenges my criticism of Tony Lawson's arguments by claiming that I have misrepresented CR. In fact the text of my 1998 paper does not support Mearman's claims. Furthermore, since (i) the principal aim of my paper was to question the interpretation of Keynes as a realist, and (ii) Mearman does not present any arguments suggesting how CR in its current form would refute my conclusions, his criticism must be judged doubly misdirected.     

A note on the effects of market power distribution in Cordella and Gabszewicz's Ricardian model

We argue that it is the distribution of market power among agents, rather than the use of market power itself, that may force Ricardian economies into autarky. By applying Baldwin (1948) monopoly equilibrium concepts to the general equilibrium with imperfect competition model analyzed by Cordella and Gabszewicz (1997), we show that the monopoly equilibrium outcome Pareto dominates the oligopoly one. As a consequence, economic efficiency is higher when market power is concentrated in one agent than when it is evenly distributed among few agents.     

Contrived desires,affluence, and welfare: J.K. Galbraith's Pigovian redistribution argument reconsidered

I argue that John Kenneth Galbraith's theory of the “dependence effect” in The Affluent Society provides a way to rescue A.C. Pigou's argument for wealth redistribution from a powerful objection. The objection is based on the unprovability of statements making interpersonal comparisons of utility. Galbraith's dependence effect theory allows him to present a version of the Pigovian argument that requires no such statements to be made. I argue that Galbraith's main piece of advocacy in The Affluent Society was for income redistribution, despite the fact that he claimed to be in favour of greater spending in the public sector rather than redistribution as such. I then show how my reading of the dependence effect theory helps to defend it against objections from Hayek and Rothbard. I end by discussing what improvements in economics a proper test of the theory would require and showing how my reading of it helps to reveal the ongoing importance of The Affluent Society to the understanding of political economy.     

A spillover‐based theory of credentialism

I propose a model in which credentials, such as diplomas, are instrumentally valuable to workers. The model avoids an important criticism of standard job market signalling models by tying a worker's wage to their output. A worker's productivity is influenced by the skills of their co‐workers, where such skills arise from an ability‐augmenting investment that is made prior to matching with co‐workers. Credentials allow workers to demonstrate their investment to the labour market, thereby allowing them to match with high‐skill co‐workers in equilibrium. Despite the positive externality associated with a worker's investment, I show how overinvestment is pervasive in equilibrium.     

Of clouds and clocks and Keynes: conceptions of reality and the growth of knowledge function of money ∗

In this paper, John Maynard Keynes' General theoryand the concept of money are given an evolutionary interpretation. This interpretation is based on Karl Popper's delightful essay ‘Of clouds and clocks: an approach to the problem of rationality and the freedom of man’. The essay presents two things: Popper's conception of indeterminism and his general theory of abstractions. Popper's general theory concerns the role of abstractions and rule-governed, hierarchical systems of abstractions in structuring an indeterministic and uncertain world. He applies his general theory to science.Popper maintains that science is an abstract, rule-governed, linguistic process that facilitates criticism as a way of learning about our world. Popper calls this the growth of knowledge function of science. Popper's general theory can be applied to Keynes' General theory. Following Popper, I argue for a conception of the economy as a rule-governed, monetary language of commerce that facilitates critically minded inquiry in the domain of ordinary economic transactions. A monetary system facilitates the growth of commonsense knowledge in the economy. I call this the growth of knowledge function of money. An awareness of indeterminism and a growth of knowledge like function of money seem to pervade Keynes' General theory.     

On-the-job search and strategic bargaining

This paper studies wage bargaining in a simple economy in which both employed and unemployed workers search for better jobs. The axiomatic Nash bargaining solution and standard strategic bargaining solutions are inapplicable because the set of feasible payoffs is nonconvex. I instead develop a strategic model of wage bargaining between a single worker and firm that is applicable to such an environment. I show that if workers and firms are homogeneous, there are market equilibria with a continuous wage distribution in which identical firms bargain to different wages, each of which is a subgame perfect equilibrium of the bargaining game. If firms are heterogeneous, I characterize market equilibria in which more productive firms pay higher wages. I compare the quantitative predictions of this model with Burdett and Mortensen's [1998. Wage differentials, employer size and unemployment. International Economic Review 39, 257-273.] wage posting model and argue that the bargaining model is theoretically more appealing along important dimensions.     

The individual and the market: Paul Samuelson on (homothetic) Santa Claus economics

Paul Samuelson often used the term “Santa Claus economics” for mathematical models with empirically unrealistic assumptions. I focus on one particular member of the Santa Claus family that Samuelson was very sceptical about: homothetic general equilibrium models (where all agents have identical homothetic preferences). I argue that Samuelson's concerns about these models provide insights into how he viewed the relationship between the individual and the market, a relationship that has implications for not only his economic theorising, but also his broader political–economic vision. His criticisms are also relevant to some ongoing debates within contemporary economic theory.     

