Information asymmetry and reentry

We model a reputation game, in which a sequence of short-run players chooses if to interact with a long-run player. Although beliefs may be identical, choices may be different, as not-interacting can lead the long-run player to improve on effort.     

When is reputation bad?

In traditional reputation models, the ability to build a reputation is good for the long-run player. In [Ely, J., Valimaki, J., 2003. Bad reputation. NAJ Econ. 4, 2; http://www.najecon.org/v4.htm. Quart. J. Econ. 118 (2003) 785–814], Ely and Valimaki give an example in which reputation is unambiguously bad. This paper characterizes a class of games in which that insight holds. The key to bad reputation is that participation is optional for the short-run players, and that every action of the long-run player that makes the short-run players want to participate has a chance of being interpreted as a signal that the long-run player is “bad.” We allow a broad set of commitment types, allowing many types, including the “Stackelberg type” used to prove positive results on reputation. Although reputation need not be bad if the probability of the Stackelberg type is too high, the relative probability of the Stackelberg type can be high when all commitment types are unlikely.     

Alternating-Offer Bargaining with Two-Sided Incomplete Information

I study alternating-offer bargaining games with two-sided incomplete information about the players' discount rates. For both perfect Bayesian equilibrium and a rationalizability-style notion, I characterize the set of expected payoffs which may arise in the game. I also construct bounds on agreements that may be made. The set of expected payoffs is easy to compute and incorporate into applied models. My main result is a full characterization of the set of perfect Bayesian equilibrium payoffs for games in which the distribution over the players' discount rates is of wide support, yet is in a weak sense close to a point mass distribution. I prove a lopsided convergence result: each player cannot gain from a slight chance that she is a strong type, but the player can suffer greatly if there is a slight chance that she is a weak type.     

Consumption externalities, production externalities, and efficient capital accumulation under time non-separable preferences

The effects of consumption and production externalities on economic performance under time non-separable preferences are examined both theoretically and numerically. We show that a consumption externality alone has long-run distortionary effects if and only if labor is supplied elastically. With fixed labor supply, it has only transitional distortionary effects. Production externalities always generate long-run distortions, irrespective of labor supply. The optimal tax structure to correct for the distortions is characterized. We compare the implications of this model with those obtained when the consumption externality is contemporaneous. While some of the long-run effects are robust, there are also important qualitative and quantitative differences, particularly along transitional paths.     

DECENTRALIZED ONE-TO-MANY BARGAINING

We study a one-to-many bargaining model in which one active player bargains with every passive player on how to share the surplus of a joint project. The order of bargaining is not fixed and the active player decides whom to bargain with in each period. Our model admits a rich set of equilibria and we identify the upper and lower bounds of equilibrium payoffs. We also examine whether two natural ordering protocols often assumed in existing studies can sustain endogenously. Although the queuing protocol may indeed arise in an equilibrium, the rotating protocol is in general not self-enforcing.     

Impact of terrorism on tourism in Turkey: empirical evidence from Turkey

This article aims at investigating the causal impact of terrorist attacks on the tourism industry in Turkey based on the Autoregressive Distributed Lag (ARDL) bounds testing procedure for the period between 1986 and 2006. The ARDL bounds test reveals that tourism is in a long-run equilibrium level relationship with terrorism. The evidence obtained from the long-run and short-run parameter estimates indicates the existence of a negative causal effect of terrorism on tourism.     

Monetary policy and dividend growth in Germany: long-run structural modelling versus bounds testing approach

This study examines the long-run relationship between monetary policy and dividend growth in Germany. For this purpose, cointegration is tested for between both variables in the period 1974 to 2003. However, problems related to spurious regression arise from the mixed order of integration of the series used, from mutual causation between the variables and from the lack of a long-run relationship among the variables of the model. These problems are addressed by applying the bounds testing approach to cointegration in addition to a more standard long-run structural modelling approach. In principle, both procedures are capable of dealing with the controversial issue of the exogeneity of monetary policy vis-à-vis dividend growth. However, the structural modelling approach still leaves a certain degree of uncertainty about the integration properties of the interest rate and the dividend growth. Hence, one feels legitimized to refer to the bounds testing procedure and to conclude that in the longer term short-term rates drive stock returns but not vice versa.     

