Selfishness, cooperation, the evolutionary point of view and its implications for economics

The assumed selfishness of market actors could be considered in the context of two perspectives: macroeconomic and microeconomic. The first concerns the market mechanism as the most effective from the social well-being or the wealth of a nation points of view. The latter is based on the premises of the nature of human beings. I have distinguished between two possible ways of understanding selfish forms of behaviour in the market: as rational economic behaviour i.e. the most effective from the gains and losses point of view (i.e. public interests in the works of A. Smith) or as selfish from the psychological point of view (this is mostly presented by J. S. Mill's theory). The first approach seems to be concerned with the creation of the most effective market mechanism from the State's point of view. In the context of historical processes over 400 years, cultural evolution “has been promoting” selfish behaviour; for example, it was widely presented in T. Hobbes' works and then for over 200 years, the theory of A. Smith has been supporting and moulding the institutional context of market and social behaviour. Thus, positive economics describes the market created by the ideas of a neo-classical paradigm, which is based on the normative premises of A. Smith and J. S. Mill. Moreover, the virtual market behaviour described by “effects” (f. e. Veblen's effect) and failures seems to be a manifestation of a discrepancy between market reality and the classical assumptions.The social evolution of human beings has been advantageous to the human species. Moreover, from the social point of view, pro-social behaviour is “natural” as well as desirable and it has been preferred by the cultural evolution. Competitiveness assumes that somebody has to lose, because someone gains. Cooperation looks for gains for all the players. The choice is political, and not imposed by selfishness.     

Searching for New Jerusalems: P.H. Wicksteed’s “Jevonian” critique of Marx’s Capital

Abstract

In 1884, P.H. Wicksteed published a critique of the first volume of Marx’s Capital, the first detailed analytical encounter in English between Marx’s value theory and the new discourse of “marginalism”. In revisiting that episode, this article has three principal objectives. The first is to show how Wicksteed developed his understanding of political economy, as he moved from initially following Henry George’s Progress and Poverty. The second is to examine why Wicksteed’s defence of George necessitated criticizing the Marxist Social Democratic Federation. The third is to show that Wicksteed’s criticisms of Marx were simply incorrect.     

Why do people rate? Theory and evidence on online ratings

The rapid growth of online retail in the last decade has led to widespread use of consumer-generated ratings. This paper theoretically and experimentally identifies influences that drive consumers to rate products and examines how those factors can create distortions in product ratings. By manipulating payoffs and effectively “deactivating” either the buyer or seller side of an artificial laboratory market, raters' behavior is decomposed into buyer-centric and seller-centric components. The cost of providing a rating also plays a major role in influencing rating behavior, with high and low quality sellers being rated more often than those of moderate quality.     

Sidgwick and Edgeworth on indeterminacy in the labour market

Commentators have underlined Sidgwick's influence on Edgeworth's thinking and more particularly on New and Old Methods of Ethics (1877). But have failed to notice that Sidgwick remained a major reference in Mathematical Psychics (1881). Therefore, the purpose of this paper is to show that, in this book, Edgeworth wanted to refine upon the problem of wages addressed by Sidgwick in 1879. The thesis of the paper is that Sidgwick and Edgeworth's disagreement as to the role of open competition in the resolution of indeterminacy in the labour market stems from two different notions of competition. This latter can be seen as a differentiation process, as in Sidgwick's, or as a replication mechanism, as in Edgeworth's.     

Intergenerational Altruism and the Environment

We construct an overlapping generations model of pollution externality in which individuals are altruistically linked to their offspring as in Barro (1974). It is shown that steady-state consumption may be a decreasing function of the intergenerational degree of altruism. Despite individuals' altruism, the competitive equilibrium is not optimal. We thus study the social optimum and show that it can be decentralized.
JEL classification: D 62; D 64; D 91     

Depreciation and intergenerational altruism in the private provision of public goods

The static model of the private provision of public goods is refuted by empirical and experimental evidence which shows that contributions are above the levels predicted by the theory. The model is reconsidered here in an intertemporal framework that allows the formation of a stock of public good over time and admits intergenerational altruism into preferences. Both of these factors affect the level of private provision. An intertemporal version of the Samuelson rule is derived and it is shown that, for some parameter values, the provision level determined by this is matched by private provision. For other parameter values, it is shown how a system of taxation can achieve the optimum.     

Competitive versus collective incentive pay: does workers’ mutual concern matter?

The paper shows that coworkers’ mutual concern may help explain the puzzling fact that wage premia based on ranked or relative performance are rare while group rewards are popular among employees. In the work environment studied, when workers are selfish the optimal effort-enhancing scheme is a labor contest with a single wage prize. It is shown that when workers care about coworkers’ material benefit a group reward scheme is optimal. Moreover, profit increases as workers’ mutual concern increases, so it is in the interest of the firm to foster mutual concern among its employees. I am indebted to Gianni De Fraja, Benedetto Gui, Antonio Nicolò , Lorenzo Rocco for insightful conversations. I also wish to thank Julio Rotemberg for advising me to carefully characterize the optimal incentive scheme. Finally, I am grateful to the Italian Ministry of Education, University and Research for a grant, and to the IRC, University of Minnesota, for its hospitality and support.     

