Home Equity Insurance

Home equity insurance policies—policies insuring homeowners against declines in the prices of their homes—would bear some resemblance both to ordinary insurance and to financial hedging vehicles. A menu of choices for the design of such policies is presented here, and conceptual issues are discussed. Choices include pass-through futures and options, in which the insurance company in effect serves as a retailer to homeowners of short positions in real estate futures markets or of put options on real estate indices. Another choice is a life-event-triggered insurance policy, in which the homeowner pays regular fixed insurance premia and is entitled to a claim if both a sufficient decline in the real estate price index and a specified life event (such as a move beyond a certain geographical distance) occur. Pricing of the premia to cover loss experience is derived, and tables of break-even policy premia are shown, based on estimated models of Los Angeles housing prices from 1971 to 1994.     

Controlling-minority shareholder incentive conflicts and directors’ and officers’ liability insurance: Evidence from China

This paper examines the demand for directors’ and officers’ liability insurance (D&O insurance) by Chinese listed companies where controlling-minority shareholder incentive conflicts are acute due to the concentrated and split ownership structure. We hypothesize and find evidence that the incidence of seeking D&O insurance is positively related to the extent of controlling-minority shareholder incentive conflicts – a finding not previously documented in the literature. Using an event study, we find that the announcements of D&O insurance decisions in firms that engage in earnings management, and/or are controlled by a local government (such firms tend to have stronger incentives to tunnel), seem to have a negative wealth effect. In addition, the incidence of the D&O insurance decision is positively related to the proportion of independent directors and several litigation risk proxies. Therefore, the breakthrough in corporate governance and judicial reforms has created non-negligible perceived securities litigation risks in China.     

Incentives of Stock Option Based Compensation

We introduce explicitly the effort as a choice variable in a continuous time utility maximisation framework of an executive who is partly compensated with stock options. We solve the model in the case where the executive is not allowed to trade in the company’s stock but is able to achieve a partial insurance through trading in a correlated market portfolio. We define the executive’s value of the options through a certainty equivalence approach both in the case of European call options and non-standard capped stock options and study the behaviour of the reservation price as relevant parameters change.JEL Classification: G13, G30, G32, J33, M12     

The Spillover effect of compulsory insurance

The assumption usually made in the insurance literature that risks are always insurable at the desired level does not hold in the real world: some risks are not—or are only partially—insurable, while others, such as civil liability or health and workers' injuries, must be fully insured or at least covered for a specific amount. We examine in this paper conditions under which a reduction in the constrained level of insurance for one risk increases the demand of insurance for another independent risk. We show that it is necessary to sign the fourth derivative of the utility function to obtain an unambiguous spillover effect. Three different sufficient conditions are derived if the expected value of the exogenous risk is zero. The first condition is that risk aversion be standard—that is, that absolute risk aversion and absolute prudence be decreasing. The second condition is that absolute risk aversion be decreasing and convex. The third condition is that both the third and the fourth derivatives of the utility function be negative. If the expected value of the exogenous risk is positive, a wealth effect is added to the picture, which goes in the opposite direction if absolute risk aversion is decreasing.     

Deposit Insurance, Capital Adequacy Requirements and Interest Rate Dynamics

This paper examines the long run interaction among deposit insurance, bank deposit rates and capital adequacy requirements. Using analysis similar to the price discrimination model of Lott and Roberts (1991) we find that a competitive environment among banks would link the spread between insured and uninsured deposit rates to the size of the insurance premium. We also find that banks that choose to operate at the regulatory minimum capital level, would increase asset risk with increased capital requirements if (1) the implicit interest paid to insured and uninsured depositors is equally sensitive to changes in risk and capital adequacy and (2) the insurance premium is independent of the level of risk and capital adequacy. Under the present risk-based premium structure, asset risk has the potential to decline when the regulatory agency raises capital requirements. Finally, we examine the time series behavior of insured and uninsured interest rates to see if it is consistent with our theoretical model. We find that insured and uninsured rates, along with deposit insurance premiums, are cointegrated series as suggested by our model.     

D&O insurance and IPO performance: What can we learn from insurers?

We investigate whether a firm’s directors’ and officers’ liability insurance contract at the time of the IPO is related to insured firms’ first year post-IPO performance. We find that insurers charge a higher premium per dollar of coverage to protect the directors and officers of firms that will subsequently have poor first year post-IPO stock performance. A higher price of coverage is also associated with a higher post-IPO volatility and lower Sharpe ratio. Our results are robust to various econometric specifications and suggest that even when the high level of information asymmetry inherent to the IPO context prevails, insurers have information about the firms’ prospects that should be valuable to outside investors.     

