马克思主义两部类经济增长关系模型探讨

文章首先在马克思主义关于生产资料优先增长理论的原假设条件下,通过数学证明生产资料优先增长理论是成立的;然后根据现代社会经济活动的实际抽象出新的假定务件,即将劳动主观条件变化引入到这一理论模型中,用数学推理的方法证明,在新的条件下两部类的经济增长关系会呈现出:第一部类增长快于第二部类、第二部类增长快于第一部类和两部类同步增长这三种不同情况.文章最后对这些结论进行了实证检验.     

马克思剩余价值理论的数理表达与创新

文章尝试从两个方面对马克思主义剩余价值理论进行探讨:一是依据马克思剩余价值基本理论抽理出这一理论的基本假定条件,并在这些假定条件下构建经典马克思剩余价值函数的基本模型,然后根据现代经济发展变化的现实,改变部分假定条件,尝试构建一个新约束条件下的剩余价值动态模型,这是现代马克思主义经济学创新的重要内容。二是探讨马克思主义剩余价值最大化生产模型与西方利润最大化的沟通与连接的问题,并通过数学推理证明两个模型在技术层面是完全可以相互沟通,这是现代马克思主义经济学繁荣发展的重要途径。     

马克思劳动价值论的数学原理

根据马克思的劳动价值理论,明确提出了价值函数的基本假定和基本公式;在此基础上,通过引入短期和长期生产函数,推导出相应的短期和长期价值函数;并借助短期和长期价值函数,具体分析了商品价值量在短期和长期中的变化规律,特别是详细讨论了劳动变化、资本变化、劳动和资本同时变化、劳动和资本同时和同比例变化以及生产函数变化对价值量的影响.     

透视我国高房价:一个马克思主义的视角

马克思的地租理论是一个综合性很强的模型,通过这一模型,能够系统地分析我国房地产行业的诸多重要问题,并提供一个对房地产价格的整体性认识。本文将马克思的地租理论模型化,并以马克思的原始模型为基础,进行了一定的改进,结合中国实际,分析了房地产市场的一些重要问题。分析表明,中国房地产价格调控最重要的措施在于金融政策和社会发展权利与住房的分割。     

论农村土地的多权分离

<正> 越来越多的迹象表明,土地产权关系模糊,是我国农村深化改革的重要障碍。一、土地多权分离的基本含义土地生产资料权利可以分离是一个客观现象,马克思在很早以前就发现了这一点。他说:“在劳动地租、产品地租、货币地租(只是产品地租的转化形式)这一切地租形式上,支付地租的人都被假定是土地的实际耕作者和占有者。他们的无酬剩余劳动直接落入土地所有者手里。”在这里,收取地租的是土地的所有者,而交付地租的农民是土地的实际耕作者和占有者,占有和所有是有严格区别的。列宁也说过,在国有的     

城市地租与房地产金融化积累:对大卫·哈维理论的探析

大卫·哈维的城市地租理论为理解房地产金融化的内生性及其背后的地租与土地所有权作用,提供了一种供给侧的分析视角.该理论系统诠释了马克思、恩格斯对城市地租的基本判断,指明房地产金融化积累是通过营造建成环境、刺激需求竞争、加强供给阶级垄断,从而创造并占有更多城市地租,并将其转化为利润.哈维区分了带来城市地租的资本循环与收入循环,揭示出房地产金融化积累的实质是对社会价值的再分配.这种价值转移是对劳动者财富的掠夺,加重了剥削;不仅可能引发金融危机,甚至还会进一步演变为经济社会危机.从中汲取理论启示,应当结合需求侧状况,着力推进房地产业供给侧结构性改革,才能防止我国房地产过度金融化,促进房地产业和经济社会的健康发展.     

