大型煤炭企业的交易规制结构研究

笔者通过分析大型煤炭企业交易规制结构演进的四个阶段和目前煤炭交易环境与存在问题,运用交易费用理论和企业网络理论,提出适合大型煤炭企业市场环境的交易机制模式--竞标交易和双边交易组合模式,并提出竞标交易与双边交易价格互动策略.     

平台"二选一"反垄断规制的挑战与应对

"二选一"属于滥用市场支配地位行为类型中的限定交易,在滥用市场支配地位规制框架下,面临诸多分析与挑战.特别是在双边市场环境下,相关市场界定、市场支配地位认定和反竞争效果评估都需要考虑新的因素,并且需要对现有的分析工具进行革新.与在传统行业中分析限定交易不同,平台的诸多特点要求对限定交易的竞争分析方法进行改进,包括增加新的考虑因素如网络效应、动态创新、"大数据"等,它们都直接影响限定交易的竞争效果.     

交易机制的博弈演化理论综述

以交易双方市场地位的变迁为线索,系统地梳理了国外从上世纪60年代初至今半个多世纪以来使用博弈论方法研究市场交易机制的文献,按照交易双方所处的市场地位不同,将市场交易的博弈机制理论划分为以下四种:拍卖机制、谈判机制、双向拍卖机制、逆向拍卖机制理论.阐述了相关文章的研究假设、研究思路和主要研究结论.在中国市场不断国际化的进程中,这对于提高市场主体参与市场博弈的效率、有效地建设社会主义市场经济体制都具有重要的参考价值.     

基于电力交易对象选择的双边合约交易机制研究

针对电力双边市场中交易对象不唯一的现象,文章提出了合作博弈论下基于交易伙伴选择的双边交易及电价形成机制,分析了一对多和多对多双边电力市场中的独立及交叉合约交易。文中运用核仁法模拟上述双边电力交易过程,分配交易利润,再由价格利润公式算出交易电价。用该方法来模拟电力双边交易中赋予市场参与者以选择交易对象的权利,还通过缩短交易时间减少了交易风险和交易成本。最后用算例对所提出的模型进行了验证。     

双边市场的定价策略及反垄断问题研究

双边市场理论是近年来产业组织研究的热点问题,本文在分析双边市场的特征及类型的基础上,研究了垄断交易平台和竞争性交易平台的定价策略、定价的影响因素及影响机理.结论表明,双边市场的定价策略与单边市场迥然不同,双边用户的价格结构并不反映其成本结构.最后对双边市场"特殊性"所带来的反垄断问题进行了探讨,由此得出一些结论和公共政策启示.     

房地产网络平台范围界定及市场细分研究

随着网络经济时代的来临,依托互联网和新兴技术而形成的新沟通方式、交易方式和管理模式不断涌现,房地产网络平台应运而生.房地产网络平台为双边用户搭建了一个相互作用的平台,其在解决信息不对称问题、降低交易费用、提升交易效率方面显示出巨大优势,但针对房地产网络平台的范围界定及市场细分的研究却很少.本文界定了房地产网络平台的含义及涉及的市场范围,进而分析了其具有的双边市场特征.根据业务类型不同,将房地产网络平台市场细分为土地交易网络服务平台、招投标服务网络平台、新房交易服务网络平台、二手房交易服务网络平台、装修服务网络平台和社区服务网络平台,以期为企业选择适当的目标市场提供参考依据.     