Revisiting the US money demand function: an application of the Lagrange multiplier structural break unit root test and the bounds test for a long-run relationship

In this article, we examine the issue of a levels relationship and stability of the US money demand function over the period 1959:01 to 2004:02. We use the Lagrange multiplier structural break unit root test and the bounds testing approach to a long-run relationship in levels of the variables, namely real money demand, nominal interest rate and real income. We find greater evidence for a long-run relationship in levels and stability of the US money demand function when we use M2 as a proxy for money demand. However, we find little evidence for a long-run relationship between M1 and M2 with their determinants for the recent period, spanning the last decade or so.     

Signaling in a Rent‐Seeking Contest with One‐Sided Asymmetric Information

We consider a two‐player rent‐seeking Tullock contest where one player has private information about his valuation of the prize, which can be high or low. This player can send a costly signal to his opponent, i.e., he can commit to reduce the prize either by some absolute amount of money or proportionally, conditional on winning it. We show that both kinds of signaling imply completely opposite results for separating equilibria, both in terms of conditions for existence and the type of player who sends the costly signal.     

PUBLIC EDUCATION EXPENDITURES, HUMAN CAPITAL INVESTMENT AND INTERGENERATIONAL MOBILITY: A TWO-STAGE EDUCATION MODEL

We show in this paper that, depending on the initial distribution of material wealth and that of individuals' abilities, economies converge in the long run towards different proportions of the skilled workforce and different levels of average wealth. We also show that the growth process raises net economic mobility, the long-run proportion of the skilled population and the long-run levels of wealth held by both rich and poor dynasties. Unless the income tax rate is too high, the increase in total public funds is associated, in the long run, with higher net mobility, a larger fraction of the skilled workers and higher levels of wealth of all the dynasties. In addition, the reallocation of public expenditures from basic to advanced education can result in lower mobility, a lower long-run size of the skilled workforce, and a lower long-run level of wealth held by rich dynasties, if the transfer of resources comes at the expense of excessively lowering the quality of education at the basic schooling level.     

Can micro-credit bring development?

We examine the long-run effects of micro-credit on development in an occupational choice model similar to Banerjee and Newman (JPE, 1993). Micro-credit is modeled as a pure improvement in the credit market that opens up self-employment options to some agents who otherwise could only work for wages or subsist. Micro-credit can either raise or lower long-run GDP, since it can lower use of both subsistence and full-scale industrial technologies. It typically lowers long-run inequality and poverty, by making subsistence payoffs less widespread. Thus, an equity-efficiency tradeoff may be involved in the promotion of micro-credit. However, in a worst case scenario, micro-credit has purely negative long-run effects. The key to micro-credit's long-run effects is found to be the “graduation rate”, defined as the rate at which the self-employed build up enough wealth to start full-scale firms. We distinguish between two avenues for graduation: “winner” graduation (of those who earn above-average returns in self-employment) and “saver” graduation (due to gradual accumulation of average returns in self-employment). Long-run development is not attainable via micro-credit if “winner” graduation is the sole avenue for graduation. In contrast, if the saving rate and self-employment returns of the average micro-borrower are jointly high enough, then micro-credit can bring an economy from stagnation to full development through “saver” graduation. Thus the lasting effects of micro-credit may partially depend on simultaneous facilitation of micro-saving. Eventual graduation of the average borrower, rather than indefinite retention, should be the goal of micro-banks if micro-credit is to be a stepping stone to broad-based development rather than at best an anti-poverty tool.     

Financial market development and trade openness: evidence from emerging economies

International trade is said to be the engine of economic growth. Despite an enormous effort to explain this phenomenon, the relationship between financial market development and trade openness and integration into the world economy is still an enigma. This article investigates the relationship between financial market development and trade openness. To do this, we develop a long-run and short-run model (a bounds testing approach to cointegration) for 18 emerging economies over the period 1980 to 2011. Estimates from all models show that financial market development, including both the stock market and the banking sector, has significant effect on trade openness in both short-run and long-run phenomena in the majority of countries. Despite many similarities among emerging economies, additional evidence suggests that the link between either stock market development or banking sector development with trade openness works via each country’s specific structure.     

Remittances and output in Bangladesh: an ARDL bounds testing approach to cointegration

Although the relationship between remittances and output is still inconclusive in literature, most studies find that remittances have a positive effect on output in the long run. Contrary to this conventional direction of causality from remittances to output, our study finds that output alone determined long-run movements in remittances in a positive direction in the Bangladesh economy over the last 35 years from 1976 to 2010. We use the autoregressive distributive lag (ARDL) bounds testing approach to cointegration to explore this long-run relationship. Surprisingly, remittances do not appear to be a long-run forcing variable to the explanation of Bangladesh’s output over the same period. While examining the channels of this output–remittance mechanism remains an area of research for the future, we hypothesize that the rise in remittances in response to increased income occurs through higher import demand and greater investment opportunities. This finding implies that Bangladeshi policymakers can influence remittances through national output in the long run.     