社会主义城市地租问题

一、马克思关于资本主义及其以前地租的一般概念和基本范畴城市地租理论是政治经济学一个组成部分。它同整个政治经济学一样是阶级性很强的一门历史科学。资产阶级有为其阶级利益作辩护的资产阶级地租理论,无产阶级也有为本阶级和全体劳动人民谋解放和为社会主义建设而阐明其发展规律的马克思主义——社会主义观点的地租理论。马克思主义地租理论同马克思主义全部政治经济学理论一样,作为这个学科的创始者马克思,是在分析资本主义土地所有制关系的基础上,阐明资本主义制度下土地所有制关系和     

级差土地收入和价格剪刀差问题

马克思的地租理论不仅是解剖资本主义生产关系的锐利武器,而且对研究社会主义经济问题也具有重要的理论价值。本文试图根据马克思的地租理论,探讨我国社会主义制度下,级差土地收入存在的条件,以及级差土地收入的分配同工农产品价格剪刀差的关系问题。地租是土地所有权在经济上的体现。     

基于马克思地租理论的城市宏观级差地租研究#br#

当前我国城市土地市场区域分化明显，一二三四线城市级差地租差异明显，但传统城市地租理论研究的是同一城市内不同地块的级差地租，难以对这一状况进行解释。本文以马克思地租理论为指导，提出城市宏观级差地租概念，反映不同层级城市土地利用效益差异。在此基础上，构建城市宏观级差地租数理模型，测算２０个城市宏观级差地租量，分析我国城市宏观级差地租的演变规律，阐述城市宏观级差地租产生的原因和条件。     

互联网级差收益的理论与现实分析

互联网可被看作是一块虚拟的土地,从而可引入级差概念来区分不同等级的互联网收益,并将地租理论应用于互联网级差收益的理论分析之中.互联网收益级差性首先与互联网的定价直接相关,根据马克思主义的劳动价值理论,商品的价值是由劳动决定的.但是,互联网是一个由互联网技术链接和支撑的虚拟空间,由此承载的价值运行与实体经济载体承担的价值不同,前者是劳动的产品,后者与劳动的联系不大.为此,依附互联网虚拟空间获得的收益,也与依附实体经济载体获得的收益不同.     

农业地租的动态非均衡分析

资本有机构成和地权流转等因素一旦发生变化,马克思农业地租模型的结论就需要重新审视.在坚持劳动价值论和生产价格理论的基础上,运用动态非均衡分析工具,把剩余价值、资本有机构成、地权流转等变量内生化,试图建立起农业绝对地租与级差地租的动态非均衡一般分析框架.     

On the Estimation of Skill Coefficients for Heterogeneous Labor

Many economists have questioned the existence of a solution to the problem of reducing the value of skilled to unskilled labor, consistent with the assumptions of the labor theory of value. This article presents a model to account quantitatively for an important component of the reduction—the relation between skills and earnings. The model contains an educational attainment graph and a multivariate linear function, which maps time to labor content. We then compare the resulting relative skill coefficients to earnings relative to an unskilled labor reference. The predictions of the model substantially agree with the empirical data.     

非物质劳动条件下马克思的劳动价值论过时了吗——评哈特和奈格里基于“共同性”的价值理论

哈特和奈格里根据当代资本主义劳动范式的转型提出了非物质劳动概念,并认为在非物质劳动条件下马克思的劳动价值论需要做出修正,进而提出了基于"共同性"的价值理论。本文通过批判性地分析他们的观点,得出以下结论:(1)以"工作时间与生活时间的模糊"来质疑马克思的劳动价值论是对劳动价值论的误读,马克思的"社会必要劳动时间计量商品价值量"是抽象意义的"计量",是对本质的规定,而非具体意义的"计量",它由商品生产与交换的社会过程客观决定,不能以具体意义的"劳动时间难以测量"来否定价值的质的规定;(2)基于"共同性"的价值理论服务于哈特和奈格里主体政治的理论建构思路,他们对价值的解读具有很强的主体性特征,这种价值与其说是商品价值,不如说是政治价值;(3)哈特和奈格里的理论建构方法,早已脱离了辩证唯物主义和历史唯物主义,走向唯心主义。因此,当代资本主义的政治经济学批判仍应建立在马克思劳动价值论的基础之上。     

论经济学中的价值理论

价值理论在经济学中占有核心地位.本文简要回顾了经济思想史上价值理论的发展过程,梳理了几种主要价值理论——劳动价值论、生产要素价值论、边际效用价值论、均衡价格理论一之间的对立和传承关系,逐一分析了这几种价值理论的基本内容,重点关注每种理论的前提假设是否合理,逻辑推演过程是否正确,尽力避免意识形态角度的评断.主要结论是:马...     