The Law of Diminishing Marginal Utility in Alfred Marshall's Principles of Economics *

The goal of this paper is to clarify the content of the Marshallian Law of Diminishing Marginal Utility. The paper is divided into seven sections. In the first one, I present the eight formulations of the Law that I record in the Principles and the foundation that Marshall provides for it. In the second and third sections, I present a couple of objections raised by Marshall himself against the universal validity of the Law; in my opinion, his answer to them is not sound. I contrast my interpretation with those of the other authors. In the fourth section, The Law of Utility is distinguised from the Law of Demand. In section five, l present the two meanings in which Marshall employs the term ‘utility’: as pleasure, and as a formal notion. In section six, I attempt to build an explanatory framework for the encountered difficulties. Finally, the seventh section is devoted to conclusions.     

An Austrian approach to law and economics, with special reference to superstition

This paper has two purposes. First, it considers what the components of an ??Austrian?? law and economics might consist of. I argue that Ronald Coase??s conception of law and economics precludes the economic analysis of legal institutions and, in particular, the beliefs that support them. In doing so, Coase??s conception precludes an Austrian law and economics. In contrast, Richard Posner??s conception of law and economics makes such analysis the core of its study. In doing so, Posner??s conception provides a productive foundation for an Austrian law and economics. Second, to illustrate what some aspects of an Austrian law and economics might look like in practice, I consider several examples of the economic analysis of beliefs of import for the law. I focus on objectively false beliefs, or superstitions, and argue that some such beliefs are socially productive.     

The Anglo-Irish context for William Edward Hearn's economic beliefs and the ultimate failure of his Plutology

Abstract

William Edward Hearn is generally regarded as Australia's first economist of international note and his Plutology ([1863]1864) is invariably deemed to be Australia's first economics text. In this paper I argue that it is more appropriate to describe Hearn as an Anglo-Irish economist and, to this end, provide the Anglo-Irish context for the economic doctrines that he expressed in Plutology and elsewhere. I also argue that the failure of Plutology in the market place was, in part, due to a campaign waged against Hearn in London by John Elliot Cairnes, who was an undergraduate contemporary of Hearn's at Trinity College, Dublin.     

On the existence of pure strategy Bertrand equilibrium

Summary The paper analyses the existence of pure strategy Nash equilibrium in price competition (or Bertrand equilibrium) in a homogeneous product market when costs are strictly convex and proves that if output is demand determined such equilibrium always exists. This paper also characterises such equilibria and shows that if firms are identical such equilibria are necessarily non-unique. However for firms with asymmetric costs it can be unique or non-unique.I am greatly indebted to Anjan Mukherji and Kunal Sengupta for this paper. I also express my profound gratitude to a referee of this journal for a very helpful set of suggestions.     

A historiographical exhumation of J.A. Hobson's Over-Saving Thesis: General theory versus historiography

Abstract

The discussion of J.A. Hobson's understanding of over-saving has been largely confined within John Maynard Keynes' famous critique in the General Theory. I argue that gauging Hobson's contribution by ‘general theory’, that is, by an ahistorical, non-evolutionary yardstick, is to miss the larger part of Hobson's achievement. Hobson's conception of over-saving was contained within an evolving historiography of capital accumulation and took on various meanings depending on whether Hobson was discussing a competitive or monopolistic environment. I show that Keynes' ‘corrected’ version of over-saving was implicitly contained within Hobson's analysis of an evolving monopolistic industrial structure.     

REPLY TO LOOMIS, WALSH, AND McKEAN

In commenting on my article "… The Opportunity Cost of the Redwood National Park" (Walker 1984), Loomis, Walsh, and McKean (1984) argue that I gave inadequate consideration to concepts of option, existence, and bequest values for wilderness areas. I am familiar with these concepts, and I believe I gave them the attention they deserve.     

Evenly rotating economy: A new modeling technique for an old equilibrium construct

In the middle of the twentieth century, just five years before Arrow and Debreu proved the existence of an equilibrium for a competitive economy in the Walrasian system, Ludwig von Mises introduced the English-speaking world to his alternative equilibrium construct: the evenly rotating economy. In contrast to Arrow and Debreu, which characterizes equilibrium as a unique vector of prices and quantities, Mises depicts equilibrium as a pattern of behavior. After reviewing the Misesian conception of equilibrium and its failure to take hold in the profession, I turn to the modern literature. I contend that the evenly rotating economy is a special case of the now-prevalent class of search-theoretic exchange models. As such, I argue that this class of models is particularly well suited for applications considered by economists working in the Austrian tradition.