双边市场中平台企业的运作机制研究评述

双边市场以各种新经济产业形式积极影响着商业舞台,双边市场的管理方"平台企业"与传统产业下的企业运作机制存在较大差异。本文以双边市场的重要性和发展为出发点,解释了双边市场产业与传统市场产业在客户间交叉网络效应、倾斜性定价和多产品策略方面的差异,介绍了客户营销管理、竞争策略、市场监管者的管制等运作机制的研究进展,从客户、竞争对手、所有者、投资者和监管者及研究方法等方面提出未来的研究重点和领域。     

基于双边市场理论的银行卡市场研究

随着新兴市场的兴起和网络外部性的不断显现,双边市场理论成为众多学者研究的重点理论之一。双边市场理论能够较好地解释电信、中介机构、网络购物平台等众多市场特征。银行卡市场能够符合双边市场定义的特征,是较为典型的双边市场。通过梳理双边市场理论研究成果,同时确定银行卡市场的范围,利用双边市场理论对银行卡市场进行分析,重点对银行卡市场的定价策略进行分析,并提出相应的建议,以期推动银行卡产业的健康、持续发展。     

我国大学城向高等教育产业集群演变的机理

根据超边际分析方法,我国大学城与高新科技园存在四种交易结构,这四种结构是逐渐演进的。产品市场的交易效率与产品的消费弹性、劳动力的产出弹性、中间产品劳动市场的交易效率、最终产品劳动市场的交易效率正相关,当产品市场的交易效率达到一定的极限,我国大学城转化为高等教育产业集群。要使产品市场的交易效率达到一定的极限,需要一些对策。     

共享经济的双边市场特征研究——来自网贷之家的经验证据

双边市场理论是研究共享经济的基础理论之一。现有理论文献认为在共享经济市场中,平台企业组织供需双方进行交易,表现出双边市场特征。该文选取网络借贷这一共享经济模式,利用网贷之家41家平台6个月的面板数据对共享经济的网络外部性特征进行实证研究。结论表明:共享经济平台双边用户呈现正的交叉网络外部性和负的自网络外部性,且外部性具有非线性关系的双边市场特征。该研究为共享经济平台治理提供了经验支持,认为应该合理利用共享经济具有的正的交叉外部性,设计良好的治理机制以减少其负的自网络外部性,从而促进共享经济平台有序健康发展。     

Optimal location in two-sided markets

As the network externality in an industrial organization has been widely discussed in recent years, many researchers in the field have noted a particular type of market, the so-called two-sided market. In a two-sided market, two or more groups of agents such as buyers and sellers interact while exerting cross-group externalities upon each other. They interact with each other via some sort of medium, called the “platform” of interaction. This paper integrates the concept of two-sided markets into the optimal location problem for two platform providers. We show that when the two groups of customers' cross-side network externalities are equal, the duopoly platforms will agglomerate at the market center with no undercutting. However, disparate conditions exist under which the duopoly platforms will stay apart at the market endpoints, or agglomerate at either endpoint, with no undercutting.     

Two-sided Markets,Competitive Bottlenecks and Exclusive Contracts

We provide a framework for analyzing two-sided markets that allows for different degrees of product differentiation on each side of the market. When platforms are viewed as homogenous by sellers but heterogeneous by buyers, we show that “competitive bottlenecks” arise endogenously. In equilibrium, platforms do not compete directly for sellers, instead choosing to compete indirectly by subsidizing buyers to join. Sellers are left with none of the gains from trade. Despite this, it is sellers who choose to purchase from multiple platforms (multihome). Finally, the role of exclusive contracts to prevent multihoming is explored. We are very grateful to Jose Miguel Abito for research assistance, and to the editor and a referee for helpful comments.     

PLATFORM COMPETITION WITH ENDOGENOUS HOMING

We consider two-sided markets in which consumers and firms endogenously determine whether they single-home, multi-home, or exit the market. We find that the competitive bottleneck allocation in which consumers single-home and firms multi-home is always an equilibrium. In addition, we find equilibria with multi-homing and single-homing on each side of the market. However, unlike the standard pricing result where the side that multi-homes faces higher prices, we find that lower prices coincide with multi-homing: agents find multi-homing more attractive when faced with lower prices. We also show that endogenous homing can induce straddle pricing which deters price undercutting between platforms.     