Collective rent seeking and division of labor

The article analyzes division of labor within multiple groups engaged in collective rent seeking through time. Each agent seeks membership in one of two subgroups within each group, conveniently labelled a leader-subgroup and a follower-subgroup. The within-group generated payoffs are used as input in the between-group competition for the other groups' payoffs and an external rent. Within-group egalitarian allocation, but not relative-effort allocation, alleviates leadership struggle if the rent is large or the group is moderately more decisive than the other groups. The group employing a more egalitarian sharing rule than the other groups alleviates its leadership struggle more successfully. The Folk theorem is used to show the conditions under which leadership struggle gets intensified or alleviated.     

Collective rent seeking and division of labor

The article analyzes division of labor within multiple groups engaged in collective rent seeking through time. Each agent seeks membership in one of two subgroups within each group, conveniently labelled a leader-subgroup and a follower-subgroup. The within-group generated payoffs are used as input in the between-group competition for the other groups' payoffs and an external rent. Within-group egalitarian allocation, but not relative-effort allocation, alleviates leadership struggle if the rent is large or the group is moderately more decisive than the other groups. The group employing a more egalitarian sharing rule than the other groups alleviates its leadership struggle more successfully. The Folk theorem is used to show the conditions under which leadership struggle gets intensified or alleviated.     

Piketty’s Elasticity of Substitution: A Critique

This article examines Thomas Piketty’s explanation of a falling wage share. Piketty explains rising income inequality between labor and capital as a result of one parameter of a production function: an elasticity of substitution, σ, between labor and capital greater than one. This article reviews Piketty’s elasticity argument, which relies on a non-standard definition of capital. In light of the theory of land rent, it discusses why the non-standard capital definition is a measure of wealth, not capital and is problematic for estimating elasticities. It then presents simple long-run estimates of σ in constant elasticity of substitution functions for Piketty’s data as well as for a subset of his capital measure that comes closer to the standard definition of productive capital. The estimation results cast doubt on Piketty’s hypothesis that σ is greater than one.     

Unions: Rent Creators or Extractors?*

This paper proposes a model of workplace‐specific unions that integrates two views of what unions do. One view holds that unions mainly engage in rent extraction. Another view holds that unions mainly engage in rent creation by providing agency services that increase workplace productivity. We demonstrate that the choice between the two activities is systematically related to the economic and regulatory environment in which the union operates. Product market competition encourages rent creation, while labor market deregulation encourages rent extraction. Moreover, we provide a rationale for why firms may want to subsidize unions.     

DO TAX CUTS ENCOURAGE RENT SEEKING BY TOP CORPORATE EXECUTIVES? THEORY AND EVIDENCE

This paper explores the role of tax policy in shaping incentives for executive effort (labor supply) and rent seeking within the firm. We develop a theoretical model that distinguishes between effort and rent‐seeking responses to income taxes, and provides a framework to estimate a lower bound for the rent‐seeking response. Using executive compensation and governance data, we find that rent seeking represents an important component of the response to changes in tax rates, especially among executives in firms with the worst corporate governance. (JEL D31, G30, H21)     

SEEKING RENT IN THE INFORMAL SECTOR

Rent seeking within the vast informal segment of the developing world is a relatively under‐explored topic in the interface of labor market policies and public economics. Moreover, how rent seeking and corruption within the informal segment gets affected by economic reforms targeted for the formal sector is rarely discussed in the literature. This paper fills the gap. We identify conditions under which economic reform in the formal segment will increase the rate of corruption or rent seeking in the informal sector and raise the pay‐off for those involved in rent‐seeking activities. When the formal sector contracts due to reforms, rent seeking in the informal sector may increase and lower the level of welfare unconditionally. Economic reforms may increase corruption instead of reducing it, unlike standard conjectures.