On the determinants of long-run inflation uncertainty: Evidence from a panel of 17 developed economies

Based on a cross section of 17 advanced economies and data for the period 1975 to 2015, we examine how the interaction between monetary policy and macroeconomic conditions affects inflation uncertainty in the long-term. We construct a proxy for the unobservable inflation uncertainty based on the slowly evolving long-term variance component of inflation from a Spline-GARCH model (Engle and Rangel, 2008). We show that long-run inflation uncertainty is high if an inflation-tolerant central bank governor is in power during a period of high inflation, if the policy rate is below the one that is prescribed by the Taylor rule and during times of heightened stock and exchange rate volatility.     

Exchange rate volatility and its impact on domestic investment

The relationship between exchange rate uncertainty and domestic investment has attracted some attention in macro literature. Previous studies that investigated the relation concentrated on firm level data with mixed results. In this paper we argue that the relationship applies equally at the aggregate. We assess the short-run and long-run effects of exchange rate volatility on domestic investment in each of the 36 countries in our sample using time-series data. The application of the bounds testing approach indicates that exchange rate volatility has significant short-run effects on domestic investment in 27 countries. The short-run effects are translated into the long-run only in 12 countries.     

A note on implicit inventory behavior in cyclical macroeconomic models with excess demand

The paper is concerned with dynamic models that allow for non-zero excess demand on goods markets but abstain from considering possible feedback effects of stock-piling. That is, inventories are only implicitly determined. Consistency requires that they do not fall below zero and, relative to output, do not grow beyond all bounds. With respect to periodic motions, conditions for consistency as well as for inconsistency are derived. It is indicated that a priori, in particular in the presence of long-run growth, inconsistency may not be an exception.     

Arms Races and Negotiations

Two players simultaneously decide whether or not to acquire new weapons in an arms race game. Each player's type determines his propensity to arm. Types are private information, and are independently drawn from a continuous distribution. With probability close to one, the best outcome for each player is for neither to acquire new weapons (although each prefers to acquire new weapons if he thinks the opponent will). There is a small probability that a player is a dominant strategy type who always prefers to acquire new weapons. We find conditions under which the unique Bayesian–Nash equilibrium involves an arms race with probability one. However, if the probability that a player is a dominant strategy type is sufficiently small, then there is an equilibrium of the cheap-talk extension of the game where the probability of an arms race is close to zero.     

The J-curve dynamics of Turkey: an application of ARDL model

This article seeks an empirical evidence for the existence of the J-curve phenomenon both in the short-run and long-run for Turkey over the period 1980-2005. The bounds testing cointegration approach is employed to estimate the trade balance model. An augmented form of Granger causality analysis is implemented between trade balance, real effective exchange rates, foreign income and domestic income. The stability of the short-run as well as long-run coefficients in the trade balance model is tested too. The empirical results that the J-curve phenomenon is supported only in the short-run. Whilst causality tests reveal mix results, the parameter stability tests seem to be inconclusive.     

Information in conflicts

We consider two-player contests for a prize of common but uncertain value. For settings where one player knows the value of the prize, while the other only knows its prior distribution, we give conditions for when the uninformed agent is ex ante strictly more likely to win the prize than is the informed agent. In the special case of a lottery contest, equilibrium expenditures are lower under asymmetric information than if either both agents are informed or neither agent is informed.     

Reputation with observed actions

Summary A single long-run player plays a fixed stage game (simultaneous orsequential move) against an infinite sequence of short-run opponents that play only once but can observe all past realized actions. Assuming that the probability distributions over types of long and short-run players have full support, we show that the long-run player can always establish a reputation for theStackelberg strategy and is therefore guaranteed almost his Stackelberg payoff in all Nash equilibria of the repeated game.The financial support of the National Science Foundation, Grant SES 90-7999, and of Consiglio Nazionale delle Ricerche is gratefully acknowledged. I wish to thank David Levine, Wolfgang Pesendorfer and Seminar Participants at UCLA, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid and University of Naples for useful discussions and suggestions.