On fair allocations

This paper examines the effects of fairness on economic behavior and allocations, where fairness is defined as the absence of envy among consumers. We use the benefit function to investigate the welfare cost of fairness. We show how fairness generates a form of altruism, captured by a “fair expenditure” function that depends on the distribution of welfare. We define the most efficient fair allocations and explore the implications of fairness for economic behavior, pricing and redistribution policies.     

Dictator game giving: altruism or artefact?

Experimental dictator games have been used to explore unselfish behaviour. Evidence is presented here, however, that subjects’ generosity can be reversed by allowing them to take a partner’s money. Dictator game giving therefore does not reveal concern for consequences to others existing independently of the environment, as posited in rational choice theory. It may instead be an artefact of experimentation. Alternatively, evaluations of options depend on the composition of the choice set. Implications of these possibilities are explored for experimental methodology and charitable donations respectively. The data favour the artefact interpretation, suggesting that demand characteristics of experimental protocols merit investigation, and that economic analysis should not exclude context-specific social norms.

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Electronic Supplementary Material  The online version of this article () contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.      

Sentiments and Motivations in Adam Smith and Vernon Smith

Vernon Smith (VS) discovered Adam Smith (AS) late in his professional career, and has adopted ideas from The Theory of Moral Sentiments to explain findings in experimental economics. Most important is the theorized link between moral sentiments and the evolution of property rights and law as foundations for commerce. VS's encounter with AS, while not new, provides a compelling look at the modern laboratory of social science through the lens of the Enlightenment, and cannot easily be encapsulated within a utilitarian framework. This paper provides an overview and commentary on VS's approach.     

Estate taxation with warm-glow altruism

This article examines the properties of the optimal fiscal policy in an economy with warm-glow altruism (utility interdependence) and heterogeneous individuals. We propose a new efficiency concept, D-efficiency, that considers an implicit constraint in the act of giving: Donors cannot bequeath to donees more than their existing resources. Considering this constraint, we show that the market equilibrium is not socially efficient. The efficient level of bequest transfers can be implemented by the market with estate and labor-income subsidies and a capital-income tax. In the absence of lump-sum taxation, the government faces a trade-off between minimizing distortions and eliminating external effects. The implied tax policy differs from Pigovian taxation since the government’s ability to correct the external effects is limited. Finally, we show that the efficiency-equity trade-off does not affect the qualitative features of the optimal distortionary fiscal policy.

Can Ecolabeling Schemes Preserve the Environment?

A three-stage game of production technology, signal and price competition is developed to study the impact of eco-labeling, in a duopoly model of vertical product differentiation. The production technology and the subsequent pollution level are non-observable by consumers. The only way to inform consumers about the environmental quality of the product is to stick an ecolabel on it. However, a polluting firm may also usurp the ecolabel by incurring a certain cost. By assuming that consumers are altruistic and willing to pay for environmental quality, we show that ecolabels can reduce the pollution level. Finally and importantly, under restrictive conditions on labeling cost, ecolabeling can constitute to some extent an environmentally effective and economically efficient policy. However, ecolabeling cannot alone internalize the whole negative externality until the optimum point.      

Yet another look at Léon Walras's theory of tâtonnement

Starting with a detailed discussion of the theorem of equivalent redistributions, Part 1 examines the central role played by the distributional neutrality of tâtonnement in Walras's pure theory of exchange. Part 2 extends this discussion to Walras's attempts at reaching a similar result when dealing with the successive versions of his theory of production before 1900. Part 3 contrasts Walras's and Edgeworth's respective technologies of exchange in order to demonstrate that a distributionally neutral tâtonnement is an intrinsic part of Walras's theory of exchange. Finally, and besides briefly summarizing the results, the conclusion develops the crucial connection between the necessity of a converging and distributionally neutral tâtonnement in pure economics with Walras's theories of property and justice.     

Altruistic behavior in a representative dictator experiment

We conduct a representative dictator game in which students and random members of the community choose both what charity to support and how much to donate to the charity. We find systematic differences between the choices of students and community members. Community members are much more likely to write in their own charity, community members donate significantly more ($17), on average, and community members are much more likely (32%) to donate the entire $100 endowment. Based on this evidence, it does not appear that student behavior is very representative in the context of the charitable donations and the dictator game.

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Electronic Supplementary Material  The online version of this article () contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.      

‘Medical altruism in mainstream health economics: theoretical and political paradoxes’ comments

In this article, which was published in the September 2014 issue of the Review, Batifoulier and Da Silva examine the role of medical altruism in health economics. They argue that abandoning homo economicus and the mainstream practice of incorporating patient well-being in the doctor’s utility function in order to explain the clinical behavior of doctors and switching from profit maximization to medical altruism both lead to a dead end. We agree but the authors leave us with no way out. We argue instead that the doctor’s clinical behavior whether expressed in terms of utility or altruism is not a fit subject for economics. The way out is to restrict economics to health care issues with financial dimensions. In their article, Batifoulier and Da Silva bring their French experience to the table. We bring to the table our American experience with more than 40 years of hands-on care for patients along with the experiences of four other physicians in our extended family. The specialties include intensive care pediatrics, emergency medicine, intensive-care pulmonary medicine, dermatology, and otolaryngology. Our premise in responding to Batifoulier and Da Silva is that apart from payment for services rendered, there probably are no serious differences in the actual practice of medicine in France compared to the United States. And even if there are such differences, they are matters to be taken up by medicine not economics.