A Value at Risk Approach to Background Risk

This paper studies the effects of an uninsurable background risk (BR) on the demand for insurance (proportional and with deductible). We study both the case of BR uncorrelated with the insurable one and the perfectly correlated one, in a Gaussian world. In order to perform our study, we exploit the new risk measure known as Value at Risk (VaR) and consider insurance contracts which are Mean-VaR efficient. We obtain results which depend on the parameters (moments) of both risks and on the magnitude of loadings charged by the insurance company, instead of depending on the risk attitudes of the insured, such as risk aversion and prudence.We demonstrate that, if loadings are not too high, the demand for insurance increases with positively correlated BR; it decreases with BR negatively correlated if the latter is less risky than the insurable one (in this case it can even go to zero, if loadings are too high); it goes to zero with BR which is negatively correlated and more risky than the insurable one.     

Experimental Tests of Self-Selection and Screening in Insurance Decisions

A major characteristic of insurance markets is information asymmetry that may lead to phenomena such as adverse selection and moral hazard. Another aspect of markets with asymmetric information is self-selection, which refers to the pattern of choices that individuals with different personal characteristics make when facing a menu of contracts or options. To combat problems of asymmetric information, insurance firms can use screening. That is, they can offer the clients a menu of choices and infer their characteristics from their choices.This article reports the results of several studies that examined the degree to which people behave according to the notions of self-selection and screening. Subjects played the role of either insurance buyers or sellers. The results of these studies provide partial support for the hypothesis that subjects use self-selection and screening in insurance markets. Our study also points at the importance of learning in experimental studies. In one-stage experiments where subjects did not get feedback, screening was not detected. When multistage experiments were conducted, and the subjects learned from experience and were also taught the relevant theories, their decisions were more aligned with screening.     

The Underpricing of Insurance IPOs

The previous literature documents that insurance initial public offerings (IPOs) are less underpriced than those of noninsurance firms. This difference is usually attributed to lower information asymmetry for regulated firms. However, we find that once one controls for the file price adjustment insurance IPOs, both stock and mutual, are no less underpriced than other noninsurance offerings suggesting the book-building process resolves any such information asymmetries. We also find that mutual IPOs appear more underpriced than stock insurance IPOs, but this difference is related to the differences in pre-issue managerial ownership.     

Equilibrium Price Dispersion in the Insurance Market

We consider price dispersion under nonsequential consumer search when a finite number of firms exists. We assume that firms have the same production technology. We find that single‐price equilibrium exists only when it is the highest possible price (monopoly price). Price dispersion is possible in equilibrium only when firms use mixed strategies. We also find that increased competition may increase price dispersion and the intensity of consumer search while reducing the expected profits of firms. The number of firms in the long run is increasing regarding expected market demand and decreasing regarding production cost and entry cost. We reinterpret some empirical observations reported in the literature.     

Do insurers respond to active purchasing? Evidence from the Massachusetts health insurance exchange

Health insurance markets face continued challenges with high premiums and limited insurer competition. We describe a unique set of “active purchasing” policies used by Massachusetts' pioneer health insurance exchange to shape the rules of competition and reward lower-price insurers with additional customers. We provide evidence that these policies significantly influenced insurer pricing. Between 2010 and 2013, over 80% of insurer prices were set exactly at or within 1% of pricing thresholds created by active purchasing policies. A key “limited choice” policy was associated with a 16%–20% reduction in average insurance prices relative to comparison markets in 2012–2014. Insurers achieved these price cuts partly through cost reductions via narrower provider networks and partly through reduced profit margins.     

The Role of Tax Subsidies in the Market for Health Insurance

This paper investigates the role of tax subsidies in linking the market for health insurance to the employment relationship. Using both American and Canadian data, it investigates how these subsidies influence whether health insurance coverage is offered in different sized firms and whether it is offered through an employer versus the individual private market. The findings indicate that tax subsidies encourage the provision of insurance in smaller firms. Removal of the subsidies would cause the level of insurance in small firms to decline significantly, but would not cause a large change in the level of insurance in larger firms. Part of this decline would be offset by increases in the market for individually purchased insurance.     

Can security analyst forecasts predict gold returns?

This paper examines whether security analyst earnings forecasts for firms primarily operating in the gold market can be utilised to predict returns on the price of gold. We first demonstrate that analysts are at least in part basing their earnings forecasts for gold firms on the return expectations of the gold commodity market. We show this by providing evidence that analyst coverage impounds not only market-wide and industry information, but also gold price information for these firms — as measured via its impact on stock return synchronicity. We then examine if the difference between forecast and observed earnings for these firms has predictive value for changes in the price of gold whilst controlling for a number of macroeconomic factors. We find that this difference does hold predictive power, but also has some limitations. However, there is potential for it to be used as an additional variable within gold forecasting frameworks.     