展览产品定价模型及价格影响因素研究——基于双边市场理论视角

本文借鉴近年来兴起的双边市场理论对展览产品的定价模型及影响因素进行了理论研究。本文指出，展览市场是典型的双边市场，具有明显的网络外部性。本文通过建立垄断和竞争两种模型研究了展览产品的定价，并指出参展商和观众的需求价格弹性、一方消费者给另一方消费者带来的网络外部性、展览市场的竞争以及产品差异化都是影响展览产品定价的主要因素。     

供应商规模、产品差异与通道费定价策略

传统理论对通道费的解释是大型零售商相对于供应商所具有的市场势力,本文借助双边市场的分析框架,将大型零售商视为一个为供应商和消费者提供交易服务的平台厂商,通过向双方分别收取通道费和零售加价来获得利润。用户数量和交叉网络外部性是影响大型零售商利润和通道费定价策略的重要因素,产品差异对交叉网络外部性的强弱有重要影响,通道费的高低则与供应商的规模与市场份额密切关系。     

反垄断法总则与双边市场理论的铆合适用--以互联网医药行业为例

互联网医药行业中,私人经济与公共利益交叉程度高,同时涉及经济垄断和行政垄断领域,部分适用通过市场机制配置资源的原则。其涉及市场机制的部分,可能会触动反垄断调查。医药实体行为或业务的性质,是界定该行为或业务是否适用市场机制的标准,同时也是判断《反垄断法》适用性的标准。互联网平台经济具有双边市场的特性,会在相关市场的界定和竞争分析的路径方面与传统医药行业案件不同。另一方面,并非所有医药行业与互联网平台的结合都适用双边市场理论,决定双边市场理论适用性的标准是医药实体与互联网平台之间的相互关系。在处理互联网医药行业垄断案件时,需正确区分两个关系:市场机制与非市场机制的关系、医药实体与互联网平台的关系。     

Median stable matching for markets with wages

We define the median stable matching for two-sided matching markets with wages and prove constructively that it exists.     

Two-sided competition with vertical differentiation

This paper studies duopoly in which two-sided platforms compete in differentiated products in a two-sided market. Direct competition on both sides leads to results that depart from much of the current literature. Under some conditions the unique equilibrium in pure strategies can be computed. It features discounts on one side and muted differentiation as the cross-market externality intensifies competition. Less standard, that equilibrium fails to exist when the externality is too powerful (that side becomes too lucrative). A mixed-strategy equilibrium always exists and is characterized. These results are robust to variations in the extensive form. The model may find applications in the media, internet trading platforms, search engine competition, social media or even health insurance (HMO/PPO).     

Paths to stability for matching markets with couples

We study two-sided matching markets with couples and show that for a natural preference domain for couples, the domain of weakly responsive preferences, stable outcomes can always be reached by means of decentralized decision making. Starting from an arbitrary matching, we construct a path of matchings obtained from ‘satisfying’ blocking coalitions that yields a stable matching. Hence, we establish a generalization of Roth and Vande Vate's [Roth, A.E., Vande Vate, J.H., 1990. Random paths to stability in two-sided matching. Econometrica 58, 1475–1480] result on path convergence to stability for decentralized singles markets.Furthermore, we show that when stable matchings exist, but preferences are not weakly responsive, for some initial matchings there may not exist any path obtained from ‘satisfying’ blocking coalitions that yields a stable matching.     

基于双边市场框架的软件产业若干问题研究

本文应用双边市场框架,选取市场中应用软件的均衡种类为落脚点,指出相比社会最优,商业专用操作系统厂商吸引了过少的应用开发商;而开放源操作系统同样无法达到社会最优,相比商业专用情形,不一定总能改善市场中提供的应用软件种类,而是取决于应用软件市场特征;同时,研究还揭示了,操作系统应用程序接口的设计是平台厂商降低应用软件开发成本、协调双边市场需求的有效手段;最后,探索性地阐明了一体化关键性应用软件生产是平台厂商营建商业生态系统的有效途径。