Capital expenditures,financial constraints,and the use of options

This paper analyzes why gold mining firms use options instead of linear strategies to hedge their gold price risk. Consistent with financial constraints based theories, the largest and least financially constrained firms are the most likely to hedge with insurance strategies (put options), while more constrained firms finance the purchase of puts by selling calls (collars). The most financially constrained firms use strategies that involve selling calls. Firms with large investment programs are also more likely to use insurance rather than linear strategies. Firms’ hedging instrument choices are also correlated with current market conditions, suggesting that managers’ market views partially drive hedging instrument choices.     

Mittelbare Diskriminierungen bei Unisex-Versicherungstarifen

The article drafts a concept for applying the prohibition of indirect gender discrimination in the specific situation of insurance tariffs. In order to reveal indirect discrimination it has to be shown that each gender is affected differently by a differentiating factor to a significant extent. The basis is a statistical comparison between the total group and the disadvantaged subgroup (among potential insurance holders). Because of Art. 5 (1) of Council Directive 2004/113/EC a statistically verifiable risk difference cannot justify indirect discriminations by itself. The provision prohibits not only direct discrimination but also the use of differentiating factors highly correlated with one gender as the correlation leads to the inclusion of a higher gender-specific risk. Therefore only distinctions which are based on the individual insurance record can be justified as their aim is to influence future behaviour. In other cases it is necessary to separate the risk difference causally linked to the differentiating factor from the incorporated gender-specific risk difference.     

Accounting, network complementarities and the development of inter-organisational relations

Networks of formally independent firms are interesting because they claim to be able to build competencies, exploit complementary resources and redesign strategies faster than firms can change. By networking, firms are said to get access to resources in a flexible way and typically by interacting with other firms non-hierarchically, directly and based on trust. Accounting and management control would appear counter-intuitive to such an arrangement. However, based on empirical observations from three horizontal networks where firms rally around projects, it appears that controls create durability and predictability. Self-regulation and orchestration mechanisms establish the network as a network enterprise seeking to develop and exploit complementarities in the diversity of network competencies and resources in different ways. Structural and functional approaches such as transactions cost economics are weak in explaining the ways in which relations are constructed and governed. We propose that accounting can be conceptualised as an actor helping to mediate, shape and construct inter-organisational relations through self-regulating and orchestration mechanisms. Self-regulating mechanisms allow interaction and exchange to occur unobtrusively, while orchestration mechanisms involve structuring these interactions. Both mechanisms are organised around various kinds of accounting—such as transfer prices and intellectual capital statements—and around the construction of segmentation in the network that provide it with a topology of centres and peripheries. Trust, it appears, is not a property of such a situation. Trust is a problematising devise. It is raised as a concern in the networks when trusting is absent.     

Managerial Opportunism? Evidence from Directors' and Officers' Insurance Purchases

We analyze a sample of 72 IPO firms that went public between 1992 and 1996 for which we have detailed proprietary information about the amount and cost of D&O liability insurance. If managers of IPO firms are exploiting superior inside information, we hypothesize that the amount of insurance coverage chosen will be related to the post-offering performance of the issuing firm's shares. Consistent with the hypothesis, we find a significant negative relation between the three-year post-IPO stock price performance and the insurance coverage purchased in conjunction with the IPO. One plausible interpretation is that, like insider securities transactions, D&O insurance decisions reveal opportunistic behavior by managers. This provides some motivation to argue that disclosure of the details of D&O insurance decisions, as is required in some other countries, is valuable.     

Stock price and systematic risk effects of discontinuation of corporate R&D programs

We extend the evidence on whether investors impound efficiently into stock prices new disclosures about corporate R&D programs. We find that firms that disclose the discontinuation of some of their R&D programs experience a significant negative announcement-period stock price response which is worse for growth stocks, for small-size firms, and for firms with low operating cash flow. We find no evidence that R&D discontinuing firms experience an event-induced change in their systematic risk. We find evidence of a one-year-long price reversal; however, it is not robust to controlling for possible risk dimensions for firms with R&D capital that the three-factor model does not capture. Evidently, investors' initial response at disclosures of discontinuation of corporate R&D programs is efficient.     

Coalition-Proof Allocations in Adverse-Selection Economies

We reexamine the canonical adverse selection insurance economy first studied by Rothschild and Stiglitz [1976]. We define blocking in a way that takes private information into account and define a coalition-proof correspondence as a mapping from coalitions to allocations with the property that allocations are in the correspondence, if and only if, they are not blocked by any other allocations in the correspondence for any subcoalition. We prove that the Miyazaki allocation—the Pareto-optimal allocation (possibly cross-subsidized) most preferred by low-risk agents—is coalition-proof.